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ABSTRACT 
 
 Textbooks are a significant element of the social studies curriculum and teacher 
pedagogical choice (Apple, 2004; Apple & Christian-Smith, 1991). Students‘ views of 
American history are dramatically affected by the textbook narratives to which they are 
exposed, and teachers often tilt their curricular choices based on the textbooks available 
to them (Luke, 2006; Schug, Western & Enochs, 1997). The history of our nation‘s 
armed conflicts is often presented, through our textbooks and our pedagogy, as a history 
of reluctant violence, which promotes a particular moral agenda that exerts control over 
our students‘ future beliefs and decisions. This is particularly important with regard to 
our textbook depictions of the U.S. Civil War, which holds a curricular status as a 
necessary and moral conflict. The ―just war‖ doctrine is a philosophical framework which 
allows individuals to consider the ethical conditions under which war may be morally 
permissible, and it provides our students with an opportunity to engage in critical 
thinking regarding our nation‘s historical policies. The utility of the ―just war‖ doctrine in 
American history classrooms is a topic that is largely unexplored in social science 
education. Therefore, using a critical analysis methodology that evaluates textbook 
depictions of the U.S. Civil War from a ―just war‖ doctrinal perspective, the ensuing 
study will contribute to the research base in social science education by elaborating a 
framework from which teachers may approach the moral realities of war with their 
students.
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Now tell us what 'twas all about,"  
Young Peterkin, he cries;  
And little Wilhelmine looks up  
With wonder-waiting eyes;  
"Now tell us all about the war,  
And what they fought each other for."  
 
"With fire and sword the country round  
Was wasted far and wide,  
And many a childing mother then,  
And new-born baby died;  
But things like that, you know, must be  
At every famous victory.  
 
"They said it was a shocking sight  
After the field was won;  
For many thousand bodies here  
Lay rotting in the sun;  
But things like that, you know, must be  
After a famous victory.  
 
"And everybody praised the Duke  
Who this great fight did win."  
"But what good came of it at last?"  
Quoth little Peterkin.  
"Why, that I cannot tell," said he,  
"But 'twas a famous victory."  
 
Robert Southey, ―The Battle of Blenheim,‖ 1805 
 
 
 
Either war is finished or we are. 
Herman Wouk, War and Remembrance
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE INTRODUCTION 
 
There had to be something somewhere in all of them, in all of us that loved it. 
Some dark, aggressive, masochistic side of us, racial perhaps, that makes us want 
to spray our blood in the air, throw our blood away, for some damned misbegotten 
ideal or other. Whether the idea is morally right or wrong makes no difference so 
long as the desire to fight for it remains in us. Fanatics willing to die for ideals. It 
was territory, back when we were animals. Now that we have evolved into higher 
beings and learned to talk, territoriality has moved up a step higher with us, and 
become ideals. We like it. Cynical as it sounds, one is about led to believe that 
only the defeated and the dead really hate war. And of course, as we all know, 
they do not count. 
James Jones, WWII, 1975 
 
The Second Battle of Bull Run was fought near Manassas, Virginia, from August 
28-30, 1862, between forces of the Confederate States of America and the Union in the 
second year of the U.S. Civil War. There were famous names involved—on the Southern 
side, mainstays like Robert E. Lee and Thomas J. ―Stonewall‖ Jackson; for the North, 
lesser luminaries such George McClellan, John Pope and Irwin McDowell. Compared to 
other engagements of the Civil War, it was not a particular distinguished battle—no 
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major territory was won or lost, no crucial towns seized or conceded, no changes on 
either side precipitated by the battle‘s outcome (other than the cashiering of another 
Union general after a loss—this time, General Pope). After the battle, General Alpheus S. 
Williams said this about its outcome: ―A splendid army almost demoralized, millions of 
public property given up or destroyed, thousands of lives of our best men sacrificed for 
no purpose‖ (as cited in Hennessey, 1993).  
The American Vision (Appleby, Brinkley, Broussard, McPherson, & Ritchie, 
2005) is a U.S. history secondary-level textbook, written by several eminent historians, 
including Dr. Joyce Appleby of UCLA. It is published by Glencoe, a division of 
McGraw-Hill, one of the four large publishing companies—Pearson, Reed Elsevier, and 
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt are the other three—that publish a variety of textbooks, for all 
grade levels and practically all subjects (Sewall, 2005). This textbook enjoys wide usage 
across the nation, including many Florida school districts (Florida School Book 
Depository, 2008). The American Vision has this to say about the Second Battle of Bull 
Run:  
As McClellan‘s troops withdrew, Lee decided to attack the Union forces 
defending Washington. The maneuvers by the two sides led to another battle at 
Bull Run, near Manassas Junction—the site of the first major battle of the war. 
Again, the South forced the North to retreat, leaving the Confederate forces only 
20 miles (32 km) from Washington. (p. 362) 
The textbook narrative moves then in a longer discussion of the Battle of 
Antietam, considered by most historians to be of greater importance than Second Bull 
Run, a battle with over twenty-three thousand casualties on both sides. 
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  One such victim was James Palmer, a young man from the Santee region of 
South Carolina. Upon learning his fate, his sister, Sarah, found herself experiencing a 
degree of grief for which she was unprepared—to their sister, Harriet, she wrote, ―I can‘t 
realize that I am never to see that dear boy again [.]‖ The loss of a loved one, in a battle 
far from home, with little hope of explanation or even the recovery of his remains, was a 
cruelty far removed from the general understanding of death in the nineteenth century. 
―We have never known what death was before,‖ Sarah wrote to her sister (Faust, 2008, p. 
144).  
 The depiction of the Second Battle of Bull Run found in The American Vision is 
free of such human costs or considerations. It is a factual, dispassionate account of a 
minor battle in the midst of a larger, more important narrative, the Civil War. In that 
account, however, The American Vision does what most textbooks do—it presents a 
single, unifying picture of American history, generally free from depictions of the 
inherent brutality and cruelty of war.  
 
Background Information 
 
Death and destruction are endemic to wars, but Americans, throughout our 
history, have conceptualized our participation in war as a matter of inevitability. At many 
points in American history, political leaders have cast a decision to enter into armed 
conflict as a reluctant choice, one taken only after all other options have been exhausted. 
For example, in his war message to Congress prior to the War of 1812, James Madison 
affirmed that the U.S. had ―exhausted remonstrances and expostulations, and that no 
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proof might be wanting of their conciliatory dispositions‖; and yet, with Great Britain‘s 
continuing bellicosity, war was now unavoidable (Madison, 1995). Abraham Lincoln, 
before a special session of Congress on July 4, 1861, claimed that the declaration of war 
against the seceding Southern states was a policy ―to the exhaustion of all peaceful 
measures, before a resort to any stronger ones‖ (McPherson, 1988, p. 309). In 1898, 
William McKinley prepared the nation for war with Spain over Cuba by asserting that ―I 
have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our 
doors‖ (McKinley, n.d.). Prior to overt military action in Vietnam (a conflict in which the 
U.S. faced no imminent territorial threat), President Lyndon Johnson justified military 
intervention after the Gulf of Tonkin incident by avowing ―America keeps her word…we 
must and shall honor our commitments‖ (Johnson, 2008). In March 2003, President 
George H.W. Bush addressed the nation and provided a similar justification for the use of 
American military force: ―The danger is clear…War has no certainty, except the certainty 
of sacrifice. Yet, the only way to reduce the harm and duration of war is to apply the full 
force and might of our military, and we are prepared to do so… Free nations have a duty 
to defend our people by uniting against the violent‖ (Public Papers of the Presidents of 
the United States: George W. Bush, 2003). It is certainly not unique among nations to 
adopt a voice of moral clarity when pursuing a violent course of action, yet America 
seems particularly to require an overt declaration of our own reluctant, yet determined, 
motives—defense, not aggression, and bloodshed only when unavoidable. 
Americans can debate the political and moral implications of our nation‘s 
decisions to go to war. In our collective memory, though, we have conceptualized war as 
a grim, but often necessary event, which is forced upon us by external contingencies. 
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Moreover, our textbooks seem to indicate a belief that our wars are always fought on 
moral high ground—that our decisions to go to war are made both in the best interests of 
the American nation and in defense of our national principles. This is certainly debatable, 
but our textbooks rarely give students the tools or opportunities to critically analyze such 
issues. Zinn (1967), for example, claims that the U.S. foreign policy of containment, 
which led to the conflict in Vietnam, was in fact suppressive of social movements around 
the world, primarily in its support of non-communist dictatorships in Central and South 
America, the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia. This interpretation is open for discussion, but 
not in our school textbooks. 
 
Rationale for Study 
Wars in American history are generally presented as inevitabilities which are non-
negotiable; that is to say, Americans do not ―choose‖ to go to war, but are instead forced 
into conflict. While the cost of war in human lives is generally presented in terms of the 
number of military dead, there is little to no discussion of the economic costs of losing so 
many fathers and sons, the emotional damage inflicted on families and children, or the 
continuing agonies of those that survive. Wars are presented as social and political 
hurricanes, which we are incapable of avoiding or nudging off-course; and the costs, 
while tragic, are necessary and noble.  
Of greater concern is the possibility that our textbooks may not provide our 
students with the critical skills necessary to make wars less common and more avoidable. 
Watkins (2008) points out that one significant goal of history instruction should be ―to 
inform and empower students to prevent such atrocities and discrimination from happening 
again‖ (p. 2). Our textbooks rarely lead our students to consider peace as a viable option 
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in historical circumstance. Our textbooks, whether they are used little or often, represent 
the knowledge we wish our children to know—more than that, they represent the value 
structure we wish our children to adopt. Krug (1963) asserts that ―what young people 
read about the history of their country… affects the degree of their commitment to 
international peace and understanding‖ (p. 425). The conceptualizations of war that our 
textbooks impress upon our students may be diluting this commitment. Our textbooks 
avoid the questions Nel Noddings (2006) raised in her book Critical Lessons: ―What 
makes war so exciting? Why are so many people drawn to it? And why do educators 
accept texts and curricula that fail to address the psychology of war‖ (p. 5)? 
 
Purpose Statement 
This study is an analysis of U.S. history secondary-level textbooks, emphasizing how 
the U.S. Civil War is conceptualized and presented. I chose the Civil War because, 
despite its status as the most destructive war in U.S. history (in terms of lives lost), it has 
achieved a status in most history texts as a historical necessity, a war that had to be 
fought.  
 I analyzed textbook depictions of the causes, consequences, and conduct of this war 
in light of the ―just war‖ doctrine, a philosophical framework that allows for the moral 
justification of armed conflict under certain conditions. This contrasts with the concept of 
pacifism, which contends that there is never an adequate justification for war as a policy 
choice, and simultaneously serves as a critical framework against which traditionally 
uncritical textbook narratives can be measured.  
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Perhaps more importantly, there is significant dissonance between textbook 
depictions of war and narratives that discuss more intrinsically the psychological impact 
of war, on participants and non-participants. Given the impact that textbooks have on 
instructional design, even among teachers who do not rely actively on such material, it is 
vital to understand the connection (if any) between what textbooks present and what we 
want students to know about war. 
 
Research Questions 
The subject of this study revolves around a central question: how do textbooks 
present the Civil War, in light of the doctrine of ―just war‖? I looked at selected events 
and topics from the historical period prior to the outbreak of hostilities, during the war 
itself, and after the war‘s conclusion. The following research questions are subsumed 
under the central question: 
 How do textbooks present the Civil War, in light of the ―just war‖ conditions of 
jus ad bellum? Specifically, how do textbook narratives present the following 
historical topics: secession and states‘-rights, the presidential election of 1860, 
and the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter in April 1861?  
 How do textbooks present the Civil War, in light of the ―just war‖ conditions of 
jus in bello? Specifically, how do textbook narratives present the following 
historical topics: the experience of Civil War battle (on combatants and non-
combatants), the treatment of prisoners-of-war, and General William T. 
Sherman‘s ―March to the Sea‖ of 1865? 
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 How do textbooks present the Civil War, in light of the ―just war‖ conditions of 
jus post bellum? Specifically, how do textbook narratives present the following 
historical topics: Robert E. Lee‘s surrender at Appomattox, the passage of the 
14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the competing plans for Southern 
Reconstruction, and the Compromise of 1877?  
 
Educational Significance 
Harrison-Wong (2003) asserts that ―[textbooks] not only shape how students 
understand the past but also influence how they envision the future‖ (p. 1). There is little 
doubt about the impact that textbooks have on teachers and their instructional choices. 
Despite efforts to move teacher practices away from traditional, text-centered approaches 
(Thornton, 1997), textbooks remain the centerpiece of most classroom instruction 
(Sleeter & Grant, 1991; Ravitch, 2003). Textbooks, in fact, often play a more central role 
in curriculum and instruction than does the teacher (Zevin, 1992). Textbooks form the 
standard by which most teachers, even experienced ones, conceptualize their instruction, 
especially in terms of topic selection; and wars are often the milestones by which teachers 
move through historical events. It is a common observation that American history is often 
taught as a grim procession from one war to the next.  
The National Council for the Social Studies (NCSS) advocates the implementation of 
ten ―themes‖ in the classroom, including that of Civic Ideals and Practices. Under the 
description of this theme, the authors include this passage: ―What is the role of the citizen 
in the community and the nation, and as a member of the world community? How can I 
make a positive difference‖ (National Council for the Social Studies, 2010)? The 
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message implicit in this theme is the idea that education should be aimed at something 
larger than skill acquisition or profitable future careers for our students. Instead, we 
should be in the practice of helping our students form positive values, with the goal of 
helping them become virtuous, ethical individuals. If our textbooks (and thus, by 
extension, our pedagogy) leads students to the belief that American wars are always 
necessary, and thus always justifiable, we do a disservice both to the skills we hope to 
foster—primarily, critical thinking and investigation of multiple perspectives—and to the 
possibility that we as educators may have a role to play in the reduction of war in our 
national lives.  
 
“Just War” Doctrine 
The ―just war‖ doctrine was first conceptualized by thinkers like Aristotle and 
Cicero, and was more fully articulated by St. Augustine as a theory of defense for the 
early Catholic Church. Its precepts have been formalized in modern documents like The 
Hague and Geneva Conventions and the United Nations Charter. ―Just war‖ is an ethical 
response to those who consider law to be inapplicable to hostile acts (what was referred 
to in Rome as inter arma silent leges, ―In time of war the law is silent‖). Modern ―just 
war‖ theory and its application to American history has been the focus of two key 
scholars—James Turner Johnson and Michael Walzer. Johnson, in Ideology, Reason, and 
the Limitation of War (1975), considers ―just war‖ to be the natural outgrowth of any 
human community. A community, Johnson claims, is a ―group of people sharing a 
common end who are internally driven to seek that end and help one another toward it‖ 
(p. 12). In a community, ―the coordination of effort is the primary function of law. Since 
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everyone agrees as to the ends to be sought, law coordinates their activities so as to 
maximize attainment of those ends.‖ This ―law of coordination,‖ claims Johnson, is the 
foundation of ―just war‖ doctrine. A given community‘s sense of ideological purpose 
gives greater weight to these acts of coordination; and ―just war,‖ since it was a product 
of early canon law and Christian theology, carried a ―relevance and an adequacy, both 
moral and political, that it could not have had otherwise‖ (Johnson, 1975, p. 12-13). 
Johnson asserts that there is a distinction between ―classic‖ just war doctrine and 
modern theory. The former existed prior to around 1500 and was mostly derived from the 
work of Augustine and other theologians of early church canon law. It was generally 
concerned with issues of jus ad bellum (the right to make war), while modern ―just war‖ 
doctrine is mostly dated to the late Middle Ages and is primarily aimed at ―the proper 
mode of fighting,‖ jus in bello (Johnson, 1975, p. 7-8).  
Together with James T. Johnson, Michael Walzer is the most noted scholar of 
―just war‖ doctrine in the modern era. In Just and Unjust Wars (1977) and Arguing About 
Wars (2004), Walzer considers the moral standing of war, arguing that aggression is ―the 
only crime that sates can commit against other states‖ (Walzer, 1977, p. 51). Walzer 
asserts that the fundamental argument behind ―just war,‖ is the idea that ―war is 
sometimes justifiable and that the conduct of war is always subject to moral criticism‖ 
(Walzer, 2004, p. ix). While his concept of ―just war‖ stands in contrast to pacifist 
theory—and that of Nel Noddings, who states that ―the deliberate killing of people who 
do not want to die can never be considered virtuous‖ (Noddings, 2006, p. 54)—Walzer‘s 
work encompasses an ethical element missing in textbook conceptualizations of war. 
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 ―Just war‖ doctrine divides the theory of war into three parts: jus ad bellum, the 
act of choosing war; jus in bello, the proper conduct of war after its beginning; and jus 
post bellum, the justice of peace agreements and the manner in which wars are brought to 
a conclusion. Brian Orend in his work ―The Morality of War‖ (2006), as well as his essay 
―War‖ for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2005), has created a framework for 
the elements of ―just war‖ which incorporates the traditional components of that theory, 
as well as more modern iterations and elaborations. 
―Just war‖ doctrine with regard to jus ad bellum contains six primary components: 
1. Just cause: this commonly includes: self-defense from external attack; defense of 
others from external attack; protection of innocents from brutal, repressive 
regimes; punishment for a grievous wrongdoing with remains uncorrected 
2. Right intention: a nation must intend to fight only in defense of its just cause, or in 
light of its justification. 
3. Proper authority/public declaration: this issue is often addressed within a state‘s 
constitution or the legitimacy of its governmental system. 
4. Last resort: from Brian Orend (2005, para. 23): ―A state may resort to war only if 
it has exhausted all plausible, peaceful alternatives to resolving the conflict in 
question, in particular diplomatic negotiation.‖ 
5. Probability of success: the intention of this requirement is to prevent unnecessary 
and futile bloodshed. 
6. Proportionality: again, from Orend (2005, para. 25): ―A state must, prior to 
initiating a war, weight the universal goods expected to result from it, such as 
securing the just cause, against the universal evils to result, notably casualties.‖ 
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Jus in bello, the second component of ―just war‖ doctrine, refers generally to 
behavior during the conflict itself, and thus adherence and articulation falls typically on 
military commanders and the soldiers themselves. There is usually a division between 
internal and external elaborations of jus in bello—the former referring to moral conduct 
towards the enemy, its combatants and its civilians, the latter aimed at a state‘s moral 
conduct towards its own citizens (Orend, 2005). External jus in bello is comprised of the 
following components: 
1. The observance of international laws on the prohibition of certain weapons: e.g., 
chemical or biological weapons, and to a lesser degree, nuclear weapons. 
2. Discrimination and non-combatant immunity: soldiers may only target those who 
are ―engaged in the business of war‖ (Walzer, 2004, p. 43), which implies the 
―discrimination‖ between combatants (and attendant, morally permissible targets, 
such as political or industrial facilities) and civilians, who are morally immune 
from attack. It is expected that some civilian deaths may occur (referred to 
euphemistically as ―collateral damage‖), but all due care must be expended in 
trying to prevent such death. 
3. Proportionality: only the force ―proportional to the end [soldiers] seek‖ is 
appropriate (Orend, 2005, para. 31). ―Weapons of mass destruction‖ are typically 
considered out of proportion. 
4. Benevolent quarantine for prisoners of war (POWs): the surrender of enemy 
soldiers delegitimizes them as threats (they are no longer, by definition, ―engaged 
in harm‖). In that case, it is morally wrong to threaten, harm, or use them 
inappropriately, a standard spelled out by various international laws, including the 
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Geneva Conventions, which require ―benevolent‖ quarantine away from battle 
zones (―Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 
August 1949,‖ 1949). Ultimately, they should be returned in exchange for the 
opposing state‘s POWs, at the conclusion of hostilities.  
5. No Means Mala in Se: Translating as ―evil in themselves,‖ this component 
condemns the use of weapons, tactics, and methods that unequivocally immoral, 
such as: ―mass rape campaigns; genocide or ethnic cleansing; using poison or 
treachery (such as disguising soldiers to look like the Red Cross); forcing 
captured soldiers to fight against their own side; and using weapons whose effects 
cannot be controlled, like biological agents‖ (Orend, 2005, para. 33).  
6. No reprisals: this component addresses the failure of a given state to observe just 
in bello, which may then cause the attacked state to retaliate with a similar 
violation of ―just war‖ prohibitions. This limitation is aimed at preventing an 
escalation of violence, and the usual descent into atrocity that follows.  
The final category of the ―just war‖ doctrine, jus post bellum, concerns moral 
behavior after the cessation of hostilities between two states. In the modern world, most 
international law concerns itself with the first two components of ―just war,‖ and thus jus 
post bellum is heavily dependent on traditional ―just war‖ theory. There are five basic 
principles: 
1. Proportionality and publicity: Any peace agreement or treaty should be 
―measured and reasonable, as well as publicly proclaimed‖ (Orend, 2005, para. 
37). This condition generally excludes demands for unconditional surrender.  
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2. Rights vindication: Any conflict, ultimately, is begun over a perceived violation 
of rights, on a party‘s behalf; the restoration of those rights, therefore, must be the 
basis for any lasting or moral peace.  
3. Discrimination: Postwar settlements must distinguish between parties on the 
defeated side (leaders, combatants, and civilians), and postwar disposition must 
be apportioned reasonably. This is aimed at discouraging mass punishments of an 
entire citizenry. 
4. Punishment: ―Proportionate punishment‖ must be assigned to a defeated state 
(and, most importantly, its leaders) when it has clearly committed blatant 
violation of other states‘-rights. Similarly, soldiers, on both sides, can commit war 
crimes; and they, too, should be held accountable and punished if necessary.  
5. Compensation: A defeated state may be required to make financial restitution (so 
long as such restitution is both proportional and discriminates between those who 
are blameworthy and those, like civilians, who are immune. 
6. Rehabilitation: It is expected that a victorious state may enact reforms within the 
institutions of a defeated country, which may include ―demilitarization and 
disarmament; police and judicial re-training; human rights education; and even 
deep structural transformation towards a minimally just society governed by a 
legitimate regime‖ (Orend 2005, para. 43). The degree of rehabilitation is largely 
dependent on the ―depravity‖ of the defeated regime, which makes this 
component of jus post bellum  
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Why “Just War?” 
 It is important to consider why ―just war‖ doctrine can not only be a valuable 
measurement of a textbook‘s moral component, but also a necessary addition to a 
textbook‘s depiction of U.S. wars. There are two reasons why ―just war‖ can serve as an 
appropriate framework from which to judge historical action—a moral stance and an 
empathetic stance.  
Dewey, in Moral Principles in Education (1909), points to the necessity to 
consider morality as a facet of historical instruction. Without morality, Dewey claims, 
history is essentially a useless subject to students: 
When treated simply as a record of what has passed and gone, [history] must be 
mechanical, because the past, as the past, is remote. Simply as the past there is no 
motive for attending to it. The ethical value of history teaching will be measured 
by the extent to which past events are made the means of understanding the 
present. (p. 36)  
Morality, and the teaching of moral ideas, is not something from which to shy 
away in our classrooms. As Dewey writes, ―when a study is taught as a mode of 
understanding social life it has positive ethical import…. what we need in education is a 
genuine faith in the existence of moral principles which are capable of effective 
application‖ (p. 57). 
Barton and Levstik (2004) write that the study of history includes by necessity a 
moral component: ―Although we may not often speak in terms of morality, we 
nonetheless expect students to celebrate the good things in history and condemn the bad‖ 
(p. 91). One reason we teach history is to encourage a proper path to the future, a set of 
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behaviors that we consider correct and virtuous. ―Just war‖ doctrine is, ultimately, a 
framework that encompasses a moral approach to war, and to life.  
In terms of historical empathy, the ―just war‖ doctrine gives students an 
opportunity to perform the essential task of any historian, ―to understand and interpret 
past events," and to answer an essential question of historical inquiry—―why did an 
individual or group of people, given a set of circumstances, act in a certain way‖ (Yeager 
& Foster, 2001, p. 15)? Students can use ―just war‖ to consider not only the moral status 
of historical action, but also to consider the restrictions under which combatants and 
civilians operated in the Civil War era.  
An important distinction is necessary here—the use of a moral and empathetic 
tool, such as ―just war,‖ should not be considered a form of indoctrination, a phenomenon 
about which we should be rightly concerned. ―Just war‖ is not pacifistic, unilaterally 
opposed to all violent conflict for any reason; neither is it militaristic, accepting (and 
sometimes, even enthusiastic endorsing) the necessity of war. Cicero (1924), in his 
Philippics against Marc Antony in 44 and 43 BCE, remarked on the cautious realism of 
the ―just war‖ philosophy, when he said ―Therefore, if we wish to enjoy peace, we must 
wage war; if we fail to wage war, peace we will never enjoy…the name of peace is 
sweet, and the thing itself is not only pleasant, but salutary‖ (p. 255). The use of an 
ethical scaffold does not necessarily mean that its moral foundations are being offered as 
valuable or even desirable to our students. Instead, it is the empathetic nature of ―just 
war‖ that makes it most valuable as a teaching tool; rather than considering whether or 
not ―just war‖ is appropriate in the modern age, students are asked whether or not 
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historical figures lived according to the moral precepts they espoused. It is the difference 
between moral education and moral propaganda.  
 
Why the Civil War? 
 The Civil War holds a singular and exalted place in most American history 
classrooms. It is often presented, in textbooks and in our collective memory, as a 
nationally defining event, one that shaped the American body politic into a unified entity. 
In 1990, PBS‘ landmark series The Civil War made an unlikely celebrity out of historian 
Shelby Foote, who charmed millions with his homespun anecdotes and sharp 
observations about the war, its impact on participants, and on the country. In a memorial 
to Foote after his death on PBS‘ Newshour program, titled ―Remembering Shelby Foote‖ 
(2005), Foote offered this illustration as to the importance of the Civil War to American 
identity:  
Before the war, it was said "the United States are." Grammatically, it was spoken 
that way and thought of as a collection of independent states. And after the war, it 
was always "the United States is," as we say today without being self-conscious at 
all. And that sums up what the war accomplished. It made us an "is." 
There is little doubt that the Civil War had a massive impact on the development 
of a national identity. Dionne (2010) refers to the Civil War as a ―mass democratic 
experience…the 19th century‘s great social revolution‖ (p. A15). Winik (2001) 
characterizes the Civil War as the forge in which the concept of ―nation‖ left undefined 
by the Constitution was ultimately created—the ―embodiment of a sturdy people…the 
stitch in the fabric that even the Founders missed‖ (p. 387). McPherson (1988) considers 
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the immense transformation brought about by the national devastation—―From the war 
sprang the great flood that caused the stream of American history to surge into a new 
channel‖ (p. 861-862). Williams (2005) critiques the large emphasis by historians on the 
political and military implications of the war, but in so doing, highlights the massive 
social changes brought about by the sectional crisis and the violence that ensued, 
especially for African-Americans, women, and Native Americans. Foner (1988), in 
considering the impact of the post-Civil War era on the U.S., points to the singular impact 
of the war on the next one hundred years of race relations in America, what he calls a 
―sweeping redefinition of the nation‘s public life‖ (p. xxvii). Scholars have long 
recognized the dominant place of the Civil War in national history, and that recognition is 
firmly entrenched in textbooks.  
Textbooks uniformly present the Civil War as a unique and defining national 
event. Lapansky-Werner, et al. (2010), in Prentice Hall‘s United States History, 
characterize the war as a struggle for ―national survival‖ (p. 360), and describe the 
changes brought about in economic terms, social, and political terms with considerable 
detail, concluding that ―the United States had never experienced a war like the Civil 
War...more Americans would see themselves as citizens not just of a state but of a unified 
nation‖ (p. 394-396). Cayton, et al. (2007), in America: Pathways to the Present, note 
that Americans, through the Civil War, had ―gained an undivided nation, a democracy 
that would continue to seek the equality Lincoln had promised for it‖ (p. 417). And 
Danzer, et al. (2005), in McDougal Littell‘s The Americans, comments that ―the Civil 
War caused tremendous political, economic, technological, and social change in the 
United States. It also exacted a high price in the cost of human life‖ (p. 366). The 
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unanimity of historians and textbook authors signal the unique curricular status of the 
Civil War in American history narrative.  
 
Limitations 
 While there are a wide variety of armed conflicts in U.S. history, both in size and 
scope, this study examined only the Civil War. Other wars and the manner in which they 
are depicted in textbooks are beyond the scope of this study and were not addressed.  
 An additional problem is determining a given textbook‘s popularity. Such 
information is usually not released by textbook companies, and though one may infer 
based on outside sources (e.g., national groups such as the American Textbook Council 
or state-specific instructional materials catalogs), there is no definitive source for a 
textbook‘s popularity or ubiquity (Ansary, 2005; Loewen, 1995; Fitzgerald, 1979). This 
being so, it is difficult to address the scope of a textbook‘s usage. 
Similar to issues regarding textbooks, there are limitations present in the use of the 
―just war‖ doctrine. This doctrine has been critiqued, in some quarters, as insufficient to 
the modern age and the emergence of non-state violence (e.g., terrorism). Certainly, there 
is room for this criticism when the doctrine is applied to historical conflicts which may 
not be appropriate for its restrictions; but when focused solely on a conflict which 
adheres to its conditions, certainly ―just war‖ can be considered appropriate to its uses. 
The U.S. Civil War, fought in the last half of the nineteenth century, was prior to the 
formal adoption of most international law. Still, European nations had been heavily 
steeped in the traditions of ―just war‖ (Johnston, 1975), and by the mid-19th century they 
had already begun the process of formalizing ―just war‖ precepts into statutes of 
21 
 
international law. The earliest formal agreement regarding international military behavior 
appeared with the Declaration of Paris of 1856, which abolished privateering, formalized 
the concept of maritime neutrality, and identified the elements of binding blockades 
(Best, 1980). Shortly after this, in August 1864, the Geneva Convention of the Wounded 
in Armies in the Field was produced by a multi-state conference and established the red 
cross as an officially neutral symbol, as well as proclaiming the neutrality of the sick, 
wounded, and the personnel that cared for them (Doty, 1998).  
The United States did not participate in either of these conferences (though it 
ultimately did sign the Geneva Convention in 1882), largely due to the traditional 
avoidance of ―entangling‖ European alliances. Still, the U.S. had been the first nation to 
codify moral principles into law with regard to the conduct of war. In 1863, President 
Lincoln commissioned Francis Lieber, a Swiss- born philosopher and jurist, to write the 
first code of conduct for the U.S. military. Officially called the Instructions for the 
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (―General Order No. 100‖), it 
was more commonly referred to as the ―Lieber Code,‖ and its admonitions are drawn 
virtually intact from the jus in bello tradition—humane treatment of prisoners (it 
specifically forbade the practice of showing ―no quarter‖ to surrendering troops), the 
banning of certain weapons (e.g., poison), and the delineation of proper and improper 
targets of hostilities. Lieber‘s work served as the model for practically all future 
international codes—Geoffrey Best (1980) says that ―Lieber‘s code…served as the 
quarry from which all subsequent codes were cut‖ (p.172). While the Civil War was not, 
by definition, a state-to-state conflict, it was largely conducted as one, to the degree that 
departures from ―just war‖ restrictions (such as William T. Sherman‘s notorious ―March 
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to the Sea‖ in 1864) were considered extremely abnormal in their time. The 
conceptualization of ―just war‖ was deeply embedded in Northern and Southern tradition 
prior to, during, and after the Civil War. 
A final limitation is methodological. The textbook analysis is a format that analyzes 
ideological representations in text (including word choice and sentence construction), 
graphics, maps/charts, and topic selection. It may offer insight into author beliefs and 
resulting student opinions, and can unpack the connections between ideology and desired 
student beliefs. There are specific advantages and disadvantages to the two evaluative 
tools used in this study, a historical narrative approach and a categorical analysis 
approach, which are addressed in Chapter 3 in greater detail. The one general limitation 
of the textbook analysis is its inability to show the measurable impact of such factors on 
student learning. There have never been any major longitudinal studies on this subject 
(Loewen, 1995; Nietz, 1961; Ravitch, 2003). This study focuses on textbook 
conceptualizations of war and their depictions of such events as compared to 
historiographical narratives, and not the impact of such depictions on students.  
 
How I Came to the Study 
 My family has a military tradition that would appear, to most outsiders, as fairly 
deep and historical. My grandfather volunteered for the U.S. Navy shortly after Pearl 
Harbor in 1941, becoming a corpsman (a medic) on board a LCI (Landing Craft, 
Infantry) and participating in a number of military operations, including the invasion of 
Normandy on June 6, 1944. My father was a captain in the U.S. Air Force and served 
from 1969 to 1970, in the Vietnam conflict, as an air traffic controller stationed in 
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Saigon. My brother volunteered for the U.S. Navy and served for twelve years. At the 
same time, we are a family of diverse political and religious practices. My grandfather is 
a conservative Irish Catholic who has voted for Republican candidates practically his 
entire adult life. My father is a Methodist minister, as is my mother, both of whom are 
considerably more liberal in their political attitudes. He was opposed to the Vietnam War, 
but chose to join the Air Force rather than risk being drafted into the U.S. Army and 
compelled to join the infantry. I went to college, earning my bachelor‘s degree in history 
and my master‘s degree in secondary education, deeply aware of the sacrifices and risks 
my family had endured in order to afford me such a privilege. 
I have taught social studies, primarily American History, at the high school level 
for 17 years. As is very normal for high school, wars play a large role in the American 
history curriculum. I have designed and used many activities about various armed 
conflicts from our national narrative, especially the American Revolution, the Civil War, 
and World War II. I have used multimedia sources, including film clips and audio clips, 
to accentuate the impact of my lessons, and I have noted an avid and generally positive 
response to our activities. I have been struck, any number of times, by the impact such 
activities have, not only with regard to the dramatic power inherent in armed conflict but 
also in the enthusiasm of student response. Americans seem to understand, by and large, 
that wars are destructive and catastrophic on a number of levels; and yet we also seem to 
stand by the firm conviction that sometimes, in some situations, wars are necessary (in 
essence, the fundamental belief of the ―just war‖ doctrine). But it was not grim 
acquiescence I observed among my students, when I previewed upcoming topics in my 
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classroom and mentioned the study of a particular war—it was excitement. Students (at 
least, a considerable number of them) seemed to construe war as fun.  
It would be easy, under such circumstances, to blame any number of external 
factors—family, society, media, popular entertainment. But I began to wonder if 
teachers—and, by extension, how and what we taught—were as impactful in the 
formation of student conceptualizations of war. Since textbooks form the basis of most 
classroom instruction, either implicitly or explicitly, I wanted to know to which 
perspectives on American wars these materials were trying to lead students. What began 
as a comparatively simple textbook analysis became, for me, an investigation into my 
own role in creating conceptualizations of war and warfare, and whether or not teachers 
can influence the occurrence or necessity for war in the future.  
From an epistemological standpoint, I adhere to the constructivist belief that our 
own selves, unique and immutable, form the lens through which we interact with the 
universe. I do not believe there is the possibility of truly value- or bias-free research, 
primarily given the fact that the selection, organization, and presentation of knowledge to 
students is determined through a process infused with politics and ideology, especially in 
the social studies. This perspective has led me to qualitative research traditions, which I 
find encompass my worldview more wholly than the more traditional quantitative 
approach. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
Literature in this area is reviewed and separated into the following categories: the 
theoretical framework of this study (critical pragmatism, power, moral education, and the 
ethic of care in schools); the role of the textbook and general historical criticism; 
textbook bias; and relevant historiography and works on the psychology of war. 
 
Critical Pragmatism 
 This study‘s theoretical framework is that of critical pragmatism, the 
philosophical belief that the value of an idea, and an education, must be measured by its 
relation to life. Cherryholmes (1999), in a hypothetical question-and-answer format, 
addressed some of the fundamental tenets of critical pragmatism: 
Q: Why do we do what we do?  
A: To get results…that are satisfying and fulfilling. We get these 
conceptions from experience, through construction. We submit our ever-
changing conceptions of satisfaction and self-fulfillment to multiple 
interpretations, exposing them to criticism, making our selections through 
democratic solidarity and not by appealing to foundational and 
fundamentalist principles…we increase the risk of making unsatisfactory 
choices to the extent that ―other‖ conceptions, beliefs, individuals, and 
groups are excluded and silenced. (p. 5)  
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Critical pragmatism finds its roots in the work of John Dewey and William James, 
both of whom still are critical to the nature of pragmatic inquiry. As Richard Rorty 
(1982) put it, ―James and Dewey were not only waiting at the end of the dialectical road 
which analytic philosophy traveled, but are waiting at the end of the road which, for 
example, Foucault and Deleuze are currently traveling‖ (p. xviii). James (1943), who was 
largely inspired by the work of C.S. Peirce (Thompson, 1953; Moore & Robin, 1994), 
achieved greater acclaim for what he called the pragmatic method: ―the attitude of 
looking away from first things, principles, ‗categories,‘ supposed necessities; and of 
looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts‖ (p. 47). 
Pragmatism is, in large part, about doing, without an emphasis on empty 
intellectualism; put another way, there is no such thing as any educational pursuit for its 
own sake. As Dewey (1927) wrote, ―the doctrine that intelligence develops within the 
sphere of action for the sake of possibilities not yet given is the opposite of a doctrine of 
mechanical efficiency. Intelligence as intelligence is inherently forward-looking; only by 
ignoring its primary function does it become a mere means for an end already given. The 
latter is servile, even when the end is labeled moral, religious, or esthetic‖ (p. 6-7). In 
Democracy and Education (1916), Dewey is more direct—―Mere amassing of 
information apart from the direct interests of life makes mind wooden; elasticity 
disappears‖ (p. 245). Pragmatism, ultimately, is about the twin goals of social hope and 
liberation (Rorty, 1982, p. 160). Such goals are attainable, ultimately, through the 
adoption of the approach of ―disciplined skepticism‖ (Cornbleth & Waugh, 1995, p. 28) 
that is deeply value-laden. The goal of education is to improve life, hardly a neutral or 
trivial idea. Instructional technique or content, devoid of meaning or value, amounts to 
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what Shaver (1979) refers to as "mindlessness,‖ involving ―the thoughtless use of method 
and/or content without examination of the underlying assumptions and the potential 
outcomes that may impact the achievement of one's purposes‖ (p. 44). 
 Critical pragmatism stands in opposition to this sort of ―mindlessness.‖ It is 
centered on the concept that controversy and disagreement are natural products of the 
discourse over what should be taught and how. Educational choices are driven by 
struggles (sometimes benign, sometimes violent) between groups at all levels of a 
society, in a variety of arenas—personal, cultural, and political. The struggle between 
dominant groups and marginalized minorities form the heart of a critical perspective on 
the role of textbooks in the classroom. 
 
Power and Ideology 
The textbook, as the most visible and immediate manifestation of a school‘s 
accepted curriculum, exerts a form of political, cultural, and educational power that 
abrogates any claim to official neutrality of perspective (Giroux, 1979). Apple (1993) 
explores the decision to define some groups‘ knowledge as the most legitimate, as official 
knowledge, while other groups‘ knowledge is marginalized, obfuscated, or deleted 
entirely. All curricula, Apple states, must go through the process of ―subjectifying‖ 
themselves, the overt acknowledgement of the degree to which they are rooted in the 
particular cultural norms and values from which they were derived. The same, by 
extension, is true of textbooks. Put another way, we must acknowledge, tacitly, that 
textbooks are not only manifestations of a subjective, constructed narrative, but they are 
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also the tools that can be used to minimize nontraditional voices, perspectives, and 
dissent.  
Anyon (1979) adopts a critical perspective of the ideological impact of textbooks 
by linking their content and their mode of production to the interests of capitalism. 
Whitty (1985) concurs that there is certainly a connection between textbook production 
and the transmission of a dominant political paradigm through them (he cites Anyon‘s 
contention that militant labor unions were routinely denied the role in textbooks that 
scholarly historiographical sources indicated they should have). While he questions the 
degree to which Anyon explores the precise relationship between textbooks and 
controlling interests, he neatly clarifies her point by saying ―the texts, then, serve to 
emphasize and legitimate the existence of some groups at the expense of others‖ (p. 42). 
This process is an example of what Giroux (1979) called the ―often ignored relationship 
between school knowledge and social control‖ (p. 20). 
Giroux explored the process by which a preexisting social order can be replicated 
through the classroom. He asserts that the fragmented approach social studies educators 
take to reform—mainly focusing on content and methodology—does nothing to correct 
the underlying nature of the ―hidden curriculum‖—the ―unstated norms, values and 
beliefs that are transmitted to students through the underlying structure of meaning in 
both the formal content as well as the social relations of school and classroom life‖ (p. 
22). Textbooks are shielded from contrary ideology—students are taught, implicitly and 
overtly, that the knowledge in textbooks is beyond question, which only prepares them 
for a life of intellectual passivity—―If the fragile ideological nature of these 
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considerations are not made clear to students, then they will learn more about social 
conformity than critical inquiry‖ (Giroux, 1979, p. 30).  
Such ―intellectual passivity‖ is fertile ground for what Apple (1995) calls the 
―grand narrative under which all relations of domination can be subsumed; the idea of the 
decentered subject where identity is both unfixed and a site of political struggle‖ (p. 11). 
Apple rejects this belief, as does Giroux (1985), who argues that schools are not neutral, 
utilizing the textbook as the instrument of social control. James Loewen (1995), in his 
popular work, Lies My Teacher Told Me, not only highlighted the frequent historical 
errors made in standard issue history textbooks, but also the degree to which they 
routinely subsumed the narratives of minorities and the underprivileged, on behalf of a 
largely white, Eurocentric paradigm. In his 2010 work Teaching What Really Happened, 
Loewen points to the powerful necessity of teaching history: ―[H]istory is 
power…Students who do not know their own history or how to think critically about 
historical assertions will be ignorant and helpless before someone who does claim to 
know it. Students need to be able to fight back‖ (Loewen, 2010, p. 12). Jean Anyon 
(2006) writes in a similar vein when she focuses on the use of schools and textbooks, 
with an aim to ―expose and reduce the reproductive effects of schooling and increase the 
liberatory possibilities of education‖ (p. 38). 
Anyon‘s efforts, similar to other scholars from this theoretical background, are 
focused on the issue of hegemony. Hegemony, in this context, is the ability of dominant 
groups to define ―legitimate‖ areas of agreement and disagreement, to shape which 
political agendas are made the public face of educational discourse in the U.S. McLaren 
(1998) describes hegemony as ―the maintenance of domination not by the sheer exercise 
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of force, but primarily through consensual social practices, social forms, and social 
structures produced in specific sites such as the church, the state, the school, the mass 
media, the political system, and the family‖ (p. 177). The mechanism that is used to 
establish this hegemony is the textbook—through its writing, adoption, and use in the 
classroom. Apple (2006) points to the hegemony intrinsic to textbooks, how in 
consideration of marketing and potential sales, ―any content that is politically or 
culturally critical or can cause a negative reaction by powerful groups is avoided‖ (p. 
244).  
Textbooks can be examined as a mechanism of hegemony, for the transmission of 
a dominant cultural paradigm and narrative. Apple (2004) refers to the process of 
―systems management‖ in the construction of school curricula and their visible material 
manifestations (e.g., textbooks) and the prevailing belief in the ―inherent neutrality‖ of 
such procedures. Apple points out that these manifestations are hardly neutral, but instead 
aim to effect and maintain what he terms ―technical control‖ and ―certainty.‖ Just as 
educators evaluate their students‘ success and failure through their own ideological 
positions, textbooks are purposed to provide students with an ―appropriate‖ body of 
knowledge, one that is intellectually valid and morally certain. 
In large part and in many places, the textbook forms the heart of the curriculum, 
even though there is no law or framework that says this must be so. Luke (2006) refers to 
this as a ―de facto national mandate‖ (p. 139), one which tends to obscure or avoid 
contradictory accounts or controversy. The power of the textbook often translates into the 
practical marginalization of both nontraditional narratives and controversial issues. For 
example, Dillabough and McAlpine (1996) examined this hegemony in light of the 
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degree to which social studies textbooks were isolated from culturally isolated groups (in 
their case, people from native Canadian First Nations), arguing for a higher degree of 
racial equity for those voices either minimized or absent from history texts. With regard 
to controversial subject matter (arguably, one of the most crucial components of the 
social studies), the movement towards a dominant cultural paradigm created by the 
narrow perspective of textbooks (combined with the economically consolidated reality of 
modern textbook publishing) has contributed to a body of ―official knowledge‖ that is 
―homogenized‖ and absent of any topics that may be deemed controversial (Carlson & 
Apple, 1998).  
It is important to note that there is much debate about the motivations for such 
hegemonic distortions inherent in textbooks. Any assertion, for example, that there is a 
malevolent or conspiratorial goal on the part of textbook publishers or corporations, is 
hardly unanimous. Apple (1986) probably goes farthest in indicting the role of the 
government as a controlling entity, and the manifestations of control in the classroom—
―from systematic integration of testing, behavioral goals and curriculum, competency-
based instruction and prepackaged curricula‖ (p. 40)—are all mechanisms to control the 
work of teachers and the knowledge presented to students. Even the absence of ill intent, 
however, can create a fracturing of the value of knowledge, a removal of the substance 
and context of a given fact that makes it worth knowing in the first place (Dewey, 1926). 
Regardless of motive, however, some textbook critics are far more blunt in their 
descriptions of what textbooks do—Clements (1981), for example, claims that, on behalf 
of patriotism and the desire to promulgate ―misleading information about other countries, 
critical events in our own history and the character and contribution of celebrated 
32 
 
individuals…textbooks lie‖ (p. 88). In her study of textbook presentation of the 
Hiroshima bombing, Harrison-Wong (2003) looked at textbooks which excluded more 
recent historiography on the decision to use nuclear weapons. In 1995, on the 50
th
 
anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing, the Smithsonian had bowed to pressure from 
veterans‘ and political action groups to remove ―revisionist‖ perspectives on the event. 
With regard to textbooks that similarly excluded such interpretations, Harrison-Wong 
concluded that these were not overt cases of censorship, but was rather an example of the 
impact of power and ideology on school curriculum.  
Textbooks, teachers, and schools are impacted by (and participate in) the political 
process of choosing instructional techniques and content. Carnoy (1989) asserts that 
American schools are influenced by direct political pressures, conditioned by the 
economy and labor market, and affected by various social groups seeking equality. Apple 
(2004) claims that ―formal schooling by and large is organized and controlled by the 
government…how it is paid for, what goals it seeks to attain and how these goals will be 
measured, who has power over it, what textbooks are approved, who does well in school 
and who does not, who has the right to ask and answer these questions, and so on—is by 
definition political‖ (p. 3). It is impossible to separate a single unifying voice and 
consider it ―objective‖ or ―true,‖ given ―the ability of dominant groups to exert leadership 
in the struggle‖ over instructional choices and content (p. 4).  
There is, of course, disparagement of textbooks from the other end of the political 
spectrum, as well. From this perspective, critics have decried the failure of constructivist 
curricula to pass on a dominant ideology, a failure which results in the failure of 
appropriate socialization, the encouragement of dissent, relativism, and the adoption of 
33 
 
nontraditional values (Shor, 1986). There is considerable pressure to raise the standards 
of texts, to standardize their content and to make them more ―difficult.‖ In addition, there 
has been a push from many quarters to make certain that the texts place more stress on 
―American‖ themes of patriotism, free enterprise, and the ―Western tradition,‖ and link 
their content to statewide and national tests of educational achievement. Such pressure is 
driven by the belief in an objective, fixed narrative of American history that can be 
passed on from generation to generation, forming the core of transmissible values 
(Ravitch, 1994; Cheney, 1995; Leming, Ellington, & Porter, 2003; Finn & Ravitch, 
2004).  
Critiques have been expanded to the manner in which textbooks are being written 
to allow the incorporation of ―special interest‖ narratives, to the exclusion of a broader, 
unifying ―American‖ story (Ezarik, 2005). This conservative critique is rejected by Krug 
(1963), who highlighted the degree to which American history textbooks typically adopt 
a tone of triumphalism—our textbooks, he asserts, announce overtly their intent to create 
patriotism and a strong belief in American exceptionalism. The desire to incorporate 
nontraditional sources and voices, and to acknowledge at most the lack of a singular 
unifying narrative, at worst its diffusion, is neither negative nor unpatriotic. It is, instead, 
an attempt to provide a crucial counterbalance for our students, who otherwise will be led 
inexorably to faulty and potentially harmful conclusions about their national culture and 
history (Parsons, 1982). Even worse, a failure to understand comparative or oppositional 
cultural norms from other countries may result in narrow misinterpretation and 
―destructive thinking‖ among our students (Tran, 2008). Textbooks that do not 
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incorporate alternative values limit our students‘ opportunity to critically examine such 
values. 
 
Moral Education 
The next component of this theoretical framework is the role of moral education 
schools. B. Edward McClellan, in Moral Education in America: Schools and the Shaping 
of Character from Colonial Times to the Present (1999), traces the various attempts in 
U.S. history to develop ethical instruction in public schools, since the earliest incarnation 
with the ―Old Deluder Satan‖ Law of 1647. He argues that early efforts to promote 
morality through schools were largely sporadic and intermingled with the functions of 
other social institutions (family, community, and apprenticeship). This was the case until 
after the American Revolution, when figures like Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Rush 
advocated a national school system that would promote ―republican virtue,‖ generally 
conceptualized as a quasi-civic devotion to the common good, rather than selfish 
concerns. After 1830, massive waves of national growth—fueled primarily by 
immigration—led to the expansion of this public system of education, and the role of the 
textbook as a vehicle of moral clarity was unquestioned. Moral education, at this point, 
was mostly behaviorist in model—a series of correct actions, manners, or conduct 
choices that were extolled by the teacher and emulated by the student.  
By 1900, the calls for moral education emanated from three camps. First, there 
were advocates for character education, who generally adhered to the virtue-as-behavior 
model. Second, there were supporters of religious education, who pushed for the 
continued presence of overt Christian doctrine in the schools. And finally, there were the 
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reformers of the new Progressive movement, led by figures like John Dewey, who called 
for a reconsideration of morality as less a collection of desirable behaviors and more as a 
―habit of mind‖ that allowed students to determine the best path forward in life, the path 
that would lead them to be contributing members of a constantly changing society.  
The twin social challenges of the 1940s and 1950s—the fights against global 
fascism and communism—diluted the intensity of the struggle over moral education, as 
most government officials and educators focused on what was perceived the greater 
external threat to American security. The tumultuous decade of the 1960s (with the 
attendant growth of cultural relativism as an educational philosophy) mostly ended the 
stringent push for moral or character education in American schools. In the 1980s and 
1990s, there was a renewed push for character education, though one of its chief 
proponents, Alan Lockwood, was quick to point out that many advocates of this renewal 
were decidedly vague on what form such education may take in the classroom 
(Lockwood, 1993). Lockwood‘s support of a concept termed ―civic decency‖ (2001), a 
form of public discourse bounded by the precepts of private etiquette, is one of the 
modern reformulations of moral education. Generally, the various calls for moral 
education today still emanate from several clearly delineated camps—values clarification, 
represented most notably by the work of Louis E. Raths, Merrill Harmin, and Sidney B. 
Simon (1978); cognitive developmentalism, encompassing the theories of Lawrence 
Kohlberg (Power, Higgins-D'Alessandro, & Kohlberg, 1989); and the final major 
component of this work‘s theoretical framework, the ethic of care promoted most 
vigorously and successfully through the work of Nel Noddings. 
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The Ethic of Care 
Noddings (2006) emphasizes the role of critical thinking in schools, in order to 
―challenge deeply held beliefs or ways of life‖ (p. 1). This view is deeply invested in the 
traditions of critical pragmatism: ―A theory held stubbornly against every objection 
becomes an ideology, and as an ideology it loses some of its usefulness as a guide to 
practice‖ (p. 14). Education should not be aimed at teaching a trivial canon of knowledge; 
instead, it should aim at deeply moral principles, and first among these should be ―a 
commitment to building a world in which it is both possible and desirable for children to 
be good—a world in which children are happy‖ (Noddings, 2003, p. 2). 
Noddings ties the act of caring in the public sphere to moral education—
―Everyone must learn to care, and an ethic of caring reminds us that we are responsible 
for each other's moral development‖ (Noddings, 1990, p. 124). Noddings urges us to 
consider other human beings as a form of relation, a continually evolving product of 
interaction with others. Given this, we are responsible, says Noddings, for our conduct 
towards others—the ethic of caring rejects the concept of ontological individuality (―I am 
responsible for myself‖) and encourages us to move towards the creation of a relational 
self, through caring interaction with others.  
Noddings goes on to distinguish between ―caring-for‖ (a highly personal 
encounter with another person, where the act of caring is focused and intentional) and 
―caring-about,‖ a more generalized concern over often abstract issues, like human 
suffering in other nations (Noddings, 1984). ―Caring-about‖ is often typified by a form of 
benign neglect, our willingness to interact with a cause or issue for a limited period of 
time before moving on in our lives (a charitable donation, for example). Noddings 
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believes that ―caring-about‖ is embedded in the public sphere and is thus the subject of 
education. Caring is, ultimately, a moral attitude—and if teachers and schools are aimed 
at inculcating a set of values in our students, values we hold dear and vital to our national 
life, we must both care for and about their emotional, intellectual, and moral well-being. 
On this, Noddings‘ work on the psychology of war is particularly germane. 
In Critical Lessons (2006), Noddings asserts that the greatest goal of education is 
to move students towards self-understanding, utilizing critical thinking to make them 
capable of interacting in society in a moral and beneficial way. She addresses the issue of 
war as it is taught in classrooms across the U.S.; we consider the causes of war, the 
results (this is generally manifested as the ability to recall the victors and losers in a 
particular conflict), but we avoid, whether consciously or not, the greater costs presented 
by the possibility of war, the chance that our students ―might lose a cherished part of their 
moral identity‖ (p. 36). 
Throughout history, war has been conceptualized as an opportunity for heroism 
and personal displays of courage. William James, in an effort to discourage war, even 
sought to develop an alternative way of life that would provide the opportunity to prove 
one‘s courage and heroism without risking life and limb (James & McDermott, 1967). 
Noddings proposes that we examine why the warrior-model and the fascination with war 
still have deep significance in human society, and the impact such significance has on our 
students. Moreover, she suggests that peace movements would present an opportunity to 
teach the values of war without the requisite horror—conscientiousness, devotion, 
courage, honor, and even patriotism (though to critics who suggest that teaching about 
antiwar movements may move our students towards ―un-American‖ attitudes, Noddings 
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points out that teaching about Karl Marx does not necessarily move our students towards 
communism). More important than embedded values, though, is the opportunity for 
critical thinking—the chance for students to evaluate protestors‘ arguments, to consider 
their merit, and then choose to accept or reject them.  
At the heart of caring in education is the idea that we, as educators, should want to 
give our students the skills and values necessary for a critically examined, moral life. 
Textbooks that present war as a grim yet moral necessity, the actions of a government 
forced into combat against its choosing, and war itself as a brutal exercise but one infused 
with glory, grandeur, and nobility, do a disservice to our moral identity and that of our 
students. Noddings‘ argument forms the cornerstone of this study: ―How can we claim to 
educate young people if we do not prepare them for the psychological upheavals that 
accompany war and violence‖ (Noddings, 2006, p. 63)? 
 
The Role of the Textbook 
Criticism of the role and content of textbooks has been a standard feature of 
educational debate for decades, especially since the Progressive era. In 1894, the National 
Education Association‘s Committee of Ten, in their report on secondary schools in the 
U.S. (1969), commented disapprovingly on ―the dry and lifeless system of instruction by 
textbook.‖ In the early 20th century, Harold Rugg wrote a series of textbooks intended to 
promote values that could make school experience more real and meaningful to students, 
with the overarching goal of preparing students to transform and improve society. The 
―reconstructionist‖ approach promoted by reformers like Rugg and Harold Counts was 
adopted by a considerable number of schools, and for a time such textbooks were in wide 
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use around the country. In spite of their goals, however, these efforts caused a backlash of 
criticism, which asserted that such books were, at best, thin on traditional content, and at 
worst, flatly subversive and unpatriotic (Bagenstos, 1977; Singleton, 1980). Other 
―revisionist‖ textbook approaches, like that of Jerome Bruner (1960), met similar 
criticisms. Throughout the last century, textbooks have been regularly targeted by critics 
from both the left and the right, politically and educationally. Often, the criticisms focus 
on the degree of inaccuracy and bias in a given textbook (Loewen, 1995), or on the 
degree to which textbooks generally promote recall of basic information but little in the 
way of higher-level critical thinking skills (Brady, 2008). More radical critiques have 
emerged in the last several decades. Fitzgerald (1979) explored the degree to which 
history textbooks present one overriding narrative, to the exclusion of others, for the 
explicit goal of improved citizenship; and in so doing, perpetuates the implicit notion of 
―official knowledge.‖  
Of course, one of the most regular criticisms of textbook is simple inadequacy. 
They are generally derided as bland, devoid of emotion or interest. At best, students view 
them as inert objects to be hauled from class to class; at worst, they are actual 
impediments to learning. Forbes (1996) notes that ―the textbook presented history and 
historical events in neat, non-controversial, inevitable, matter-of-fact narrative…any 
events or people not judged crucial by the author are left out. The reader of the text is 
exposed to a narrow version of the story which leads to endings that appear inevitable‖ 
(p. 456). Harriet Tyson-Bernstein, in A Conspiracy of Good Intentions: America’s 
Textbook Fiasco (1988), highlights the major failings of textbooks, primarily the manner 
in which they are written. Tyson-Bernstein points out that many problems in textbooks 
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are simply a matter of bad writing; the language has been made as accessible and 
colorless as possible, making most textbooks fact-oriented, ordinary, and bland. These 
efforts are driven by an overarching motive to wash any and all controversy out of the 
content, combined with an overt reliance on readability formulas. These formulas, while 
well-meant, have become in many ways the lynchpin of the adoption process (too high a 
readability score, and the likelihood that a book will be purchased drops precariously) 
and have thus contributed grossly to the ―dumbing-down‖ of all student material (Tyson-
Bernstein, 1988, p. 25). An overemphasis on learning ―skills‖ (e.g., packing a given 
paragraph with words featuring the same vowels, rather than concentrating on valuable 
and engaging content), as well as falling prey to the ―mentioning‖ problem (hopping from 
fact to fact in the text, without context or connection) are other ways textbooks are now 
not only of little value in the classroom, but might actually be harmful. 
The role of the textbook in determining and dictating curriculum is well-explored 
(Stevens & Wood, 1992, Apple, 1993, 2000 & 2004, Apple & Christian-Smith, 1991). 
Ross (1996) cites a 1978 study of fifth-grade curricula that found 78% of what students 
studied in class was derived from textbooks, as well as a 1979 study that showed 90% of 
instructional time was directly tied to textbooks and related materials (cited in 
McCutcheon, 1995). Marker and Mehlinger (1992) found that the percentage of social 
studies teachers that depended on a single textbook was almost 50%, whereas the number 
that depended on less than three was about 90%. Wade (1993) found that between 70% 
and 90% of classroom instructional time in social studies was based on textbooks. Anyon 
(1978) claims that social studies textbooks are generally a student's ―only sustained 
exposure to disciplined social thought‖ (p. 41). And the primacy of textbooks seems 
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unlikely to change; Schug, Western, and Enochs (1997) found that teachers generally rely 
on textbooks because they see it as a cost-effective method of teaching, one they are loath 
to surrender unless they believe they can gain more, instructionally, from a switch to 
available alternatives. 
Of course, in a rapidly changing technological environment, the role of the 
textbook may be apt to change, as well. In March 2010, a controversy in Texas over the 
revision of textbook curricular standards resulted in widespread national attention and 
debate. Given the impact of Texas in the national textbook market, the possibility of 
politically-motivated revisionism in textbook narratives prompted critics to charge that 
such changes might result in a ripple effect across the country, as publishers rushed to 
produce similar texts for consumption in other state markets (McKinley, 2010). Some 
experts, however, asserted that this was unlikely, given the impact and availability of new 
technology—Jay Diskey, executive director of the schools division of the Association of 
American Publishers, commented on the Texas controversy by saying, ―It's an urban 
myth, especially in this digital age we live in, when content can be tailored and 
customized for individual states and school districts‖ (―Texas Ready for Schoolbook 
Showdown,‖ 2010). Still, teachers face considerable impediments in the effective 
implementation of technology in the classroom, including time demands, a lack of 
pedagogical training in effective use of such technology, and a comparatively low 
comfort level with applications that may be markedly different from their preexisting 
skill set (Berson & Balyta, 2004). In spite of routine criticism, ―it is textbooks, and not 
primary sources, that are placed in the hands of American history teachers‖ (Paxton, 
1999).  
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Often, the use of the textbook is prosaic. Nietz (1961) describes how, in the early 
part of the twentieth century, the textbook formed the borders of a teacher‘s content 
knowledge to such a degree that she might have assumed there was little else to know 
about a subject beyond what was recorded in the textbook. Since content plays such a 
vital role in secondary social studies instruction, many teachers rely almost exclusively 
on the textbook as their source of relevant information (Romanowski, 1993). Apple 
(1995) points out that, even without a national curriculum intended to unify instructional 
choices and practices, the standardized textbook provides much of the framework for a 
hidden national curriculum. Some teachers resist this, and perform explicit or implicit 
oppositional readings of the text to provide their students with the opportunity to critique 
textbooks for ―their silences,‖ to analyze ―whose stories are included and excluded‖ 
(Apple, 1995, p. 14). Still, while many teachers may use the textbook as a ―jumping-off 
point‖ for instruction rather than an ironclad template, it is undeniable that ―teachers in 
the United States do in fact use the textbook as the fundamental curriculum artifact in 
classrooms to a remarkable degree‖ (Apple, 1995, p. 36). Teachers are the primary 
determinant of what actually occurs in classrooms, irrespective of standards or external 
bureaucratic mandates (Thornton, 1991), and thus their understanding of textbooks is 
vitally important to their use.  
 
Textbook Bias 
Critical pragmatism, deeply invested with the critical perspective on the nature of 
hegemony, provides a solid epistemological platform from which to approach textbooks 
in American history. It rejects the concept of scientific objectivity and relies instead on 
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critical judgment; pedagogically, it recognizes the role of the student in historical 
thinking and the manner in which knowledge is constructed, rather than received. It also 
provides the best framework from which to examine a factor which, to positivists, only 
exists in nontraditional historical narratives—that of textbook bias. 
 Though not common among most scholars, there is a strong positivist tradition 
that views textbooks as a neutral, unbiased, indisputable collection of ―important‖ facts. 
In March 2010, the Texas State Board of Education approved a wide-ranging series of 
changes to state curriculum standards, including ―the superiority of American capitalism, 
questioning the Founding Fathers‘ commitment to a purely secular government and 
presenting Republican political philosophies in a more positive light‖ (McKinley, 2010). 
Supporters of these revisions did not characterize it as an effort to indoctrinate students 
with a specific historical perspective; instead, Dr. Don McLeroy, the Board‘s most vocal 
proponent of the changes, claimed that the effort was aimed at ―adding balance…History 
has already been skewed. Academia is skewed too far to the left‖ (p. A10).   
The contrasting views of historical perspective, constructivist and traditional, 
creates a difficult climate for textbook authors. An ―insider‘s‖ view of textbook writing is 
presented in Norton‘s (2005) piece, ―Reflections of a Longtime Textbook Author; or, 
History Revised, Revised—and Revised Again.‖ Norton and her colleagues wrote the 
textbook A People and A Nation (Norton, Sheriff, Katzman, & Blight, 2008) with the 
intent that it would be ―different‖ from other textbooks, traditional in design yet 
nontraditional in content, with a deeper emphasis on social history and an organizational 
structure that used introductory vignettes as a device to engage student interest at the 
beginning of each chapter. With the success of their first edition, the publisher called on 
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the team to prepare a second, and ultimately, a sixth and seventh. With each edition came 
a near constant process of revision, primarily about expanding certain chapters—mostly 
because reviewers and analysts, when asked, generally request additions much more 
frequently than deletions of material (Levstik & Tyson, 2008). Norton admits, as Apple 
and others have charged, that there is at least ―some‖ market consideration in the editing 
process. Moreover, Norton freely states that she finds it ―immensely gratifying to realize 
that hundreds of thousands of American college students (and high school students in 
honors or Advanced Placement courses) have read my version of early American history‖ 
(p. 1383). While no one should pounce on this statement as evidence of Norton‘s 
malevolent bias, it does highlight the larger issue of author perspective—a textbook 
represents a chosen narrative, not an objective or value-free one.  
Goodman, Homma, Najita, and Becker (1983), in their comparison of Japanese 
and American textbooks, draw attention to the homogenizing influences present in the 
U.S., despite the absence of an official national or federal organ. Among these are state 
approval of textbooks (referred to as the ―Texas and California Principle,‖ given those 
two states‘ preeminence in textbook adoption nationwide); publishing for a national 
market over the more expensive option of preparing region-specific texts; the restricting 
tendencies of school-appropriate writing parameters, as passed on by editors to writers; 
and the issue of the ―lowest common denominator,‖ the principle that a book which 
―offends absolutely no one will sell everywhere‖ (p. 542). Such practical considerations 
are important to keep in mind when considering textbook bias. 
While some studies assail textbooks on issues of bias, based on the implicit belief 
that objectivity and neutrality were possible (Billington & Hill, 1966), many others have 
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focused largely on issues of historical inaccuracy. Logan and Needham (1985) criticize 
the presentation of the Vietnam War in elementary schoolbooks, pointing out numerous 
factual errors and obfuscations. Anyon (1983), in reviewing 17 U.S. history textbooks, 
searched for evidence of an expressed ideology in curriculum that would privilege one 
group or set of groups over others—among her results, she found ―omissions, 
stereotypes, and distortions that remain in ‗updated‘ social studies textbook accounts of 
Native Americans, blacks, and women [that] reflect the relative powerlessness of these 
groups‖ (p. 49). Noah, Prince, and Riggs (1962), in ―History in High-School Textbooks: 
A Note,‖ attack a number of secondary-level American history textbooks for either 
including outdated historiographical interpretation or none at all, particularly with regard 
to the social-class distinctions among historical actors in the American Revolution period. 
Loewen (1995) focuses on a number of U.S. history textbooks and highlights the frequent 
occasions on which their assertions are unsupported or contradicted by more scholarly 
work. In his discussion of the Civil War, Loewen points out that textbooks largely 
remove ideology from their narrative on Union motives and morale—in removing ideas 
of ethics, justice, and morality from their pages, textbooks have taken away the power of 
such ideas to help students understand historical events like the Civil War. As Loewen 
states, ―In reality, soldiers, who began fighting to save the Union and not much more, 
ended fighting for all the vague but portentous ideas in the Gettysburg Address‖ (p. 189).  
U.S. history textbooks routinely have been criticized both for their avoidance of 
controversial subjects and their embrace of nationalistic bias. Moreau (2003) points out 
that historians in the last several decades have begun to address nontraditional narratives 
and stories with greater frequency, and that these narratives have filtered down to 
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students in textbook form—but always through the distortion of publishing concerns, 
political conflict, and social hegemony. Santoli (1997), in comparing treatment of 
subjects from World War II across a spectrum of textbooks from various European 
countries and the U.S., found that American texts were routinely the most biased in their 
description of events which included U.S. involvement. Zhao and Hoge (2006), in 
highlighting a Japanese history textbook and its treatment of Japan‘s behavior during 
World War II, claim that history textbook writers typically avoid anything that might 
reflect negatively on national culture or character, a similar argument to the one outlined 
by Apple (2004) with regard to textbook publishing. The ―sanitized‖ history that results 
tends to insulate students from controversial events and contributes to what Epstein 
(1994) found in her survey of high school students. She found that a majority of students 
judged a standard history textbook to be a well-written compilation of events, without 
offering reasons for the events described therein or the political motives of the authors. 
The tendency of textbooks to avoid controversy leads teachers to inevitably avoid it in 
their pedagogical choices (Levitt & Longstreet, 1993). This runs contrary to our desire, as 
educators, to have students engage critically with the text, not merely to act as passive 
recipients of knowledge (Leahey, 2007). 
 Sugnet, Yiannoussi, and Sommers (1993) highlighted the manner in which 
textbooks, even without explicit motive, may distort historical reality. In their comparison 
of two textbooks and their depictions of the events of the year 1492, the authors used two 
checklists—one dealing with facts that should be included in order for the textbook to be 
considered appropriate according to the Minnesota Department of Education; and another 
that would indicate the degree to which a textbook was inclusive of nontraditional 
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viewpoints (such as race and gender), as well as conceptually sufficient. They found the 
textbooks often made serious errors of historical interpretation, often stressing, for 
example, the role of disease in the extermination of Native American population over that 
of overwork or colonial violence. While these textbooks are not, in terms of fact, 
―wrong,‖ they have chosen one version of reality to value over another—the role of 
random, unplanned infection, over conscious policy decisions. 
 Romanowski (1996), in ―Problems of Bias in History Textbooks,‖ explored the 
manner in which textbooks do not help students develop an understanding of the 
traditional values that many critics call for. In examining five textbooks, Romanowski 
found that the books did reflect important events and aspects of American history, but 
also were deeply invested with the moral and ethical beliefs of their authors. Worse still, 
students who read the textbooks accepted their narrative without question or critique, a 
passive receipt of knowledge that is valueless and without reason.  
According to Harrison-Wong (2003), there has been little in the way of textbook 
analyses primarily focused on war. She notes a singular exception: Griffen and 
Marciano‘s (1980) study on textbook treatment of the Vietnam War. In studying 28 
textbooks, the authors found that the books routinely left out details regarding issues like 
environmental damage done by U.S. military policy, CIA espionage and anti-subversive 
campaigns, suppression of the anti-war movement within the United States, and similar 
controversies. The books took an ―official‖ stance regarding tumultuous policies such as 
the invasion of Cambodia and involvement in Indochina, describing them generally as 
part of the broader U.S. strategy of containment. In general, the study found that 
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textbooks, on this issue, adopted an approach similar to most issues—non-controversial 
and oriented to the dominant ideological paradigm. 
 
Historiography and the Psychology of War 
Unlike the far-ranging chronological sweep of textbooks, historians can afford to 
explore in greater depth and specificity, as opposed to textbooks, which are fixed on the 
concept of a single, unifying national history. A historian may devote hundreds of pages 
to an esoteric event or little-known individual, freed from the expectations of addressing 
the broad swath of American history. Seixas (1993) examined the degree to which those 
who champion a single, ―star-spangled,‖ ―gripping‖ narrative of American 
exceptionalism represent an antiquated view of historiography, which has recently 
trended towards the inclusion of nontraditional narrative sources and voices. This study 
will contrast depictions of war in U.S. history textbooks with the more nuanced and 
detailed historiography on the subject.  
Textbooks are often written from a positivist foundation—the singular and 
progressive narrative of American history, where ―facts‖ are knowable and the 
understanding of perspective is secondary to the ―names, dates, and places‖ that form the 
backbone of historical knowledge. Recently, there has been a growing number of scholars 
that treat the subject of history in much the same way as educators do—essentially, that 
―fact‖ is less important than understanding the particular lenses (e.g., political, cultural, 
religious) through which historical figures viewed the world. Many of these 
―postmodern‖ historians (such as Robert J.C. Young, Walter Hixson, Robert Berkhofer, 
and Hayden White) derive their theoretical grounding from Michel Foucault‘s work, as 
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many recent educational scholars have done. And, similar to educational constructivists 
like Michael Apple, many historians are recognizing the impact of power and ideology on 
the accepted versions of history. 
In historians‘ parlance, the documents that form the basis of historiography are 
impacted by discourse, which Hixson (2008) defines as ―language or text governed by 
conventions and built-in assumptions of which the user may be unaware yet internalizes 
all the same‖ (p. 309).  The control of discourse, therefore, is a major consideration in the 
adoption of a given historical narrative, the root of the common bromide ―history is 
written by the winners.‖ That phrase, a common assertion about the creation of history, 
forms what historians term a ―trope,‖ meaning a figure of speech that implicitly adopts an 
ideological position. Berkhofer (1995) asserts that the study of these structures of 
language in historical works (such as textbooks) can uncover ―authors‘ attempts to 
naturalize, essentialize, or universalize the categories they employ as foundational to their 
texts‖ (Berkhofer, 1995, p. 310).  
In general, there has been significant historiography written on the subject of war 
and its impact on soldiers and civilians in general. Paul Foos (2002), in A Short, Offhand, 
Killing Affair, considers the Mexican War of 1846-1848 as a period of brutality and 
mayhem marked by America‘s reliance on volunteer ―citizen-soldiers,‖ who, driven by 
the principles of manifest destiny and American exceptionalism, committed multiple 
atrocities in Mexico. The combat experiences of regular Americans in their first foreign 
war became the template for Civil War expectations and predictions two decades later, 
and thus Foos‘ analysis of the Mexican war‘s impact on the American citizenry is 
particularly relevant. Paul Fussell, in The Great War and Modern Memory (1975), 
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sketches a portrait of wartime experiences that are meant to educate civilians and 
noncombatants on the violence and degradation in war—in Fussell‘s personal experience, 
World War II. In Doing Battle (1996), Fussell recounts the everyday brutality of war, 
recounting events in which he took part (including, for example, the shooting of 
surrendering German soldiers) that certainly would be worthy of moral critique. 
Research in military science and theory have produced significant findings with 
regard to the psychology of war and killing. Shortly after the conclusion of World War II, 
S.L.A. Marshall, in Men against Fire: the Problem of Battle Command in Future War 
(2000), unveiled a stunning analysis of behavior under combat conditions. He concluded, 
through interviews of veterans that revolved around two questions—―did you see the 
enemy?‖ and ―did you fire?‖—that, in World War II, no more than one in four 
infantrymen actually fired their weapons during combat. While these findings have been 
subject in recent years by criticism (largely over Marshall‘s methodology), his 
conclusions have enough merit to have been accepted as part of the foundational belief of 
U.S. military training programs, as reflected in the endorsement of Marshall in the United 
States Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) monograph on the subject (Williams 
& Canedy, 1994).  
Dave Grossman, in his work On Killing: the Psychological Costs of Learning to 
Kill in War and Society (1995), examines the psychological impact of killing on soldiers 
and reaches a surprising conclusion—most soldiers do not have an innate instinct to kill, 
and find varying ways in which to resist such activity. Grossman focuses on the 
increasing expertise the U.S. military has acquired in breaking down such individual 
barriers: ―Indeed, the history of warfare can be seen as a history of increasingly more 
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effective mechanisms for enabling and conditioning men to overcome their innate 
resistance to killing their fellow human beings‖ (Grossman, 1995, p. 13). Richard 
Gabriel, in Military Psychiatry: a Comparative Perspective (1986), examined the 
tendency, which may be the prevailing one, among many soldiers throughout history to 
avoid the opportunity to kill.  
Some historiography serves a revisionist purpose of recasting not just the nature 
of war, but its omnipresence in U.S. history and its lasting impact. Richard Hofstadter 
and Mike Wallace (1970) wrote American Violence: A Documentary History with the 
goal of refuting the notion of liberal consensus with regard to war and violence in the 
U.S. Written in the midst of the Vietnam War, Hofstadter‘s work attacked the concept of 
American history as a nation moving forward, progressively and peacefully, with only 
occasional bursts of violence marring our positivist sweep. In so doing, Hofstadter noted 
Americans‘ ―remarkable lack of memory‖ for violence, a trait that is present implicitly in 
our textbooks today. Some literature, though not directly connected to U.S. history, 
serves a similar revisionist agenda regarding traditionally accepted narrative.  
With regard to the Civil War (certainly America‘s most famous and popular war), 
the literature can be categorized as relevant to the three components of the ―just war‖ 
doctrine. In terms of jus ad bellum, most historiography on the Civil War is a radical 
departure from the narrative of standard-issue textbooks. James McPherson‘s Pulitzer 
Prize-winning Battle Cry of Freedom: the Civil War Era (1988) is considered the best 
single volume on the conduct of the Civil War. David Williams, in A People’s History of 
the Civil War: Struggles for the Meaning of Freedom (2005), presents a view of the 
conflict from a social historical position, in the tradition of Howard Zinn. Christopher 
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Olsen‘s The American Civil War: a Hands-On History (2006) is a relatively recent and 
brief ―survey‖ text on the Civil War.  
The second component of ―just war,‖ jus in bello, is largely concerned with a 
state‘s conduct during wartime. One of the two topics drawn from jus in bello and 
featured in this study is that of the impact of Civil War battle on soldiers and civilians. 
There is research that directly impacts the traditional narrative about the impact of the 
war on both combatants and non-combatants. One researcher that examined similar 
experiences prior to the war‘s formal outbreak was Michael Fellman, in Inside War: the 
Guerrilla Conflict in Missouri during the American Civil War (1989). He asserts that the 
impact of war on rural Missourians served as a ―frontal attack‖ on ―the base for their 
prior values—their ‗moral structure‘‖ (Fellman, p. xvi). With regard to the experiences of 
average soldiers in Civil War combat, there is significant recent research. J. Tracy Power 
examines the combat experiences of Confederate soldiers (primarily enlisted men) 
through an exhaustive study of personal letters and diaries, in Lee's Miserables: Life in 
the Army of Northern Virginia from the Wilderness to Appomattox (Power, 1989).  
There are contrasting historiographical approaches as to the impact of combat on 
the average soldier. Earl J. Hess, in The Union Soldier in Battle: Exploring the Ordeal of 
Combat (1997), claims that in spite of unimaginable brutalities and terror, the vast 
majority of Union soldiers managed to not only acquit themselves well, but to also 
acclimate positively to life after the war, secure in the ideological purity of their cause. 
Conversely, Gerald Linderman asserts in Embattled Courage: the Experience of Combat 
in the American Civil War (1987) that the unprecedented violence of the war wreaked 
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tremendous psychological damage on the average soldier, who tended to lose faith in the 
overall cause and concerned himself mainly with the day-to-day business of survival.  
The second topic drawn from jus in bello is the ―March to the Sea,‖ led by Union 
General William T. Sherman in late 1864, from Atlanta to Savannah. This event is 
common to virtually every history textbook (and all ten in this study‘s sample), and is the 
subject of considerable historiography. James McPherson (2007), in This Mighty 
Scourge: Perspectives on the Civil War, explores a range of jus in bello issues, including 
the policy decisions that led to Sherman‘s march and the political, ideological, and 
military justifications for it. Michael Grimsley (1995), in The Hard Hand of War: Union 
Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865, presents a moderate view of the 
March, casting it as a tough, but even-handed policy of attrition (one he terms a ―hard‖ 
policy) that was well within the norms of military expectations for the age. Works such as 
these provide a comprehensive historiographical platform from which to evaluate jus in 
bello issues.  
Events like Sherman‘s March were notorious, in their own time and now, for the 
psychological trauma inflicted upon the South, as a military and social entity. The 
psychological impact of the Civil War on the average soldier, and his family, has been 
the subject of several major works. Paddy Griffith (1989) conducted impressive studies 
on the firing and hit rates of Civil War soldiers, concluding that most soldiers of the era 
either did not fire their weapons in battle, or when they did, rarely aimed with the intent 
to kill the enemy. In The Vacant Chair: the Northern Soldier Leaves Home (1993), Reid 
Mitchell examined the development of the Union soldier‘s state of bravery, viewing it as 
a product of home and family experiences prior to the war that became conceptualized by 
54 
 
most soldiers as a ―coming of age‖ process that led to the development of admirable, 
―manly‖ character traits. Most recently, Drew Gilpin Faust (2008) approached the Civil 
War from a philosophical direction entirely absent in our textbooks. In This Republic of 
Suffering, Faust considers the devastation wrought by the Civil War—typically related in 
arithmetical quantities of deaths in most textbooks—in terms of social upheaval, 
suffering, family and community rituals, and the conception of sacrifice and value in war. 
The nineteenth-century tradition of the ars moriendi, the ―Good Death‖—at peace and in 
resignation, surrounded by family and friends at home—was swept aside by the morass 
of unidentified corpses, mass graves, mutilations, and atrocities. ―Individuals found 
themselves in a new and different moral universe, one in which unimaginable destruction 
had become daily experience‖ (Faust, 2008, p. 267). The practical impact of such 
devastation was a massive expansion in the federal government‘s ability and will to care 
for the dead and the surviving; the moral implications went much farther, as Americans 
struggled to account for their own individuality in the face of industrial, mass carnage. 
The third component of ―just war,‖ jus post bellum, is most significantly represented 
by the period of Reconstruction, after the Confederacy‘s surrender in 1865. With regard 
to this period, there are several important studies, though a common criticism of most of 
the works in this area is a singular focus on either race or politics, but rarely a symbiosis 
of the two. There is a general lack of comprehensive volumes on Reconstruction, whether 
because of publishers‘ unwillingness to support them or historians‘ failure to produce 
such volumes. Eric Foner‘s Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution (1988) is 
probably the most esteemed single volume, but it is often critiqued as too heavily tilted 
towards a focus on race and racism in the postwar South. Many Civil War texts contain 
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reliable and insightful sections on Reconstruction, including Randall, Donald, & 
Randall‘s The Divided Union (1961), Allen C. Guelzo‘s The Crisis of the American 
Republic: Civil War and Reconstruction (1995), and Charles P. Roland‘s The American 
Iliad (2004).  
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CHAPTER THREE: 
METHOD AND PROCEDURES 
 
 Methods for this study are addressed in this section under the following headings: 
research design, description of participants, sampling, data collection, and issues of 
reliability and validity.  
 
Research Design 
 Because a textbook analysis does not involve human participants, it presents a 
research design that is nontraditional in many aspects. In a very literal sense, there are no 
subjects at all, given the inanimate nature of the textual material being analyzed; and 
more technically, textbooks in this study are not randomly selected for investigation, 
instead relying on a combination of sources to obtain a sample of texts that can be 
considered representative of the current field.  
Beck and McKeown (1991) assert that most textbook analyses are 
overwhelmingly critical of textbook narrative, but accomplish little beyond that since 
they routinely do not consider, to any great degree, ―the textual features that contribute to 
the negative evaluations of textbooks and the effects these features might have on student 
learning‖ (p. 496). Textbook analyses that focus on cognitive perspectives and try to ―get 
inside‖ the textual presentations of the narrative will generally prove more useful in 
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understanding the specific areas in which a given textbook may succeed or fail. Given 
that, this study focuses, through critical analysis, on the conceptualizations that textbooks 
present with regard to specific events and topics of the Civil War.  
 
Description of Textbooks 
 This study focuses on secondary-level U.S. history textbooks, primarily those 
furnished by the four largest publishing companies—Glencoe/McGraw-Hill, Pearson, 
Prentice Hall, and Houghton Mifflin. All the textbooks in this survey are aimed for 
general American History survey courses, not for specialized programs such as 
International Baccalaureate classes, which typically use materials either aimed at a 
collegiate audience or designed specifically for the objectives of that program.  
 
Sampling 
 There is wide divergence on the issue of sampling, varying from one textbook 
analysis to the next. In terms of content, textbooks are generally similar in breadth, 
length, and scope. There is great flexibility in size of textbook analyses, largely mediated 
by a researcher‘s scope and the nature of his/her questions—some studies use as few as 
five (Su, 2007; Watkins, 2008), while some choose much larger samples (e.g., Harrison-
Wong, 2003; Tompkins, Rosen & Larkin, 2006).  
 For this study, the sample is drawn from nationally known, widely used 
textbooks. In twenty-two states, state textbook adoption committees determine which 
books will be used in their classrooms, mostly in the South and West. Because three 
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states—Texas, Florida, and California—tend to start the adoption process earlier, and 
because textbook companies market their products aggressively there, these states‘ 
textbooks are often adopted by other states, including many without textbook committees 
themselves (Ezarik 2005; Harrison-Wong 2003). While local adoption varies from 
district to district, all of these textbooks are generally similar in scope and sequence of 
topic; and though narrative style may change from source to source, there is typically 
little variance in either style or graphic presentation. The unanimity of textbook narrative 
accounts for the wide variance in sample size. My sample includes ten books, all 
produced by national publishing houses, all contained on the approved textbook lists 
from California, Florida, and Texas: 
  
Table 1 
 
Textbook Sample List 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Publisher Publication Date Lead Author  Title 
Pearson-Prentice 
Hall 
 
2007 D. Goldfield The American Journey 
Pearson/Prentice 
Hall 
 
2008 M. Carnes The American Nation 
Pearson/Prentice 
Hall 
 
2007 A. Cayton America: Pathways to the Present 
Pearson/Prentice 
Hall 
 
2009 J.W. Davidson America: History of Our Nation 
Pearson/Prentice 
Hall 
2010 E.J. Lapansky-
Werner 
 
United States History 
McDougal/Littel 2010 G.A. Danzer The Americans 
 
Norton 2008 E. Foner Give Me Liberty! 
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Prentice Hall 2010 J.D. Keene Visions of America 
 
Houghton Mifflin 2006 D.M. Kennedy American Pageant 
 
Houghton Mifflin 2008 P.S. Boyer The Enduring Vision 
 
 
Data Collection 
 This study utilizes a critical analysis method to evaluate the textbook presentation 
of the Civil War. The analysis method will be similar to ones used by Jean Anyon (1979) 
in Ideology and United States Textbooks, and Carol Harrison-Wong (2003) in 
Educational Significance of how U.S. History Textbooks Treat Hiroshima. There are two 
main components to the procedure: a historical narrative approach and a categorical 
analysis approach. Below is a discussion of the critical analysis method in general, 
followed by an overview of the two methodological approaches.  
Textbook analyses generally fall into two categories. The first is called a content 
analysis, and it is defined by Merriam (1988) as ―a systematic procedure for describing 
the content of communications…that captures relevant characteristics of the document‘s 
content‖ (p. 116-117). This method uses quantitative methodology to ―code‖ the 
statements and assertions in the books by measuring the literal amount of coverage for 
selected topics (generally measured in the number of occasions a given topic is addressed 
within the text). This is effective at indicating the sheer volume of attention a given topic 
may receive in a textbook, and is often used to focus on what most textbook analyses are 
researching—primarily, issues of bias or accuracy. The second type, a critical analysis, 
attempts to uncover evidence of ideology and implicit motive through the selection, 
prioritization and arrangement of content. Critical textual analysis searches for 
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―ideological perspectives‖ embedded ―in the use of language, through nuance, 
descriptors, and choice of wording, and in visual images accompanying the text‖ 
(Harrison-Wong 2003, p. 33). Also, the design, goals, and placement of instructional 
exercises are analyzed to determine whether or not they present students with the 
opportunity to engage in critical evaluation of U.S. policy choices, or if instead they lead 
to a consensus viewpoint. Paxton (1999) point out that historical narrative is not 
scientifically produced, but is instead a personally configured creation of the author, an 
―act of rhetorical interpretation‖ (p. 6). Critical analysis methodology, in this case, is used 
to explore the motives and impact of such textbook narrative. 
This study incorporates two different methodological approaches—a historical 
narrative approach and a categorical analysis approach. Leahy (2007), in his study of 
textbook analysis methodologies, describes different procedures for textbook analysis. 
Two of these procedures serve as the primary evaluative tools of this study. The first, the 
historical narrative approach, compares textbook narrative with other historical 
narratives, while pointing out alternative interpretations, omissions, distortions, and the 
presence of historical ―myth.‖ There are three main advantages to this method. First, it 
allows the analysis to more accurately reflect the historical record, as a variety of 
historical sources are used as a foundation to construct a narrative from which to critique 
textbooks. Second, the emphasis on the historical record highlights the similarities and 
differences between the textbook sample and other historical accounts in a manner that is 
easy for readers to follow and comprehend. Third, this method allows the major 
historiographical works surrounding the topic to set the scope of the analysis, rather than 
relying on the scope and sequence of the textbook narrative or arbitrary categories 
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determined by the researcher. Conversely, according to Leahy there is a singular 
disadvantage to this method—its inherent subjectivity, since the critique is necessarily 
limited to topics selected by the researcher (a criticism often leveled at James Loewen, 
the most noted practitioner of this method).  Given the qualitative nature of this brand of 
research, subjectivity is not considered a fundamental flaw; and, as Leahy points out, 
being ―openly self-reflective, including alternative interpretations, and seeking out 
disconfirming evidence can minimize this approach‘s inherent subjectivity‖ (Leahy 2007, 
p. 125).  
The second major method for this study is the categorical analysis approach. In 
his study of textbook methodologies, Leahy critiques the work of Podeh (2002) who 
examined the history of the Israeli-Arab conflict in Israeli history textbooks by 
comparing narrative accounts to preselected categories for analysis. According to Leahy, 
this approach has three distinct advantages. First, it allows the researcher to focus more 
exclusively on the structure, tone, and style of the textbook narratives. Second, it allows 
the researcher to avoid the linear restrictions that come from relying on the chronology of 
the textbook accounts. And finally, the method is designed to determine the degree to 
which textbooks offer a complete, balanced narrative by assessing the narrative‘s tone, as 
well as supporting pictures, assessments, and activities. There are, however, two distinct 
disadvantages to this method: first, as with the historical narrative approach, it is highly 
subjective and contains no measure of validity; and second, it requires textbook 
narratives and corresponding historical accounts to be subjective to the criteria, which in 
the case of this method are categories predetermined by the researcher. In the case of this 
study, the categories to be used—the three broad classifications of ―just war‖ (jus ad 
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bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum) and their constituent subcategories—have a 
distinct advantage over Podeh‘s method, in they were not arbitrarily selected or created. 
Instead, they are the distillation of a historically stable and academically verifiable 
tradition of scholarship, one that has been present over a broad swath of history.  
The two methodologies help to provide a comprehensive analysis of the moral 
content of textbooks, with regard to the depictions of the Civil War. The historical 
narrative method will examine the degree to which textbooks represent historical content 
that formed the basis for Northern and Southern views of the war (e.g., topics such as the 
Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, the passage of which was viewed by both sides as a major 
component of the increase in hostility). The categorical analysis method allows for an 
investigation of the manner in which moral content is present, implicitly or explicitly, in 
textbooks. In this study, then, there will be three sections, in each of the following 
chapters. In each section, textbook narratives are analyzed with two methodologies—a 
historical narrative approach and a categorical analysis approach. Under the first 
approach, textbook depictions of selected events/topics are compared and contrasted to 
relevant historiographical sources, in order to identify issues of inaccuracy, bias, 
interpretive discrepancies, and omissions. Under the second approach, textbook 
depictions of selected events/topics are compared to the categories of the ―just war‖ 
doctrine. The historical events/topics were chosen because of their conceptual similarity 
to prominent elements of ―just war.‖ For this section, the three broad divisions of ―just 
war‖ and the nineteen subcategories identified by Brian Orend, in The Morality of War 
(2006), form the framework for the categorical analysis. This framework is useful, given 
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the manner in which Orend has organized the historical traditions and antecedents of 
―just war‖ into a model that is clear, parsimonious, and comprehensive.  
Data was summarized in clustered summary tables, derived from Miles and 
Huberman‘s (1984) techniques of qualitative data analysis. See Appendices A and B for 
the table in question. Using this tool, the conceptualization of war presented in standard 
U.S. history textbooks can be evaluated for moral and ethical assumptions. Prior to the 
categorical analysis in each of the three chapters, a brief discussion of the ―just war‖ 
components to which textbook narrative will be compared is included.  
In Chapter 4, Jus Ad Bellum, there are three historical events/topics used for 
analysis, which were chosen because of their conceptual connection to the ―just war‖ 
category of ―justice before war.‖ The first event, the issue of secession and states‘-rights 
prior to 1860, was used by Southern states as a broad justification for their potential 
refusal to submit to federal authority in the years prior to the outbreak of open war in 
1861; and, conversely, was used by Northern states as evidence of Southern treason 
against the cause of national union (McPherson, 1988). This topic aptly encompasses the 
major component of jus ad bellum, that of just cause. For the purposes of this study, the 
issue of secession and states‘-rights will be examined in relation to the following 
subtopics: the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798-1799 (because of its status as 
the philosophical roots of secession), the nullification crisis of 1828-1832, between the 
federal government and South Carolina (given the fact that it was the first time a state had 
proposed the idea of political secession from the Union), the Wilmot Proviso of 1846 
(given its preeminence in the issue of slavery‘s potential expansion into newly acquired 
territories after the Mexican War), and the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 (because of the 
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Southern view that an adequate federal prosecution of this law was vital for the 
preservation of the Union).   
The second event, the presidential election of 1860, was the event to which most 
Southerners pointed to as the singular moment that made secession an inevitability, given 
the contemporary (and inaccurate) Southern view of Abraham Lincoln as a strident 
abolitionist. For example, upon its secession, the state of Mississippi issued a declaration 
in February 1861 wherein the election of Lincoln was referred to as ―a blow at slavery 
[and] a blow at commerce and civilization…there was no choice left us but submission to 
the mandates of abolition, or a dissolution of the Union, whose principles had been 
subverted to work out our ruin‖ (―A Declaration of the Immediate Causes which Induce 
and Justify the Secession of the State of Mississippi from the Federal Union,‖ 2008).  
Arguably, the election of Lincoln provided a suitably convenient justification for a course 
of action already favored by those in power. In any case, the Southern and Northern 
reactions to this election are conceptually analogous to the jus ad bellum categories of 
just cause and right intention.  
The third event, the Southern attack on Fort Sumter, in Charleston, South 
Carolina, in April 1861, is typically identified in textbooks as the initial hostile act of the 
Civil War. The conceptualization of this event, within textbook narrative, is analogous to 
the jus ad bellum categories of ―just cause‖ and ―last resort.‖ For the historical narrative 
approach, these events were compared to relevant historiographical work, including 
James McPherson‘s Battle Cry of Freedom (1988), David Williams‘ A People’s History 
of the Civil War: Struggles for the Meaning of Freedom (2005), and Christopher Olsen‘s 
The American Civil War: a Hands-On History (2006).  
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The second section of this study, Chapter 5, concerns the ―just war‖ category of 
jus in bello, ―justice during war.‖ For this section, two events/topics drawn from textbook 
narratives are considered. The first topic is broadly conceived as the experience of 
soldiers and civilians in combat. Most textbooks contain narrative descriptions of the 
nature of Civil War battle, concerned less with overarching strategic implications and 
more with the day-to-day reality of war for the Union and Confederate soldier, their 
families at home, and non-combatants in general. For the historical narrative approach, 
these descriptions are compared with relevant historiographical work, including 
Fellman‘s Inside War: the Guerrilla Conflict in Missouri during the American Civil War 
(1989), J. Tracy Power‘s Lee's Miserables: Life in the Army of Northern Virginia from 
the Wilderness to Appomattox (1989), Earl J. Hess‘ The Union Soldier in Battle: 
Exploring the Ordeal of Combat (1997), Drew Gilpin Faust‘s (2008) This Republic of 
Suffering, and Gerald Linderman‘s Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the 
American Civil War (1987). For the categorical analysis approach, the events in question 
will be measured against the ―just war‖ category of proportionality.  
The second event addressed in this chapter is one of the most noted events of the 
Civil War era, the ―March to the Sea‖ led by Union General William T. Sherman in late 
1864. This event is ubiquitous to textbooks and is typically presented as evidence of the 
escalation of the war, against both combatants and non-combatants. For the historical 
narrative approach, historiographical works like Mark Grimsley‘s (1995) The Hard Hand 
of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865, and J.M. 
McPherson‘s (2007) This Mighty Scourge: Perspectives on the Civil War will be used. 
For the categorical analysis approach, textbook depictions of Sherman‘s march are 
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evaluated against the ―just war‖ components of benevolent quarantine and the ethical 
treatment of prisoners of war (POWs), means that may be considered mala in se, and 
proportionality.  
The third section of the study, Chapter 6, addresses issues of jus post bellum, 
―justice after war.‖ This chapter considers textbook portrayals of events/topics dating 
from the war‘s cessation to 1877, the date at which most textbook narrative mark the end 
of the Reconstruction period (and thus, the conclusion of narrative regarding jus post 
bellum issues). Narrative depictions of the following events are considered: the surrender 
of Robert E. Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia to General Ulysses S. Grant at 
Appomattox Court House, on April 9, 1865, which is generally depicted in most 
textbooks as the ―unofficial‖ end to the Civil War; the passage of the 14th Amendment 
after the war‘s end; the competing plans for the South‘s reconstruction, those of President 
Andrew Johnson and the Radical Republicans of the U.S. Congress; and the Compromise 
of 1877, which determined the victor of the presidential election of the previous year and 
is displayed in most textbooks as the practical end of the Reconstruction period. For the 
historical narrative approach, the following historiographical works are utilized: Eric 
Foner‘s Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution (1988), Randall, Donald, and 
Randall‘s The Divided Union (1961), Allen C. Guelzo‘s The Crisis of the American 
Republic: Civil War and Reconstruction (1995), and Charles P. Roland‘s The American 
Iliad (2004).  
The first event, Lee‘s surrender to Grant at Appomattox, is depicted in most 
textbooks as the most prominent cessation of violence (although three other Confederate 
armies were still in the field at the time), and is generally presented as the closest thing to 
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a formal peace agreement. In this sense, it is analogous to the ―just war‖ requirement of 
proportionality and publicity, as well as the components of discrimination. It should be 
recalled that Orend, in The Morality of War (2006) distinguishes between the jus in bello 
conception of proportionality and discrimination, and the jus post bellum usage of the 
same terms (p. 15-17).  
The three other events/topics analyzed in this section of the study are drawn from 
the historical period broadly designated Reconstruction. This era is usually 
chronologically measured between April 1865, the practical end of violence (since there 
were regular occurrences of low-intensity hostility well after that point), and 1877, the 
point at which federal troops were finally removed from Southern states. The second 
event, the passage of the 14
th
 Amendment, is analogous to the ―just war‖ components of 
rights vindication, given its designers‘ general intent to provide political and social 
equality to newly-freed Southern blacks (as well as preventing the Supreme Court from 
invalidating the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which accorded citizenship to all people born 
within the United States). The third event/topic—the two plans for Reconstruction 
presented by President Andrew Johnson (largely drawn from the elements of President 
Lincoln‘s ―ten-percent‖ plan) and by Radical Republicans in the U.S. Congress—is 
conceptually linked to the ―just war‖ components of compensation and rehabilitation. The 
third event, the Compromise of 1877, is typically depicted in textbooks as the formal end 
of Reconstruction (though there is considerable historical debate about the legality of the 
―compromise‖), and thus is analogous to the ―just war‖ requirement of rights vindication.  
In the final chapter, ―A Framework for the Moral Critique of War,‖ the utility and 
application of the ―just war‖ doctrine for the study of war and policies that may result in 
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violent conflict is explored. Additionally, I will explore the manner in which the 
psychological effects of war are largely misrepresented in our classrooms. For this, I will 
rely on works addressing the psychological and social implications of combat (from both 
the Civil War and throughout history) on soldiers and civilians. These works include 
Grossman‘s (1995) On Killing, Paddy Griffith‘s (1989) Battle Tactics of the Civil War, 
S.L.A. Marshall‘s (2000) Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future 
War , and These works will be used to compare and contrast textbook depictions of the 
experience and impact of war on participants and onlookers in the North and South.  
 
Table 2: Methodological Framework  
 
Jus Ad Bellum   Jus In Bello   Jus Post Bellum 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Historical Narrative Analysis     Historical Narrative Analysis        Historical Narrative Analysis 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Secession & States‘ Rights 
 Virginia/Kentucky Resolutions 
 Nullification Crisis 
 Wilmot Proviso 
 Fugitive Slave Law 
Election of 1860 
Fort Sumter 
 
Experience of battle for combatants 
 Battle and casualties 
Experience of battle for non-
combatants 
 Women in the war 
 Discontent on the Home Front 
 Death and Dying 
 Vicksburg 
Prisoners of War (POWs) 
Sherman‘s ―March to the Sea‖ 
 
Lee‘s surrender at Appomattox 
Presidential Reconstruction v. Radical 
Reconstruction 
The 14th Amendment 
Compromise of 1877 
Categorical Analysis           Categorical Analysis                        Categorical Analysis 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Just Cause 
Right Intention 
Proper Authority 
Last Resort 
Benevolent Quarantine of POWs 
Mala in Se 
Proportionality 
Proportionality and Publicity 
Compensation and Punishment 
Rehabilitation 
Rights Vindication 
Discrimination 
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Reliability and Validity 
In this section, the issues of reliability and validity are discussed. This study is 
based in part on Beck and McKeown‘s (1991) three-part framework for a comprehensive 
textbook analysis From a constructivist point of view, the threat of bias is not a prima 
facie danger to the validity of the study, since all research (including the questions, the 
data, the findings and the recommendations) is drawn from and influenced by our 
individual perspectives. A greater impediment to reliability, rather than the omnipresent 
influence of the researcher, is the quality of the research itself. The findings of many 
textbook analyses seem to revolve around textbooks‘ generic quality, their dullness, or 
their tendency to homogenize the American experience and, in so doing, to abbreviate or 
entirely delete the perspectives of minority or marginalized groups. With that general 
finding, the recommendations of most textbook analyses are similarly redundant—
textbooks should provide more coverage, from more points of view (therefore, of course, 
compounding the problem of immense, generic textbooks that try and please everyone, 
rarely succeeding).  
If a researcher critiques a textbook, it should be generally assumed that such 
criticism derives from a belief on the researcher‘s part that there is a certain 
understanding learners should acquire from using a textbook—and, subsequently, a 
textbook‘s ability to help students acquire such an understanding is a measurement of its 
acceptability. While this assumption is implicit, Beck and McKeown hold that it should 
be specifically addressed in a textbook analysis. They put forth three elements that should 
be present for a textbook analysis to comprehensively address a textbook‘s content. First, 
the analysis should contain a situation model, ―the set of ideas and their relationships that 
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a researcher believes would constitute student understanding about a specific topic‖ (p. 
503). Put another way, the situation model represents a researchers‘ view of what a 
textbook should look like, or what content a textbook should present and roughly in what 
manner.  
 Beck and McKeown point to another element that should be present in any 
comprehensive textbook analysis, the presence of extensive examples. A common feature 
of textbook analyses is their reliance on generalizations about what the researcher thinks 
is appropriate or inappropriate, without the detail necessary to augment such conclusions. 
Beck and McKeown assert that text excerpts are vital; with regard to the issue of 
practicality (especially given the degree of coverage a textbook may dedicate to a given 
topic, such as the Civil War), the authors state: 
It is not always feasible or practical to present extensive excerpts in a report to 
illustrate text treatment of a topic; discursive descriptions of text content can also 
provide a faithful portrayal of a text presentation, particularly if they are liberally 
salted with some direct quotes. (p. 508) 
The final element of Beck and McKeown‘s elements for a comprehensive textbook 
analysis is commentary. It is common, in textbook analyses, for the researcher to 
investigate a given text to a much greater degree of depth than would be expected among 
more casual readers. Concurrently, it is common for the researcher to make assertions 
about text narrative that may seem quite self-evident, but may be less so to a party less 
knowledgeable about the topic being researched or the text being investigated. To combat 
this tendency, Beck and McKeown call for a comprehensive explanation to follow the 
presentation of evidence, in order to facilitate a reader in verifying inferences that may be 
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drawn from a given argument—―for a reader to understand an example as an instance of 
something, it is frequently necessary for an investigator to provide a commentary that 
explains how and why the example illustrates what the investigator says it does‖ (p. 504).  
The presence of these three elements helps make a textbook analysis reliable in its 
structure. But to make such a study worthwhile and of value to the academic field, it is 
vital to avoid, as much as possible, the common pitfalls of contraction, incoherence, or 
the support (whether implicit or explicit) of a particular ideological purpose. In an effort 
to insure data integrity and quality, this study will also incorporate Holder‘s five criteria 
for the confirmation of interpretation through data analysis (cited in Gall, Gall, & Borg 
2007, p. 283):  
 Internal coherence (the different parts of a theoretical argument do not contradict 
one other and the conclusions follow from the premises 
 External coherence (the interpretation fits theories accepted in and outside the 
discipline) 
 Correspondence between theory and data 
 Fruitfulness of theoretical suppositions (how many new directions, lines of 
inquiry, or perspectives are opened up) 
 Trustworthiness, professional credentials, and status of the author (and his/her 
supporters 
In terms of validity, there is considerable debate about the value of the traditional use 
of that term with regard to qualitative research. Certainly, external validity, as a 
theoretical (rather than statistical) concept has its value; yet a qualitative textbook 
analysis will not yield the measurements that are typical to quantitative studies and are 
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more visibly evaluated. Lincoln and Guba (1985) propose an alternative formulation for 
―qualitative validity,‖ comprised of four components (p. 300-301): 
 Credibility (can the findings be construed as ―true?‖) 
 Transferability (can the findings be applied to other contexts?) 
 Dependability (are the findings consistent and repeatable?) 
 Confirmability (an iteration of the subjective/objective distinction, wherein a 
study‘s findings are shaped by respondents and not the researcher; in effect, 
where fact is confirmed, confirmable, and reliable) 
These criteria are not without controversy, and are aimed generally at qualitative 
interview data, rather than textbook analyses. But since textbooks are human products, 
they are subject to the same individual construction of perspective as any testimonial or 
interview, the process that Lincoln and Guba call ―the daily fender-bender of reality‖ (p. 
85).  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
JUS AD BELLUM 
 
 The purpose of this study is to examine the moral implications of textbook 
narrative depictions of the Civil War, as measured against the ―just war‖ doctrine. This 
chapter focuses on three topics/events connected to the ―just war‖ category of jus ad 
bellum: the issue of secession and states‘-rights, the presidential election of 1860, and the 
Confederate attack on Fort Sumter in April 1861. 
 
Secession and States’-Rights 
 The issue of states‘-rights has been a prominent theme in American history since 
the nation‘s founding. States, in the eyes of many early Americans (especially in the 
South), were the dominant political institutions of the Union, and the federal government 
was viewed as, at best, a partner rather than as a master. Whether or not a given state was 
justified in breaking the governmental compact and leaving the Union was fundamental 
to that state‘s moral standing, and is deeply connected to the ―just war‖ component of just 
cause. The issue of secession, for the purposes of this study, will be examined in relation 
to the following foundational subtopics: the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798-
1799, the nullification crisis between South Carolina and the U.S. government between 
1828 and 1832, the Wilmot Proviso of 1846, and the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. These 
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issues are prominent in historiographical literature, where they are generally displayed as 
contributory to development of secession and states‘-rights in the South prior to the Civil 
War. The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions are depicted as the philosophical 
underpinning upon which Southern arguments for secession would ultimately be based; 
and, similarly, the nullification crisis of 1828-1832 is often considered by historians to be 
a major conceptual step towards disunion, thirty years later. The Wilmot Proviso of 1846, 
and its attempt to restrict slavery from entering newly-won territories in the southwest, 
was perceived by many Southerners as the first open assault on their defining institution; 
and the Fugitive Slave Law was seen by both the North and the South as a crucial and 
provocative step towards civil war—in the North, because of the moral outrage attending 
the apprehension and extradition of freedmen; in the South, because of the perceived 
failure by the North to adequately enforce the Act, once passed.  
 
Historical Narrative Analysis 
 This section includes the historical narrative analysis of textbook depictions of the 
following event: the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798-1799, the nullification 
crisis of 1828-1832, the Wilmot Proviso of 1846, and the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. 
 
The Virginia and Kentucky resolutions. 
The notion of secession had been a latent political issue since 1798-99, when 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison anonymously penned the Virginia and Kentucky 
Resolutions in reaction to the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts by the U.S. 
75 
 
Congress. The resolutions put forth the idea that individual states had the right to deny 
acts of the federal government that exceeded strict constitutional allowance. These 
documents had no legal authority, and were written before the Supreme Court had 
adopted the power of judicial review, leaving the states, to Madison and Jefferson, as the 
final bulwark against governmental tyranny. But the notion that a state could legally defy 
the Union took root in the South, and became the guiding ideology of Southern secession, 
the seemingly logical end result of what John Calhoun termed ―nullification‖ (Olsen, 
2006, p. 8).   
Major historiographical works bear out the importance of these two resolutions as 
the theoretical underpinning of both the South Carolina nullification crisis of 1828-1832 
(the most infamous and radical states‘-rights episode, prior to the Civil War) and the 
secession movement of the early 1860s. Noted historians like Henry Steele Commager 
and Samuel Eliot Morison (1942) pointed to the philosophical development of the states‘-
rights position with the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions and their embedded 
―compact‖ theory, and its reflection in minority views throughout American history. 
Morrison goes on to connect Madison and Jefferson‘s doctrine and its manifestation in 
concurrent historical events—in New England states‘ attempt to renounce the federal 
embargo on trade with Great Britain and France in 1809, the South Carolina nullification 
crisis of the late 1820s, and the secession movement prior to the Civil War (Commager & 
Morison, p. 377, 641-642). In John C. Miller‘s The Federalist Era, 1789-1801 (1960), the 
author describes the manner in which the twin resolves led ultimately to the South 
Carolina nullification crisis. In proposing that the final arbiter for Constitutional 
interpretation was not the Supreme Court but instead the states, the theory behind the 
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resolutions ―ultimately led to the nullification by a state of a Federal law‖ (p. 239). Harry 
Watson, in Liberty and Power: the Politics of Jacksonian America (2006), links the 
famous debate between Senators Daniel Webster of Massachusetts and Robert Y. Hayne 
of South Carolina in the winter of 1830—and specifically, Hayne‘s argument for 
nullification—to the text of the Virginia Resolutions and what he termed ―a deliberate, 
palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers not granted by the [Constitution]‖ 
(cited in Watson, 2006, p. 119).  
The role of Thomas Jefferson in the development of nullification as a 
constitutional mechanism has also been the focus of prominent historiography. Joseph 
Ellis (1996), in American Sphinx: the Character of Thomas Jefferson, points out that 
since his death, Jefferson‘s ideology, and its manifestation in the Kentucky resolves, had 
been appropriated (however contrary it might have been to Jefferson‘s true loyalties) by 
southern secessionists in the decades leading to the Civil War (Ellis, 1996, p. 8, p. 333). 
In The Wolf by the Ears: Thomas Jefferson and Slavery (1977), John C. Miller describes 
the evolution of Thomas Jefferson‘s principles, from early attempts to ban the extension 
of slavery into newly established territories to converting ―the doctrine of states‘-rights 
into a protective shield for slavery against interference by a hostile federal government‖ 
(p. 231). And Louis Masur, in 1831: Year of Eclipse (2001), describes the manner in 
which James Hamilton, the governor of South Carolina from 1830-1832, appropriated 
Jefferson‘s words and philosophy in defending both the idea of nullification and the 
possibility of secession (p. 146-147). Taken together, there is substantial consensus 
regarding the philosophical link between the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, 
nullification, and ultimately secession. 
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 Textbooks from this sample often mention the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions 
in relation to the Alien and Sedition Acts, without overt connection to the future prospect 
of secession. For example, McDougal-Littel‘s The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010) 
describes Jefferson and Madison as viewing the new Acts as a ―serious misuse of power 
on the part of the federal government,‖ and they therefore decided to ―organize 
opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts by appealing to the states‖ (p. 195). On the 
following page, the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions are quoted as one document, 
using Jefferson‘s phrasing to assert that the ―Constitution has…been wise in fixing limits 
to the government it created‖ (p. 196). The Americans states that Virginia and Kentucky 
pushed for other states to adopt similar resolutions, but diffuses this point in saying that 
no other state did so, and that ―the issue died out by the next presidential election‖ (p. 
196). Additionally, the textbook presents an implicitly dim view of the importance of the 
Resolutions with its sidebar vocabulary terms—to the left of the main column, just above 
the description of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, the term ―sedition‖ is presented 
with the following definition: ―rebellion against one‘s country; treason‖ (p. 195). The 
Americans does present an opportunity for students to critically examine the moral status 
of the Alien and Sedition Acts and the contrary view of the Resolutions with its ―Critical 
Thinking‖ exercise at the end of the section:  
Analyzing Issues: Do you agree with the Democratic-Republicans that the Alien and 
Sedition Acts were a violation of the First Amendment? Were they necessary? 
Support your opinion. Think about: 
 The intent of the First Amendment 
 What was happening in Europe 
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 What was happening in America (p. 196)  
While the text does examine the Alien and Sedition Acts and the Virginia and 
Kentucky Resolutions from an implicitly moral viewpoint, there is no explicit discussion 
or analysis of the issue beyond this, and there is no overt connection between the 
Resolutions and future secession.  
 Prentice Hall‘s United States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010) says far less 
about the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. ―In two Democratic Republican states,‖ it 
claims, ―the state legislatures passed controversial resolves in response to the [Alien and 
Sedition] Acts‖ (p. 202). Beyond this statement, the textbook contains little information 
about the resolves themselves, and there are no activities, prompts, cartoons or visual 
representations of the Resolutions as a response to the Alien and Sedition Acts. The 
single remaining statement about the resolves is seemingly contradictory: ―Though this 
doctrine of nullification threatened to dissolve the union, no other state legislatures 
adopted it‖ (p. 202). The first part of the statement infers the importance of the 
resolutions and their ideological weight in the future issue of secession, but there is no 
clarification or support in terms of why such a doctrine might find support in Southern 
states. The second part of the statement accomplishes the same function as the depiction 
of the Resolutions in The Americans: to dilute the ideological impact of the resolves in 
future sectional disputes.  
 Other textbooks are equally brief in their descriptions of the Resolutions. Prentice 
Hall‘s America: Pathways to the Present (Cayton, et al., 2007) provides a similar 
description of Jefferson and Madison‘s motive in writing the resolves, but emphasizes 
their theoretical standing—―for the time being, this principle of nullification remained 
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untested. Neither Virginia nor Kentucky tried to enforce the resolutions. Still, their 
defiance of federal power was clear‖ (p. 208). Pearson-Longman‘s The American Nation: 
A History of the United States (Carnes, et al., 2008) describes the resolutions in detail, 
and to its credit, the text points out that Madison and Jefferson were not interested in 
―advancing a new constitutional theory of extreme states‘-rights. ‗Keep away all show of 
force,‘ Jefferson advised his supporters‖ (p. 167). But there is no explicit connection 
between the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions and the philosophy of nullification (and 
ultimately, secession) beyond a cryptic reference a page later, at the end of the chapter:  
The Kentucky and Virginia Resolves, however, had raised an issue that would 
loom large in the next century. If Congress passed laws that particular states 
thought to be unconstitutional, did states have the right to ignore those laws—or 
to withdraw from the Constitution altogether? (p. 168) 
 Pearson-Prentice Hall‘s The American Journey (Goldfield, et al., 2007) presents a 
connection between future iterations of Southern states‘-rights and the Virginia and 
Kentucky Resolutions in its text: ―[Jefferson and Madison] produced the first significant 
articulation of the southern stand on states’-rights [sic]‖ (p. 228). Beyond this, though, 
there is no mention of the relationship between the Resolutions, the resulting philosophy 
of nullification, and the issue of secession in the 1860s. Norton‘s Give Me Liberty! 
(Foner, 2008) mentions how the Kentucky legislature went so far as to delete Jefferson‘s 
original passage that gave states the power to nullify acts of Congress that violated the 
Constitution, diffusing the connection between Jefferson‘s rhetorical position and the 
secession movement sixty years later (Foner, 2008, p. 292). Similarly, Prentice Hall‘s 
Visions of America: a History of the United States (Keene, et al., 2010) covers much of 
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the same territory as other textbooks, and tries to explain the Resolutions as a product of 
Madison and Jefferson‘s desire to oppose Federalist policy rather than to create a radical 
theory of states‘-rights. Beyond this, though, there is little discussion of the resolves‘ 
foundational nature to secession, other than an oblique reference that the resolutions 
would ultimately become ―the foundation for subsequent arguments‖ about states‘-rights 
(p. 184).  
While most textbooks in this study do not explicitly make a connection between 
the Resolutions and secession as a theoretical concept, several others try to connect the 
issue of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions to the secession movement of the early 
1860s. Houghton Mifflin‘s The Enduring Vision (Boyer, et al., 2008) does a 
commendable job of explaining the theoretical nature of the Resolutions and their appeal 
to the power of interposition, which the text describes as a state‘s right to ―protect the 
liberties of their citizens‖ (p. 209). Moreover, the text presents a compelling description 
of what Jefferson‘s original passage (which describes a state‘s ability to nullify federal 
law) might mean in practice:  
Although the resolutions were intended as nonviolent protests, they challenged 
the jurisdiction of federal courts and could have enabled state militias to march 
into a federal courtroom to halt proceedings at bayonet point. (p. 209)  
This evocative description is followed by a strong summary of the impact of the 
Resolutions (―their passage demonstrated the great potential for disunion in the late 
1790s‖), though there is no explicit connection between the Resolutions and the 
nineteenth-century issues of nullification and secession.  
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Prentice Hall‘s America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009) 
addresses this connection with more detail and complexity that most textbooks in this 
study, addressing the issue of the Resolutions in a section titled (in bold, large letters), 
―STATES‘-RIGHTS‖ (p. 300). At the end of this section, after providing a detailed 
(though comparatively short) description of the Alien and Sedition Acts and the resulting 
Resolutions, the text provides a clear connection between the resolves, the theory of 
nullification, and secession:  
In decades to come, a number of states would refuse to obey certain federal laws. 
States‘-rights would become the rallying cry for southern defenders of slavery. (p. 
301) 
The textbook authors also include a chart on the previous page that details 
arguments for federal power versus states‘-rights (―Because the states created the United 
States, individual states have the power to nullify a federal law‖), as well as providing a 
coda titled ―Trouble on the Horizon‖ that outlines the future interpretations of the 
Resolutions:  
Within 25 years of the Alien and Sedition Acts, people in New England and South 
Carolina would threaten to leave the Union because they either disagreed with 
American foreign policy or opposed laws passed by Congress. (p. 300) 
Houghton Mifflin‘s The American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006) presents a 
substantially more colorful and powerful version of the Resolutions. ―Resentful 
Jeffersonians,‖ it begins, ―refused to take the Alien and Sedition Laws lying down.‖ (p. 
206) The textbook describes the idea of nullification and goes so far as to connect it to 
the historical and philosophical antecedent of the ―compact theory,‖ the notion that the 
82 
 
federal government was a member of a contract with the various states; and, ―since water 
can rise no higher than its source, the individual states were the final judges‖ of whether 
or not the federal government had overstepped its authority (p. 206). The American 
Pageant connects the resolves to future notions of secession by noting that Southern 
slaveowners would ultimately adopt the argument to defend leaving the Union, though 
the textbook narrative closes by pointing out that dissolving the Union was the last thing 
Jefferson and Madison had intended; instead, ―they were groping for ways to preserve 
it…the only real nullification that Jefferson had in view was the nullification of Federalist 
abuses‖ (p. 207).  
In summary, then, only a handful of textbooks attempt to connect the Kentucky 
and Virginia Resolutions to the future issues of nullification and secession. Certainly this 
is due in part to the grade level expectations of certain books and the inherent complexity 
of some texts over others; still, given the role this theory played for Civil War-era 
Southerners in establishing the ―just cause‖ necessary for hostilities, there is enough 
ambiguity or absence to create a concern. Deeper analysis on this topic will explore the 
degree to which moral content is present in textbooks, but not clearly delineated or 
organized in such a manner as to encourage (or even allow) coherent criticism by 
students.  
 
Nullification crisis, 1828-1832. 
The second subcategory of the issue of secession/states‘-rights is the crisis that 
erupted between South Carolina and the U.S. government, between 1828 and 1832. In 
1828, South Carolina became the first battleground of nullification, as state leaders opted 
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to ―nullify‖ a federal tariff deemed too harsh to Southern interests. President Andrew 
Jackson was prepared to use military force to compel the recalcitrant state to comply with 
federal law, by using the newly passed Force Bill to crush those he considered 
imminently threatening to the Union. Jackson and South Carolina were both ultimately 
mollified by a compromise tariff negotiated in 1832 by Congressman Henry Clay, and it 
seemed the issue was resolved. But the nullification crisis between South Carolina and 
the federal government was a harbinger of the philosophical divide that was growing 
between Northerners and Southerners.  
There are a number of historiographical works of the era that devote considerable 
attention to the nullification crisis. Christopher Olsen, in The American Civil War: A 
Hands-On History (2006), considers nullification less of a tool to exert state sovereignty 
over tariffs and more about slavery, in order to protect that institution ―from a federal 
government [Southerners] saw as increasingly threatening, and in the future apt to be 
dominated by Yankees‖ (Olsen, 2006, p. 8). Though the compromise tariff of 1832 is 
often seen as the solution to the crisis, Olsen points out that the South Carolina 
legislature, in a final bit of legalistic peevishness, followed their de rigueur repeal of the 
Ordinance of Nullification with a final act of defiance, by nullifying President Jackson‘s 
Force Bill. The ―lessons‖ learned by the South in the nullification crisis were dangerous 
ones for the future safety of the Union—Southerners concluded that states‘-rights was 
clearly a winning position, since they had largely achieved what they wanted (namely, 
lower rates on the federal tariff), and many came to believe that, by forcing the federal 
government to compromise, threats to secede were legitimate ones. What the South 
learned, Olsen asserts, laid the groundwork for the disruption of the nation, as they began 
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to ―see states‘-rights, nullification, and even secession as viable options in the quest to 
protect slavery‖ (Olsen, 2006, p. 9).  
Other works reflect the importance of nullification, both in terms of its connection 
to secession and the alarm, consternation, and defiance it raised among contemporaneous 
national figures. Louis Masur, in 1831: Year of Eclipse (2001) describes how James 
Madison, eighty years old at the midpoint of the nullification crisis, roused himself from 
semi-retirement to address what he called the ―heresy‖ of the South‘s attempt to subvert 
the original intent of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. The nation, he claimed, was 
a singular entity comprised of states, not controlled by them—the Constitution ―cannot be 
altered or annulled at the will of the States individually‖ (cited in Masur, 2001, p. 148). 
This did not dissuade Southerners like Representative George McDuffie of South 
Carolina, who, at a public dinner on May 19, 1831, invoked the example of the 1776 
Revolution and thundered, ―Shall we be terrified by mere phantoms of blood, when our 
ancestors, for less cause, encountered the dreadful reality? Great God! Are we the 
descendants of those ancestors; are we freemen; are we men‖ (Masur, 2001, p. 158)? 
Not all South Carolinians agreed with the ―nullifiers,‖ and their objections clearly 
illustrate the direct link between the prospect of nullification and the fear of secession 
(and, by extension, civil war). Representative William Drayton vilified the supporters of 
nullification in an address on July 4, 1831, and warned of the possibility of violence as a 
result of the theory put in action, the ―spectacle of brother armed against brother, of 
parent against child, and of the child against his parent‖ (cited in Masur, 2001, p. 166).  
The resolution of the nullification crisis is presented by some historians as a 
definitive boost to the prospect of secession. Harry Watson, in Liberty and Power: the 
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Politics of Jacksonian America (2006), claims that the failure of the federal government 
to clearly oppose nullification and to avoid compromise on a number of issues prior to 
1832 had opened the door to the Southern conclusion that the federal-or-states‘-rights 
dilemma was tilting towards the latter. The expulsion of Indian tribes from the South and 
the resultant opening of vast acreage dedicated to the expansion of slavery had indicated 
a preference, in the Southern view, for that institution; and the compromise tariff hinted 
at a federal willingness to favor agrarian interests over industrial interests, a preference 
for slave laborers over freedmen (Watson, 2006, p. 130). This seemingly positive attitude 
towards the federal government, fostered by the resolution of the nullification crisis, 
would be bitterly cast away when it seemed, in the near future, that the North was trying 
to oppose and destroy Southern interests.  
Textbooks in this sample all cover the nullification crisis, though only one tries to 
connect the crisis to the philosophical foundation of the Kentucky and Virginia 
Resolutions and from thence to the secession of the Confederacy. America: History of 
Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009), which does a comparatively admirable job with 
the two resolves of 1798, again delivers with its coverage of the nullification issue. Under 
its section titled ―The Nullification Crisis,‖ the text narrative includes the dominant 
Southern perspective on the 1828 tariff—―If the federal government could enforce what 
they considered an unjust law, could it also use its power to end slavery‖ (p. 364)? It also 
provides a functionally accurate definition of nullification, highlighted in blue: ―an action 
by a state that cancels a federal law to which the state objects‖ (p. 364).  
 America: History of Our Nation does tend, as most textbooks do, to overly 
simplify historical issues. At one point in the main narrative, the text quotes Andrew 
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Jackson‘s toast from the Democratic Jefferson Day dinner on April 13, 1830 (―Our 
Federal Union—it must be preserved‖) and then follows with the response of John C. 
Calhoun (―The Union—next to our liberty, the most dear‖). While this exchange is 
quoted accurately, and even dramatically, the concluding sentence of the paragraph 
drastically simplifies the complexity of Calhoun‘s reasoning—―to Calhoun, states‘-rights 
was more important than the Union‖ (Davidson & Stoff, 2009, p. 365). 
Similarly, the text provides a deceptively clear ending to the crisis in 1833: 
Unable to win support for its position from other states, South Carolina then 
repealed its tariff nullification. Many Americans breathed a sigh of relief. The 
crisis had been settled peacefully. (p. 365)  
This ignores the nullification of the Force Act by the South Carolina legislature in 
the wake of its repeal of the tariff nullification, and the impact of the entire crisis on the 
future secession movement is only hinted at by the end of the section: ―Americans would 
continue to debate the balance between states‘-rights and federal powers until the Civil 
War broke out in 1861‖ (p. 366). There is no concrete connection between the 
nullification crisis and the secession movement of the 1860s.  
 Several textbooks do a commendable job in joining the nullification crisis 
philosophically with the Southern belief that the federal tariff of 1828 was a thinly veiled 
attack on the institution of slavery. Give Me Liberty! (Foner, 2008) does this implicitly 
before discussing the nullification issue at all, by profiling the unique character of South 
Carolina as a setting for such a crisis:  
The state with the largest proportion or slaves in its population (55 percent in 
1830), South Carolina was controlled by a tightly knit group of large planters. 
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They maintained their grip on power by a state constitution that gave plantation 
counties far greater representation in the legislature than their population 
warranted, as well as through high property qualifications for officeholders. (p. 
374) 
And the textbook follows this section with an explicit connection between 
nullification and slavery: ―Behind their economic complaints against the tariff lay the 
conviction that the federal government must be weakened lest it one day take action 
against slavery‖ (Foner, 2008, p. 374). In this respect, Give Me Liberty! contains one of 
the most comprehensive treatments of the nullification crisis. 
Other textbooks also attempt to connect Southern resistance to the tariff and 
Southern anxiety over the future of slavery. In The American Nation: a History of the 
United States (Carnes, et al., 2008), the authors highlight the complex realities of South 
Carolina‘s economic life and the fear that slave rebellion was a very real prospect: 
In addition to the economic woes of the up-country cotton planters, the great 
planter-aristocrats of the rice-growing Tidewater, though relatively prosperous, 
were troubled by northern criticisms of slavery. In the rice region, blacks 
outnumbered whites two to one; it was the densest concentration of blacks in the 
United States. (p. 261)  
The American Journey (Goldfield, et al., 2007) addresses the nullification crisis in 
the same manner, connecting it to a fear of Northern attacks on slavery: 
What fueled antitariff sentiment was not just the economic argument that high 
tariffs worsened the agricultural depression…Protective tariffs were also 
denounced as an unconstitutional extension of national power over the states; 
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many southern planters feared that they were only a prelude to forced 
emancipation of the slaves. (p. 277).  
This textbook also highlights an interpretation that is often neglected in 
textbooks—the perceived connection between the tariff, resistance to it, and the 
possibility of slave uprisings. The American Journey moves from its discussion of 
Southern resistance on philosophical grounds to commentary describing how Southerners 
feared that submission on the tariff issue would encourage further Northern agitation 
against slavery, and thus make bloody insurrections like Nat Turner‘s rebellion of 1831 
more and more likely: ―The disturbances so far would be ‗nothing to what we shall see,‘ 
warned the South Carolina planter James Hamilton, Jr., ‗if we do not stand manfully at 
the Safety Valve of Nullification‘‖ (Goldfield, et al., 2007, p. 277). This textbook does 
not explicitly connect the issue of nullification to the future secession movement, 
however, possibly in the interest of chronological flow (the sequential nature of which is 
the hallmark of practically every textbook‘s design); in depicting Andrew Jackson‘s 
―victory‖ in the nullification crisis, The American Journey highlights the short-term 
political repercussions of the issue rather than the long-term sectional impact: ―In the 
shock waves set off by the nullification crisis, a new anti-Jackson coalition began to form 
in the South‖ (p. 280).  
Other textbooks tend to focus more on personality or biography than on the 
philosophical roots of the crisis. United States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010) 
focuses initially on the two major characters of the nullification crisis, Andrew Jackson 
and John C. Calhoun. The authors begin their narrative with a comparative chart labeled 
―Reading Skill: Compare,‖ in which the authors ask students to ―fill in a table like the 
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one below to compare the viewpoints of Jackson and Calhoun on the issue of 
nullification‖ (p. 255). Visions of America: a History of the United States (Keene, et al., 
2010) also tends to depict the nullification crisis, at least partially, as the result of a 
deteriorating relationship between Calhoun and Jackson: ―Even if Jackson and Vice 
President Calhoun had not fallen out…the two remained on a collision course‖ (p. 230). 
The Enduring Vision (Boyer, et al., 2008) also highlights the presence of distinct and 
powerful personalities in the crisis, primarily the spokesman of South Carolina and 
states-rights:  
Calhoun also burned with ambition to be president. Jackson had stated that he 
would only serve one term, and Calhoun assumed that he would succeed Jackson. 
To do so, however, he had to maintain the support of the South, which was 
increasingly taking an antitariff stance. (p. 284) 
 America: Pathways to the Present (Cayton, 2007) includes a section on the 
congressional debate between Senators Robert Hayne and Daniel Webster, but hardly 
references Hayne‘s argument for nullification at all—instead, the author relies on a short 
description of Webster‘s prowess as an orator and a thumbnail sketch of his argument for 
Union:  
In January 1830, senators Robert Hayne of South Carolina and Daniel Webster of 
Massachusetts engaged in a debate that quickly leaped to the broader question of 
the fate of the Union. The debate peaked on January 26, when Webster, a great 
orator, delivered a thrilling defense of the Union. ‗While the Union lasts we have 
high, exciting, gratifying prospects spread out before us, for us and our children,‘ 
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Webster declared. He attacked Hayne‘s claim that liberty (meaning, in Hayne‘s 
view, states‘-rights) was more important than the Union. (p. 299) 
 Similarly, The American Nation: A History of the United States (Carnes, et al., 
2008) portrays the struggle over nullification as less a battle over the philosophical 
meaning of the Constitution and more a contest of contrasting personalities: 
It is difficult to measure the importance of the animosity between Jackson and 
Calhoun in the crisis to which this clash was a prelude. Calhoun wanted very 
much to be president. He had failed to inherit the office from John Quincy Adams 
and had accepted the office of vice presidency [.] (p. 258)  
The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010) goes one step farther in a side-panel 
biography of John Calhoun, describing his personality in decidedly unflattering terms:  
Calhoun had a hard and humorless side. He took a tough position on slavery, 
arguing that it was not only necessary but even good: ―There never has yet existed 
a wealthy and civilized society in which one portion of the community did 
not…live on the labor of the other.‖ (p. 231)  
The habit of reducing historical events to battles of will between powerful 
individuals may be understandable, given the complexity of the nullification issue (even 
to those directly involved in the crisis) and the tendency of textbooks to reduce such 
complexities to more simplistic concepts. But the effort, whether intentional or not, to 
reduce an intricate philosophical issue to a question of personal ambition, loyalty, avarice 
or character is disingenuous, and limits our students‘ opportunities to evaluate the moral 
foundations of the Civil War. 
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 Only a few textbooks do a consistent job of connecting nullification to secession 
and the threat of civil war. United States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010) is fairly 
typical of the stilted, abbreviated manner in which the two topics are linked: ―The 
difficult questions of nullification and secession, however, had been postponed rather 
than resolved‖ (p. 256). Beyond that oblique reference, seemingly an attempt to 
incorporate a form of dramatic tension into the narrative, there is no further connection 
between the nullification crisis and the onset of the Civil War. The Americans (Danzer, et 
al., 2010) shows the fear of imminent violence, among the historical figures of the time, 
by citing Daniel Webster‘s speech before the Senate with regard to the nullification 
crisis:  
On January 26, Webster replied that he could not conceive of a ―middle course, 
between submission to the laws, when regularly pronounced constitutional, on the 
one hand, and open resistance, which is revolution, or rebellion, on the other. (p. 
232) 
The Americans does, in its narrative, have one stark connection between the issues 
at hand and the future conflict: ―The power struggle between states and the federal 
government has caused controversy since the country‘s beginning. At its worst, the 
conflict resulted in the Civil War‖ (p. 237). The text, however, includes this statement as 
part of a student prompt to examine political cartoons and primary documents, at the end 
of the section (see below for a discussion of student activities regarding the nullification 
crisis). Houghton Mifflin‘s The American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006) does show the 
imminent threat of violence contained in the nullification crisis—―If civil war were to be 
avoided, one side would have to surrender, or both would have to compromise‖ (p. 
92 
 
264)—but it does not explicitly connect the nullification crisis to future threats of 
secession and the onset of the Civil War in 1861. And, much the same as United States 
History, there is a dangling attempt to leave open the question of secession, without overt 
reference to the violence on the horizon thirty years later: ―Armed conflict had been 
avoided, but the fundamental issues had not been resolved. When next the ‗nullies‘ and 
the Union clashed, compromise would prove more elusive‖ (Kennedy, et al., 2006, p. 
265). 
In this same vein, The American Nation: A History of the United States (Carnes, 
et al., 2008) illustrates clearly how nullification threatened to bring about the destruction 
of the Union—―If South Carolina did not back down, the president‘s threat to use force 
would mean civil war and possibly the destruction of the Union he claimed to be 
defending‖ (p. 261). But here, too, the authors do not make clear the connection between 
nullification and the Civil War. They do, however, signal that the uncertain resolution of 
the crisis—with the acceptance of the Compromise Tariff in 1833, the nullification of the 
Force Bill, and the feeling among some ―nullifiers‖ that the entire episode had been a 
victory for the South—harbored trouble for the Union, in the form of future attempts by 
southern states to organize:  
And so the Union weathered the storm. Having stepped to the brink of civil war, 
the nation had drawn hastily back…but the radical South Carolina planters were 
becoming convinced that only secession would protect slavery. The nullification 
fiasco had proved that they could not succeed without the support of other slave 
states. Thereafter they devoted themselves ceaselessly to obtaining it. (p. 262) 
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While most textbooks reference nullification in their main narrative, there are a 
few textbooks that provide students with an opportunity to critically evaluate the role and 
impact of the crisis. These activities deserve distinct mention, since it is their inclusion 
(and hopefully, their use) that gives students the greatest opportunity for morally 
analyzing the ―just war‖ components present in both the Southern and Northern 
justifications for war. The best textbook from this sample in providing such opportunities 
is clearly McDougal-Littel‘s The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010). Similar to its content 
regarding the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, this text includes a significant number 
of activities that allow students to philosophically connect nullification with the Civil 
War and to contest the Southern justification for war, prior to secession.  
At the end of the section concerning nullification, The Americans includes this 
assignment for students, under the heading ―Thinking Critically—Forming 
Generalizations‖:  
In what ways do you think the tariff crises of 1828 and 1832 might be considered 
important milestones in American history before the Civil War? Use evidence from 
the text to support your argument. Think About: Calhoun‘s nullification theory; the 
Hayne-Webster debate; why Jackson pushed Congress to pass the Force Bill. (p. 236) 
By providing a chronological stopping point for student consideration, the authors 
signal implicitly that the events of 1828-1832 had important consequences for the South 
and the North, in their impact on the possibility of civil disunion. Likewise, the text 
allows students to consider the reasons behind nullification‘s allure for many 
Southerners, with a section titled ―Standardized Test Practice‖: 
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Which reason best explains why the theory of nullification was widely supported in 
the South? 
 Southerners believed that states had the right to determine whether federal 
laws were constitutional. 
 Southerners wanted to continue buying manufactured goods from Britain. 
 Southerners wanted to divide the United States into two separate countries. 
 Southerners did not want to pay the high tariffs that Congress passed. (p. 237) 
Under the heading ―Alternative Assessment,‖ The Americans references a prompt 
from the beginning of the chapter, establishing the topic of states‘-rights as a guiding 
theme for this chapter: ―Recall your discussion of the question on page 211: Would you 
support the federal or state government?‖ For the assessment, students are given the 
following prompt:  
Now that you know more about the nullification theory and the fight over tariffs 
and states‘ rights, would you change your response to this question? Discuss your 
thoughts with a small group. State whether or not you would change your 
response and support your position with information from the chapter. (p. 237) 
It is unclear as to what degree teachers may incorporate such activities, or the 
degree to which students may learn from them. But for the purposes of this study and the 
historical-narrative approach, The Americans provides the best opportunity for students to 
evaluate the impact of the nullification crisis on the beginning of the Civil War and its 
stature as a justification for war, in the eyes of nineteenth-century Southerners.  
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Wilmot Proviso 1846. 
 The Mexican war of 1846-1848 reignited the sectional debate as new territory in 
the Southwest was claimed, organized, and would presumably be considered, ultimately, 
for statehood. The issue of whether or not slavery would be introduced into the new 
territories became a national obsession, and in Congress, there were literally hundreds of 
speeches made by representatives and Senators, expressing general fear or concern over 
the prospect that slavery might be extended as far as California (McPherson, 1998, p. 52). 
Such fears became concrete with the introduction, on August 8, 1846, of a proposal by 
freshman Congressman David Wilmot of Pennsylvania, which stated outright a position 
many Southerners had believed was already Northern doctrine: ―…as an express and 
fundamental condition of the acquisition of any territory from the Republic of 
Mexico…neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall ever exist in any part of said 
country‖ (cited in McPherson, 1998, p. 52-53).  
 Major historical works reflect the importance of the Wilmot Proviso in the era 
prior to the beginning of the Civil War. McPherson (2007) considers the Proviso a pivotal 
event, one that ―framed national politics for the next fifteen years‖ and caused a 
―wrenching…of party divisions into a sectional pattern,‖ one which was defined 
increasingly by rancor over slavery (McPherson, 2007, p. 15). Foner (1982) assents in 
this judgment, likening the Proviso‘s impact on the two parties to that of the Missouri 
Compromise of 1820 (in Grob & Billias, ed., 1982, p. 390). In his larger and considerably 
more noted work, Battle Cry of Freedom (1988), McPherson again takes up the issue of 
the Proviso, highlighting the fact that Wilmot‘s speech was not a singular event, but was 
instead one of many such speeches on the issue of the expansion of slavery—―of the 
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congressmen who spoke on this matter, more than half expressed confidence (if southern) 
or fear (if northern) that slavery would go into the new territories if allowed to do so‖ (p. 
52). McPherson sees Wilmot‘s proposition as less anti-slavery and more pro-Northern 
Democrat, especially given that constituency‘s belief that the Polk administration was 
decidedly pro-Southern—he cites one Ohio congressman saying ―the administration is 
Southern, Southern, Southern!...Since the South have fixed boundaries for free territories 
[a reference to the disputed Oregon territory], let the North fix boundaries for slave 
territories‖ (p. 53). 
 McPherson presents the Wilmot Proviso as the legalistic product of a free-soil 
movement with three different levels. First, there was a core of committed abolitionists 
who viewed slavery as a great moral wrong that should be immediately abolished. 
Second, there was an outer circle of antislavery people (mostly Whigs and some 
Democrats) who saw slavery as the momentous issue of the age, a social evil ―by which 
they meant that it was socially repressive, economically backward, and politically 
harmful to the interests of free states‖ (p. 54). Finally, there was a third layer that agreed 
with the precepts of the Proviso but did not see the issue of slavery as the most crucial 
matter of the age and were thus more willing to compromise. The difficulty, McPherson 
argues, is that this multilevel free-soil movement was perceived by the South as a unified 
entity, one who was leveling an unconstitutional attack on the institution of slavery. 
McPherson details the legislative efforts of John C. Calhoun to deny Congress‘ right to 
exclude slavery from the territories—Calhoun asserted that ―Congress could no more 
prevent a slaveowner from taking his human property to the territories than it could 
prevent him from taking his horses or hogs there‖ (McPherson, 1988, p. 57). The Wilmot 
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Proviso, in McPherson‘s view, was the first iteration of the free-soil movement that 
would lead, ultimately, to popular sovereignty, and ultimately contribute to the outbreak 
of war.  
 Other scholars agree on the importance of the Wilmot Proviso. Winik (2001) 
groups it with other major pre-Civil War events like the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Nat 
Turner‘s Rebellion, and the publication of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, calling it ―a powerful 
symbol that would transform the country‘s landscape, and exacerbate the unresolved 
contradictions from America‘s founding‖ (p. 21). Olsen (2006) connects the issue of 
California‘s entry into the Union (a product of the Compromise of 1850) to the Proviso, 
through opponents of both initiatives: 
Opponents of California statehood objected [to California‘s statehood] partly 
because it would mean one more free state, ending the long tradition of equality in 
the Senate…They also believed California‘s admission would be a ‗back-door‘ 
means to impose the hated Proviso, since the land was gained from Mexico. The 
possible addition of another free state was so threatening that it touched off a 
secession movement across much of the Deep South [.] (p. 12) 
The Wilmot Proviso is present in all the textbooks in this sample, though the 
degree to which it is described as a potential cause of the Civil War varies. Give Me 
Liberty! (Foner, 2008) does a commendable job in presenting a detailed case for Southern 
opposition to the Proviso:  
To white southerners, the idea of barring slavery from territory acquired from 
Mexico seemed a violation of their equal rights as members of the Union. 
Southerners had fought and died to win these territories; surely they had a right to 
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share in the fruits of victory. To single out slavery as the one form of property 
barred from the West would be an affront to the South and its distinctive way of 
life. (p. 476)  
Additionally, Give Me Liberty! gives concrete examples of why the South viewed 
the Wilmot Proviso as an attack on their way of life, beyond rhetoric and symbolism:  
A majority of slaves in 1848 lived in states that had not even existed when the 
Constitution was adopted. Many older plantation areas already suffered from soil 
exhaustion. Just as northerners believed westward expansion essential to their 
economic well-being, southern leaders became convinced that slavery must 
expand or die. (p. 476) 
Other books in the sample present the Wilmot Proviso with a strong degree of 
historical detail and complexity. The Enduring Vision (Boyer, et al., 2008) describes 
Northern opposition to the expansion of slavery in economic terms, rather than moral 
ones, which would have been typical of the majority of white Americans in 1846:  
 [Supporters of the Proviso] argued that competition with slaves degraded free 
labor, that the westward extension of slavery would check the westward migration 
of free labor, and that such a barrier would aggravate the social problems already 
beginning to plague the East; class strife, social stratification, and labor protest. 
(p. 392) 
The American Journey (Goldfield, et al., 2007) also presents the Wilmot Proviso 
in historically accurate fashion. It comprehensively describes the Proviso‘s intent and 
includes the fact that David Wilmot himself did not construe the Proviso as an explicit 
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attack on slavery, but rather as a defense of white labor in newly-acquired western 
territories:  
Wilmot explained that he wanted only to preserve the territories for ―the sons of 
toil, of my own race and own color.‖ By thus linking the exclusion of slavery in 
the territories to freedom for white people, he hoped to generate support across 
the North, regardless of party, and even in some areas of the Upper South. (p. 
389)  
The authors then point to the impact the Proviso had on the South—not only in 
the fact that limiting slavery in the west might comprise an attack on the institution itself, 
but also in the belief among many southerners that the Proviso was a deliberate insult:  
Linking freedom for white people to the exclusion of slaves infuriated 
southerners. It implied that the mere proximity of slavery was degrading and that 
white southerners were therefore a degraded people, unfit to join other Americans 
in the territories. (p. 389) 
The American Journey also describes the division over the Proviso in religious 
terms, pointing to the schism between northern and southern evangelicals over its 
interpretation and import:  
During the debate on the Wilmot Proviso, a Boston minister wrote, ―The great 
problem for the Christian world now to accomplish is to effect a closer union 
between religion and politics…We must make men to do good and be good.‖ 
Southern evangelicals recoiled from such missing of church and state, charging 
northerners with abandoning the basic tenets of evangelical Christianity. (p. 389) 
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Similar to its narrative regarding the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, The 
Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010) does an admirable job with the Wilmot Proviso. Its 
initial explanation of the Proviso—―This attack on slavery solidified Southern support for 
war by transforming the debate on war into a debate on slavery‖ (p. 294)—is essentially 
the same as those drawn from the other texts in this sample. The Americans follows this, 
however, with a strong section devoted to explaining Northern support and Southern 
opposition that goes beyond strict pro- or anti-slavery sentiment:  
Northerners, angry over the refusal of Southern congressmen to vote for internal 
improvements, such as the building of canals and roads, supported the proviso. 
They also feared that adding slave territory would give slave states more members 
in Congress and deny economic opportunity to free workers…Southerners, as 
expected, opposed the proviso, which, some argued, raised complex constitutional 
issues. Slaves were property, Southerners claimed, and property was protected by 
the Constitution. Laws like the Wilmot Proviso would undermine such 
constitutional protections. (p. 306) 
Stylistically, The Americans also provides elements that capture the sense of 
imminent peril that faced the Union after the Mexican War. Though none of the 
textbooks in this study would probably be considered great literature, the inclusion of 
primary documents, quotes, and speeches from historical figures who were involved in 
the events prior to the Civil War help to represent not only the drama of those days, but 
also the possibility that war might have been avoided (and thus provide a strong 
counterbalance to the general impact of most textbook narrative, a sense of historical 
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inevitability). One such example is the use of a quote from Alexander Stephens, the 
future Vice-President of the Confederacy:  
The North is going to stick the Wilmot amendment to every appropriation and 
then all the South will vote against any measure thus clogged. Finally a 
tremendous struggle will take place and perhaps [President] Polk in starting one 
war may find half a dozen on his hands. I tell you the prospect ahead is dark, 
cloudy, thick and gloomy. (p. 305)  
Other textbooks present the Wilmot Proviso only in passing, or obliquely. The 
American Nation: a History of the United States (Carnes, et al., 2008), for example, 
performs the classic textbook ―mentioning‖ of the topic, including a brief description of 
Wilmot‘s proposal, John Calhoun‘s counterproposal that would effectively nullify the 
Proviso, and then this:  
Calhoun‘s resolutions could never pass the House of Representatives, and 
Wilmot‘s Proviso had no chance in the Senate. Yet their very existence threatened 
the Union; as Senator Benton remarked, they were like the blades of a pair of 
scissors, ineffectively separately, an efficient cutting tool taken together. (p. 315) 
This quotation, while evocative, does little by itself to explain the manner in 
which Southerners perceived the Wilmot Proviso as a direct assault on their ―peculiar 
institution.‖ Other textbooks make similarly obscure references to the impact of the 
Proviso. Visions of America: a History of the United States (Keene, et al., 2010) describes 
the Proviso‘s meaning and its role in igniting a sectional debate, but ignores the manner 
in which it was perceived in the North, in many quarters, as a defense of white labor 
rather than an indictment of slavery or Southern interests: ―Southerners denounced it as a 
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thinly veiled attack on slavery, while Northerners denied this charge, insisting that it left 
slavery untouched where it already existed.‖ In the same way, America: Pathways to the 
Present (Cayton, et al., 2007) tends to obscure the impact of the Proviso: 
The Wilmot Proviso never became law. Each time it came up for discussion, 
however, the Wilmot Proviso revealed the growing gap between the North and the 
South over slavery. (p. 354) 
In this manner, then, the Wilmot Proviso is often presented for its symbolic value, 
rather than any contemporary impact it might have had on policy or future events. On the 
other hand, some textbooks do make a significant effort to connect the Proviso to 
concrete subsequent events. America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009) 
does point out that ―the controversy over the Wilmot Proviso also led to the rise of a new 
political party,‖ the Free-Soil Party (p. 483). The American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 
2006) describes the political schism that resulted from the Proviso‘s introduction in a 
similar fashion: ―Ominously, debate over slavery in the area of the Mexican Cession 
threatened to disrupt the ranks of both Whigs and Democrats and split national politics 
along North-South sectional lines‖ (p. 390). Examples such as these, however, do not 
obscure the tendency of textbook authors to foster a lack of agency in historical decision-
making; United States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010), for example, describes 
the impact of the Proviso in the following manner:  
The Proviso brought the slavery issue to the forefront and weakened the two 
major parties, which had long tried to avoid discussing the issue in Congress. 
Thus, the lands won from Mexico increased tensions between North and South. 
(p. 312) 
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Passages such as this infer that the harsh differences over the institution of 
slavery, North and South, and by extension the same differences that led to the outbreak 
of war, were caused by ―the lands won from Mexico,‖ and not conscious decisions taken 
by Americans. This stylistic lack of agency is less a problem for the topic of secession 
and states‘-rights, but is much more regularly found in the description of events closer to 
the actual beginning of the Civil War (for this study, the attack on Fort Sumter).  
In terms of student activities or assignments, there is one textbook in this sample 
that try to give students opportunities to critically examine the role of the Wilmot Proviso 
in the beginning of the Civil War (and thus, its relation to Southern and Northern senses 
of just cause in the conflict to come). Under a section titled ―Comprehension and Critical 
Thinking,‖ America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009) includes the 
following prompt: ―Did the Wilmot Proviso successfully address the nation‘s divisions of 
slavery? What effect did it have on the nation‖ (p. 485)? The questions are not 
particularly strong, in the sense that they do not require to students to move much beyond 
an affirmative or negative in the first part, and they would tend to lead to vague or non-
substantive answers in the second part; but compared to the other textbooks in this 
sample (which include no activities, prompts, or assignments regarding the Wilmot 
Proviso), America: History of Our Nation gives students the best opportunity for critical 
thinking about this topic, though by default.  
In summary, then, all textbooks in this sample describe the Wilmot Proviso, but 
only a few—especially The Americans, Give Me Liberty!, The Enduring Vision, and The 
American Journey—depict the Proviso with historical clarity and accuracy, and in so 
doing provide an effective platform for a moral critique of jus ad bellum content. Other 
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textbooks tend to minimize the importance of the Proviso or reduce it to largely symbolic 
value. And only one book, America: History of Our Nation, includes opportunities for 
students to engage in historical thinking about the impact and importance of the Proviso, 
and therefore by extension to morally critique the foundations of the Civil War.  
 
Fugitive Slave Law 1850. 
 Prior to the beginning of the Civil War in 1861, one of the most unsettling events 
in the experience of most Americans was the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act in 1850. 
With the proposed admission of California into the Union, the South saw the addition of 
another free state and the resulting imbalance in the U.S. Senate (as well as the possibility 
of a renewed Wilmot Proviso to restrict slavery‘s spread) as a potentially traumatic 
upheaval at the national level. The Compromise of 1850, brokered by the three great 
voices of the Senate—John C. Calhoun, Daniel Webster, and Henry Clay—was intended 
to forestall a descent into violence, and did so successfully for over a decade. It was not, 
however, the admission of California that became the most notorious component of this 
compromise. It was the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act. 
 In and of itself, the Fugitive Slave Act was nothing new; in fact, the 1850 version 
was actually a revision of a previously passed law of the same name, from 1793. This act 
was the legal mechanism that empowered Congress to uphold Article 4, Section 2 of the 
U.S. Constitution, which guarantees a slaveowner‘s right to recovery fugitive runaways. 
The national reception to the new Fugitive Slave Act, as a component of the 
Compromise, was markedly different from almost sixty years earlier. Northerners who 
had never before taken an interest or a stand on slavery found themselves enraged by the 
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prospects of the ―Bloodhound Bill,‖ and Southerners were embittered by the North‘s 
seeming refusal to carry out the law in proper fashion. Though the law was not often 
enacted nor pursued by slaveowners (most of whom could not afford nor risk a recovery 
operation of runaways to the North), the few widely publicized captures, attempted 
captures, and even violent episodes in the wake of the Act‘s passage made it one of the 
most important touchstones in the decade prior to the Civil War.  
Historians generally agree that the Fugitive Slave Act increased the likelihood of 
secession and war. McPherson (2007) focuses on the political impact of the Act‘s 
passage, not the moral dimension, when he asserts that the new law strengthened federal 
power on behalf of a region that was historically antagonistic to such an expansion—―In 
the name of protecting the rights of slaveowners, it extended the long arm of federal law, 
enforced by marshals and the army, into Northern states to recover escaped slaves and 
return them to their owners‖ (p. 9). He points to the impact of the Act on Harriet Beecher 
Stowe and the motivation it provided for her to write Uncle Tom’s Cabin, which became 
a publishing phenomenon and intensely personalized the debate over fugitive slaves. The 
story of Eliza, jumping across ice floes on the Ohio River to escape slavecatchers, 
captivated Northerners. The book‘s popularity was resented bitterly by Southerners, and a 
general belief (fueled by an active and zealous abolitionist press) grew that the North was 
now actively assisting fugitive slaves escape. This anger was evident in their actions in 
the next few years—―In their ordinances of secession, several Southern states cited 
Northern help to fugitives as one of the grievances that provoked them to leave the 
Union‖ (p. 21). 
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Olsen (2006) describes the far-reaching impact of the Act—it ―literally brought 
the issue [of slavery] to street corners in the North for the first time‖ (p. 19). He also 
quotes one of the notorious Southern state ordinances, the Georgia Platform of 1850, 
wherein delegates enumerated the conditions under which they were willing to stay in the 
Union: ―…that upon the faithful execution of the Fugitive Slave Bill by the proper 
authorities depends the preservation of our much beloved Union‖ (p. 17).  
 Textbooks from this sample routinely cover the Fugitive Slave Act in impressive 
and often dramatic detail. Certainly, when contrasted with legalistic topics like the 
Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, such indulgence is understandable, especially when 
given the very real human tragedy involved in carrying out the Act‘s prerogatives. The 
Fugitive Slave Act occupies a much larger part of textbook narrative for all the books in 
this sample than do the Resolutions, the nullification crisis, or the Wilmot Proviso; and 
while there are certainly historians who might debate which of these topics is genuinely 
the most important, there can be little doubt among readers that the Fugitive Slave Act 
was a vastly more influential event than the others. 
 Visions of America: a History of the United States (Keene, et al., 2010) begins its 
coverage of the Act with a full-page graphic, a political cartoon from the pre-Civil War 
era depicting the standard abolitionist view of the law as a barbaric and cruel 
infringement on the natural rights of African-Americans (see Figure 1): 
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Figure 1: ―Effects of the Fugitive Slave Act,‖ from Visions of America: a History of the 
United States (Keene, et al., 2010) 
 
 
 The textbook narrative follows this graphic with a description of the manner in 
which support for the Compromise of 1850 indicated a weakening of party loyalty and an 
increase in sectional voting, largely directed by support or opposition to the Fugitive 
Slave Act. Its description of the Act‘s provisions is blunt and forceful, and quite typical 
of the other textbooks in the sample:  
The act created a force of federal commissioners who possessed broad powers to 
pursue and return suspected escaped slaves to their owners. It also permitted 
federal marshals to deputize private citizens to assist in capturing fugitive slaves. 
Those who refused to help were subject to fines and imprisonment. Once 
apprehended, an accused fugitive had no right to a jury trial. His or her fate was 
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instead decided by a federal commissioner who stood to earn a fee of ten dollars if 
he returned the accused to slavery and only five if he released him or her. (p. 349) 
 Most of the textbooks in this sample describe in considerable detail the angry 
reaction in the North to the Fugitive Slave Act. United States History (Lapansky-Werner, 
et al., 2010) says the law ―enraged many northerners. The anger was not restricted to 
abolitionists; it extended to other northerners who felt forced to support the slave system‖ 
(p. 331). America: Pathways to the Present (Cayton, et al., 2007) represents the Act as a 
fundamental flaw of the Compromise of 1850—―Part of the Compromise, the Fugitive 
Slave Act, actually made the situation worse by infuriating many Northerners—including 
Harriet Beecher Stowe, who expressed her outrage in her book, Uncle Tom’s Cabin‖ (p. 
359). America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009) uses the heading 
―Compromises Fail‖ at the opening of its section on the Fugitive Slave Act, another 
telling absence of agency or responsibility among historical actors. The American Nation: 
A History of the United States (Carnes, et al., 2008) portrays ―the sight of harmless 
human beings being hustled off to a life of slavery disturbed many Northerners who were 
not abolitionists‖ (p. 350). The American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006) describes the 
legal penalties faced by ―freedom-loving northerners‖ if they helped runaway slaves, and 
points to the manner in which the Act broadened resistance to slavery in general:  
So abhorrent was this ―Man-Stealing Law‖ that it touched off an explosive chain 
reaction in the North. Many shocked moderates, hitherto passive, were driven into 
the swelling ranks of the antislaveryites. (p. 400) 
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Some textbooks also detail, in dramatic fashion, the trauma created by the 
Fugitive Slave Act among Northern blacks. The American Journey (Goldfield, et al., 
2007) asserts that ―the strongest reaction to the act was in the black communities of the 
urban North,‖ where ―the Fugitive Slave Act brought the danger of slavery much closer 
to home….The lives that 400,000 black Northerners had constructed, often with great 
difficulty, appeared suddenly uncertain‖ (p. 392). The authors go on to implicitly 
reference the growth of the Underground Railroad by claiming ―a growing militancy‖ in 
the black community over the Act‘s passage (p. 393). The American Nation: A History of 
the United States (Carnes, et al., 2008) is more evocative: ―Something approaching panic 
reigned in the black communities of northern cities when slave hunters arrived to seize 
former slaves‖ (p. 350). 
United States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010) probably goes furthest in 
its illustration of the Fugitive Slave Act‘s impact on northern blacks, by describing the 
very real threat of the law to freedmen: ―Black Americans, of course, despised the law. 
Some of the captured ‗fugitive slaves‘ were really free people who had been kidnapped 
and sold into slavery‖ (p. 333). The preceding page of the textbook is dominated by a 
full-page graphic that includes references to the Fugitive Slave Act, the Underground 
Railroad, and the ubiquitous Harriet Tubman, all set against a background image of the 
antislavery newspaper The North Star (see Figure 2):  
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Figure 2: ―Infographic,‖ from United States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010) 
 
The authors then provide a compelling example of the resistance that ―slaves, fugitives, 
and free black people‖ were determined to carry out, under a large heading in bold red 
font titled ―Northern Blacks Mobilize‖: 
In 1851, a small group of free African Americans gathered in a farmhouse in 
Christiana, Pennsylvania. Heavily armed, they had come to protect several 
fugitives from their Maryland master, who had brought a federal official to 
reclaim them. In the scuffle that followed, the slave owner was killed. White 
bystanders refused to intervene [sic] to help the slave-hunting party. Although 
more than 30 people were tried for the conspiracy, none was found guilty. No one 
was tried for the murder of the slave owner. The ‗Christiana Riot‘ was a dramatic 
enactment of a scene that was played out in many northern communities. (p. 333) 
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The word ―intervene‖ is underlined and defined in a side panel as ―to get involved 
in a situation in order to prevent a certain outcome.‖ This is a largely amoral definition, 
drawn from an anecdote that vividly references the moral outrage in the North regarding 
the Fugitive Slave Act. Other textbooks, too, rely heavily on such personal anecdotes to 
illustrate the law‘s upheaval, though without explicit condemnation of the Act or its 
impact. For instance, The Enduring Vision (Boyer, et al., 2008) begins its explanation of 
the Act by telling the story of Anthony Burns, a former slave who was captured, 
convicted, and returned back to the South from Boston, despite immense popular support 
in Massachusetts. This is from the first paragraph of the chapter:  
No witness would ever forget the scene. As five platoons of troops marched with 
Burns to the ship, some fifty thousand people lined the streets. As the procession 
passed, one Bostonian hung from his window a black coffin bearing the words, 
―THE FUNERAL OF LIBERTY.‖ Another draped an American flag upside down 
as a symbol that ―my country is eternally disgraced by this day‘s proceedings. (p. 
401) 
The Enduring Vision then follows this with a description of the Act, its 
widespread denunciation in the North, and then ends with the equally compelling account 
of Margaret Garner, who, ―about to be captured and sent back to Kentucky as a slave, slit 
her daughter‘s throat and tried to kill her other children rather than witness their return to 
slavery.‖ (p. 401) Eric Foner‘s Give Me Liberty! (2008) includes three such stories, 
presenting them as ―a series of dramatic confrontations‖—the capture of a slave named 
Jerry in Syracuse, NY 1851, the ―Christiana Riot‖ of the same year, and the tragic story 
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of Margaret Garner (who was, Foner notes, the inspiration for the popular contemporary 
novel by Toni Morrison, Beloved).  
 The depiction of the Fugitive Slave Act is atypical as compared to the previous 
three topics of Secession/States‘-Rights, in that many textbooks provide descriptions of 
not only Northern outrage over the law, but also Southern anger over what was seen as a 
moral and constitutional failing on the part of the federal government. The Americans 
(Danzer, et al., 2010) describes how difficult it became for Southerners to acquire their 
runaway slaves, given the common tendency in the North to deliberately delay the legal 
proceedings involved: ―…Northern lawyers dragged these trials out—often for three or 
four years—in order to increase slave catchers‘ expenses. Southern slave owners were 
enraged by Northern resistance to the Fugitive Slave Act‖ (p. 311). 
Visions of America: History of the United States (Keene, et al., 2010) connects the 
passage of the Act to increased operation of the Underground Railroad, and then includes 
a description of Southern expectations of the law‘s enforcement:  
Although the number of escaped slaves remained relatively small, averaging one 
thousand per year out a total slave population that approached four million by 
1860, Southern slaveholders grew increasingly angry over the unwillingness of 
Northerners to assist in the return of their ‗property.‘ Especially galling were the 
‗personal liberty laws‘ passed by nine Northern states between 1842 and 1850, 
which prohibited the use of state officials or facilities like courts and jails for the 
capture and return of escaped slaves…With these precedents in mind, Southerners 
made clear…that they expected Northerners to uphold the law. (p. 349) 
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The American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006) addresses anger over the North‘s 
failure or refusal to carry out the law, casting it as a snub that Southerners found 
particularly obnoxious: ―To the slaveowners, the loss was infuriating, whatever the 
motives. The moral judgments of the abolitionists seemed, in some ways, more galling 
than outright theft. They reflected not only a holier-than-thou attitude but a refusal to 
obey the laws solemnly passed by Congress‖ (p. 395). The Enduring Vision (Boyer, et al., 
2008) is similar in its depiction, and goes a considerable distance to humanize the issue 
from a Southern perspective: 
The frequent cold stares, obstructive legal tactics, and occasional violence 
encountered by slaveholders who ventured north to capture runaway slaves helped 
demonstrate to southerners that opposition to slavery boiled just beneath the 
surface of northern opinion. In the eyes of most southerners, the South had gained 
little more from the Compromise of 1850 than the Fugitive Slave Act, and now 
even that northern concession seemed to be a phantom. After witnessing riots 
against the Fugitive Slave Act in Boston in 1854, a young Georgian studying law 
at Harvard wrote to his mother, ―Do not be surprised if when I return home you 
find me a confirmed disunionist.‖ (p. 401-402) 
The American Nation: A History of the United States (Carnes, et al., 2008) 
describes a Southern reaction based on perceived unfairness: ―White Southerners accused 
the North of reneging on one of the main promises made in the Compromise of 1850.‖ (p. 
350). The American Journey (Goldfield, et al., 2007) is more delicate in its narrative: 
―…the North‘s hostile reception to the law made southerners doubt it s commitment to 
the compromise‖ (p. 391). The American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006) portrays the 
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Southern position as one defined by failed expectations: ―The southerners…were 
embittered because the northerners would not in good faith execute the law—the one real 
‗and immediate southern ―gain‘ from the Great Compromise‖ (p. 400). 
Despite the comprehensive coverage the Fugitive Slave Act receives from 
textbooks (in line with the expectations sown by major historical works), there is a 
curious lack of vitality in these passages. The textbooks in this sample present moral 
outrage without ownership, without clarity or principle. At best, the narratives displayed 
here highlight the Fugitive Slave Act as an element in the outbreak of the Civil War, but 
in their portrayals of ―harmless human beings‖ being denied their freedom by brutal 
slavecatchers, over the objections of ―freedom-loving‖ Northerners, there is no explicit 
denunciation of the Act as a moral failing or mistake. In fact, the closest example of this 
is found in The American Pageant, which provides the following analysis of the 
notorious law:  
Beyond question, the Fugitive Slave Law was an appalling blunder on the part of 
the South. No single irritant of the 1850s was more persistently galling to both 
sides, and none did more to awaken in the North a spirit of antagonism against the 
South…Delay also added immensely to the moral strength of the North—to its 
will to fight for the Union. In 1850 countless thousands of northern moderates 
were unwilling to pin the South to the rest of the nation with bayonets. But the 
inflammatory events of the 1850s did much to bolster the Yankee will to resist 
secession, whatever the cost. (p. 400-401) 
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In terms of historical content, the narratives of the sampled textbooks are superior 
to the other three elements of Secession and States‘-Rights analyzed in this study. In 
terms of moral content, it is present, though diffuse and inarticulate.  
 
Categorical Analysis 
In the tradition of jus ad bellum as elaborated by Brian Orend in ―The Morality of 
War,‖ there are six overall categories: just cause, right intention, proper authority/public 
declaration, last resort, probability of success, and proportionality. For the purposes of 
this study, the emphasis in jus ad bellum will be on three of these elements: just cause, 
right intention, and proper authority. This is not to assert that other categories are not 
applicable, or should not be applied to the Civil War. On the contrary, the ―just war‖ 
doctrine is a philosophical structure with which any armed conflict, as well as 
governmental/social policy decisions pursuant to that conflict, may be analyzed. In terms 
of textbooks, though, some allowance should be made for what it widely recognized as 
their inherent limitations. These are textbooks of American history, not political science, 
philosophy, or religion; and, obviously, they are not ―just war‖ treatises. More 
prosaically, textbooks only have so much space which may be dedicated to any given 
topic. Given the tendency of such books to pack in historical data and the hard editing 
choices which, given such limitations, become necessary, it would be unfair to expect a 
given text to contain enough substantive narrative to critique American conflicts from all 
available ―just war‖ perspectives. For example, while the jus ad bellum requirement of 
public declaration is an important one, it would probably be an unreasonable expectation 
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to insist a textbook contain concrete descriptions of such declarations on the part of the 
North and the South in 1861 (though, in truth, some texts do).  
However, there are certain elements of ―just war‖ that can be, and should be, 
contained in any textbook. The issue of just cause, for example, is fundamental to ―just 
war,‖ possibly the component most heavily scrutinized and deliberated by scholars in the 
field, especially given the manner in which nations will appeal to the concept in order to 
justify their decisions to enter into a conflict. The South, prior to 1861, felt that a 
sufficient just cause existed for a movement towards violence, as did the North.  Whether 
or not such just cause existed—and whether or not each side was actually fighting in 
pursuit of that just cause—is certainly a vital moral component to the depiction of the 
Civil War, and a textbook‘s description of such (or lack thereof) should be considered a 
fair subject for criticism. 
Moreover, it is important to point out that there is no intent to challenge, from a 
moral perspective, the rightness or wrongness of a textbook‘s interpretation of the ethical 
value of a historical event. If a textbook contains narrative, explicit or implicit, that 
asserts the South was wrong morally for seceding from the Union, it is not the place of 
this study to claim that the book is itself at fault. Instead, what is at issue is the presence 
of moral content, and the manner in which it is presented. Whether or not an opportunity 
for moral criticism exists for our students is the subject of this research, not the 
measurement of a textbook‘s content against a personally-held set of ethics and values.  
 
117 
 
Just cause. 
The first component of jus ad bellum to be considered is that of just cause. Just 
cause, it will be remembered, typically includes the following: self-defense from external 
attack; defense of others from external attack; protection of innocents from brutal, 
repressive regimes; punishment for a grievous wrongdoing with remains uncorrected 
(Orend, 2006).  
None of the ten textbooks in this sample address just cause explicitly, though 
many contain references to the inherent concept of justice, self-defense, and wrongdoing. 
United States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010), for example, addresses the 
nullification crisis of 1828-1832 by including a quote from John C. Calhoun‘s ―South 
Carolina Exposition and Protest‖ that effectively captures the Southern view of the 
tariff‘s threat:  
So partial are the effects of the [Tariff] system that its burdens are exclusively on 
one side and its benefits on the other. It imposes on the agricultural interest of the 
South…That the manufacturing States…bear no share of the burden of the Tariff 
[.] (p. 255) 
Similarly, United States History provides a quotation, this time from Jefferson 
Davis under a section titled ―Why Limit Slavery Only in the Territories?‖, which hints at 
the manner in which the South saw the Wilmot Proviso as a veiled attack on the 
institution of slavery:  
It is not humanity that influences you…It is that you may have an opportunity of 
cheating [the South] that you want to limit slave territory…It is that you may have 
a majority in the Congress of the United States and convert the Government into 
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an engine of northern aggrandizement. It is that your section may grow in power 
and prosperity upon treasures unjustly taken from the South…[Y]ou want…to 
promote the industry of the New England states, at the expense of the people of 
the South and their industry. (p. 324) 
These quotations highlight the degree to which Southerners saw proposed national 
policies, regarding tariffs and expansion, as a form of external threat, emanating from a 
region and a constituency that had a superior degree of political, economic, and military 
power. In this manner, and with the words of historical figures involved in the prelude to 
the Civil War, United States History contains implicit moral content equivalent to the 
―just war‖ component of just cause. 
The Enduring Vision (Boyer, et al., 2008) takes a similar approach with regard to 
nullification, pointing out that “Southerners feared that a federal government that passed 
tariff laws favoring one section over another might also pass laws meddling with slavery‖ 
(p. 285). The authors write that in South Carolina, the debate over the tariff became a 
debate over protecting their ―peculiar institution‖—―These developments were enough to 
convince many troubled South Carolinians that a line had to be drawn against tariffs and 
possible future interference with slavery‖ (p. 285). Regarding the Wilmot Proviso, The 
Enduring Vision points to the manner in which Southerners thought of western expansion 
as a possible solution to one of the great traditional fears of the South—―…the westward 
extension of slavery would reduce the concentration of slaves in the older regions of the 
South and thus lessen the chances of as slave revolt‖ (p. 392). A federal attempt to check 
that expansion might lead to further bloody uprisings, like Nat Turner‘s in 1831 (though 
The Enduring Vision does not make that explicit connection).  
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The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010) utilizes quotations from historical figures to 
indicate the degree to which Southerners felt threatened by the federal government in the 
decades prior to 1861. Though most textbooks describe the Hayne-Webster senatorial 
debate of 1830, almost all describe Robert Hayne as a preliminary character, one whose 
remarks merely set the stage for Daniel Webster‘s stirring oratory. The Americans, 
though, includes a quotation from Hayne under a heading titled ―A Personal Voice,‖ from 
his speech of January 21, 1830, that aptly illustrates the degree to which Southerners felt 
that the U.S. government was threatening their way of life:  
The measures of the federal government…will soon involve the whole South in 
irretrievable ruin. But even this evil, great as it is, is not the chief ground of our 
complaints. It is the principle involved in the contest—a principle, which 
substituting the discretion of Congress for the limitations of the constitution, 
brings the States and the people to the feet of the federal government, and leaves 
them nothing they can call their own. (p. 232)  
The Wilmot Proviso is generally presented, in most textbook narratives, from the 
Southern perspective. In this respect, The Americans is no different—―Southerners, as 
expected, opposed the proviso, which, some argued, raised complex constitutional issues. 
Slaves were property, Southerners claimed, and property was protected by the 
Constitution. Laws like the Wilmot Proviso would undermine such constitutional 
protections‖ (p. 306). In a similar vein, The Americans describe the trepidation felt by 
Southerners regarding future political prospects: ―Many Southerners feared that if the 
Wilmot Proviso became law, the inevitable addition of new free states to the Union 
would shift the balance of power permanently to the North‖ (p. 305). 
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This textbook, though, does not restrict itself to a singular perspective; instead, to 
its credit, it also includes a Northern point of view regarding this issue. The authors point 
to the fact that Northerners, rather than viewing the Proviso as an attempt to destroy 
slavery, generally saw it as a possible remedy to the threat the South was presenting to 
the nation at large:  
Northerners, angry over the refusal of Southern congressmen to vote for internal 
improvements, such as the building of canals and roads, supported the proviso. 
They also feared that adding slave territory would give slave states more members 
in Congress and deny economic opportunity to free workers. (p. 306) 
Generally, though, the Wilmot Proviso is presented from a Southern point of 
view—the implication that an attempt to restrict slavery in the territories was an attack on 
the Southern way of life. At the least, textbooks from this sample describe the Proviso, 
from the Southern point of view, as ―particularly insulting‖ (The American Nation: A 
History of the United States, 2008, p. 315), a legalistic scheme that intimated Southerners 
were ―a degraded people‖ not fit to share in the conquests won in the Mexican War (The 
American Journey, 2007, p. 389; Give Me Liberty! 2008, p. 476). At the most, textbooks 
describe the Southern reaction to the Wilmot Proviso as one of dire alarm, a general fear 
that without the ability to push slavery beyond the South, the institution itself was in 
future peril. America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009) is fairly tame in 
its depiction of this fear: ―Many supporters of slavery viewed it as an attack on slavery by 
the North.‖ (p. 482) But Foner frames it more vitally in Give Me Liberty!, saying ―just as 
northerners believed westward expansion essential to their economic well-being, southern 
leaders became convinced that slavery must expand or die‖ (p. 476). With regard to the 
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Wilmot Proviso, then, textbooks from this sample do present evidence of just cause, 
though it is largely inchoate, implicit, and from a singular point of view.  
 The Fugitive Slave Act is, for the textbooks used in this study, the most fertile 
ground for just cause. Most narratives contain detailed passages describing the Act‘s 
impact on both North and South. United States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010) 
and America: Pathways to the Present (Cayton, et al., 2007) both describe the anger felt 
in the North about the intervention of the Act into everyday life, as well as the moral 
outrage that arose from ―infuriating‖ episodes of slavecatchers hunting down fugitive 
slaves. United States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010) describes the anger in the 
North as well as their surprisingly ironic reaction to the Act:  
Northerners also resented what they saw as increasing federal intervention in the 
affairs of the independent states. A few northern states struck back, passing 
personal liberty laws. These statutes nullified the Fugitive Slave Act and allowed 
the state to arrest slave catchers for kidnapping. Many northerners agreed with 
abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison when he demanded ―nothing less than…a 
Revolution in the Government of the country. (p. 331) 
The anecdotes about captured slaves like Anthony Burns and Thomas Sims, the 
―Christiana Riot,‖ the grisly deaths of Margaret Garner and her daughter—all are 
featured in many of these textbooks, and are powerful additions to a sense of the 
Northern position on just cause.  
What distinguishes textbook narratives of the Fugitive Slave Act from the other 
three subcategories regarding secession and states‘-rights is the degree to which those 
texts include content that encompasses the issue of just cause from both a Northern and 
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Southern perspective. America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009) presents 
the high hopes Southerners felt about the law upon its passage, embodied in the 
ubiquitous presence of John C. Calhoun, who ―had hoped that the Fugitive Slave Law 
would force northerners to admit that slaveholders had rights to their property‖ (p. 487). 
Visions of America: a History of the United States (Keene, et al., 2010) refers to the anger 
Southerners felt not only over their belief that Northerners (especially abolitionists, a 
persistent thorn in their sides) would not only fail to enforce the laws, but would also 
actively impede them, primarily through the use of ―personal liberty laws‖ (p. 349). The 
Enduring Vision (Boyer, et al., 2008) details the ―frequent cold stares, obstructive legal 
tactics, and occasional violence‖ Southerners came to expect on their rare forays into the 
North on slave-catching missions (p. 401-402), while The American Pageant (Kennedy, 
et al., 2006) describes the ―holier-than-thou attitudes‖ Southerners encountered from 
abolitionists and Northerners in general, regarding their ―peculiar institution‖ (p. 395). 
Textbook depictions of the Fugitive Slave Act come closest, of the four subcategories of 
secession and states‘-rights, to comprising just cause, from a ―just war‖ perspective. 
It can‘t be said, however, that textbook narratives present a coherent moral 
account of Southern or Northern justifications for armed violence, with regard to 
secession or states-rights. At best, the textbooks of this sample hint at the national 
calamity looming in the future, but there is no explicit discussion of whether or not the 
accumulation of philosophical beliefs (the theory of nullification, first expressed in the 
Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions and first attempted in South Carolina in 1832) and 
actual historical events (the Wilmot Proviso‘s attempt to limit slavery and the national 
trauma attending the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act) comprised a sufficient moral 
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foundation for the South to secede in the face of Northern aggression. While there is 
moral content in these textbooks, in terms of the ―just war‖ component of just cause, it is 
inferential and diffuse.  
Right intention. 
 The ―just war‖ condition of right intention refers to the tenet that a state must 
fight (and intend to fight) only in defense of a legitimate just cause, or in light of its 
justification, but not for a hidden or ulterior motive. It is a concept that dates to St. 
Thomas Aquinas, who set as a condition of ―just war‖ that ―it is necessary that the 
belligerents should have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, 
or the avoidance of evil‖ (cited in Temes, 2003). In this case, as with just cause, no 
textbook in this sample makes explicit claims regarding right intention, and it would be 
unreasonable to expect it to be otherwise. There is, however, implicit moral content in all 
textbooks, given their hegemonic tendency to present a chosen national narrative—and 
with regard to right intention, all textbooks in this sample contain latent references to the 
concept. Since ultimately, it was the South that chose an aggressive step by attacking Fort 
Sumter in April 1861, it is their position on right intention that is the proper focus of ―just 
war‖ theory.  
 The Southern position on secession and states‘-rights, as presented in textbooks, 
is about two issues: unfair treatment by the North and the federal government, and the 
protection of the ―Southern‖ way of life (i.e., slavery). All textbooks in this sample 
present narrative sections on these topics, frequently addressing what Southerners 
thought of federal policies regarding tariffs, the expansion of slavery, and Northern 
attitudes about the South in general and slavery in particular. In reference to right 
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intention, then, the question at this juncture is, do textbooks include content that allows 
students to question the motive or motives of the South in the push to secede from the 
Union?  
 Certainly, every textbook dedicates a considerable amount of time and paper to 
the issue of slavery. All textbooks in this sample devote ample space to describing the 
conditions under which slaves were forced to live, the daily degradation and mundane 
tortures they could expect to endure, the loss and separation and risk in the pre-Civil War 
South. The depictions of these textbook are mostly interchangeable, and well-represented 
by this selection from The American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006): 
Slavery was intolerably degrading to the victims. They were deprived of the 
dignity and sense of responsibility that come from independence and the right to 
make choices. They were denied an education, because reading brought ideas, and 
ideas brought discontent. Many states passed laws forbidding their instruction, 
and perhaps nine-tenths of adult slaves at the beginning of the Civil War were 
totally illiterate. For all the slaves—indeed for virtually all blacks, slave or free—
the ―American dream‖ of bettering one‘s lot through study and hard work was a 
cruel and empty mockery. (p. 362) 
Given the overtly negative tone of this depiction (and those like it, across the 
spectrum of the sample), it is hard to ignore the message being implicitly established—
namely, that slavery was more than just a Southern tradition that led to civil disunion, but 
was instead a great moral calamity. Almost in tandem with this description, then, The 
American Pageant includes a section that details the Southern position on slavery. A 
section similar to this can be found in all ten textbooks of this sample: 
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Proslavery whites responded by launching a massive defense of slavery as a 
positive good. In doing so, they forgot their own section‘s previous doubts about 
the morality of the ―peculiar institution.‖ Slavery, they claimed, was supported by 
the authority of the Bible and the wisdom of Aristotle. It was good for the 
Africans, who were lifted from the barbarism of the jungle and clothed with the 
blessings of Christian civilization…Southern whites were quick to contrast the 
―happy‖ lot of their ―servants‖ with that of the overworked northern wage slaves, 
including sweated women and stunted children. (p. 367) 
The quotation marks surrounding happy and servants are typical of the moral 
inferences of textbooks—rather than simply label the Southern position as evil, the 
authors rely on the subtle contrast of prevailing modern (and contemporaneously 
abolitionist) attitudes regarding race and slavery. But while all the textbooks of this 
sample provide ample justifications from the Southern perspectives regarding the moral 
rightness of their cause, there are no discernible opportunities for students, either in the 
written narrative or included activities, to distinguish between Southern justifications for 
their decision to fight. Students would be hard-pressed to determine whether the South 
thought they were fighting for slavery, or in defense of Constitutional rights, or some 
mixture of both. Evidence of all these positions can be found sprinkled throughout the 
textbooks, but in terms of ―just war‘s‖ condition of right intention, there is, once again, a 
common finding—a great deal of content, though diffuse and presented without 
opportunity for critique.  
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Proper authority. 
The jus ad bellum component of proper authority is typically addressed through a 
given state‘s political structure—generally, was proper procedure for the initiation of 
conflict followed, and was the state that initiated it legitimate? The issue of public 
declaration is the simplest, with regard to the Civil War; all the textbooks in this sample 
address the secession of Southern states after the election of 1860 and the public 
proclamations that occasioned it, starting with South Carolina. Of greater importance and 
value for ―just war‖ considerations is that of proper authority with regard to the 
legitimacy of the Confederacy. Was the government set up by Southern states after their 
secession legitimate, one who was morally capable of initiating conflict with another 
government?  
One aspect of ―just war‖ that is fundamental to this issue is the concept of the 
―minimally just community.‖ Orend, in The Morality of War (2006), introduces the 
concept as a foundational necessity for ―just war‖ generally, and for the moral conduct of 
a civil war in particular. A ―minimally just state,‖ says Orend, has ―moral and legal rights 
to territorial integrity and political sovereignty.‖ He establishes three basic conditions for 
a minimally just state to exist: first, that it is recognized as such by both the international 
community and its own people; second, that it avoids violating the rights of other 
societies/nations; and third, that it makes ―every reasonable effort to satisfy the human 
rights of [its] own citizens‖ (p. 35-36).  
 What is at issue, then, in a civil war, is whether or not the government at large has 
failed in these criteria, as well as whether or not the government that is attempting to 
achieve independence can realistically uphold those standards. Orend puts it thus: ―This 
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is the key question in a civil war; who has minimal justice on their side (sic)‖ (p. 84)? In 
Orend‘s view, the Union‘s war against the South was morally justified, given the 
Confederacy‘s inability to satisfy the conditions of a minimally just state. Orend points to 
two factors which places the South in an unjust position—its acts of aggression that led to 
the general outbreak of war (particularly the attack on Fort Sumter in April 1861), and its 
defense of the institution of slavery, what Orend calls ―a massive social injustice, a 
hideous and widespread violation of human rights—depriving slaves of freedom, basic 
equality, social recognition as persons, and, quite often, their very physical security.‖ (p. 
84)  
 Certainly, this conclusion can be debated, especially from a historical 
perspective—Southerners, at the minimum, did not view slavery as abhorrent as Orend 
does, and certainly those who supported the Confederacy did not generally consider 
themselves representing an unjust society. And certainly many Southerners felt that the 
federal government had become, throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the 
embodiment of what Orend describes as a moral condition for waging a civil war, a 
government ―of oppressive tyranny…a severe discriminator which respects the rights of 
one privileged group while violating those of another‖ (p. 84). Thus, many Southerners 
would view their own status as a minimally just state violated by federal aggression, and 
therefore a violation of what Garrett (2004) frames as a fundamental right of such states--
they ―should be free from force and fraud by other states…they should be permitted to 
govern themselves without harmful interference from outside.‖ What is more important, 
for the purposes of this study, is whether or not textbooks allow for the opportunity to 
question the legal and moral status of the Confederacy, as a political entity. 
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Across the ten textbooks of this sample, none explicitly discuss the moral stature 
of the Confederacy as a minimally just community. This is, of course, predictable—
Orend‘s conceptual framework is probably too sophisticated an idea for inclusion in a 
survey textbook. The question of whether or not the Confederacy had a legal or moral 
right to exist, however, is a concept that (and thus, to initiate a war against the Union) not 
only is fundamental to a ―just war‖ consideration of the Civil War, but it is also well 
within the critical capabilities of most high school students. There is considerable 
coverage of the events and topics that Northerners and Southerners grappled with on the 
road to war—for example, there is much discussion of the constitutional basis for 
secession, or the lack thereof, as described above, and there are a substantial number of 
pages dedicated to the inhumane conditions under which slaves were forced to live. 
However, at no point in the ten books of this sample is the fundamental question of a 
minimally just community posed or hinted at—did the Confederacy have the moral right 
to exist? This is a deficiency that severely inhibits any textbooks‘ capacity for moral 
criticism, from a ―just war‖ perspective. 
 
The Election of 1860 
 The second component of jus ad bellum for this study is the presidential election 
of 1860. In November 1860, the presidential election highlighted the sectionalism 
plaguing the nation. Four candidates—Abraham Lincoln, Stephen Douglas, John 
Breckenridge, and John Bell—vied for the White House, and the electoral results were 
taken in the North and South as a warning of the violence about to erupt across the 
country.  
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Historical Narrative Analysis 
 Major historiographical works are in consensus on the importance of the election 
of 1860 as a primary and immediate cause of Southern secession. Morison and 
Commager (1942) call secession a ―foregone conclusion‖ after Lincoln‘s election, 
symbolically conflating the events in the title of their chapter on the time period, 
―Lincoln, Secession, and the Civil War‖ (p. 637). McPherson (1988) refers to it as the 
most ―unique in the history of American politics‖ (p. 223). He describes how the 
possibility of Lincoln‘s election precipitated a crisis of epic proportions in the South 
regarding their electoral and national fate: 
As the election neared, a volatile mixture of hysteria, despondency, and elation 
[arose] in the South. Whites feared the coming of new John Browns encouraged 
by triumphant Black Republicans; unionists despaired of the future; secessionists 
relished the prospect of southern independence….stories of slave uprisings that 
followed the visits of mysterious Yankee strangers, reports of arsons and rapes 
and poisonings by slaves crowded the southern press…This mass hysteria caused 
even southern unionists to warn Yankees that a Republican victory meant 
disunion. (p. 228-229) 
 Doris Kearns Goodwin, in A Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham 
Lincoln (2005), describes how many Republicans, during the campaign of 1860, tried to 
dispute immediacy of the southern threat to secede, saying that the ―the South had made 
similar threats intermittently for forty years.‖ As Lincoln himself told a journalist, the 
saber-rattling in the South was ―a sort of political game of bluff, gotten up by politicians, 
and meant solely to frighten the North‖ (p. 274). Whether Lincoln believed this or was 
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adopting a campaign tactic to allay fears of disunion, he was wrong—Goodwin points out 
that in the South, ―the election of a ‗Black Republican‘ was merely the final injury in a 
long list of grievances against the North…[including] attempts to exclude slaveowners 
from the new territories; failure to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act; continued agitation of 
the slavery question that held Southerners up to contempt and mockery; and the fear of 
insurrection provoked by the John Brown raid‖ (p. 293-294).  
 Olsen (2006) also enumerates the Southern complaints, adding that, in electing a 
President with no southern votes, the North had formalized ―an insult to the South and 
their claim of equality within the Union. Over and over, Southerners used the same words 
to describe the Republican triumph: humiliating, insulting, degrading‖ (p. 60). This insult 
had been brewing for some time, and the election of Lincoln should not have been seen, 
according to Olsen, as a thunderclap from the heavens. In fact, the outcome of the 
election itself was practically decided back in October 1860, when early voting was held 
in three crucial states—Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Lincoln‘s victories in these 
states largely assured his national victory a month later, made clear to ―most Americans 
that he would win the election‖ (p. 59-60).  
 David Williams, in A People’s History of the Civil War (2005) writes that the 
campaign of 1860 was not a ―referendum on secession among southern whites,‖ but that 
even the candidate seen as most overtly pro-Southern, the Southern Democrats‘ John 
Breckenridge, cast himself as the only nominee who could save the Union—since the 
election of Lincoln would ensure southern secession and black equality. Williams is less 
emphatic about the concept of Southern unity on disunion—he argues, persuasively, that 
the issue was largely divided along class lines, with large landowners and planters 
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generally in favor of seceding and poor whites less sanguine on the issue. In fact, 
Williams states, there was sentiment among some landowners for secession not to 
prevent the calamity of Republican rule, but instead to keep abolitionism from springing 
up among the lower classes of southern whites—―one secessionist warned that if the 
slaveholders did not take their states out of the Union, there would indeed soon be ‗an 
Abolition party in the South, of Southern men.‘ Another frankly admitted, ‗I mistrust our 
own people more than I fear all of the efforts of the Abolitionists‖ (p. 52). What is 
beyond dispute, as Williams illustrates, is that the election of Abraham Lincoln was 
viewed as a tipping point in relations between the North and South, though the degree to 
which such an event represented an irrevocable break between the two regions is 
debatable. Interestingly, Williams also includes the perspective of a group largely ignored 
in most narratives of this event—with regard to slaves, Williams points out that ―slaves 
wanted to be set free, and by 1860 they believed Lincoln would do just that. How could 
they think otherwise with secessionists ranting throughout the South that Lincoln‘s 
ultimate goal was to free them?‖ Williams describes a planned slave uprising in 
Chesterfield County, Virginia, where slaves were sure that Lincoln would come to help 
them, and claims that such attempts were common in the weeks after the election in 
November 1860 (p. 53). With the white South‘s traditional fear of slave rebellion already 
stoked by the recent attempt of John Brown, even the barest mention of widespread 
uprisings would have been seen as a dire threat.  
 Textbooks are largely unanimous in their depiction of the election of 1860 as the 
primary cause of secession and disunion. Many books try to establish the sense of 
national foreboding that seemed to hang over the United States prior to the presidential 
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election. The American Nation: A History of the United States (Carnes, et al., 2008) 
bluntly describes the danger facing the nation prior to the event itself: ―By 1860 the 
nation was teetering on the brink of disunion. Radicals North and South were heedlessly 
provoking one another‖ (p. 367-368). America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & 
Stoff, 2009) sets the stage for the coming crisis: ―As the election of 1860 drew near, 
Americans everywhere felt a sense of crisis. The long and bitter debate over slavery had 
left the nation seriously divided.‖ (p. 499). The authors go on to state that ―due to rising 
tensions between the North and South, the election of 1860 took place in an atmosphere 
of distrust and suspicion.‖ (p. 499). Under the paragraph heading of ―A Rail-Splitter 
Splits the Union,‖ The American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006) goes so far as to 
implicitly blame Lincoln himself, placing their description of the calamity facing the U.S. 
that year—―Beyond question the presidential election of 1860 was the most fateful in 
American history. On it hung the issue of peace or civil war‖ (p. 425). 
Pathways to the Present (Cayton, et al., 2007) similarly tries to engage students 
by describing the tension of the days leading to the election, as well as the stakes 
involved:  
As 1860 began and a new presidential election approached, it was clear that most 
Northerners would not accept leadership by a Southerner. Southerners, likewise, 
would not accept a leader from the ranks of the antislavery Republicans in the 
North. The next presidential election was looming. Could the Union survive it? 
(p. 369-370)  
The American Journey highlights the manner in which the coming election was 
viewed in the South as a direct threat, given the ―radicalism‖ of the Republican Party:  
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It was one thing to condemn slavery in the territories but another to attack it 
violently where it was long established. Southerners now saw in the Republican 
party the embodiment of John Brown‘s ideals and actions. So, in their view, the 
election of a Republican president would be a death sentence for the South. (p. 
407) 
Only a few textbooks do an effective job of encapsulating the position of the 
South, prior to this election. The Enduring Vision (Boyer, et al., 2008), for example, does 
the best job of describing how the election itself was viewed by many Southerners as the 
final act in a long-building series of insults, depredations, and assaults upon their way of 
life:  
…the events of the 1850s persuaded many Southerners that the Union had 
deserted the true principles of the Union. Southerners interpreted northern 
resistance to the Fugitive Slave Act and to slavery in Kansas as either illegal or 
unconstitutional, and they viewed headline-grabbing phrases such as 
―irrepressible conflict‖ and ―a higher law‖ as virtual declarations of war on the 
South. To southerners, it was the North, not the South, that had grown peculiar... 
To white southerners, the North, not slavery, was the problem. (p. 416) 
 Some textbooks are commendable in the manner in which they connect Southern 
concerns to more recent events than the prior ten years. Visions of America: a History of 
the United States (Keene, et al., 2010) describes the Southern connection of the 
presidential election to the recent raid by John Brown, a white abolitionist who had tried 
to inspire a slave uprising at Harper‘s Ferry, Virginia. His capture and subsequent 
execution for treason against a state had struck a deep chord of terror in the South, and 
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Visions of America frames the Southern view of the presidential election in the light of 
memory of that event:  
Brown‘s audacious act convinced many Southerners that Northern abolitionists 
would continue to conspire to instigate future slave uprisings in order to destroy 
Southern society. Increasingly they talked of dissolving their union with the North 
to protect their property and way of life. Robert Toombs of Georgia voiced the 
most pressing concern of Southerners: ―Never permit this Federal government to 
pass into the traitorous hands of the black Republican party.‖ (p. 367) 
United States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010) also addresses Southern 
concerns prior to the war, as well as national apprehension over the continuing violence 
in Kansas ; but in addition, the authors describe Northern anxiety over the recent decision 
of the U.S. Supreme Court in Dred Scott v. Sanford, which declared that slaves living in 
free territories were still considered slaves:  
John Brown‘s raid and execution were still fresh in the minds of Americans as the 
1860 presidential election approached. Uncertainty about Kansas—would it be a 
slave state or a free state?—added to the anxiety. In the North, loss of confidence 
in the Supreme Court resulting from the Dred Scott decision and rage about the 
Fugitive Slave Act‘s intrusion into the states‘ independence further aggravated the 
situation. The issue of states‘ rights was on southern minds as well. Would 
northern radicals conspire to eliminate slavery not only in the territories, but also 
in the original southern states…Even southerners who did not own slaves felt that 
their way of life and their honor was under attack. (p. 346-347) 
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 In their depictions of the election itself, many textbooks imply that the election of 
Abraham Lincoln shook the South like a thunderclap, without warning, while others point 
out that the shock of the Republican victory was more muted. All textbooks describe the 
manner in which the Democratic party split along regional lines and nominated two 
different candidates—Stephen Douglas and John Breckenridge—while the Republicans 
eschewed the odds-on favorite, William Seward, in favor of the more moderate Lincoln. 
Additionally, all textbooks indicate the degree to which some Southerners wished to 
avoid disunion and the possibility of war by creating another party, one dedicated to 
Southern principles and unity, the Constitutional Union Party (whose candidate in the 
1860 election was John Bell). In the spirit of many textbooks, America: History of Our 
Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009) tries to split the difference and maintain historical 
accuracy while also portraying the impact of the election—after asserting that even some 
of Lincoln‘s opponents in the general election were ―sure that Lincoln would win the 
election,‖ the authors distort that claim by saying later that “Lincoln‘s election sent shock 
waves through the South‖ (p. 499). The textbook does showcase the degree to which the 
election seemed to indicate a political division within the nation that went beyond mere 
rhetoric and the anger of an active fringe element in the South: 
The election showed just how fragmented the nation had become. Lincoln won in 
every free state and Breckenridge in all the slaveholding states except four. Bell 
won Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia—all in the upper South. Douglas carried 
only Missouri. Although Lincoln only got 40 percent of the popular votes, he 
received enough electoral votes to win the election. (p. 500) 
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Other textbooks provide similar descriptions of the regional nature of the 
presidential election of 1860. Give Me Liberty! ((Foner, 2008) is blunt: ―In effect, two 
presidential campaigns took place in 1860.‖ (p. 495) Visions of America claims that ―For 
the first time in the nation‘s history, a purely regional party, the Republicans, had won the 
White House‖ (p. 369). Textbooks differ on the degree to which Lincoln was perceived 
as the rightful victor in the race. In The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010), the authors 
focus on the tenuous claim Lincoln had to national support: 
Lincoln emerged as the winner, but like Buchanan in the previous election, he 
received less than half the popular vote. In fact, although Lincoln defeated his 
combined opponents in the electoral vote 180 to 123, he received no electoral 
votes from the South. Unlike Buchanan, Lincoln had sectional rather than national 
support, carrying every free state but not even appearing on the ballot in most of 
the slave states. The outlook for the Union was grim. (p. 330) 
 The American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006) is even more forthright, almost 
dismissive in its depiction of Lincoln‘s victory and the near-illegitimacy of the new 
administration:  
Awkward ―Abe‖ Lincoln had run a curious race. To a greater degree than any 
other holder of the nation‘s higher office (except John Quincy Adams), he was a 
minority president. Sixty percent of the voters preferred some other candidate. He 
was also a sectional president, for in ten southern states, where he was not 
allowed on the ballot, he polled no popular vote. (p. 427) 
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In contrast to this, The American Nation: a History of the United States (Carnes, 
et al., 2008) tries to dispel some of the common rhetoric about Lincoln‘s minority status, 
by pointing out that mathematically, his claim to the presidency was beyond dispute: 
―Lincoln was thus a minority president, but his title to the office was unquestionable. 
Even if his opponents could have combined their popular votes in each state, Lincoln 
would have won‖ (p. 370). The Enduring Vision (Boyer, et al., 2008) follows this same 
theme, claiming that despite the unusual nature of the election of 1860, there could be 
little question of Lincoln‘s clear triumph: ―Lincoln won a clear majority of the electoral 
vote, 180 to 123 for his three opponents combined. Although Lincoln gained only 39 
percent of the popular vote, his popular votes were concentrated in the North, the 
majority section, and were sufficient to carry every free state‖ (p. 417). 
 Rather than setting the stage for the election or highlighting the election‘s 
outcome, it is the manner in which textbooks depict the consequences of the election that 
is most telling. Most textbooks highlight the outrage, despair, and near-panic felt in the 
South at the prospect of a Republican administration. The Americans (Danzer, et al., 
2010) is blunt: ―Lincoln‘s victory convinced Southerners that they had lost their political 
voice in the national government‖ (p. 330). In The Enduring Vision (Boyer, et al., 2008), 
the authors start with a bland, plainly factual statement about the election‘s impact—
―Lincoln‘s election initiated the process by which the southern states abandoned the 
United States for a new nation, the Confederate States of America‖ (p. 416)—but 
ultimately describes white Southern anger over what they perceived ―as a calculated 
northern insult‖ (p. 420). 
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America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009) puts it thus: ―Lincoln‘s 
election sent shock waves through the South. To many southerners, it seemed the South 
no longer had a voice in the national government. They believed that the President and 
Congress were now set against their interests—especially slavery‖ (p. 500). The authors 
then quote a Virginia newspaper editor as representative of most Southern sentiments: 
―‘A party founded on the single sentiment…of hatred of African slavery, is now the 
controlling power…The honor, safety, and independence of the Southern people are to be 
found only in a Southern confederacy‘‖ (p. 501). America: Pathways to the Present 
(Cayton, et al., 2007) is almost exactly the same as this narrative, in both tone and 
structure, in its description of the Southern reaction, even including a quote from an 
angry newspaper editor:  
Southerners were outraged that a President could be elected without any southern 
electoral votes. The national government, it seemed, had passed completely out of 
their hands. Planters and others who backed slavery called for the South to 
secede, or withdraw, from the Union. An Augusta, Georgia, newspaper editor 
wrote: ―[The Republican Party] stands forth today, hideous, revolting, loathsome, 
a menace not only to the Union of these states, but to Society, Liberty, and to 
Law.‖ (p. 371) 
One important element of textbook narrative descriptions of the election of 1860 
is the degree to which the authors attempt to depict the immediacy of the threat, as 
perceived by Southerners. Many texts join the election results and the secession of South 
Carolina, implicitly accentuating a sense of immediacy to the Southern reaction. Typical 
of this form of narrative is this section from The American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 
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2006): ―South Carolinians rejoiced over Lincoln‘s victory; they now had their excuse to 
secede. In winning the North, the ‗rail-splitter‘ had split off the South‖ (p. 427). In the 
same vein, the narrative style of Visions of America: a History of the United States 
(Keene, et al., 2010) reflects a conceptual link between the election and practically 
immediate separation of North and South: ―Southern fire-eaters, having warned 
Southerners that the election of a ‗Black Republican‘ would lead to the end of slavery 
and the destruction of their society, wasted no time in calling for secession‖ (p. 369). 
Only a few authors try to point out that the ―threat‖ of a Republican administration was 
entirely a theoretical one—especially since Lincoln, in the run-up to the election and 
thereafter, took pains to try and assure Southern states that he had no intention of trying 
to eradicate slavery. Eric Foner, in Give Me Liberty! (Foner, 2008), is very detailed in 
describing why Southerners found the prospect of Lincoln‘s presidency so alarming: 
In the eyes of many white southerners, Lincoln‘s victory placed their future at the 
mercy of a party avowedly hostile to their region‘s values and interests. Those 
advocating secession did not believe Lincoln‘s administration would take 
immediate steps against slavery in the states. But if, as seemed quite possible, the 
election of 1860 marked a fundamental shift in power, the beginning of a long 
period of Republican rule, who could say what the North‘s antislavery sentiment 
would demand in five years, or ten? Slaveowners, moreover, feared Republican 
efforts to extend their party into the South by appealing to non-slaveholders. 
Rather than accept permanent minority status in a nation governed by their 
opponents, Deep South politicians boldly struck for their region‘s independence. 
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At stake, they believed, was not a single election, but an entire way of life. (p. 
496) 
Similarly, The American Journey (Goldfield, et al., 2007) tries to point out that 
even the results of the election had been relatively easy to predict prior to the actual 
casting of votes, thanks to a historical scheduling quirk: ―In those days, states did not 
hold gubernatorial elections on the same day, or even in the same month, as the national 
presidential election. When, in mid-October, Republicans swept the statehouses in two 
crucial states, Pennsylvania and Indiana, [it became clear] that Lincoln‘s election was 
inevitable‖ (p. 409).  
 All textbooks contain significant passages on the election of 1860, and while most 
include a few student activities or opportunities for critique, only a few provide 
significant examples of the kind. America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 
2009) includes a ―Comprehension and Critical Thinking‖ question that allows students to 
consider the impact of the election on Southern states: ―What was the South‘s reaction to 
Lincoln‘s election? How did Lincoln try to reassure the South?‖ And it also includes a 
writing assignment that philosophically links the election to the subsequent secession of 
South Carolina: ―Based on what you have read in this section, write a thesis statement for 
an essay explaining why the election of Abraham Lincoln caused the South to secede‖ (p. 
502). America: Pathways to the Present (Cayton, et al., 2007) has review questions that 
ask students to explain a characterization of Lincoln‘s victory as ―a decisive victory, but a 
sectional one,‖ and contains the most direct connection of the election to secession of any 
textbook with this question: ―Why did Lincoln‘s election prompt the secession of the 
southern states‖ (p. 372)?  
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The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010) provides the most comprehensive set of 
activities, encouraging students to examine the election critically, to evaluate its impact, 
and even to engage in multiple perspectives regarding the vote itself. In a section labeled 
―Critical Thinking,‖ the texts asks, ―If you had been voting in the presidential election of 
1860, for whom would you have voted, other than Abraham Lincoln? Explain your 
reasoning by using specific references to the chapter‖ (p. 331). Later, the authors include 
a chart that asks students to examine ―Key Events,‖ like the Wilmot Proviso, the 
Compromise of 1850, the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, and the election of 1860, and 
explain how each could be considered ―Fuel for Secession‖ (p. 334). Finally, at the end of 
the chapter on this topic, the textbook narrative refers to an introductory activity at the 
beginning of the section and asks students to make judgments about what they know 
now:  
Alternative Assessment: Recall your discussion of the question on page 303: How 
can the Union be saved? Now that you know more about the road leading to the 
secession crisis, would you change any of your responses? Write a plan of action 
in the voice of a presidential advisor. (p. 335) 
While many textbooks include brief, descriptive or identifying exercises for 
students, The Americans is the sole book in this study that provides comprehensive 
activities that encompass a broad range of skills and cognitive levels.  
 In sum, then, textbooks from this sample do an admirable job in detailing the 
issues, events, and consequences of the presidential election of 1860, though the degree 
to which such narratives properly emphasize the philosophical impact of the election on 
the South varies. Most textbooks do a good job in describing the anxiety felt by many 
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Americans prior to the election, and all detail the position of the Southern states 
regarding the issues at risk. Several books try, intentionally or not, to mute the impact of 
the election or to show its predictability, which in turn impacts the content of the South‘s 
moral position on just cause. Finally, while all textbooks present student activities 
regarding the substance and impact of the election of 1860, many are merely cursory or 
informational. Only one book in this sample, The Americans, has a series of activities that 
allow students to meaningfully critique the historical meaning of the presidential election.  
 
Categorical Analysis 
The categorical analysis of textbook narrative depictions of the presidential election of 
1860 includes two main components of jus ad bellum: just cause and right intention.  
 
Just cause. 
 The Southern reaction to the presidential election is key to their assertion of just 
cause in the Civil War. It is not the intent of this study to cast moral judgment on the 
choices made by textbook authors regarding moral content, except so far as the degree to 
which it is present in their narrative choices. Put another way, this study does not assert 
that there is a correct moral content to present to students; instead, this study seeks to 
examine what moral content is present, and to what degree is it organized or coherent. 
With that in hand, the Southern position on the presidential election does not need to be 
presented glowingly or approvingly, but it should be included for student consumption, if 
the jus ad bellum requirement of just cause is to be satisfied.  
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 The depictions of the presidential election of 1860 in the textbooks of this study 
often contain detailed descriptions of the Southern perspective, after Lincoln‘s victory. 
Many of them contain explicit references to what amounted to a Southern explication of 
just cause—the foundational belief that a nation that chooses the Republican Party is a 
nation that has effectively signaled its hostility towards the Southern way of life. 
America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009) establishes the link between 
the election and secession, practically in the same sentence:  
South Carolina was the first southern state to secede from the Union. When news 
of Lincoln‘s election reached the state, the legislature called for a special 
convention. On December 20, 1860, the convention passed a declaration that ―the 
union now subsisting between South Carolina and the other states, under the name 
of the ‗United States of America‘ is hereby dissolved‖….With the hope of 
accommodation all but gone, six more states followed South Carolina out of the 
Union. (p. 500-501) 
The term accommodation is underline in the text and set aside in the margin under 
the heading ―Vocabulary Builder,‖ with the following definition: ―adjustment; 
adaptation‖ (p. 501). Following this, America: History of Our Nation proceeds to 
elaborate on the Southern reaction and provide justification for their separation from the 
Union, under a section titled ―Was War Avoidable?‖: 
In 1850, southerners might have been satisfied if they had been left alone. But by 
1861, many Americans in both the North and the South had come to accept the 
idea that war could not be avoided. At stake was the nation‘s future. Four years 
later, a weary Lincoln looked back to the beginning of the conflict. He noted: 
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―Both parties [condemned] war, but one of them would make war rather than let 
the nation survive, and the other would accept war rather than let it perish, and the 
war came.‖ (p.503) 
This section lays out a foundation for just cause, but one that includes a 
substantial lack of agency. From this perspective, the South simply wanted to be ―left 
alone‖ by the larger North; but by the war‘s beginning, Americans ―had come to accept‖ 
the fact that war was a likelihood. In this scenario there is no voluntary action, no 
decisions or policies that led to war; instead, it is referred to as an event beyond explicit 
control, in spite of the gravity of the issue involved (the ―nation‘s future‖). This subtext is 
contrasted by Lincoln‘s sentiment in the final sentence of the paragraph, drawn from his 
Second Inaugural Address, though the point made by the President is that the South chose 
war, while the North accepted it—this is an unequivocally Northern position on the war‘s 
beginning, and explicitly challenges the notion that the South may have felt threatened or 
the subject of federal aggression. America: History of Our Nation includes elements of 
Southern just cause, but moves quickly, in its phrasing and selection of text, to undermine 
it.  
 In America: Pathways to the Present (Cayton, et al., 2007), the issue of secession 
is clarified from a legal perspective prior to the depiction of the South‘s departure from 
the Union. The Southern belief that secession was justified, primarily after the election of 
such an allegedly divisive figure as Abraham Lincoln, is the subject of this section:  
The secessionists, or those who wanted the South to secede, argued that since the 
states had voluntarily joined the United States, they also could choose to leave it. 
Edmund Ruffin, a secessionist, claimed that because the Republicans controlled 
145 
 
the federal government, they could act constitutionally and legally ―to produce the 
most complete subjection and political bondage, degradation, and ruin of the 
South.‖ (p. 371) 
 Some authors try to show how Southern secessionists viewed themselves as not 
only in the right in terms of legality, but also historically. The American Journey 
(Goldfield, et al., 2007) highlights the manner in which advocates of secession saw 
themselves as philosophically akin to the Founding Fathers: ―Southerners, they 
maintained, were the true heirs to the spirit of 1776. Lincoln and the Republicans meant 
to deny southerners the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness‖ (p. 409). In a 
similar vein, Give Me Liberty! (Foner, 2008) explains the Southern belief that the issue of 
secession was not merely a legal issue, but was a moral principle derived from the 
nation‘s original tradition of independence and defiance. The author quotes the South 
Carolina proclamation of secession at length:  
The North had ―assumed the right of deciding upon the propriety of our domestic 
institutions.‖ Lincoln was a man ―whose opinions and purposes are hostile to 
slavery.‖ Experience had proved ―that slaveholding states cannot be safe in 
subjection to non-slaveholding states.‖ Secessionists equated their movement with 
the struggle for American independence. Proslavery ideologue George Fitzhugh, 
however later claimed that southern secession was even more significant than the 
―commonplace affair‖ of 1776, since the South rebelled not merely against a 
particular government but against the erroneous modern idea of freedom based on 
―human equality‖ and ―natural liberty.‖ (p. 497)  
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The ultimate futility of secession is on display in The Enduring Vision (Boyer, et 
al., 2008), in which the authors concede what might have been apparent even in 1860—
that the South was unlikely to win a protracted war:  
Viewed as a practical tactic to secure concrete goals, secession did not make a 
great deal of sense…Yet to dwell on the impracticality of secession as a choice 
for the South is to miss the point. Talk of secession was less a tactic with clear 
goals than an expression of the South‘s outrage at what southerners viewed as the 
irresponsible and unconstitutional course that Republicans were taking in the 
North. It was not merely that Republican attacks on slavery sowed the seeds of 
slave uprisings. More fundamentally, southerners believed that the North was 
treating the South as its inferior—indeed, as no more than a slave. (p. 416) 
This is a well-written, thoughtful piece describing the Southern conceptualization 
of the rightness of their cause. It does, however, represent a form of ―collective memory‖ 
about the Civil War and the South‘s choices in that conflict. Michael Kammen, in Mystic 
Chords of Memory: the Transformation of Tradition in American Culture (1991) 
describes how collective memory can be used to elevate a dominant historical group‘s 
perspective, similar to the hegemonic process present in textbooks and described by 
Michael Apple. The dominant discourse on the Civil War—and thus, the dominant theme 
in American history textbooks—is that the South never had a real chance at winning the 
war and achieving its goals. Thus, its policies and behavior are viewed through a 
backward-looking lens, through which we implicitly acknowledge that the South was 
foolhardy to pursue its aims, that its defeat was merely a matter of time. The South‘s 
sense of just cause is diluted by the inferred futility of their ambition; and since one of the 
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major categories of ―just war‖ theory is that of probability of success, approbation for the 
imminent bloodshed of the war itself falls more heavily, in textbook narratives, on the 
South. 
In terms of fully explaining the Southern claim of just cause, probably the most 
comprehensive book in this sample is The American Nation: a History of the United 
States (Carnes, et al., 2008). The selection below illustrates how Southerners did not see 
the election of 1860 as a singular event, but instead as part of a broader trend that 
threatened their cultural and regional existence. Moreover, the narrative here is unique 
among the texts in this sample in that it explicitly refers to the appearance of Southern 
aggression; which, to just war theorists, is the singular factor which most often excludes 
claims to just cause.  
Extremism was more evident in the South, and to any casual observer that section 
must have seemed the aggressor in the crisis. Yet even in demanding the 
reopening of the African slave trade, southern radicals believed that they were 
defending themselves against attack. They felt surrounded by hostility. The North 
was growing at a much faster rate; if nothing was done, they feared, a flood of 
new free states would soon be able to amend the Constitution and emancipate the 
slaves. John Brown‘s raid, with its threat of an insurrection like Nat Turner‘s, 
reduced them to a state of panic.  
When legislatures in state after state in the South cracked down on freedom of 
expression, made the manumission of slaves illegal, banished free blacks, and 
took other steps that Northerners considered blatantly provocative, the advocates 
of these polices believed they were only defending the status quo. Perhaps, by 
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seceding from the Union, the South could raise a dike against the tide of 
abolitionism. Secession also provided an emotional release, a way of dissipating 
tension by striking back at criticism. (p. 368) 
 What is most unique about The American Nation is the degree to which it offers a 
cogent and illuminating articulation of the Southern argument, including an insightful 
commentary on the effect of the previous tumultuous years on the collective state of mind 
in the South: ―The years of sectional conflict, the growing northern criticism of slavery, 
perhaps even an unconscious awareness that this criticism was well founded, had 
undermined and in many cases destroyed the patriotic feelings of white Southerners‖ (p. 
370-371). In spite of this, though, this textbook offers little on the connection Southerners 
made between the election of Abraham Lincoln and all the ill tidings most believed it 
harbored. All the books in this sample address the Southern argument for secession, after 
the election of 1860, and cast it implicitly within the moral framework of just cause; 
though only The American Nation encapsulates the elements of this argument in an 
effective manner which allows for a comprehensive examination of the Southern 
position. Even so, The American Nation lacks the explicit connection between the 
election of 1860 and Southern arguments for secession that would constitute a 
meaningful degree of content, from a ―just war‖ perspective.  
 
Right intention. 
 One of the most intriguing elements of ―just war‖ theory is that of right intention, 
or the belief that a nation must intend to fight only in defense of its just cause, or in light 
of its justification. Brian Orend, in The Morality of War, describes how this component 
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began with the writings of St. Augustine, who postulated that a Christian ruler could only 
turn to war out of the ―greatest reluctance, and not with any pleasure or hatred for the 
enemy whatsoever. The right intention must be loved for, and desire to protect, the 
endangered innocents‖ (p. 12-13). Over time, this concept was secularized, and is now 
generally construed as the correlation between a nation‘s stated cause of aggression and 
the real reason it fought. With regard to the Civil War, the issue of right intention is best 
examined in the consideration of one question: did the South really go to war in 1860 
because of the perceived aggressive threat of the election of Abraham Lincoln? 
 There is little doubt, in relevant historiography and the textbooks in this sample, 
that the consensus view of the time period is that Lincoln‘s election was the final trigger 
to secession. An important aspect of this narrative is the degree to which conflict within 
the South over the issue of slavery is depicted. David Williams, in A People’s History of 
the Civil War: Struggles for the Meaning of Freedom (2005), details how advocates of 
secession were by no means a dominant majority of the South, even after the election of 
1860. Even prior to the 1850s and the nationalization of the slavery debate, there was a 
large anti-slavery faction in the South itself—in 1827, 106 of the 130 abolitionist 
societies in the United States were in the South (Williams, 2005, p. 25). Williams details 
how secession in the Deep South was certainly more imminent than in the upper South 
and the border states, but was by no means a sure thing—even with the presence of 
violent threats, pro-Union turnout at state secession conventions was high in states like 
Alabama, Louisiana, Georgia, and Texas. Williams also points out that the state 
conventions which ultimately voted for secession were dominated by slaveowners—in 
Georgia, 87 percent of convention delegates owned slaves, while only just over a third of 
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Georgia‘s qualified voters held any slaves at all (p. 57). The elitist cast of the conventions 
was obvious from the characteristics of the delegates and the nondemocratic nature of the 
process—only in Texas was the issue of secession submitted directly to the people, while 
in the six other seceding states, the ratification of secession ordinances were never given 
over to the voters (Williams, 2005, p. 58). David Potter, in his study of secession, 
concluded that ―at no time during the winter of 1860-1861 was secession desired by a 
majority of the slave states…Furthermore, secession was not basically desired even by a 
majority in the lower South‖ (Potter, 1979, p. 58). 
 Some textbooks acknowledge that secession was not an inevitable choice for all 
Southerners, and that many did not want to leave the Union. The Enduring Vision (Boyer, 
et al., 2008) describes the ―uncertainty‖ of the secessionist movement, and the resistance 
among many southerners to the initial call for separation: ―Even after Lincoln‘s election, 
fire-eating secessionists had met fierce opposition in the Lower South from so-called 
cooperationists, who called upon the South to act in unison or not at all. Many 
cooperationists had hoped to delay secession in order to wring concessions from the 
North that might remove the need for secession‖ (p. 420).  
The American Nation: A History of the United States (Carnes, et al., 2008) 
concedes that secession did not enjoy universal approval in the South, but infers that such 
diffidence was short-lived in many quarters:  
Not every slave owner could contemplate secession with such bloodthirsty 
equanimity. Some believed that the risks of war and slave insurrection were too 
great. Others retained a profound loyalty to the United States. Many accepted 
secession only after the deepest examination of conscience. (p. 371) 
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The sentence at the end of this section implies that reluctance to go to war was a 
temporary condition for many Southerners, and that eventually they submitted to what is 
implicitly depicted as the dominant will of the people. In the same vein, the authors of 
America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009) describe opposition to 
disunion and then barely pause before minimizing such opposition‘s impact: 
However, not all southerners favored secession. Tennessee Senator Andrew 
Johnson and Texas Governor Sam Houston were among those who opposed it. 
Yet, the voices of the moderates were overwhelmed. ―People are wild,‖ said one 
opponent of secession. ―You might as well attempt to control a tornado as attempt 
to stop them.‖ (p. 501) 
United States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010) also tends to minimize the 
impact or influence of Unionist support in the South prior to secession, in giving token 
mention to the existence of such support before presenting it as a minor current in the 
largest tempest: 
Sentiments favoring secession were not always unanimous, with the gravest 
doubts surfacing in Georgia. State senator Alexander H. Stephens, though 
alarmed by Lincoln‘s election, was devoted to the Union of states under the 
Constitution: ―This government of our fathers, with all its defects, comes nearer 
the objects of all good government than any other on the face of the Earth,‖ he 
said. But Georgia voted to secede anyway. Like delegates in the other slave-
dependent, cotton-growing states, they believed they had to take this step to 
protect their property and way of life. (p. 350) 
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Another consideration to take into account with textbook narratives of secession 
is the discrepancy between the behavior of the Deep South and the Upper South. All the 
textbooks in this sample describe how seven states originally formed the Confederacy, 
but that a few—Virginia, Arkansas, Tennessee, and North Carolina—held out until the 
Southern attack on Fort Sumter. While implicitly acknowledging this fact, very few of 
the textbooks actually describe why the Upper South waited.  
The Enduring Vision (Boyer, et al., 2008) does a good job in explaining how the 
Upper South flatly rejected secession,‖ using a map feature to show the relative dates of 
secession. The authors then go on to compare and contrast pro-secession fervor in the 
Deep South and the Upper South, pointing out that the resistance in the states closer to 
the north was based on strong economic ties to the North. Additionally, there was a 
generally lower slave population in the Upper South, and thus considerably less loyalty to 
the concept of secession among the significant portion of these states‘ population that 
owned no slaves. Virginia was a particular case; and The Enduring Vision identifies 
concern over the solidly pro-Union sentiment in that state‘s western counties as an 
impediment to secession. All this combined to cause the pro-secession movement to lose 
some of its luster in the winter and early spring of 1860-1861, a fact that no other 
textbook acknowledges: ―the secession movement that South Carolina so boldly started 
in December 1860 seemed to be falling apart by March 1861‖ (p. 420). Other than The 
Enduring Vision, there are no books in this sample that detail why the Upper South 
delayed their secession from the Union.  
 To the issue of right intention, then, the salient questions are: did the South secede 
in the defense of their stated just cause? And did Northern actions, prior to the attack on 
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Fort Sumter, align with their explication of just cause—namely, the defense of the 
Union? For the South, all the textbooks in this sample identify the ideological defense of 
their own independence and way of life as the primary motivation for leaving the Union. 
But there are differences in the portrayal of enthusiasm for secession, both from a 
philosophical and commercial perspective.  
 For the South, all of the textbooks include considerably detailed accounts of the 
ideological basis of secession. In all texts, the South is depicted as feeling threatened, 
their way of life imperiled by the election of a clearly abolitionist President. Generally, 
the textbook accounts do not move significantly beyond that version—though two books, 
The American Pageant and The American Nation, do include more layered and 
multifaceted explanations of why secession occurred.  
 In The American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006), describes secession as mostly 
rooted in slavery, though varied in its practical manifestation. The South was alarmed by 
the ―inexorable tipping of the political balance against them,‖ the increasing political 
power of the more heavily populated North. Additionally, the authors here describe the 
South as a minority region that was tired of being treated as such: ―They were weary of 
free-soil criticism, abolitionist nagging, and northern interference, ranging from the 
Underground Railroad to John Brown‘s raid. ‗All we ask is to be let alone,‘ declared 
Confederate president Jefferson Davis‖ (p. 431). The American Pageant describes the 
Southern confidence that Northern commercial interests would be unwilling to go to war 
and risk their investments in the South; and even if war became necessary, ―the immense 
debt owed to northern creditors by the South—happy thought—could be promptly 
repudiated, as it later was.‖ Additionally, the prospect of separation carried the possibility 
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that the South may be able to achieve a degree of economic independence, as well as 
more forward in manufacturing and industry, finally shaking off the ―vassalage‖ that had 
made it so reliant upon the North over the previous decades (p. 431). 
 Most notably, The American Pageant connects the issue of secession to both 
historical and contemporary events. The authors point out that Southerners largely felt 
themselves philosophically in league with the original revolutionaries of 1776:  
Historical parallels ran even deeper. In 1776, thirteen American colonies, led by 
the rebel George Washington, had seceded from the British Empire by throwing 
off the yoke of King George III. In 1860-1861, eleven American states, led by the 
rebel Jefferson Davis, were seceding from the Union by throwing off the yoke of 
―King‖ Abraham Lincoln. With that burden gone, the South was confident that it 
could work out its own peculiar destiny more quietly, happily, and prosperously. 
(p. 431) 
To this historical reference, The American Pageant adds that, to the nineteenth-
century world view, revolution and nationalism were emerging trends:  
Worldwide impulses of nationalism—then stirring in Italy, Germany, Poland, and 
elsewhere—were fermenting in the South. This huge area, with its distinctive 
culture, was not so much a section as a subnation. It could not view with 
complacency the possibility of being lorded over, then or later, by what it 
regarded as a hostile nation of northerners. (p. 431) 
The American Pageant goes so far as to include a section titled ―Varying 
Viewpoints,‖ a short essay detailing the positions taken by historians over the years since 
the Civil War. The textbook describes how the causes of the War have been variously 
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ascribed to an economic struggle between the North and South, as asserted by Charles 
and Mary Beard; the breakdown of political institutions, as per the scholarship of James 
G. Randall and Avery Craven; and the inevitability of ―an unavoidable conflict between 
two societies,‖ examined variously by Allen Nevins, David Potter, Eric Foner, and 
Eugene Genovese (p. 432). Though the degree to which it may accessible or useful for 
students is debatable, it is clear that The American Pageant contains a substantive and 
comprehensive review of Southern attitudes about secession. 
 The American Nation: A History of the United States (Carnes, et al., 2008) also 
gives the subject of secession a thorough going-over. In much the same vein as The 
American Pageant, the authors here describe the Southern anxiety over the ―hostility‖ of 
the North, as well as its rapidly increasing population: ―if nothing was done, they feared, 
a flood of new free states would soon be able to amend the Constitution and emancipate 
the slaves‖ (p. 368). The text identifies the irony of Southern repression of free 
expression in light of its protestations of freedom, and thoughtfully explains the paradox:  
When legislatures in state after state in the South cracked down on freedom of 
expression, made the manumission of slaves illegal, banished free blacks, and 
took other steps that Northerners considered blatantly provocative, the advocates 
of these polices believed they were only defending the status quo. Perhaps, by 
seceding from the Union, the South could raise a dike against the tide of 
abolitionism. Secession also provided an emotional release, a way of dissipating 
tension by striking back at criticism. (p. 368) 
In elaborating the root causes of secession, The American Nation remarks that 
separation from the Union might seem ill-timed to an outside observer; with sympathetic 
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Democrats in the majority in Congress, and with the Supreme Court aligned with 
Southern interests, it made little sense to secede only because of the election of a 
President thought (erroneously) to be an abolitionist. In explaining this, The American 
Nation hits on several of the elements described by The American Pageant: the 
―tremendous economic energy‖ of the North was a direct threat to Southern 
independence, and the prospect of secession offered a chance for the South to create the 
sort of ―balanced economy‖ that would put it in the same league as the North. (p. 370) 
The possibility of liberating their states from economic bondage to the North was a 
powerful incentive to Southerners, as both textbooks here describe. The American Nation 
goes farther than The American Pageant in detailing how the emotional factors behind 
secession were equally compelling, especially how native pro-American sentiment had 
been eroded in the South over the previous decades: 
The years of sectional conflict, the growing northern criticism of slavery, perhaps 
even an unconscious awareness that this criticism was well founded, had 
undermined and in many cases destroyed the patriotic feelings of white 
Southerners. Because of the constant clamor set up by New England antislavery 
groups, the South tended to identify all Northerners as ―Yankee abolitionists‖ and 
to resent them with increasing passion. (p. 370-371) 
 In sum, then, all ten of the textbooks in this sample address the Southern 
perspective on secession, but only two provide sufficiently detailed, complex analyses of 
the different iterations of that perspective. In all cases, however, the texts depict the 
Southern just cause distinctly, and do not contrast it with hidden agendas or inferred 
motives; so in that sense, the textbook narratives do not provide content from which to 
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critique the ―just war‖ component of right intention. The northern perspective, however, 
is largely absent from most of the books in this sample—the North is described as a 
passive spectator to the parade of secession going on after Lincoln‘s election in 
November, 1860. While the textbook authors satisfactorily include depictions of the 
Southern state of mind, the anxiety and dread many in the South felt about Abraham 
Lincoln and the Republican Party, none of the authors ask or answer an interesting 
question: how did the North feel about the prospect of imminent secession? Did the North 
go to war to preserve the Union for ideological purposes or economic purposes?  
 David Williams, in A People’s History of the Civil War (2005), goes into 
considerable detail about the desire among northern commercial interests to keep the 
Deep South in the Union: ―Northern industrialists and financiers vigorously pressured the 
government to keep the cotton states in the Union—by compromise if possible, by force 
if necessary‖ (p. 60). Williams argues that secession would prohibit access to southern 
markets and a ready supply of cotton; and, maybe more importantly, ―secession would 
make it impossible for northern creditors to collect on the millions of dollars in debt 
southerners owed,‖ to the amount of over $300 million (p. 60).  
Lincoln himself understood the two motives—in his inaugural address of March 
4, 1860, he identified the legal and moral principle behind resisting secession: ―the 
declared purpose of the Union that it WILL Constitutionally defend and maintain itself.‖ 
In his special message to Congress on July 4, 1861, he spoke from the alternative 
perspective, that reclaiming the South was an economic imperative:  
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The nation is now in debt for money applied to the benefit of these so-called 
seceding States, in common with the rest. Is it just, either that creditors shall go 
unpaid, or the remaining States pay the whole?...Again, if one State may secede 
so many another, and when all shall have seceded none is left to pay the debts. Is 
this quite just to the creditors? Did we notify them of this sage view when we 
borrowed their money? (United States & Scott, R. N, 1971) 
The northern perspective is generally muted or entirely absent from the textbooks 
in this sample. This perhaps is understandable; since the South ultimately struck the first 
blow at Fort Sumter, it is common and probably expected to spend more time and pages 
examining their motive versus the North‘s. But the North‘s position on secession is 
usually reduced to a bland desire to restore the Union, or as the first step in the eventual 
struggle against slavery; and the latter interpretation is at odds with historiography in the 
field, which is unanimous in pronouncing that Lincoln himself had no intention, at the 
outset of the war, to wage a grand campaign against the institution of slavery itself. The 
American Nation: A History of the United States (Carnes, et al., 2008) contains the only 
explicit description of the Northern frame of mind on the prospect of secession: ―In the 
North there was a foolish but understandable reluctance to believe that the South really 
intended to break away‖ (p. 372). While there are multiple references to Lincoln‘s 
position on slavery and secession, there are no overt descriptions, throughout the sample, 
of the possibility of an economic motive for war in 1860. 
 The textbooks in this sample do contain, however, a significant number of student 
activities and questions from which to consider jus ad bellum content with regard to the 
election of 1860 and the secession of the South. America: History of Our Nation 
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(Davidson & Stoff, 2009), for example, includes two questions labeled ―Comprehension 
and Critical Thinking,‖ which ask students to consider the main issue: ―What was the 
South‘s reaction to Lincoln‘s election? How did Lincoln try to reassure the South‖ (p. 
502)? The first question infers the importance of the election of 1860 as a trigger to 
secession; and the implied answer to the second question—that Lincoln reassured the 
South by asserting he had no desire to remove slavery where it already existed—
reinforces an often-ignored truth about the election, that Lincoln was not an ardent 
abolitionist. Similarly, America: History of Our Nation includes a writing prompt that 
alludes to the central importance of the election of 1860: ―Based on what you have read 
in this section, write a thesis statement for an essay explaining why the election of 
Abraham Lincoln caused the South to secede‖ (p. 501).  
 
Fort Sumter 
 The third component of jus ad bellum for this study is the attack on Fort Sumter in 
April, 1860. The Southern decision to wage war is typically portrayed in light of this 
event, and it forms the broadest point of consensus among all the textbooks in this sample 
with regard to Confederate aggression. The historical narrative analysis will consider the 
textbooks‘ relation to the verdict of relevant historiography on the attack, and the 
categorical analysis will compare textbook accounts of this event to the following ―just 
war‖ components: just cause, right intention, and last resort. 
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Historical Narrative Analysis 
 The Confederate attack on Fort Sumter is universally recognized as the beginning 
of the American Civil War. After the secession of the Lower South, a tense standoff 
followed between the new Confederacy and the United States, which wallowed through 
the last days of James Buchanan‘s administration until March 1861, when Abraham 
Lincoln‘s inauguration. During the interregnum, Confederates took possession of U.S. 
forts, installations, post offices, and arsenals throughout the South. By April 1861 there 
were only two federal outposts left in the South of note—Fort Pickens in Florida and Fort 
Sumter, in Charleston harbor. Thought he shots fired at Fort Sumter on April 12 were not, 
in fact, the first shots fired in the war, they were the first recognized acts of aggression, as 
well as the first to garner retaliation. From a ―just war‖ perspective, historiographical 
works recognize the attack on Fort Sumter as the initial aggressive act of the Civil War. 
Practically all major historiographical works on the era begins the story of the 
war‘s beginning with Lincoln‘s inaugural address. Most historians focus on the 
―conciliatory‖ nature of Lincoln‘s speech, which tried to reach out to Southern moderates 
and encourage a migration back towards the Union—his lyrical admonition that ―we are 
not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies‖ is regularly quoted as evidence that 
Lincoln sought to avoid war. The exact degree to which he was willing to cede federal 
authority in order to have peace, though, is a matter of some dispute among scholars in 
the field. Olsen (2006) contrasts Lincoln‘s inaugural vow that ―The Government will not 
assail‖ the South with his equally solemn promise to ―hold, occupy, and possess‖ federal 
property in the South. Olsen notes that ―despite his great efforts to appear 
conciliatory…Lincoln steadfastly insisted that the Union was sacred and absolute, and 
161 
 
that secession could not be tolerated‖ (p. 69). McPherson (1988) holds that Lincoln 
wished to avoid provocation of the South, though his inaugural was generally seen by 
those concerned on both sides as confirmatory to their previously-held biases—
Republicans hailed its ―firmness and ―moderation,‖ while southerners castigated it as a 
―Declaration of War‖ (p. 263). McPherson believes that Lincoln‘s intent really was 
peaceful—―Lincoln had hoped to cool passions and buy time with his inaugural 
address…time to organize his administration, to prove his pacific intent, to allow the 
seeds of voluntary reconstruction to sprout‖ (p. 270). David Williams, in A People’s 
History of the Civil War (2005), disputes this, holding instead that Lincoln had long 
expected and hoped for a chance to end the secession movement in the South ―against the 
popular will‖—but the difficulty lay in having too small a standing army, and too divided 
a population, to justify interceding in the Lower South. Williams claims, rather 
ominously and conspiratorially, that ―Lincoln needed an incident‖ (p. 63).  
 That crisis arrived the morning of his inauguration, as Major Robert Anderson, the 
commander of U.S. troops inside Fort Sumter, sent the President a letter stating they were 
running out of supplies. Anderson had become something of a national hero in December 
of 1860 when, without waiting for specific orders from the Buchanan administration, he 
moved his command from Fort Moultrie—a substantially weaker outpost, closer to the 
shore of South Carolina—to Fort Sumter, which held sway over the entrance to 
Charleston harbor. The fate of Major Anderson and his men had thus been an issue of 
considerable debate prior to April, 1861. Lincoln was faced with a perilous choice—
remove the garrison, and signal Northern submission to the claims of legitimacy by the 
South; or try to resupply the fort, which could provoke hostilities. While there is 
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unanimity among scholars about Fort Sumter‘s role in starting the war, there is greater 
scrutiny paid to Lincoln‘s decision to resupply the garrison.  
Most historiographical works note a detail that is important but often ignored in 
textbook narratives. Prior to Lincoln‘s inauguration, President James Buchanan—who is 
universally derided as weak and ineffectual during this period—approved a plan by 
General Winfield Scott, the commander of the U.S. Army, to resupply Fort Sumter in 
January 1861. The plan was intended, in McPherson‘s terms, to ―minimize publicity and 
provocation‖ (McPherson, 1988, p. 266), in that it entailed sending an unarmed merchant 
ship, the Star of the West, carrying soldiers and supplies to South Carolina. The operation 
failed, however, as poor execution allowed word of the enterprise to get out prior to its 
beginning; worse still, Anderson was given no word of the mission, ―so that the garrison 
at Sumter was about the only interested party that lacked advance knowledge‖ of the 
resupply effort (McPherson, 1988, p. 266). The important point here is what transpired 
after the Star of the West arrived in Charleston harbor—Confederate artillery fired upon 
her, and even hit the ship once, before the merchantman‘s captain turned and departed. 
McPherson claims this could have been the start of the Civil War, but was not, if only 
because Major Anderson, lacking orders, did not return fire from Fort Sumter. Yet the 
first aggressive act between the Confederacy and the Union occurred in January 1861, not 
in April.  
Olsen (2006) focuses on the impact of the Star of the West’s mission on Southern 
politics—Jefferson Davis, alarmed at the prospect of allowing South Carolina‘s civilians 
to decide when and how the South would enter a war, entered the fray more directly and 
issued orders to General P.G.T. Beauregard, the commander of Confederate forces 
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outside the fort, to force the issue and demand the garrison‘s surrender. Whether or not 
the attack on the Star of the West was a sufficiently aggressive act to justify a Northern 
response—and thus, whether or not Lincoln‘s attempt to resupply the fort in April was 
moderated in light of that attack—is an unexplored topic in major historiographical 
works. 
McPherson (1988) points out, interestingly, that the decision to resupply Fort 
Pickens in Florida—often ignored in light of Fort Sumter—was bungled in a similar 
manner to the Star of the West’s mission in January. The resupply orders, which were 
issued from General Scott and thus had not been signed by the Secretary of the Navy, 
were ignored by the naval captain outside Fort Pickens (partially because the orders were 
sent, inexplicably, to the army officer on board the Union ship, rather than the naval 
commander). The failure to resupply Fort Pickens might have influenced Lincoln‘s 
decision in April with regard to Fort Sumter, primarily in terms of what McPherson sees 
as the President‘s overall aim—to encourage Southern unionists. A submission to the 
South—or, possibly even worse, another high-profile bungling—might tend to 
discourage the moderate anti-secession forces in the South that Lincoln was counting on 
to bring the crisis to an end.  
Lincoln‘s decision to resupply the fort is often cast as a canny political decision 
that tried to split the difference between open hostility and meek deference to the South. 
Olsen, in The American Civil War: a Hands-On History (2006), points out that Lincoln 
was not unaware of the impact of this decision, in that resupply ―would probably lead to 
violence‖ (p. 70). Lincoln tried to blunt that possibility by informing South Carolina‘s 
governor of the mission and telling him that the relief mission had no reinforcements, 
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only food, and that they had been ordered not to fire unless fired upon. This was less an 
issue of humanity, according to Olsen, and more a practical necessity—Lincoln was in a 
position where open provocation would have caused a thunderous public reaction, as he 
―faced greater dissent‖ among ―wavering Northerners‖ than did Jefferson Davis (p. 71).  
In considering Lincoln‘s motivation for sending a relief mission to Fort Sumter, 
historians have largely fallen into one of three camps. McPherson (1988) describes the 
three positions—first, that Lincoln deliberately maneuvered the South into firing on Fort 
Sumter in order to provoke a war under the heading of a just cause; second, that Lincoln, 
wanting to maintain the status quo, came up with the idea of resupply in order to give the 
South the choice between peace and war; and third, that Lincoln wanted peace but 
expected the South to fire on the fort, so that, in McPherson‘s words, ―either way he 
won‖ (p. 272). Of the three historians referenced in this portion of the study, McPherson 
gives Lincoln the most credit, pointing out that the President on April 12 held a meeting 
with John Baldwin, a Virginia unionist, possibly to explore some sort of resolution to the 
issue; after the meeting, Lincoln issued the order to resupply Fort Sumter, presumably 
having a newly pessimistic view of his attempts to mollify the pro-Union South, what 
there was of it. The resulting plan—to bring ―food to the hungry,‖ rather than 
reinforcements—is hailed by McPherson as a ―stroke of genius,‖ ―the first sign of the 
mastery that would mark Lincoln‘s presidency‖ (p. 272). 
Historians also spend considerable time and effort considering the Southern 
position prior to the resupply mission to Fort Sumter. Olsen (2006) examines the issues 
facing Jefferson Davis, the President of the Confederacy, in much the same way he does 
for Lincoln; Olsen points out that Davis was facing increasing pressure from his own 
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people to address the matter of Fort Sumter, as it was being viewed as ―an insult to their 
honor and a direct challenge to Confederate independence‖ (p. 70). Additionally, a delay 
might be seen by the Upper South as vacillation, a fear reflected in the North as well; 
many Southerners felt that waiting on action at Fort Sumter was inviting the conclusion 
that the Confederacy was unwilling to fight. McPherson, too, asserts that the clamor in 
the South was growing for a change from the ―do-nothing policy‖ of Davis, as fire-eaters 
warned that the policy of voluntary reconstruction advocated by William Seward was 
becoming more likely with the passage of time. Given the demands of his own people 
and the fear of losing the Upper South, as well, Davis‘ decision to order an attack on Fort 
Sumter seems like inevitability. 
All the textbooks in this sample address Fort Sumter, some in significant detail 
and some, less so. In describing the strategic situation with the Fort, none of the textbook 
narratives offer much detail beyond a bare minimum. America: History of Our Nation 
(Davidson & Stoff, 2009) is fairly typical in its narrative which alludes to the 
Confederate absorption of federal installations after secession: ―The seceding states took 
over post offices, forts, and other federal property within their borders. The new President 
had to decide how to respond‖ (p. 501).  
Similar to historiographical works, most textbook narratives begin substantively 
with Lincoln‘s inaugural address. The selection below is quoted here from America: 
History of Our Nation, and can be found to some degree in every textbook from this 
sample:  
In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is the 
momentous issue of…war. The government will not assail [attack] you…We are 
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not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have 
strained, it must not break our bonds of affection. (p. 501) 
In describing the substance of the inaugural address, textbook authors often rely 
on a single adjective: conciliatory. Below are examples drawn from the various narratives 
in this study:  
In his inaugural address, delivered on March 4, 1861, Lincoln tried to be 
conciliatory. (Foner, Give Me Liberty!, p. 498) 
 
In his inaugural address on March 4, 1861, Abraham Lincoln denounced 
secession and vowed to uphold Federal law, but tempered his firmness with a 
conciliatory conclusion. (Goldfield, et al, The American Journey, p. 411) 
 
Lincoln‘s inaugural address was conciliatory but firm. (Carnes, et al, The 
American Nation: A History of the United States, p. 376) 
 
Lincoln‘s inaugural address was firm yet conciliatory—there would be no conflict 
unless the South provoked it. (Kennedy, et al, The American Pageant, 2006, p. 
434) 
 
In his inaugural address, [Lincoln] took a firm but conciliatory tone toward the 
South…there would be no war, he pledged, unless the South started it. (Lapansky-
Werner, et al, United States History, 2010, p. 352) 
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In all of these selections, the tone is unmistakable—the Union‘s goal was to stave 
off war, to prevent any violation of the peace, and thus any provocation would be entirely 
on the part of the Confederacy. While this interpretation is certainly valid and supported 
by a substantial number of historians, it also circumvents any moral ambiguity and 
presents a singular view of the beginning of the Civil War—what happened after 
Lincoln‘s inaugural at Fort Sumter was the South‘s fault.  
The conciliation that Lincoln referred to was not merely wordplay, however. 
There had been attempts to avoid the prospect of war, after the inauguration. What 
happened after Lincoln‘s inaugural is often shortened, in textbook narratives, shrinking 
several weeks into a few sentences. That being the case, the degree to which textbooks 
incorporate the issue of possible compromises, which may have averted the war, tends to 
vary. The major compromise effort was begun in the U.S. Senate with a group called the 
―Committee of Thirteen,‖ and it was Senator John J. Crittenden of Kentucky that put 
together a series of proposed amendments that ultimately were termed the ―Crittenden 
Compromise.‖ These amendments included a guarantee of slavery without future 
interference by the federal government, a prohibition against slavery north of the 36‘30‘ 
line (effectively, a return to the boundaries set by the Missouri Compromise of 1820), and 
a promise that these amendments would never be removed from the Constitution. It is 
uncertain the degree to which this compromise might have saved the Union; McPherson 
(1988) is convinced that it could not, pointing out that ―no compromise could have 
stopped the event that triggered disunion: Lincoln‘s election by a solid North‖ (p. 254). 
Still, Lincoln was adamantly against the Crittenden plan, and the Republicans on the 
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Committee of Thirteen followed suit; the measure went down to defeat along straight 
party-line votes. 
 There were two other attempts at conciliation. In the midst of the Fort Sumter 
crisis, Secretary of State William Seward concocted a rather extraordinary scheme that he 
believed would bring the country back together, united by a common interest. Seward 
proposed to Lincoln that the United States should, as a matter of policy, provoke a war 
with Spain and France, ostensibly because of their interventions in Santo Domingo and 
Mexico, and ―declare war if their explanations were unsatisfactory‖ (McPherson, 1988, p. 
270). Seward was beholden to the idea of voluntary reconstruction, and certainly his 
hopes were to create a new national patriotism during a time of schism; but Lincoln 
pointedly ignored the notion of foreign war in his response, reiterating his intention to 
hold, occupy, and possess federal property, be it Fort Sumter or Fort Pickens. 
 Textbooks are mixed in their depiction of the Crittenden Compromise. America: 
Pathways to the Present (Cayton, et al., 2007) engages in the traditional ―mentioning‖ 
tactic with its description of Senator Crittenden‘s plan: ―Some politicians proposed 
compromises with the South. Senator John J. Crittenden of Kentucky, for example, 
introduced a plan that would recognize slavery in territories south of 36‘30‘N. President-
elect Lincoln opposed the plan, however, and convinced the Senate to reject it‖ (p. 371). 
The text is placed under the heading, ―Last-Minute Compromises Fail,‖ and there is no 
mention of Lincoln‘s motivation in rejecting the plan, nor any mention of the party 
partisanship reflected in the Senate‘s vote. 
Foner‘s Give Me Liberty! (2008) gives one of the best descriptions of the 
Crittenden Compromise and Lincoln‘s motivation for opposing it:  
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Willing to conciliate the South on issues like the return of fugitive slaves, Lincoln 
took an unyielding stand against the expansion of slavery. Here, he informed one 
Republican leader, he intended to ―hold firm, with a chain of steel.‖ A 
fundamental principle of democracy, Lincoln believed, was at stake. ―We have 
just carried an election,‖ he wrote, ―on principles fairly stated to the people. Now 
we are told in advance that the government shall be broken up unless we 
surrender to those we have beaten, before we take office…if we surrender, it is 
the end of us and the end of the government.‖ (p. 497 
No other textbook addresses Lincoln‘s motive for rejecting the Crittenden 
Compromise quite so thoroughly, though one, The American Nation: A History of the 
United States (Carnes, et al., 2008), does describe the president‘s philosophical belief in a 
similar fashion, though without explicit connection to the Compromise itself. Beyond 
this, none of the ten textbooks in this study devote any considerable length to the 
Crittenden Compromise, or William Seward‘s plan to instigate a foreign war; in general, 
these topics are muted in coverage, a limitation which in turn creates a dismissive tone to 
their description. The ―conciliation‖ to which the textbook authors refer is thus largely 
rhetorical, drawn from Lincoln‘s inaugural but not supported by actual initiatives to avoid 
a war. 
The tone of inevitability to the war is similarly reflected in textbook depictions of 
the attack on Fort Sumter itself. America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 
2009) gives a succinct account of the issue, Lincoln‘s decision, and the Southern 
reaction:  
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Lincoln did not want to give up the fort. But he feared that sending troops might 
cause other states to secede. Therefore, he announced that he would send food to 
the fort, but that the supply ships would carry no troops or guns…Confederate 
leaders decided to capture the fort while it was isolated…On April 12, 
Confederate artillery opened fire on the fort. After 34 hours, with the fort on fire, 
the U.S. troops surrendered. (p. 503) 
The word isolated is highlighted in bold print and a definition is provided in the 
page‘s margin, under the heading ―Vocabulary Builder‖—―to isolate, to set apart; to 
separate.‖ This selection, while brief, is effectively identical to the descriptions of the 
attack itself, across the sample of textbooks in this study.  
 What is most striking about textbook depictions of the Southern attack on Fort 
Sumter is what is omitted. For example, the mission of the Star of the West, the ship 
dispatched by President Buchanan in January 1861, is largely ignored by the books in this 
study. The mission was authorized by Buchanan and organized by the War Department, 
and the unarmed merchant ship made it to Charleston harbor before cadets at the Citadel, 
the military college based in the city, opened fire. The Star of the West was hit three times 
before retiring—Major Robert Anderson, the commander inside Fort Sumter, decided not 
to return fire, and thus a general outbreak of hostilities was avoided.  
Only two of the books in this sample mention either the Star of the West or the 
ship‘s mission. America: Pathways to the Present (Cayton, et al., 2007)  includes this line 
in its description of Fort Sumter: ―A federal ship sent to supply the fort in January had 
been forced to turn back when Confederate forces fired on it‖ (p. 372). United States 
History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010) is more explicit in its reference to this mission, 
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though it does not include any follow-up analysis or conclusion: ―In January 1861, 
President Buchanan tried to send troops and supplies to the fort, but the unarmed supply 
ship sailed away when Confederate guns fired on it‖ (p. 353). There is no other reference 
to the Star of the West throughout the remainder of the sample.  
Instead of acknowledging the attempt made by the Buchanan administration, most 
of the books describe Buchanan himself as weak and dilatory, unable or unwilling to 
prevent secession. In fact, the only references to any effort mounted by the outgoing 
President are oblique and passing, as with this comment from United States History 
(Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010): ―President Buchanan, in his last few weeks in office, 
told Congress that he had no authority to prevent secession. He lamented the breakup of 
the Union and he sympathized with the South‘s concerns, but he made no serious effort to 
resolve the crisis. Other pacifying attempts also failed‖ (p. 352). In similar fashion, 
Visions of America: a History of the United States (Keene, et al., 2010) presents only a 
bland account of the lame-duck administration‘s attempt to resupply the fort: ―Even as 
the new Confederate government took shape, President James Buchanan, a weak and 
timid leader with Southern sympathies, did little to avert the crisis, claiming that he 
lacked constitutional authority to do anything‖ (p. 369). The ―little‖ that Buchanan did 
attempt, the failed mission of the Star of the West, is not described.  
 The decision to resupply Fort Sumter with food, rather than reinforcements, is a 
central issue for historiographical works, and many textbooks are reflective of that. 
Lincoln‘s strategy is often cast as a nuanced, shrewd ploy, which put the onus for actually 
starting a war directly on the Confederacy; but there is little analysis of the prospect that 
such resupply may have constituted an aggressive act. The Americans (Danzer, et al., 
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2010), for example, describes the strategy thus: ―Lincoln executed a clever political 
maneuver‖ (p. 339). In America: Pathways to the Present (Cayton, et al., 2007), the text‘s 
authors mark out the dilemma facing Lincoln and then portray his decision as the only 
ethically consistent one:  
Lincoln struggled to come to a decision. He had pledged to Southerners in his 
Inaugural Address that ―the government will not assail you. You can have no 
conflict without being yourselves the aggressors.‖ Yet he had also taken an oath 
to defend government property. Fort Sumter stood as a vital symbol of the Union 
he had sworn to preserve. To fight to keep the fort, or even to send new troops 
there, might make him responsible for starting a war. Yet to abandon the fort 
would mean acknowledging the authority of the Confederate 
government…Remaining true to both of his pledges, on April 6 Lincoln told the 
governor of South Carolina that he was sending food, but no soldiers or arms, to 
Fort Sumter. (p. 372-373) 
In The American Nation: a History of the United States (Carnes, et al., 2008), 
there is a similar method—describe the position Lincoln was in, and then conclude that 
his strategy to resupply was the only sensible one:  
While denying the legality of secession, Lincoln had taken a temporizing position. 
The Confederates had seized most federal property in the Deep South. Lincoln 
admitted frankly that he would not attempt to reclaim this property…Most 
Republicans did not want to surrender them without a show of resistance...Yet to 
reinforce the forts might mean bloodshed that would make reconciliation 
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impossible. After weeks of indecision, Lincoln took the moderate step of sending 
a naval expedition to supply the beleaguered Sumter garrison with food. (p. 376) 
Some textbooks strive to depict Lincoln‘s decision to resupply as the only 
sensible one. From The American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006), there is this section 
outlining Lincoln‘s situation in April 1861 and concluding with the verdict that the 
President‘s decision was only reasonable:  
Ominously, the choices presented to Lincoln by Fort Sumter were all bad. This 
stronghold had provisions that would last only a few weeks—until the middle of 
April 1861. If no supplies were forthcoming, its commander would have to 
surrender without firing a shot. Lincoln, quite understandably, did not feel that 
such a weak-kneed course squared with his obligation to protect federal property. 
But if he sent reinforcements, the South Carolinians would undoubtedly fight 
back…After agonizing indecision, Lincoln adopted a middle-of-the-road solution. 
(p. 435) 
In the same light, some textbook accounts implicitly validate the position that war 
was inevitable, given the situation. Sometimes these inferences are quite subtle, as with 
Visions of America: a History of the United States (Keene, et al., 2010), which hints that 
Lincoln‘s decision to resupply was the result of a logical progression: ―With food and 
other necessities running low at Fort Sumter, Lincoln informed the South Carolina 
government of his intention to send a ship with non-military supplies‖ (p. 370). Other 
textbooks are more explicit in their portrayal of Lincoln‘s decision. The authors of The 
Enduring Vision (Boyer, et al., 2008) outline Lincoln‘s pledge to ―hold, occupy, and 
possess‖ federal property in the South, and then claim that such an assertion had 
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―committed him to the defense‖ of Fort Pickens and Fort Sumter (p. 421-422). United 
States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010) points out that, ―as President, [Lincoln] 
was sworn to defend the property of the United States‖ (p. 353).  
 Student activities vary from textbook to textbook, regarding Fort Sumter. 
America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009) asks only two questions about 
the incident in its chapter activities, one very bland and informational (―What happened 
at Fort Sumter?‖), and one more philosophical and critical (―Do you think southerners 
were justified in seceding despite Lincoln‘s assurances? Explain‖). The latter prompt 
gives students a chance to consider the Southern perspective prior to the attack, which is 
a valuable concept (p. 504). In similar fashion, the authors of United States History 
(Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010) pair a strictly informational prompt—―Outline an answer 
to this question: Was secession the only option for the South? (p. 353)—with a more 
conceptual question—―what caused Lincoln to call for troops to fight against the 
Confederacy‖ (p. 355)? 
Some books encourage varying points of view on the issue of Fort Sumter, while 
others tend to encourage a dominant, implicitly hegemonic view of the attack. America: 
Pathways to the Present (Cayton, et al., 2007) allows students to take on the views of 
Southerners in the run-up to the Civil War, asking at one point for multiple perspectives 
which varied across the regions of the South: ―Describe how the Lower South, Upper 
South, and Border States responded differently to Lincoln‘s election and the attack on 
Fort Sumter (p. 373).‖ Additionally, the authors of this text provide activities that 
encourage students to both reconstruct and compare differing viewpoints on the war, 
including this ―Critical Thinking and Writing‖ prompt: ―Making Comparisons: Many 
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Southerners called the Civil War the Second War for Independence. Many Northerners 
called it the War of the Rebellion. Explain how each name reflects the point of view of 
the people who used it‖ (p. 373). 
Contrary to this, The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010) infers a specific moral 
orientation in its prompts; under a heading entitled ―Main Idea: Analyzing Causes,‖ the 
textbook authors place the blame for the Civil War squarely on the President of the 
Confederacy: ―Why did Jefferson Davis choose to go to war‖ (p. 339)? The inference 
here, that the war was entirely of the South‘s choosing, may be historically valid or not; 
but the prompt implies a moral stature on the part of the authors.  
 In sum, then, a historical narrative analysis of the textbooks from this sample 
indicates that such textbooks tend to adopt the tone of major historiographical works on 
the issue of Lincoln‘s first inaugural, especially the emphasis on conciliation. Textbooks 
do not, however, detail to any great degree the conciliatory efforts which did occur or 
were proposed, such as the Crittenden Compromise; and they generally do not address 
efforts that might have led to an outbreak of hostilities prior to Fort Sumter, such as the 
failed mission of the Star of the West. Textbook authors emulate many historians in their 
admiration for Lincoln‘s political acumen in his ―food for the hungry‖ strategy at Fort 
Sumter; and as will be evident in the categorical analysis that follows, textbook authors 
also are generally dismissive of the Southern position at Fort Sumter in 1861.  
 
Categorical Analysis 
The categorical analysis of textbook narrative depictions of the incident at Fort 
Sumter includes two main components of jus ad bellum: just cause and last resort. 
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Just cause.  
There are two issues of primary interest with this category of ―just war‖—to what 
degree the South felt subject to Northern aggression prior to Fort Sumter, and to what 
degree did Northern policy prior to the attack on the fort constituted a genuine act of such 
aggression. As described earlier, there is dispute as to whether or not the Confederate 
States of America may be considered a ―minimally just community,‖ and thus entitled to 
defend its own sovereignty and rights; but the larger point is not whether or not the South 
deserved to be a political entity, but only that its members thought it was. Thus, their 
actions could have been consistent with the behavior of a sovereign state, though the 
morality of such behavior may have been questionable.  
A similar concept illustrates the foundation for Southern action at Fort Sumter. 
Brian Orend (2006) describes the concept of ―implicit entitlement,‖ wherein minimally 
just states—who are imbued with the rights of territorial and political sovereignty—may 
―employ measures necessary to secure the objects of these rights, and to protect them 
from severe, predictable threats, such as the violent aggression of others‖ (p. 70). The 
question, then, is did the South have sufficient cause to justify an aggressive act towards 
Fort Sumter? As before, moral criticism may be directed at the South at its philosophical 
foundation, for its oppression of African-American slaves; according to Orend and other 
―just war‖ theorists, the Confederacy lacked the basic moral status to claim the right of 
territorial and political integrity. The purpose of this study is not to critique the moral 
position of textbook authors, but to examine the presence and nature of such moral 
positions.  
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 Textbooks, in general, do address the Southern position prior to the attack on Fort 
Sumter in April 1861, though the degree to which they capture the depth of Southern 
antipathy and anxiety prior to the attack varies. America: History of Our Nation 
(Davidson & Stoff, 2009), for example, deals with the Southern determination to capture 
the fort in only the most minimal detail, claiming that their decision to attack was based 
on the fact that the fort was ―isolated‖ (p. 503). The authors of United States History 
(Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010) do little more; after spending several detailed paragraphs 
describing the dilemma faced by President Lincoln as to resupply or reinforce Fort 
Sumter, the textbook authors explain the South‘s ultimatum to the garrison at the fort by 
explaining that Confederate leaders ―were suspicious of Lincoln‘s motives‖ (p. 353). 
America: Pathways to the Present (Cayton, et al., 2007), too, gives only the most cursory 
examination of Southern motivation prior to the attack; in fact, the textbook‘s authors 
spend considerably more time sketching out Lincoln‘s strategy and his reluctance to 
provoke hostilities, before ending its section with this:  
On April 10, before supplies could arrive, Confederate president Davis ordered 
General P.G.T. Beauregard to demand that Fort Sumter surrender. If Anderson 
refused, Beauregard was to take it by force. ..Anderson did refuse, and on April 
12, 1861, Beauregard opened fire on the fort. After a 34-hour bombardment, 
Anderson surrendered Fort Sumter to Confederate troops. (p. 373) 
There is no description of why Southerners might view the fort itself as a threat, 
or the fact that the Union had tried to resupply the fort in January (an event to which 
America: Pathways to the Present alludes in the section prior to this one). In this 
conceptualization, the South attacks more or less without cause. 
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Other textbooks present more diverse perspectives. The Enduring Vision (Boyer, 
et al., 2008) focuses on the strategic issues of the incident, going so far as to critique the 
South‘s decision to risk open war on behalf of “the dubious military advantage of 
attacking Fort Sumter before the arrival of relief ships‖ (p. 422). Give Me Liberty! 
(Foner, 2008) tries describes the choice facing Jefferson Davis, the President of the 
Confederacy, who made the final decision to attack the fort: ―Viewing Fort Sumter‘s 
presence as an affront to southern nationhood, and perhaps hoping to force the wavering 
Upper South to join the Confederacy, Jefferson Davis ordered batteries to fire on the fort‖ 
(p. 499). This selection indicates the twin motivations facing Davis—the Southern clamor 
for independence and the slight the presence of Fort Sumter represented, together with 
the political reality of the still-uncommitted Upper South. In similar fashion, The 
American Journey (Goldfield, et al., 2007) combines Southern positions through Davis, 
though the authors here do not focus on any ―affronts‖ to Confederate pride and instead 
describe the tactical and strategic implications of the fort‘s presence:  
…President Davis wanted to take Sumter before the provisions arrived to avoid 
fighting Anderson and the reinforcements at the same time. He also realized that 
the outbreak of fighting could compel the Upper South to join the Confederacy. 
But his impatience to force the issue placed the Confederacy of firing, 
unprovoked, on the American flag and at Major Anderson, who had become a 
national hero. (p. 411)  
In this case, the authors have created a section of largely neutral text, listing 
political factors facing Davis at the time, though the ending sentence contains an 
explicitly moral stance—the attack on Fort Sumter was ―unprovoked.‖ Moreover, the 
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wanton assault on the fort was brought about by Davis‘ ―impatience,‖ rather than the 
temperate conciliation displayed by Lincoln in the days prior to the incident. While this 
may be an accurate depiction of the attack, it does place the blame for the war squarely 
on the South.  
 The American Nation: A History of the United States (Carnes, et al., 2008) is less 
blunt about its moral judgment, though such conclusions are evident through its depiction 
of the attack on Fort Sumter. ―Lincoln took the moderate step of sending a naval 
expedition to supply the beleaguered Sumter garrison with food,‖ the text states, joining 
Lincoln‘s moderation and conciliation with an evocatively phrased description of the 
fort‘s condition. In the next sentence, the Southern decision to attack is minimized to 
retaliatory intransigence: ―Unwilling to permit this, the Confederates opened fire on the 
fort on April 12 before the supply ships arrived‖ (p. 376). There is no additional detail 
provided regarding Southern motivation for the attack.  
The American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006) takes a comparable tack, 
presenting the assault as a collision between the Union‘s constraint and the South‘s 
belligerence. In the selection below, the authors contrast Lincoln‘s moderation with 
Confederate suspicion:  
After agonizing indecision, Lincoln adopted a middle-of-the-road solution. He 
notified the South Carolinians that an expedition would be sent to provision the 
garrison, though not to reinforce it. He promised ―no effort to throw in men, arms, 
and ammunition.‖ But to Southern eyes ―provision‖ still spelled ―reinforcement.‖ 
A Union naval force was next started on its way to Fort Sumter—a move that the 
South regarded as an act of aggression. On April 12, 1861, the cannon of the 
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Carolinians opened fire on the fort, while crowds in Charleston applauded and 
waved handkerchiefs. After a thirty-four hour bombardment, which took no lives, 
the dazed garrison surrendered. (p. 435) 
The celebratory mood of South Carolina‘s citizenry is set against the condition of 
the ―dazed‖ Union soldiers, while the description of the attack follows Lincoln‘s 
distinction between ―provision‖ and ―reinforcement,‖ a point itself formalized by its 
inclusion in the text‘s main narrative. The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010) does 
something comparable—after describing Lincoln‘s ―dilemma‖ between resupply and 
reinforcement, the authors depict the President‘s eventual strategy as ―a clever political 
maneuver‖ (p. 339). The authors then shift the perspective to Jefferson Davis, and in 
outlining the choices he faced and the decision he eventually took, the authors depart 
from the traditional avoidance of personal agency and place the blame flatly on Davis:  
 Now it was Jefferson Davis who faced a dilemma. If he did nothing, he would 
damage the image of the Confederacy as a sovereign, independent nation. On the 
other hand, if he ordered an attack on Fort Sumter, he would turn peaceful 
secession into war. Davis chose war. At 4:30 AM on April 12, Confederate 
batteries began thundering away. Charleston‘s citizens watched and cheered as 
though it were a fireworks display. The South Carolinians bombarded the fort 
with more than 4000 rounds before Anderson surrendered. (p. 339) 
Finally, there are several textbooks from this sample that not only examine the 
Southern position prior to the attack on Fort Sumter, but address the other half of the 
equation—the Southern reaction to President Lincoln‘s response to that attack. From the 
Southern perspective, the assault on the fort was justified; though in truth, the 
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Confederacy‘s primary justification for open war was not the presence or resupply of Fort 
Sumter, but instead President Lincoln‘s call to arms after the attack on April 12. America: 
Pathways to the Present (Cayton, et al., 2007)  presents the Southern position succinctly:  
By firing on federal property, the Confederate states had committed an act of open 
rebellion. As the defender of the Constitution, Lincoln had no choice but to 
respond. When he called for volunteers to fight the seceding states, Southerners 
saw his action as an act of war against them. (p. 373) 
Other textbooks capture the same sentiment. The American Journey (Goldfield, et 
al., 2007) is more circumspect, alluding to the Upper South‘s secession after Lincoln‘s 
call for volunteers as an act motivated by a ―[refusal] to make war on South Carolina‖ (p. 
413); and in similar manner, The American Nation: A History of the United States 
(Carnes, et al., 2008) only mentions briefly the fact that ―[Lincoln‘s] request prompted 
Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas, and Tennessee to secede‖ (p. 376). The authors of 
The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010) make a passing reference to Virginia‘s 
―[unwillingness] to fight against other Southern states,‖ (p. 339), while The Enduring 
Vision (Boyer, et al., 2008) frames the Upper South‘s response to Lincoln‘s call against 
the dramatic departure of one of the most famous American figures of the era—―After 
acknowledging that ‗I am one of those dull creatures that cannot see the good of 
secession,‘ Robert E. Lee resigned from the army rather than lead federal troops against 
his native Virginia‖ (p. 422). Probably the best single description of the Southern view is 
from The American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006), which works hard to connect the 
secession of the Upper South definitively to Lincoln‘s call for militia, as well as 
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referencing earlier qualms among many Southerners about the prospect of leaving the 
Union:  
The call for troops, in turn, aroused the South much as the attack on Fort Sumter 
had aroused the North. Lincoln was now waging war—from the Southern view an 
aggressive war—on the Confederacy. Virginia, Arkansas, and Tennessee, all of 
which had earlier voted down secession, reluctantly joined their embattled sister 
states, as did North Carolina. Thus the seven states became eleven as the 
―submissionists‖ and ―Union shriekers‖ were overcome. Richmond, Virginia 
replaced Montgomery, Alabama, as the Confederate capital—too near 
Washington for strategic comfort on either side. (p. 436) 
 
Last resort. 
 Other than just cause, the ―just war‖ requirement of last resort is possibly the most 
important moral component of the doctrine in question. While ―just war‖ admits as a 
foundational belief the notion that war may be, on some occasions, morally justified, that 
belief is based firmly on the presupposition that violence is excusable only if there are no 
other viable options. Orend (2006) points to the antiquity of this provision, describing the 
process by which ancient Rome would dispatch a ―diplomatic party‖ to a potential enemy 
prior to war in an attempt to gain a peaceful settlement of the issue at hand; if none were 
forthcoming, the party would return to Rome and inform the Senate of the opponent‘s 
defiance. ―If the Senate voted for war,‖ Orend writes, ―the party would return to the 
enemy, read aloud the Senate‘s public declaration and then symbolically throw a sharp-
pointed javelin into the enemy‘s soil‖ (p. 11). This was one of the earliest manifestations 
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of last resort, and dramatically highlights the requirement‘s essential utility—a state may 
fight only when all other reasonable alternatives have been exhausted. While periods of 
diplomatic tension between states can create an ―overheated crisis atmosphere, in which 
people discern ‗emergencies‘ which aren‘t, in fact, there,‖ it is vital that a nation attempt 
to maintain a rational course in order to be certain that war is, in fact, the last resort (p. 
156).  
 Some elements of last resort that would be appropriate to consider in textbooks 
are absent. For example, Abraham Lincoln‘s decision to send in ―food for hungry men,‖ a 
move generally applauded by historians and textbook authors, is not considered in the 
manner it was viewed by many Southerners—as a hostile move designed to extend Union 
control over the fort, Charleston harbor, and South Carolina. Nor are the political 
ramifications of such a strategy—namely, that Lincoln may have endorsed the supply of 
food, not reinforcements, so as to avoid provoking the secession of the Upper South—
considered in any meaningful way in these textbook narratives. While the textbooks in 
this study do contain elements of the last resort component of ―just war,‖ most refer to it 
only in a peripheral, implicit fashion.  
Given the standard approach of most textbook narratives—a litany of events that, 
given their chronological order and emphasis on causation, seem largely inevitable—it is 
not surprising that such narratives tend to obscure the possibility that what happened 
needn’t have happened the way it did. America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & 
Stoff, 2009) has a promising section at the end of its description of the attack on Fort 
Sumter titled ―Was War Avoidable?‖ But rather than referring to the attack itself or 
whether or not the South was justified in launching that assault, the authors fall back on a 
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brief allusion to the inevitability of war: ―…by 1861, many Americans in both the North 
and the South had come to accept the idea that war could not be avoided‖ (p. 503). In 
Eric Foner‘s Give Me Liberty! (2008), a dramatic retelling of Henry Wadsworth 
Longfellow‘s 1842 poem Slavery closes the section on Fort Sumter; in its references to 
the ―poor, blind Samson,‖ who shakes ―the pillars of this Commonweal/Till the vast 
Temple of our liberties/A shapeless mass of wreck and rubbish lies,‖ the text creates an 
overarching belief that the Civil War was an unavoidable conflict, one that had been 
brewing for decades (p. 499).  
This may be so. But the ―just war‖ component of last resort refers to the 
immediate causes of a conflict, and not the philosophical fissures that may have lead two 
states to the brink of war. Other textbooks are more overt in setting the conditions for last 
resort, even without explicit reference to the philosophical concept. In doing this, 
however, many authors take implicit moral stands on the efficacy of the attack and 
whether or not it was truly necessary for the South. In America: Pathways to the Present 
(Cayton, et al., 2007), for example, the authors take time to offer a vivid picture of the 
readiness of Fort Sumter as a military installation, drawing the reader‘s attention to the 
fact that any threat the South felt from the garrison there was probably misplaced: ―…The 
structure was still incomplete and partially unprotected when it came under fire in 1861. 
Because the fort was built to protect the city from attack by sea, its 60 guns faced 
outward—not toward the Confederate outposts onshore that shelled the fort—severely 
damaging it‖ (p. 372).  
The moral stance of the authors of The American Journey (Goldfield, et al., 2007) 
is much more apparent. In their discussion of Fort Sumter, the obvious conclusion here is 
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that the Confederacy, and primarily Jefferson Davis, acted rashly and in the absence of a 
direct, imminent threat:  
At Charleston, Confederate General P.G.T. Beauregard had standing orders to 
turn back any relief expedition. But President Davis wanted to take Sumter before 
the provisions arrived to avoid fighting Anderson and the reinforcements at the 
same time. He also realized that the outbreak of fighting could compel the Upper 
South to join the Confederacy. But his impatience to force the issue placed the 
Confederacy of firing, unprovoked, on the American flag and at Major Anderson, 
who had become a national hero. (p. 411) 
 The indictment of Davis‘ ―impatience‖ is a clear example of a textbook‘s 
tendency to promote a hegemonic view of American history. Whether or not the premise 
of the statement is historically valid is not at issue—the question is whether or not the 
statement contains moral content, from a ―just war‖ perspective. Interestingly, while most 
of the textbooks implicitly or plainly blame Jefferson Davis for the attack, one book—
Visions of America: a History of the United States (Keene, et al., 2010)—ignores the 
Confederate president and indicts only the Confederate officer in charge, General P.G.T. 
Beauregard, who ―decided to force the issue‖ in assaulting the fort (p. 370). Whether 
blaming the Confederacy‘s political or military leaders, the preponderance of books in 
this sample take the moral stance that the attack on Fort Sumter was precipitous and 
unjustified.  
 Several textbooks take a more detailed view of the attack and the substance of last 
resort. The American Nation: A History of the United States (Carnes, et al., 2008) 
considers why the South felt the need to attack when it did:  
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Why were white Southerners willing to wreck the Union their forebears had put 
together with so much love and labor? No simple explanation is possible. The 
danger that the expanding North would overwhelm them was for neither today nor 
tomorrow. Lincoln had assured them that he would respect slavery were it existed. 
The Democrats had retained control of Congress in the election; the Supreme 
Court was firmly in their hands as well [.] (p. 370)  
The American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006) take a similar approach, pointing 
out that the South, after the election of 1860, wasn‘t in the imminent danger that 
secessionist fire-eaters were claiming:  
Yet the South, despite its electoral defeat, was not badly off. It still had a five-to-
four majority on the Supreme Court. Although the Republicans had elected 
Lincoln, they controlled neither the Senate nor the House of Representatives. The 
federal government could not touch slavery in those states where it existed except 
by a constitutional amendment, and such an amendment could be defeated by 
one-fourth of the states. The fifteen slave states numbered nearly one-half of the 
total—a fact not fully appreciated by southern firebrands. (p. 427) 
 These passages indicate a subtle framing of the last resort component; secession, 
and by extension the attack on Fort Sumter, was unnecessary and brought on by a 
philosophic belief in the value of such resistance, rather than by an externally valid threat. 
Certainly, this position has merit, and is supportable by historical fact and endorsed by 
any number of historians. The thrust of these passages, however, points to a tendency of 
textbooks to promote a singular view of American history—the position that the South 
acted at best rashly, at worst criminally, in the attack on Fort Sumter. As with the other 
187 
 
elements of jus ad bellum, the textbooks in this sample contain implicit moral positions 
that become apparent when held up against the ―just war‖ doctrine. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
JUS IN BELLO 
 
 The focus in this chapter is on topics/events connected to the ―just war‖ category 
of jus in bello. First, the experiences of battle for combatants and noncombatants from 
both the Union and Confederacy, is examined. The section on combatants is focused on 
the impact of battle and casualties on soldiers, while the section on non-combatants is 
divided into the following subcategories: women in the war, discontent on the home 
front, death and dying, and the civilian experience of the battle of Vicksburg in 1863. 
Second, the depiction of ―Sherman‘s March to the Sea,‖ the destructive passage of 
General William T. Sherman‘s army in 1864 through Georgia and South Carolina is 
examined. Finally, both components are analyzed in comparison to the ―just war‖ 
doctrine, in the categorical analysis section. For this section, the analysis is concentrated 
on the following principles: the benevolent quarantine and treatment of prisoners-of-war, 
means of war that may be termed mala in se (―evil in themselves‖), and proportionality.  
 
Historical Narrative Analysis 
 In The American Journey (Goldfield, et al., 2007), a chart is presented that shows 
the number of casualties for both the Union and Confederacy over the course of the Civil 
War. The Union lost a total of 1,566,678, with 275,175 wounded. Of the dead, 110,070 
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died of wounds in battle, while 249,458 died of disease. For the Confederates, 1,082,119 
died, with 100,000 wounded. Of the dead, 94,000 died of wounds in battle, 164,000 died 
of disease (p. 404). These numbers are, of course, daunting, and should be grounds for 
considerable reflection. They are offered practically without commentary or criticism, 
and do not reflect the social devastation created by a conflict of the Civil War‘s 
magnitude.   
 The Civil War was a war between societies and national identities, where the 
strict separation between soldier and civilian was often difficult to distinguish or enforce. 
In this chapter, the historical narrative analysis and categorical analysis are focused on 
two broad categories: combatants and non-combatants.  
 
Combatants 
The Civil War is often characterized as the first ―modern‖ war, and practically 
every general history of the event takes pains to explain what that characterization means. 
A common feature of such works is the attempt to describe the nature of combat, how it 
differed from previous iterations and how its impact was substantially more profound. 
What follows is a comparison of major historiographical works to the textbooks of this 
study regarding the manner in which the experience of combat is presented. This section 
focuses first on the issue of battles such as Bull Run, Shiloh, Antietam, and Gettysburg, 
and then follows with casualties and the manner in which the Civil War marked a change 
in Americans‘ conception of war.  
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Battle and casualties.  
 The two primary generalist works used for this study are James McPherson‘s 
Battle Cry of Freedom (1988) and Christopher Olsen‘s The American Civil War: A 
Hands-On History (2006). McPherson examines the impact of modern war on America in 
considerable detail. McPherson points out that the ―United States has usually prepared for 
its wars after getting into them‖ (p. 312), which meant that the armies of both the North 
and South would have to be built practically from the ground up. After detailing the 
considerable logistical efforts involved in this process, McPherson turns to what would 
become one of the sources of the overwhelming carnage of the Civil War—the 
widespread lack of training or apprehension among both sides‘ soldiers. In training their 
armies, the officer class of both sides did not rely heavily on mock combat or large-unit 
drill; instead, the emphasis was on basic maneuvers at the company-level and what 
McPherson terms the ―manual of arms‖—the constant repetition of loading, aiming, and 
firing individual weapons, but with little real target practice (p. 330). Among officers, 
most received little training in strategy—at West Point, the premier military academy in 
the nation, most of the curriculum was heavily tilted towards engineering, math, and ―a 
smattering of tactics‖ (p. 331). McPherson makes the crucial point that ―the Civil War 
was pre-eminently a political war, a war of peoples rather than professional armies‖ (p. 
332). According to that conception, then, the expectations of both nations weighed 
heavily in the war‘s conduct.  
Most soldiers on both sides assumed the war would be a short one, with the Union 
confident in their material advantages (industry, population) and the South convinced 
that, in the words of Henry Wise of Virginia, ―it was not the improved arm, but the 
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improved man, which would win the day‖ (p. 317). With such assumptions at work, both 
sides planned for a limited war, in both time and goals—the North, for example, aiming 
at suppressing the insurrection and allowing Southern unionism, widely assumed to be 
present but dormant, to reassert itself.  
The first major battle of the war, Bull Run, was fought outside Washington D.C., 
and historians often use it to showcase the manner in which the training and expectations 
of both sides combined to establish how the Civil War would be fought. Olsen (2006) 
highlights the manner in which the battle typified the Union experience of the Civil War 
from 1861 to 1863—the battle was well-planned, though the timing was off in the 
operation, and the Union was slow to bring up its reserves and exploit its considerable 
numerical advantage. Though the battle was a Southern victory, historians like Olsen and 
McPherson point to the psychological impact of such a stunning victory at the war‘s 
outset; Southerners interpreted the outcome as indicative of the superiority of their cause 
and class, creating a national mood bordering on cockiness, whereas a ―sort of stubborn 
determination‖ set in among the North after the loss (Olsen, 2006, p. 91).  
The issue of casualties in that first battle is a source of discrepancy for Olsen and 
McPherson. It is clear that both write about the battle with an eye to what lay ahead in the 
war, with the former describing the shock of such bloodshed on the populace, and the 
latter framing the battle‘s cost as comparatively light in comparison to future events. 
Olsen describes the manner in which ―the human cost of the battle staggered the nation,‖ 
pointing out that the almost 900 men killed was ―almost as many as died in battle during 
the entire Mexican War‖ (p. 91). McPherson, though, considers the battle a small affair, 
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more important in long-term psychological effect and strategy rather than in human 
cost—―the price in casualties was small compared with later battles‖ (p. 347).  
Casualties in battle are a common feature of historiographical works on the Civil 
War. The battle at Shiloh is a commonly used reference point for the shocking carnage; if 
Bull Run was a first indication of how bloody the war might be, Shiloh was proof that the 
human cost might well outweigh any possible prediction. Olsen (2006) characterizes the 
battle—where over 3,500 died and 16,5000 were wounded, with an additional 2,000 
dying later of their injuries—as ―the deadliest battle in American history—about five 
thousand men had died in the entire American Revolution‖ (p. 101). Olsen uses graphic 
description to capture the public horror over the battle‘s outcome; he quotes the 
Cincinnati Times’ account of the hospital after the battle, with ―amputated legs and arms 
[lying] scattered in every direction‖ (p. 101). Olsen also quotes a Union soldier‘s diary, in 
which the author records images of men ―torn all to pieces leaving nothing but their 
heads or their boots…Pieces of clothing and strings of flesh hang on the limbs of trees 
round them.‖ He closes with an appeal to God—―Can there be anything in the future that 
compensates for this slaughter?‖ (p. 101).  
McPherson (1988) also uses contemporary accounts to illustrate the human 
damage of Shiloh. The phrase ―seeing the elephant‖ was a common euphemism among 
soldiers for experiencing battle for the first time, and McPherson points to the manner in 
which Shiloh was the initial exposure of many young Union troops (and Confederate, 
too) to the trauma of combat. The battle was a hideous bloodletting, and McPherson 
quotes liberally from Union descriptions of the scene—―the gory corpses lying all about 
us, in every imaginable attitude, and slain by an inconceivable variety of wounds [that 
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were] shocking to behold‖ (p. 413). A Tennessee soldier commented on the vanished 
image of war as a glorious venture—―I never realized the ‗pomp and circumstance‘ of the 
thing called glorious war until I saw this…Men lying in every conceivable position; the 
dead…with their eyes wide open, the wounded begging piteously for help [.]‖ McPherson 
quotes William Sherman‘s comment after Shiloh: ―The scenes on this field would have 
cured anybody of war‖ (p. 413).  
 Practically all generalist works on the Civil War contain the standard rationale for 
what McPherson calls a ―ghastly harvest of death,‖ the staggering death toll of the war (p. 
472). The combination of new, highly accurate, powerful new weapons (primarily the 
rifled musket and new, long-range artillery) with Napoleonic tactical emphasis on close-
order formations and tightly massed offensives produced such an enormous body count. 
Olsen (2006) provides a succinct description of the new weaponry and its likely effect, 
built around a slightly macabre metaphor: 
Muskets fired a round shell that came out with no spin (think of a knuckleball 
pitch in baseball) and were accurate to about 60 yards; rifles, with grooves inside 
the barrel, fired conical-shaped shells that spun in a spiral (imagine a football 
pass) and were accurate to about 350 yards. In the hands of trained men, muzzle-
loading rifles could be shot twice about every minute or so. This made infantry 
charges over open ground nearly suicidal, and meant that a small number of men, 
well-positioned and supplied, often could hold off vastly superior forces. (p. 117) 
McPherson (1988) points out that the emphasis on large-scale frontal assault was 
the result of current historical trends and recent American success in the Mexican war. 
Though it turned disastrous during the Civil War (especially in how it increased the value 
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and emphasis on tactical defensive positions), it would have been unreasonable to assume 
the era‘s officer corps would have been quick to abandon what was, then, military 
orthodoxy.  
 Antietam is typically presented as the high-water mark of bloodshed in the Civil 
War. Olsen (2006) describes it as ―the deadliest day in American history (still)‖ (p. 134). 
McPherson (1988) characterizes it as ―the hardest of the war‖ (p. 540). The aftermath of 
Antietam is poignantly described by McPherson as ―a scene of horror beyond 
imagining.‖ He goes on to provide excruciating context to the battle‘s impact: 
Nearly 6,000 men lay dead or dying, and another 17,000 wounded groaned in 
agony or endured in silence. The casualties at Antietam numbered four times the 
total suffered by American soldiers at the Normandy beaches on June 6, 1944. 
More than twice as many Americans lost their lives in one day at Sharpsburg as 
fell in combat in the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Spanish-American 
war combined [sic]. (p. 544) 
 The ―slaughter‖ that McPherson describes is given roughly the same treatment by 
Olsen in his work—a fearful battle that cost more lives than any armed conflict in 
American history. Similarly, the battle of Fredericksburg, in December 1862, is often 
characterized by historians as emblematic of the sort of bloodshed that was typical of the 
Civil War. McPherson includes testimony from a Confederate soldier who recalled 
corpses ―swollen to twice their natural size…one without a head, one with legs, yonder a 
head and legs without a trunk…with fragments of shell sticking in oozing brain, with 
bullet holes all over the puffed limbs‖ (p. 574). The Battle of Gettysburg, universally 
recognized as the turning point in the war and the beginning of the end for the 
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Confederacy, is also noted for the fearsome toll—Olsen (2006) describes it as the 
―costliest battle of the war and in all American history,‖ and McPherson noted the ―high 
human cost‖ of the outcome—over 23,000 Union casualties, combined with 28,000 
Confederate losses.  
 The impact of these casualties, beyond the mathematical cost, is largely 
unexplored by the works cited above. While generalist works like those of Olsen and 
McPherson provide great insight into the events themselves, they focus less on the 
experience of soldiers in combat and more on the overarching strategy or tactics at play 
in individual battles. It falls to more specific historiography to examine the impact of 
Civil War fighting on the combatants themselves.  
Gerald Linderman‘s Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the 
American Civil War (1987) examines the everyday life of the Union and Confederate 
soldier and the impact of warfare on their lives and psyches, to a greater level of detail 
than do McPherson or Olsen. Linderman especially focuses on the manner in which the 
concept of courage changed over the grinding course of the war. Linderman asserts that 
the experience of battle had a dramatic impact on soldiers‘ beliefs about the war, its aims, 
and their own abilities and character.  
 The way that ―war‖ itself changed in the Civil War—from a series of 
individualized exploits that made personal glory a real if remote possibility, to the 
experience of mass warfare that depersonalized soldiers and made death in combat an 
anonymous, mundane affair—had a distinct impact. The changing conception of courage 
reflected the growing division between what soldiers had thought war would be, and what 
it actually was. The impact of combat, where death might occur at any moment, was 
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paralleled grimly by the despondency of camp life, where boredom was a preferable 
mode of existence, given the prevalence of disease. Disease led to the hospital, and 
practically every soldier on both sides agreed that was an experience to avoid at all 
costs—not only because of the chance of fatality (which was extremely high, in 
comparison to the odds of death in battle), but also because dying in the hospital was not 
properly representative of the values of heroism, sacrifice, and patriotism that had 
motivated so many at the war‘s outset (Linderman, p. 130).  
But it was the shock of battle itself that had the greatest impact on soldiers, 
especially the sharp divergence between their expectations and the reality. Even though 
most Americans of the 19
th
 century grew up much closer to death and its various daily 
manifestations than today, soldiers from the North and South were profoundly affected 
by the specter of war. Death could be sudden and without warning—one private, after 
seeing a nearby soldier struck down, commented that ―only a few seconds ago that man 
was alive and well, and now he was lying on the ground, done for, forever‖ (Linderman, 
p. 124). Even more troubling was the horrifying reality of violent death. Linderman (p. 
125) points out that ―few soldiers died with tidy holes through the chest.‖ The sheer gore 
of mangled corpses, the stench and mutilation of a battlefield, was a tremendous shock 
for most combatants, as was the stunning magnitude of such devastation—the sight of 
hundreds of bodies, untended, seemingly left to rot, challenged traditional notions of 
heroism, courage, and respect.  
The impact of these experiences has been interpreted in various ways by 
historians. Linderman, for example, holds that the majority of soldiers on both sides 
found the dissonance between their expectations and the reality of battle too difficult to 
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encompass, and widespread disillusionment—what he defines as ―the deeply depressive 
condition arising from the demolition of soldiers‘ conceptions of themselves and their 
performance in war‖ (p. 240)—was the general result. Other historians disagree—most 
notably, Earl J. Hess, who, in The Union Soldier in Battle: Enduring the Ordeal of 
Combat (1997), argues that Northern soldiers were not subject to what Hess terms ―the 
modernist view,‖ the ―assumption that all wars are equally disastrous to victor and 
defeated alike‖ (p. 197). Hess believes that, contrary to Linderman‘s emphasis on 
disillusionment, the Union soldier was generally able to make a lasting connection 
between courage, sacrifice, and patriotism, and was thus able to move beyond the horror 
of war into emotional stability. In a similar vein, J. Tracy Power, in Lee’s Miserables: 
Life in the Army of Northern Virginia from the Wilderness to Appomattox (1989) 
examines the war from a Confederate viewpoint and considers the impact of the war‘s 
brutality as a nonpermanent phenomenon—―Countless men who had endured the 
confusion of the Wilderness, the horrors and numbing fatigue of Spotsylvania…and the 
grim retreat towards Appomattox returned home and went immediately back to work 
[.]…The vast majority of those who did survived neither dwelt on the war nor forgot the 
sacrifices they and their comrades made during it‖ (p. 321). The variations are many, but 
the emphasis on the Civil War‘s bloodshed on American psyche, morality, and memory 
of the war itself is definitive and universal.  
Textbooks in this sample follow a common pattern in their depiction of the Civil 
War. Most address the same series of events, in roughly the same order. All ten begin 
their chapters on the war with a breakdown of the comparative advantages and 
disadvantages of the North and South, followed quickly by a brief description of each 
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side‘s expectations, both in terms of overall outcome and individual exploits. The 
American Journey (Goldfield, et al., 2007) provides a typical example:  
The feeling that a holy war was unfolding energized recruits. A Union soldier 
expressed his feelings in a letter home at the beginning of the war: ―I believe our 
cause to be the cause of liberty and light…the cause of God, and holy and 
justifiable in his sight, and for this reason, I fear not to die in it if need be.‖ 
Equally convinced of the righteousness of his cause, a Confederate soldier wrote: 
―Our Cause is Just and God is Just and we shall finally be successful whether I 
live to see the time or not.‖…The armies of both sides included men from all 
walks of life, from common laborers to clerks to bankers. An undetermined 
number of women, typically disguised as men, also served in both armies. They 
joined for the same reasons as men: adventure, patriotism, and glory. (p. 422-423) 
The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010) is even more succinct: ―Northerners and 
Confederates alike expected a short, glorious war. Soldiers left for the front with bands 
playing and crowds cheering. Both sides felt that right was on their side‖ (p. 340).  
Each textbook after this begins its chapter on the Civil War‘s military history with 
the First Battle of Bull Run. The verdict on this skirmish is fairly common to all textbook 
narratives. It began as a Union rout, turned on the individual bravery of Confederate 
General Thomas J. ―Stonewall‖ Jackson (the manner in which Jackson acquired his 
nickname is featured prominently in most of the books from this sample), and shows both 
sides that the war would be neither short nor easy—as United States History ((Lapansky-
Werner, et al., 2010) puts it, the battle ―proved a shock to those who had hoped the war 
would end quickly—and who were unprepared for the carnage modern warfare could 
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produce‖ (p. 364). Give Me Liberty! (Foner, 2008) gives a hint as to how horrifying the 
war would become after this initial engagement—―Almost 800 men died at Bull Run, a 
toll eclipsed many times in the years to come, but more Americans than had been killed 
in any previous battle in the nation‘s history‖ (p. 510) On the other hand, other textbooks 
are almost dismissive of the battle itself—The American Nation: A History of the United 
States (Carnes, et al., 2008) ends its description of Bull Run by stating that ―casualties on 
both sides were light, and the battle had little direct effect on anything but morale‖ (p. 
380).  
Some textbooks discuss the experience of battle for soldiers, both North and 
South. All textbooks, to some degree of detail, include a section on the technological 
changes that directly impacted the conduct of the war; most of these passages are roughly 
similar to this selection from The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010):  
Rifles were more accurate than old-fashioned muskets, and soldiers could load 
rifles more quickly and therefore fire more rounds during battle. The minie ball 
was a soft lead bullet that was more destructive than earlier bullets. Troops in the 
Civil War also used primitive hand grenades and land mines. (p. 343) 
The use of hand grenades and land mines can hardly be considered a major factor 
in the actual fighting of the war; given that, the inclusion of such weapons into this 
passage contributes to the implicit conclusion that the topic here discussed is less about 
the potential destructiveness of new technology and more about the innovative nature of 
such inventions. In fact, many of the textbooks tend to focus on technological innovations 
as a topic of interest apart from the connection of such technology to an increase in 
casualties. For example, most books contain passages describing the development of 
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―ironclad‖ ships like the Monitor and the Merrimack (often, in textbooks, identified by its 
original name, rather than its rechristened title, the C.S.S. Virginia) even though most 
historians agree the development of such ships contributed little to the overall outcome of 
the war. Similarly, some books include references to repeating rifles such as the Henry, 
weapons which were quite advanced but had a limited impact on the war‘s progress, 
given their late entry in the war. Still, several textbooks present the evidence of these 
trends in a compelling manner—the graphic below is from United States History 
(Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010), and provides visual evidence of the technological 
changes at work in the war, as well as providing an opportunity for students to critically 
evaluate the importance of such changes:  
 
 
Figure 3: ―Infographic,‖ from United States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010), p. 
363 
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 The subject of casualties is addressed in all textbooks—in fact, there is a heavy 
reliance on the term casualties itself, as it is far and away the most ubiquitous term to 
identify the number killed or wounded. In fact, one textbook, America: History of Our 
Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009), goes so far as to provide a definition of the word—―the 
military term for persons killed, wounded, or missing in action‖ (p. 520). Interestingly, 
America: Pathways to the Present (Cayton, et al., 2007) uses practically the same 
definition in its text—―the military term for those killed, wounded, captured, or missing 
in action‖ (p. 382).  
All textbooks include sections that describe how outdated tactics tended to 
combine with modern technology to create an outsized number of dead and wounded. 
The narratives vary, however, in the degree to which they explain the reasons for the use 
of such antiquated tactical approaches to war. America: History of Our Nation (Davidson 
& Stoff, 2009), for example, states that ―Civil War generals were slow to recognize the 
problem and change tactics. Thousands of soldiers on both sides were slaughtered by 
following orders to cross open fields against these deadly new weapons‖ (p. 518). There 
is no explanation of why officers might rely on such a seemingly disastrous strategy. 
While America: History of Our Nation offers no explanation, Visions of America: a 
History of the United States (Keene, et al., 2010) portrays the adherence to older tactics 
as a matter of hidebound tradition on the part of the officer corps:  
Military commanders on both sides, however, were slow to adjust to these 
changes. Schooled in traditional warfare at military academies such as West 
Point, most were reluctant to abandon the strategy of attacking entrenched enemy 
positions on charging soldiers. The results were horrific. (p. 384) 
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Other textbooks do a better job of showing the reasons why such tactical approaches 
could exist alongside such technological achievements like the rifle and the minie ball. 
America: Pathways to the Present (Cayton, et al., 2007) shows how the reliance on 
frontal assaults was not merely a stubborn resistance to change among generals, but was 
instead the product of decades of military theory, combined with very recent experience:   
For generations, European commanders had fought battles by concentrating their 
forces, assaulting a position, and driving the enemy away. The cannons and 
muskets they used were neither accurate nor capable of repeating fire very 
rapidly. Generals relied on masses of charging troops to overwhelm the enemy. 
Most Civil War generals had been trained in these methods and had seen them 
work well in the Mexican War. (p. 384) 
The Enduring Vision (Boyer, et al., 2008) echoes this position, pointing out that, 
despite the enthusiasm such weapons engendered, often the rifles simply did not work as 
intended, forcing a reliance on traditional tactics. Moreover, these tactics were not 
adopted out of professional ignorance or incompetence, but were instead based on 
accepted military orthodoxy: ―Military manuals of the 1840s and 1850s assumed that 
defenders armed with muskets would be able to fire only a round or two before being 
overwhelmed‖ (p. 432).  
Several textbooks dispute the standard view that tactics in the Civil War stayed static 
throughout the course of the conflict. The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010) points out 
that, contrary to other narratives, there were tactical changes, as weaponry dictated a 
change in military defensive approaches: ―The new technology gradually changed 
military strategy. Because the rifle and the minie could kill fare more people than older 
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weapons, soldiers fighting from inside trenches or behind barricades had a great 
advantage in mass infantry attacks‖ (p. 344). Give Me Liberty! (Foner, 2008) echoes this 
sentiment, highlighting how the change in tactics benefited one side over the other—
―This development changed the nature of combat, emphasizing the importance of heavy 
fortifications and elaborate trenches and giving those on the defensive—usually southern 
armies—a significant advantage over attacking forces‖ (p. 507). And interestingly, The 
American Journey (Goldfield, et al., 2007) argues that even with changes to offensive 
strategy coming late in the war, there were still factors that limited such alteration: ―Only 
late in the war did tactics change, but even then, the problems of communication and the 
inability to precisely coordinate attacks continued to favor the packed ranks of men 
advancing forward at a trot, often in the face of withering fire‖ (p. 427). In this manner, 
these textbooks present a more nuanced and complex view that is traditional to many 
textbooks.  
Similar to historiographical works, many textbooks rely on the battle of Shiloh to 
provide the narrative starting point for a depiction of casualties in the war. The Americans 
(Danzer, et al., 2010) points out that Shiloh, as opposed to Bull Run, ―demonstrated how 
bloody the war might become, as nearly one-fourth of the battle‘s 100,000 troops were 
killed, wounded, or captured‖ (p. 342). The authors even include a compelling illustration 
of the battle‘s brutal nature, describing how ―many Union troops were shot while making 
coffee; some died while they were still lying in their blankets‖ (p. 342). United States 
History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010) connects the carnage of the battle to the growing 
celebrity of the Union general in command, Ulysses S. Grant, with a nod towards his 
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coming role in the War: ―The Battle of Shiloh horrified both the North and the South and 
damaged Grant‘s rising reputation‖ (p. 364).  
 America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009) provides a full-page 
description of the battle of Shiloh, under the heading of ―Geography and History.‖ It 
includes a representation of the battle itself, with Confederate troops plunging hurriedly 
towards the Union line, under the caption: ―Exposed to Counterattack: Confederate 
troops marched toward the Union position without the protection of trees or foxholes. 
Every charge was met with a flurry of bullets from Union soldiers using vegetation and 
raised mounds of earth as cover‖ (p. 523). Below that is a depiction of one of the 
violently contested parts of the battlefield, the ―Hornet‘s Nest,‖ so named, according to 
the text, ―because of the intense fire the Confederate soldiers encountered…Union bullets 
caused many Confederate injuries‖ (p. 523). Despite the clear references to the battle‘s 
brutality and the ferocity of the fighting, the book also includes an implicit moral 
judgment about the value of the event: ―The Battle of Shiloh was costly yet important for 
both sides. The South suffered nearly 11,000 casualties and the North more than 13,000. 
However, the Union forced the Confederate army to withdraw from the railroad center.‖ 
(p. 521). The American Journey (Goldfield, et al., 2007), on the contrary, does a better 
job of connecting the battle to the human cost:  
The staggering casualties shook the confidence of both belligerents. More 
Americans fell there in two days than in all the battles of the Revolution, the War 
of 1812, and the Mexican War combined. Union losses exceeded 13,000 out of 
63,000 engaged; the Confederates lost 10,699…and the people, North and South, 
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stopped thinking of the war as a romantic test of courage and military guile. (p. 
384) 
 Antietam and Gettysburg compete, in most textbooks, for the most hyperbolic 
description of casualties. Unusually, America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 
2009) departs from the traditional chronological arrangement of content and addresses 
the battle of Antietam (from September, 1862) after the battle of Shiloh (April, 1862). 
The authors spare little verbiage in describing the battle itself: ―This was the bloodiest 
day of the Civil War. The Union Army attacked again and again. It suffered about 12,000 
casualties‖ (p. 520). America: Pathways to the Present (Cayton, et al., 2007) does a more 
thorough job of addressing Antietam, even including a personal note from a soldier 
exposed to the worst of the battle:  
In the first three hours of fighting, some 12,000 soldiers from both sides were 
killed or wounded. By day‘s end Union casualties had grown to over 12,000. 
Lee‘s nearly 14,000 casualties amounted to more than a third of his army…The 
Battle of Antietam [sic] became the bloodiest day of the Civil War. ―God grant 
these things may soon end and peace be restored,‖ wrote a Pennsylvania soldier 
after the battle. ―Of this war I am heartily sick and tired.‖ (p. 389) 
In a similar manner, Give Me Liberty! (Foner, 2008) includes significant details 
and perspective that moves beyond mere reporting—―The dead, one survivor recalled, 
lay three deep in the field, mowed down ‗like grass before the scythe‘‖ (p. 512). In 
addition, the text adds a contextual section that allows for a comparison of the 
devastation of Antietam to other, more notorious events in American history—―More 
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Americans died [at Antietam] than on any other day in the nation‘s history, including D-
Day in World War II and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001‖ (p. 512). 
United States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010) tries to capture the 
devastation of the battle by including a table, together with graphic imagery, that shows 
how casualties mounted as the battle wore on (see Figure 4, below):  
 
 
Figure 4: ―The Union and Confederate Dead,‖ from United States History (Lapansky-
Werner, et al., 2010) p. 369 
 
 Some textbooks aim more generally at the strategic and tactical implications of 
the battle, with special attention paid to the leadership of the Union army. The Enduring 
Vision (Boyer, et al., 2008) offers a standard view of the battle‘s outcome: “Although a 
tactical draw, Antietam proved a strategic victory for the North, for Lee subsequently 
called off his invasion and retreated south of the Potomac‖ (p. 435). The American 
Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006) relates the story of a Union scout finding, at the base of a 
tree, the Confederate Army‘s battle orders wrapped around three cigars, and concludes 
that the information helped secure a strategic victory for the North—―With this crucial 
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piece of intelligence in hand, McClellan succeeded in halting Lee at Antietam on 
September 17, 1862, in one of the bitterest and bloodiest days of the war‖ (p. 459). Other 
textbooks, though, do not share this generous assessment of McClellan‘s abilities. The 
American Journey (Goldfield, et al., 2007) focuses on McClellan‘s failings. ―McClellan,‖ 
the text states, ―squandered his numerical superiority with uncoordinated and timid 
attacks‖ (p. 430). While harsh assessment of McClellan are hardly unusual, in either 
historiographical works or textbooks, the term ―timid‖ infers both personal cowardice and 
an unwillingness to accept the brutality of war—perhaps not a fair characterization, given 
the frequent descriptions of Antietam as the ―bloodiest‖ battle in the history of the nation. 
The criticism of McClellan is echoed by The American Nation: a History of the United 
States (Carnes, et al., 2008), which goes so far as to presume what a different general in 
the same situation should have done:  
Although casualties were evenly divided and the Confederate lines remained 
intact, Lee‘s position was perilous. His men were exhausted. McClellan had not 
yet thrown in his reserves, and new federal units were arriving hourly. A bold 
northern general would have continued the fight without respite through the night. 
One of ordinary aggressiveness would have waited for first light and then struck 
with every soldier who could hold a rifle, for with the Potomac at his back, Lee 
could not retreat under fire without inviting disaster. McClellan, however, did 
nothing. For an entire day, while Lee scanned the field in futile search of some 
weakness in the Union lines, he held his fire. That night the Confederates slipped 
back across the Potomac into Virginia. (p. 386) 
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Visions of America: a History of the United States (Keene, et al., 2010) 
acknowledges the massive effusion of blood, but considers it secondary to the strategic 
failures of the Union general: ―The carnage of the weeklong clash was staggering, but 
McClellan‘s losses were proportionately smaller than Lee‘s and his army lay just 25 
miles from Richmond. He refused, however, to move on Lee‘s weakened army, claiming 
inadequate intelligence, supplies and men‖ (p. 383). The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010) 
writes in the same tone, but more blunt and caustic: ―Casualties totaled more than 26,000, 
as many as in the War of 1812 and the war with Mexico combined. Instead of pursuing 
the battered Confederate army and possibly ending the Civil War, however, McClellan, 
cautious as always, did nothing‖ (p. 344). The inference in both of these passages is that 
casualties, as bad as they might have been, were a secondary concern compared to the 
strategic opportunity presented to McClellan. These may well be genuinely valid 
criticisms; indeed, the judgment of most historiographical works is often even less 
complementary, often casting the failures of the Army of the Potomac in the early years 
of the war almost entirely as a product of McClellan‘s personality, what McPherson 
(1988) terms his ―vainglory‖ (p. 359). Yet the moral implication is that McClellan should 
have pushed on, paying little heed to the bloodshed that would have resulted and less 
thought for the blood that had already been spilled. This judgment is clear in the text of 
The American Nation: a History of the United States (Carnes, et al., 2008), which deems 
McClellan‘s failings to be ―both intellectual and psychological,‖ in which his view of the 
war itself was a fatal flaw: 
[McClellan] saw the Civil War not as a mighty struggle over fundamental beliefs 
but as a sort of complex game that commanders played at a leisurely pace and for 
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limited stakes. He believed it more important to capture Richmond than to destroy 
the army protecting it. With their capital in northern hands, surely the Southerners 
(outwitted and outmaneuvered by a brilliant general) would acknowledge defeat 
and agree to return to the Union. The idea of crushing the South seemed to him 
wrongheaded and uncivilized. (p. 384) 
 The Battle of Gettysburg, of course, is considered by historiography and textbook 
alike as the turning point of the war, the largest battle ever fought on American soil, and 
the most crucial moment of the entire conflict. The descriptions of this battle are 
sometimes evocative, sometimes quite clinical. America: Pathways to the Present 
(Cayton, et al., 2007) aims for the former, by quoting a survivor of the battle to illustrate 
what it was like: ―Men fire into each other‘s faces, not five feet apart. There are bayonet-
thrusts, sabre-strokes, pistol-shots…men going down on their hands and knees, spinning 
round like tops, throwing out their arms, falling; legless, armless, headless. There are 
ghastly heaps of dead men‖ (p. 406). America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 
2009), on the contrary, uses the battle as a device for teaching vocabulary: ―In all, the 
Confederacy suffered more than 28,000 casualties during the three-day Battle of 
Gettysburg. Union losses exceeded 23,000.‖ The highlighted word is featured in a side 
panel, ―Vocabulary Builder,‖ and defined as ―to go beyond what is expected; to be 
greater than what was planned‖ (p. 535). The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010) includes 
the same numerical characterization of the battle‘s cost as America: History of Our 
Nation, though it concludes with a disturbing illustration of the battle itself:  
The three-day battle produced staggering losses. Total casualties were more than 
30 percent. Union losses included 23,000 men killed or wounded. For the 
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Confederacy, approximately 28,000 were killed or wounded. Fly-infested corpses 
lay everywhere in the July heat; the stench was unbearable. (p. 360) 
 The singular moment of the Battle of Gettysburg that commands the most 
coverage in the textbooks of this sample is Pickett‘s Charge of July 3, 1863, the last 
attempt by the Confederates to break the Union lines. It has the virtue of being a highly 
dramatic occurrence, and a useful framing device for the larger narrative of the battle 
(i.e., that this was the turning point of the war and that the South had reached its high 
water mark). Pickett‘s Charge is often presented from a tactical viewpoint, as to its goals 
and sequence—there is little consideration given to whether or not it was a necessity, nor 
whether the soldiers themselves thought it was a strategy worth pursuing. In fact, most 
textbooks restrict their versions of Pickett‘s Charge to something similar to that offered 
by America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009): 
On the afternoon of July 3, Lee ordered an all-out attack on the center of the 
Union Line. General George E. Pickett led about 15,000 Confederates across 
nearly a mile of open field toward Cemetery Ridge. As they advanced, Union 
artillery shells and rifle fire rained down on them. Only a few hundred men 
reached the Union lines, and they were quickly driven back. (p. 534) 
America: Pathways to the Present (Cayton, et al., 2007) is more descriptive, but 
still, there is no discussion of whether or not the attack was necessary, nor whether or not 
Confederate troops hesitated or resisted the attack: ―Hundreds of canister shells rained 
down on the approaching soldiers, tearing huge gaps in their ranks. When the Southern 
troops approached to within about 200 yards of the Union lines, Northern soldiers poured 
rifle fire into those who remained standing‖ (p. 406). In general, the particular images of 
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Pickett‘s Charge and the overall depiction of the Battle of Gettysburg are used by most 
textbooks as a sort of narrative device, a pivot point between the Southern domination of 
the war‘s early years to the eventual victory of the Union forces. At best, rather than 
using the battle to discuss the casualties and horror inherent in war, textbooks rely on 
Gettysburg to provide a moral transition from the battle itself to the evocative language of 
President Lincoln‘s Gettysburg Address. In this, The American Journey (Goldfield, et al., 
2007) is fairly typical; after relating the failure of Pickett‘s Charge, the authors illustrate 
the importance of the event by presenting the picture below (see Figure 5), with this 
accompanying text:  
The Union and Confederate dead at Gettysburg represent the cost of the war, the 
price of freedom. President Lincoln transformed the battleground from a killing 
field to a noble symbol of sacrifice for American ideals. Gettysburg continues to 
occupy a special place in our nation‘s history and in the memory of its citizens. 
(p. 437) 
 
Figure 5: ―The Union and Confederate Dead,‖ from The American Journey (Goldfield, et 
al., 2007), p. 437 
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 This moral concept—the horror of war, juxtaposed with an inference of moral 
necessity—is implicit in how textbooks discuss casualties without specific reference to 
battles. Often, these descriptions are disturbing. Indeed, there are many occasions when it 
seems that textbook authors are trying to disturb the reader with unsettling imagery. 
America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009), for example, includes this 
quote from a Confederate soldier to describe the experience of battle—―Our men were 
vomiting with excessive fatigue, over-exhaustion, and sunstroke; our tongues were 
parched and cracked for water, and our faces blackened with powder and smoke, and our 
dead and wounded were piled indiscriminately in the trenches‖ (p. 518). The American 
Journey (Goldfield, et al., 2007) also quotes a soldier who described the battle of Shiloh 
as ―the dead and dying lying in masses, some with arms, legs, and even their jaws shot 
off bleeding to death, and no one to wait upon them to dress their wounds‖ (p. 427). The 
American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006) is almost lyrical in its portrayal of battle: 
―Artillery shells blanketed the battlefield with a smoky haze. Bullets zinged through the 
air like a driving rain‖ (p. 441). In Visions of America: a History of the United States 
(Keene, et al., 2010), there is an inset section concerning photography in the Civil War, 
aimed largely at the work of Matthew Brady, who took hundreds of battlefield pictures 
that shocked the nation. The textbook‘s authors include the words of the New York Times, 
which recognized the innate ability of most individuals to ignore the realities of war:  
The dead of the battle-field come up to us very rarely, even in dreams. We see the 
list in the morning paper at breakfast, but dismiss its recollection with the 
coffee…Mr. Brady has done something to bring home to us the terrible reality and 
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earnestness of war. If he has not brought the bodies and laid them in our door-
yards and along streets, he has done something very like it. (p. 387)  
The section concludes with a powerful question, aimed at students: ―how do you 
imagine such images shaped the public‘s attitude toward this and future wars‖ (p. 386-
387)? 
 A particularly common element of textbook narratives is a description of wartime 
hospitals. America: Pathways to the Present (Cayton, et al., 2007) makes mention of the 
horrifying mortality associated with being wounded in the Civil War: ―a Union soldier 
was three times more likely to die in camp or in a hospital than he was to be killed on the 
battlefield. In fact, about one in five Union soldiers wounded in battle later died from 
their wounds‖ (p. 399). The American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006) identifies 
―dysentery, diarrhea, typhoid, and malaria‖ as the major killers of the war, and the 
authors blame a lack of ―proper medical understanding of sterilization or sanitation‖ on 
the elevated risk of camp life and hospital treatment (p. 441). In The Americans (Danzer, 
et al., 2010) and United States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010), there is more 
attention paid to the most common treatment for wounds taken in the war. The former 
describes how ―minie balls, soft lead bullets, caused traumatic wounds that could often be 
treated only by amputation‖ (p. 355), whereas the latter emphasizes the ―gaping wounds‖ 
caused by such weapons, going so far as to point out that often the amputations in 
question were sometimes performed ―without anesthesia‖ (p. 377). 
The assumption of command by General Ulysses S. Grant and the turn towards 
what is characterized as ―total war‖ is the point at which casualties in the Civil War 
seemed to become almost overwhelming. Grant‘s determination to wage a nearly 
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relentless campaign against the Confederate army, in order to take advantage of the 
Union‘s numerical superiority, resulted in some of the most ghastly battles that could 
have been imagined, then as now. Textbooks generally acknowledge this; they also 
generally acknowledge public outrage in the aftermath of these battles, as the number of 
dead and wounded climbed to nearly unbearable tolls. For example, Visions of America: 
a History of the United States (Keene, et al., 2010) describes how ―many Northerners, 
appalled at the fifty-five thousand Union casualties (to thirty thousand Confederate) in a 
single month, questioned Grant‘s competence; others simply called him a butcher‖ (p. 
399). This text also points out that Grant heard and understood the criticism: ―Grant 
quickly changed his strategy…By now Grant recognized the futility of staging frontal 
assaults against entrenched troops and settled down for a prolonged siege. It was not the 
aggressive form of warfare he preferred‖ (p. 399).  
Other textbooks are not so nuanced in their view of Grant; most depict him as a 
stolid, steadfast presence, one who understood the elements of ―modern war‖ now at play 
and who was resistant to temporary calls for restraint. United States History (Lapansky-
Werner, et al., 2010) says that ―Grant would accept nothing less than victory‖ (p. 386). 
The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010) casts Grant as the steadying force the nation 
needed—―Democrats and Northern newspapers called Grant a butcher. However, Grant 
kept going because he had promised Lincoln, ‗Whatever happens, there will be no 
turning back‘‖ (p. 363). The American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006) calls Grant ―the 
man for this meat-grinder type of warfare,‖ whose personal motto was ―when in doubt, 
fight‖ (p. 473). Even Visions of America, which acknowledges the role of Northern 
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condemnation of Grant, describes him in positive terms; Grant ―was not like his 
predecessors,‖ in that he possessed ―total confidence in his overall strategy‖ (p. 399). 
What is most noticeable about textbook depictions of Grant‘s strategy is the 
manner in which mass casualties are conceded yet unquestioned, from a moral 
perspective. Practically every textbook narrative admits that Grant‘s shift to ―total war‖ 
meant a tremendous upswing in bloodshed; yet, implicitly or explicitly, most textbooks 
present this shift as a necessary, if regrettable fact of the war. America: History of Our 
Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009), for example, reports the 55,000 casualties suffered by 
Grant over seven weeks in his initial campaign against Robert E. Lee, alongside the 
35,000 Confederate losses, but follows by pointing out that ―Grant realized that his army 
could count on a steady stream of men and supplies. Lee, on the other hand, was running 
out of both‖ (p. 535). America: Pathways to the Present (Cayton, et al., 2007)  depicts the 
battle of Spotsylvania, where ―In some parts of the battlefield, the Union dead were piled 
four deep.‖ But when protests followed the ―huge loss of life,‖ the textbook narrative 
highlights ―a determined Grant‖ telling President Lincoln, ―I propose to fight it out on 
this line [course of action] if it takes all summer‖ (p. 411). And authors here indicate that 
Grant had approval from at least one quarter—his own men: ―Despite the high number of 
casualties, Union soldiers were proud that under Grant‘s leadership they would not retreat 
so easily‖ (p. 411).  
Some textbook accounts take a traditional ―top-down‖ view of the change in 
policy that does not reflect the reality of that shift from a soldier‘s perspective. The 
American Journey (Goldfield, et al., 2007), for example, illustrates ―Grant‘s Plan to End 
the War,‖ which meant two particular innovations: a coordinated Union effort to attack 
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on all fronts, and a change in the ―tempo‖ of war, where, when in the past there had been 
long intervals between battles, ―Grant, with the advantage of superior numbers, proposed 
nonstop warfare‖ (p. 444). The text acknowledges that now, Union and Confederate 
soldiers were to engage in a practically unrelenting conflict that was not only bloody, but 
psychological and emotionally traumatic—yet there is no opportunity for readers to 
critique this shift in strategy. It is passively rendered, and thus passively accepted.  
Yet despite the often disturbing language and imagery used to describe battle, 
there is an overarching (and hegemonic) principle at work in these textbook narratives—
the sacrifice of these soldiers was necessary, and their courage was a fairly representative 
characteristic of the combatants on both sides. Certainly, there is historical evidence for 
this position. Given the sheer number of soldiers, both North and South, who fought and 
often died for their respective causes, it is easy to conclude that most willingly fought and 
risked their lives without overt question. Yet the purpose of this study is to explore the 
presence of, and opportunity for moral criticism of American wars—and the consensus 
view of most textbooks is that courage and sacrifice were by default, and any deviation 
from that pattern was atypical. 
 An example of this phenomenon can be found in America: Pathways to the 
Present (Cayton, et al., 2007), in which the authors begin a section describing the soldiers 
of the Civil War by highlighting the nature of most battles: ―Civil War battles were noisy 
and smoky. Cannons boomed, rifles fired, men shouted, and the battlefield was wreathed 
in a haze of gunfire and dust. How did commanders communicate with their troops in this 
chaos‖ (p. 402)? As in answer to this question, the textbook narrative then moves to the 
issue of drummer boys, ―usually only 12 to 16 years old,‖ who ―were so important that 
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they were often purposely fired on by the enemy, and hundreds were killed in battle.‖ 
This disturbing thought—disturbing not least of which because of the similar age of most 
of the text‘s prospective readers—is followed by noting that one drummer boy ―who was 
wounded in action at Vicksburg received the Medal of Honor.‖ The authors then include 
a quotation from another drummer boy that presents a surprising degree of personal 
courage as representative of the type: 
A cannon ball came bouncing across the corn field, kicking up dirt and dust each 
time it struck the earth. Many of the men in our company took shelter behind a 
stone wall, but I stood where I was and never stopped drumming. An officer came 
by on horseback and chastised the men, saying ‗this boy puts you all to shame. 
Get up and move forward‘…Even when the fighting was at its fiercest and I was 
frightened, I stood straight and did as I was ordered…I felt I had to be a good 
example for the others. (p. 402)  
This passage presents the notion that physical courage, even when manifested by 
the very young, was the ideal characteristic, contrary to the behavior of the adult soldiers 
in this particular unit, who, in seeking shelter in the midst of a fight, are put to ―shame‖ 
by the drummer boy. The thought that seeking shelter might be a natural, even rational 
reaction, is not presented in this section. 
In The American Journey (Goldfield, et al., 2007), a poetic, emotional letter from 
a Union army officer to his wife is quoted at length. Sullivan Ballou wrote to his wife, 
Sarah, on July 14, 1861, and remarked candidly on the prospects of his own death and his 
willingness to face it: 
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If it is necessary that I should fall on the battle-field for my Country I am ready. I 
have no misgivings about, or lack of confidence in the cause in which I am 
engaged, and my courage does not halt or falter. I know how American 
Civilization now leans upon the triumph of the government and how great a debt 
we owe to those who went before us through the blood and suffering of the 
Revolution. And I am willing, perfectly willing, to lay down all my joys in this 
life, to help maintain this government, and to pay that debt. (p. 420)  
This degree of commitment is admirable, as is Ballou‘s declaration that ―my love 
for you is deathless…it seems to bind me with mighty cables that nothing but 
omnipotence can break; and yet my love of Country comes over me like a strong wind 
and bears me irresistibly with all those chains to the battle-field‖ (p. 420). It is presented 
as the opening anecdote of The American Journey’s main chapter on the Civil War, and it 
is followed by this pronouncement: ―Sullivan Ballou‘s letter to his wife on the eve of the 
First Battle of Bull Run typified the sentiments of the civilian armies raised by both 
North and South‖ (p. 421). The main thrust of the text is that the sacrifice of soldiers like 
Ballou (who died at the First Battle of Bull Run, shortly after writing this letter) was 
tragic, but necessary. This same sentiment is echoed in United States History (Lapansky-
Werner, et al., 2010) which includes a quote from Brock‘s Richmond During the War 
(1970): 
An old lady, the mother of several dearly loved sons, but echoed the almost 
universal sentiment when she said…―War, I know is very dreadful, but if, by the 
raising of my finger, I could prevent my sons from doing their duty to their 
country now, though I love them as my life, I could not do it. I am no coward, nor 
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have I brought up my boys to be cowards. They must go if their country needs 
them.‖ (p. 360)  
In The American Journey, the authors remark that ―the Civil War preserved the 
Union, abolished slavery, and killed at least 620,000 soldiers, more than in all the other 
wars the country fought combined. To come to terms with this is to reconcile the war‘s 
great accomplishments with its awful consequences‖ (p. 421). By presenting the war 
itself as a tragic necessity, textbooks themselves provide a form of intellectual 
reconciliation. 
 
Non-combatants 
 Every textbook in this study includes substantial and detailed accounts of the 
manner in which civilians endured the Civil War. The textbooks account in this sample 
are compared below to historiographical works which focus on areas related to 
noncombatants in the Civil War: the role of women in the war, the occurrence of popular 
discontent with the war, the changing nature of death and dying, and particular examples 
of civilian suffering, especially the Union army‘s siege of the city of Vicksburg. 
 
Women in the war. 
 There is considerable literature on the role of women in the war, though most tend 
to focus on the home front for both the Union and the Confederacy. This is only sensible, 
given the fact that, in the 19
th
 century, home life and child care was the primary role for 
women, with political and military affairs a remote province for their involvement or 
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influence. Many historians highlight the role women on both sides were expected to fill, 
that of ―Spartan motherhood,‖ what Olsen (2006) describes as ―a self-sacrificing 
philosophy named for the legendary Greek city-state that existed on a culture of warfare‖ 
(p. 115). McPherson (1988) reinforces this depiction by highlighting the impact of the 
economic transformation of the mid-19
th
 century, as work moved from the home to the 
factory and created the concept of separate ―spheres‖ of life—one for work, outside the 
home, and one of ―domesticity‖ (p. 33). McPherson does point out, however, that this 
increased emphasis on the woman‘s role as guardian of the family resulted in, 
paradoxically, a significant increase in their activities outside the home, particularly in 
religion and education. By the outbreak of the Civil War, women were more highly 
educated and involved in civic affairs than ever before, though the broad majority 
(around three-fourths) remained in the traditional role of mother and homemaker. Still, 
this fact did not stop local communities from relying on women and women‘s groups to 
help organize recruiting drives for the war, once fighting began.  
Olsen points out that for the first six months of the war, families in both the North 
and the South felt the war in only a limited way, with little physical privation or lack of 
supply—other than the departure of their loved ones, women on both sides found their 
lives undisturbed in the early stages of the conflict. Other than the now-increased 
difficulty of maintaining the harvest cycle (though even this was only a mild disruption; 
most Southerners had planted crops well before the war had started, and most men and 
slaves were still available to harvest before the largest enrollments in the army began), 
there was not, through the winter and first months of 1862, ―widespread material 
hardship or even great inconvenience‖ (Olsen, 2006, p. 116). All that would change.  
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Women played a large role in the war, both on the home front and in the war 
itself. The number of women at work in both the North and South increased significantly, 
to make up for the massive shortfall in labor during the war years. Women took jobs in 
civil service, nursing, agriculture (where the advent of farm machinery made stepping in 
for male laborers substantially easier). In manufacturing, women increased their already 
significant presence, increasing from one-fourth to one-third of the work force 
(McPherson, 1988, p. 449). In the war itself, women served as nurses, primarily through 
the efforts of organizations like the U.S. Sanitary Commission, which became the largest 
employer of women in the war effort—from 1861 to 1865, around 3,200 women served 
as paid nurses (Olsen, 2006, p. 197). In the South, where records were less reliably kept, 
the Confederacy relied more heavily on slaves—especially women—to care for the 
wounded. Still, women on both sides of the conflict braved the stereotype against 
―refined ladies‖ working in hospitals and contributed mightily to the war effort.  
 Textbooks in general take significant note of the contributions of women, but 
occasionally to an outsized degree not commensurate with the positions taken by 
historiographical works. For example, America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & 
Stoff, 2009) does refer to the work women did as nurses, factory workers, and teachers—
but the authors also include details regarding at least ―400 women disguised themselves 
as men and joined the Union or Confederate armies, as well as others who ―became spies 
behind enemy lines.‖ No historian would reasonably assert that these were common 
experiences for women during the Civil War, yet the text in question puts such exotic 
occupations alongside the more routine work done by millions of women in the North 
and South, inferring their equal status. In like manner, The American Pageant (Kennedy, 
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et al., 2006) points out that ―one woman was executed for smuggling gold to the 
Confederacy,‖ hardly a typical pastime for any woman in the time period. Some 
textbooks go as far as to imply that the war was a positive experience for women, as with 
The American Journey (Goldfield, et al., 2007), which comments that the ―new economic 
opportunities the war created left northern society more open to a broader view of 
women‘s roles‖ (p. 441). The American Nation: A History of the United States (Carnes, et 
al., 2008) sounds a similarly optimistic note, point out that the ―‘proper sphere‘ of 
American woman was expanding, another illustration of the modernizing effect of the 
war‖ (p. 398). United States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010) casts the war as the 
opportunity for which women had been waiting—―Many women had long sought an 
active role in public life. The Civil War offered them new opportunities‖ (p. 378). 
 Among the books from this sample, The Enduring Vision (Boyer, et al., 2008) 
provides a strong account of the challenges facing women in the Civil War, presenting 
them as something more (and something worse) than an opportunity for modernization. 
This text phrases these challenges as often more emotional than economic or practical—
the authors quote a Kentucky woman who commented, on the loss of Southern men to the 
war, that ―there is a vacant chair in every house‖ (p. 450). When relating the experiences 
of nurses in the war, The Enduring Vision tries to connect the overall human devastation 
of the war to what these women endured: “Wherever they worked, nurses witnessed 
haunting, unforgettable sights. ‗About the amputating table,‘ one reported, ‗lay large piles 
of human flesh—legs, arms, feet, and hands…the stiffened membranes seemed to be 
clutching oftentimes at our clothing‘‖ (p. 454). While other texts contain similar 
descriptions and make similar efforts, The Enduring Vision manages to highlight the 
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changes to the status of women in America in a manner truly reflective of the difficulties 
involved.  
 
Discontent on the home front. 
 As the Civil War began to change from a limited war to what is euphemistically 
referred to as a ―modern‖ war, the experiences and attitudes of noncombatants began to 
change as well. Discontent with the war became a standard occurrence, in both the North 
and the South. As the war grew in destruction and length, civilians on both sides began to 
challenge the standard assumption that the war was worth fighting. 
 For the men fighting, that had been an open question for some time. 
Historiographical works have thoroughly explored the effect that the changing nature of 
the war had on soldiers‘ commitment to the fight and their willingness to endure. 
McPherson (1988) cites the worsening Southern economy, as well as the development of 
massive shortages (especially in salt) as the major reason why, starting in 1862, 
desertions began to plague the Confederate army. He cites a letter from one Mississippi 
soldier who wrote to his governor in late 1861, saying ―Poor men have been compelled to 
leave the army to come home to provide for their families…We are poor men and are 
willing to defend our country but our families [come] first‖ (p. 440). In the Union army, 
desertions were a similar problem—after the disaster at the battle of Fredericksburg in 
1862, men at one point were deserting at the rate of one hundred or more a day (p. 584).  
 The degree to which desertions were fueled by civilians is an open question. 
Olsen (2006) acknowledges that it is difficult to know what impact heart-rending letters 
from home might have encouraged men to leave the army, but the fact that such letters 
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existed and played a role is beyond question. Many such letters simply described the 
conditions facing soldiers‘ families, while others were open pleas for their loved ones to 
return— Olsen cites one such missive, by Mary Cooper to her husband Edward, warning 
him that ―unless you come home, we must die.‖ By 1864 and early 1865, around half of 
all Confederate troops were absent without leave (p. 211). Williams (2005) quotes a 
North Carolina government official who said, ―Desertion takes place because desertion is 
encouraged…And though the ladies may not be willing to concede the fact, they are 
nevertheless responsible‖ (p. 247). 
 While appeals from their families probably convinced many soldiers to go home, 
events on the home front encouraged greater discontent. As the southern economy began 
to disintegrate late in the war, shortages created a degree of civil unrest that undoubtedly 
impacted the war effort. Inflation was a particular plague, as enlisted soldiers‘ pay 
remained fixed at eleven dollars a month in spite of rapidly rising prices. Finally, in April 
1863, several hundred women in Richmond, Virginia rioted and looted bread and beef 
from city stores; it took an impassioned plea by Jefferson Davis, followed by a threat to 
have troops shoot rioters, to put down the protests. These events were echoed in cities 
across the South, notably in Mobile, Alabama, where crowds carried signs that read 
―BREAD OR BLOOD‖ (Olsen, 2006, p. 186). By 1863, support for the war had waned 
throughout the South; the lack of fervor for the war effort was evident in the returns of 
the Confederate congressional elections of that year (Jefferson Davis, the president of the 
Southern states, had a six-year term, so his own popularity is difficult to measure). In 
Texas, half of the congressmen elected as pro-secession two years earlier were defeated, 
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while in Georgia only one of ten congressmen held their seats. Altogether, only half the 
incumbents in the southern Congress stayed in office (Williams, 2005, p. 101).  
 In the North, the Democratic Party—which had been opposed to the war 
practically from its beginning—helped to focus popular discontent. From a social 
perspective, the New York City draft riots are often viewed as the singular event that 
represented popular unrest over the war; but these riots are often viewed as an isolated 
event, fueled as much by class distinction and resentment over African-Americans as by 
anger over the draft. In truth, the resistance to the draft was truly a national event, 
spanning both North and South, as lower- and working-class people in both regions 
viewed the attempt at conscription as a violation of personal and states‘ rights (especially 
in the Confederacy) and as a defense of what had become a ―rich man‘s war, poor man‘s 
fight‖ (Williams, 2005, p. 280).  
 Textbooks often bring the issue of discontent among noncombatants into their 
narratives, but within the now-standard ―mentioning‖ framework typical to this style. 
America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009) is fairly representative, as it 
presents the major issues in one separate section from the main narrative of the war. The 
authors concede that desertion ―was a problem for both sides. Between 300,000 and 
550,000 Union and Confederate soldiers left their units and went home‖ (p. 530). The 
draft, the text asserts, was deeply unpopular, resulting in riots throughout the North, with 
―the worst‖ in New York City. The authors state that rioters ―destroy[ed] property and 
attack[ed] African Americans and wealthy white men,‖ though there is no explanation for 
why these two groups were particular targets (p. 530). America: History of Our Nation 
concludes this section on discontent with a reference to the ―economic strain‖ felt 
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primarily in the South, with a depiction of the Richmond bread riots and a quote from a 
farm woman of North Carolina: ―A crowd of we poor women went to Greensboro 
yesterday for something to eat as we do not have a mouthful of bread nor meat…I have 6 
little children and my husband in the army and what am I to do‖ (p. 530)? While this 
section does adequately represent the major issues of popular anger over the war‘s 
conduct, by embedding it as a segment of the larger narrative, the authors implicitly 
minimize it.  
 Other textbooks contain passages detailing popular unrest over the war. Visions of 
America: a History of the United States (Keene, et al., 2010) describes the bread riots of 
Richmond and other cities, as well as identifying the depth of Southern anger towards 
speculators and black marketers by including a contemporary cartoon and this text: ―A 
cold-hearted speculator counts his profits as a hungry mother and child look through his 
window. ‗Anathema on him who screws and hoards/who rob the poor of wheat, potatoes, 
and bread,‘ read the first two lines of the accompanying poem.‖ (p. 389) America: 
Pathways to the Present (Cayton, et al., 2007) describes the commonality of desertion, 
even quoting the same Mississippi soldier referenced by James McPherson (see p. 215 
above). Give Me Liberty! (Foner, 2008) goes farther, not only relating the reality of 
desertion—the author quotes a Confederate official who noted that men ―cannot be 
expected to fight for the government that permits their wives and children to starve‖ (p. 
533)—but also pointing out the existence of Southern Unionists, chiefly present in 
antiwar societies throughout the Confederacy. Give Me Liberty! is the only text to include 
such a reference, and the author highlights the fact that “southerners loyal to the Union 
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made a significant contribution to northern victory…By the end of the war, an estimated 
50,000 white southerners had fought in the Union armies‖ (p. 533).  
In an interesting addendum, The American Nation: a History of the United States 
(Carnes, et al., 2008) addresses the issue of desertion by placing it within an analysis of a 
popular film, Cold Mountain, which showcases a fictional Confederate soldier who 
leaves the war and tries to return to his own home and loved one. The film, while 
fictional, does present the real dilemma soldiers faced with deciding whether or not to 
desert; the film shows the ―the psychological effects of the loss of morale in the South, 
which man historians now regard as the best explanation for its defeat.‖ The text does a 
strong job of framing the issue of desertion and morale within a context with which 
modern audiences may be more familiar, and even highlights the manner in which film 
may tend to distort our understanding of real events: ―Cold Mountain is not history. But 
the movie illuminates the anguish of those who cling to life and love rather than to a war 
effort that will likely fail‖ (p. 403).  
 There is considerable variety in the conclusions drawn by textbook authors with 
regard to the influence wielded by Southern civilians over the conduct of Confederate 
soldiers. On the one hand, textbooks like The American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006) 
argue that Southern citizenry maintained its commitment to the cause until the very end: 
To the brutal end, the South mustered remarkable resourcefulness and spirit. Women 
buoyed up their menfolk, many of whom had seen enough of war at first hand to be 
heartily sick of it‖ (p. 452). On the other hand, The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010), 
argues that the impact of civilian letters on soldier morale was considerable, and 
illustrates the problem of desertion by commenting that ―In every Southern state except 
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South Carolina, there were soldiers who decided to turn and fight for the North—for 
example, 2,400 Floridians served in the Union army‖ (p. 362). The text goes on to 
include commentary on the ―more than 100 open meetings‖ held in North Carolina in 
1863 to demand an end to the war. The authors conclude: 
 Although these movements failed, by mid-1864, Assistant Secretary of War John 
Campbell was forced to acknowledge that active opposition to the war ―in the 
mountain districts of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama 
menaces the existence of the Confederacy as fatally as…the armies of the United 
States.‖ (p. 362) 
 Some textbooks try to split the difference and highlight both division and unity, 
especially in the South as the war began to go against the Confederacy. The American 
Journey (Goldfield, et al., 2007), for example, details the issue of desertion and even 
provides an anecdote to illustrate how fervent antiwar sentiment had become: ―In 
Randolph County, North Carolina, two women torched a barn belonging to a state official 
in charge of rounding up deserters. Incidents like these convinced authorities that women 
were mainly responsible for desertion in the last years of the war‖ (p. 443). The authors 
of this text relate how many religious citizens (especially women) had ―concluded that it 
was God, not the Yankees, who had brought destruction on the South for its failure to live 
up to its responsibilities to women and children.‖ Yet despite this picture of despair and 
discontent, the authors still include evidence that many Southerners had not waned in 
both their patriotism and their ferocity: ―One woman displayed the bones of a federal 
soldier in her yard and another hoped for a ‗Yankee skull‘ to use as a jewelry box‖ (p. 
443-444).  
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Death and dying. 
 The passage above alludes to what was undoubtedly the greatest calamity endured 
by noncombatants on both sides—the changing nature of death. While death in battle or 
in camp were ever-present threats for soldiers, the emotional and psychological trauma 
involved in wartime existence for civilians was a social hurricane that changed all 
Americans‘ perceptions of what it meant to live and die in the modern era. Reid Mitchell, 
in The Vacant Chair: The Northern Soldier Leaves Home (1993) casts the experience of 
war as a vast ―coming of age‖ experience fueled by the tremendous death toll, ―as if the 
nation could not really mature without a massive bloodletting, as if six hundred thousand 
deaths were some kind of adolescent rite of passage‖ (p. 18).  
Drew Gilpin Faust, in This Republic of Suffering (2007), explored how the Civil 
War was a mechanism for the reconceptualization of death in 19
th
-century America. Prior 
to the war, there was a common understanding of what death was supposed to be, one 
that was strongly articulated given the close presence and ubiquity of dying at the time. 
The ars moriendi, the Good Death, dated back in Christian and cultural tradition to at 
least the fifteenth century, and had become standard code of practice for Americans 
facing their final trial. As Faust points out, by the 1860s the Good Death had been largely 
secularized and had ―become as much a part of respectable middle-class behavior and 
expectations in the North and South as they were the product or emblem of any particular 
religious affiliation‖ (p. 7). The Good Death required an understanding of mortality and 
the victim‘s appreciation that the end (the hors mori, the hour of death) was near; 
additionally, it was expected that the person to die would do so at or near home, which 
was typical of the experience prior to the Civil War. There had been deaths in prior 
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American wars, but most of those were of limited duration or distance; the one truly 
foreign war, the Mexican-American War, had cost a comparatively few 13,000 lives, with 
only 2,000 of those from wounds in battle (Faust, 2007, p. 55). The Civil War was 
monumentally different in both expectations before the war and the experience of it—
American soldiers were dying in shocking numbers, their bodies torn and mutilated by 
powerful new weapons, their corpses unidentified, buried in mass graves, unclaimed. 
Indeed, possibly the most difficult aspect of the national calamity was the fact that so 
many young Americans were dying far from home, without prospect for recovery by their 
families. The sheer volume of death in the Civil War created a rent in the social fabric of 
the nation, both North and South, as families struggled to endure the pain that came not 
only from the loss of their loved ones but also the inability to reconcile their deaths 
within cultural norms. As Faust puts it, ―the blow that killed a soldier on the field not 
only destroyed that man but also sent waves of misery and desolation into a world of 
relatives and friends, who themselves became war‘s casualties‖ (p. 143). 
 Though living with the loss of family members or loved ones was a common 
experience for practically all civilians, there was a particular manifestation of violence 
and death that was especially terrifying for many Americans. As the war progressed into 
its latter stages, the lines between combatant and noncombatant began to blur, especially 
in areas like Missouri, where arguably the war had started several years before Fort 
Sumter. Pro-Confederate guerrillas in that state had conducted vicious attacks against 
both Northern soldiers and civilians suspected of pro-Union sentiments. In response, 
Union troops had paradoxically adopted similar tactics in an effort to make the guerrillas 
submit—in the words of one Iowan, ―Just shoot them down wherever we find them. In so 
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doing we can soon make them sick of their own work‖ (Fellman, 1989, p. 167). Violent 
reprisals and counter-reprisals became the order of the day, and any sense of social 
normality began to fragment in light of a war that had ceased to be a conflict between two 
national ideologies. Michael Fellman, in his work Inside War: The Guerrilla Conflict in 
Missouri During the American Civil War (1989), points out that ―the war undermined 
their social security and eroded their ability to remain within the moral structure in which 
they believed‖ (p. 264). Fellman asserts that the essential nature of the Civil War, in 
Missouri but also present throughout the conflict, made a lasting commitment to ―just 
war‖ principles difficult—―In a civil war, with neighbor attacking neighbor, justice was 
impossible‖ (p. 266). The Civil War‘s impact on civilians would become more 
pronounced as the Union army began its move into Southern states in 1863-1864, and the 
war became a daily manifestation in the lives of citizens throughout the Confederacy.  
 Several textbooks acknowledge the changing nature of death and its impact on 
noncombatants, but often only in an inferential manner. America: Pathways to the 
Present (Cayton, et al., 2007) quotes Confederate diarist Mary Chesnut, who 
acknowledges the horrifying losses the South was suffering, both strategically and in 
terms of human costs: ―Battle after battle—disaster after disaster…Are we not cut in 
two?...The reality is hideous‖ (p. 386). The American Journey (Goldfield, et al., 2007) 
refers to the nature of civilian suffering in the wake of the war: ―fatherless children, 
women who never married, families never made whole‖ (p. 452). Other textbooks do 
contain descriptions of the lasting effects of the war among the civilian population (see 
below, ―Proportionality‖). Most textbooks, though, focus on the experience of death in 
battle, and thus tend to minimize their depictions of civilian suffering. This is perhaps 
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understandable—textbooks only have a limited amount of space for coverage of any 
topic, and authors and editors must make decisions about what goes and what stays 
throughout a given narrative. Yet providing an incomplete description of what a conflict 
like the Civil War did to American lives both in combat and at home does not adequately 
equip our students with the content knowledge necessary to make informed moral 
decisions about U.S. policies.  
Two textbooks include sections detailing the advancements in communications 
and the manner in which this brought the reality of battle and death home to the civilian 
population. Give Me Liberty! (Foner, 2008) describes the ―immediacy‖ with which news 
of the war was brought back to the home front, with the presence of war correspondents 
alongside the armies and quickly-published lists of casualties in newspapers across the 
country. In 1862, photography became the mechanism through which an understanding 
of the reality of war began to seep into the American consciousness, and Give Me 
Liberty! acknowledges the ability of this ―infant art‖ to carry ―images of war into millions 
of American living rooms‖ (p. 509). Similarly, Visions of America: a History of the 
United States (Keene, et al., 2010) contains a large subsection on the rise of photography, 
including a profile of prominent photojournalists like Matthew Brady, Alexander 
Gardner, and James F. Gibson. The authors here contrast two images of war—one, a 
famous Currier and Ives lithograph of the First Battle of Bull Run, and the other an 
Alexander Gardner photograph of the field of Antietam (see Figure 6):  
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Figure 6: ―Images as History: Photography and the Visualization of Modern War,‖ from 
Visions of America: a History of the United States (Keene, et al., 2010) p. 386-387 
 
 
In the text prior to the two pictures, the authors point out that the advances in 
photographic technology prior to the Civil War ―allowed Americans to see what 
traditionally had been left to the imagination or an artist‘s pen or brush: actual images of 
war‘s carnage and destruction.‖ The text encourages students to notice the contrast 
between the two pictures—the Currier and Ives illustration that captured the standard 
belief that ―the war would be short, glorious, and victorious,‖ and the authors follow this 
with a question which allows students to critique the impact of modern warfare on such a 
preconception: ―How did Gardner‘s grim image compare to the Romantic visions of war 
Northerners and Southerners expressed at the outset of the conflict? How do you imagine 
such images shaped the public‘s attitude toward this and future wars‖ (p. 386-387)? 
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Vicksburg. 
One of the most notable examples of civilian suffering in the Civil War was the 
siege of Vicksburg. This city on the Mississippi River was considered a lynchpin of the 
Confederate defense and was the subject of an extended attack by General Ulysses S. 
Grant which, at the time, was considered even more important than the Southern defeat at 
Gettysburg. Once the city fell—on the same day General Robert E. Lee was driven from 
southern Pennsylvania—it seemed the war might end in mere months. While this was not 
to be, the siege at Vicksburg is emblematic of the manner in which civilians would be 
forced to endure the war, as it was changed from a limited war mainly conducted by and 
between soldiers to a wider conflict, in which noncombatants were caught. 
Olsen (2006) illustrates the trauma inflicted on Vicksburg‘s residents during the 
siege from the winter of 1862 through the summer of the following year. Food ran out, 
and soldiers and civilians alike were forced to make due on ―mule meat, rats (which were 
‗hung and dressed‘ in the market, according to one resident), water-soaked leather, and 
dirt paste.‖ Black humor ruled the day—a ―menu,‖ presumably written by a citizen of 
Vicksburg, was found after the battle and published around the country. It included items 
such as ―mule side stewed, new style, hair on,‖ ―mule foot,‖ and ―mule hoof soused‖ 
(Olsen, p. 176). Such good humor, sardonic though it was, gave way as the siege ground 
on—McPherson (1988) relates that eventually, skinned cats were also featured alongside 
mule meat in market windows, and anxiety built to a dangerous level. One Confederate 
officer predicted that, if the siege went on much longer, ―a building will have to be 
arranged for the accommodation of maniacs‖ (McPherson, 1988, p. 634). Residents were 
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forced to dig caves in hillsides in and around the city in order to avoid Union artillery, 
which rained down without regard for specific targets.  
Many textbooks join Gettysburg and Vicksburg in their narrative; for example, 
America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009) states that ―decisive battles at 
Gettysburg and Vicksburg would change the war‘s course and enable the Union to win 
the Civil War‖ (p. 533). 
While this seems a natural editorial choice (since they both ended on the same 
day), but historically disingenuous, since this infers the two battles were joined 
operations. In one sense, they were—the invasion of southern Pennsylvania was 
approved by Jefferson Davis at least in part in order to relieve the pressure on Vicksburg 
(Olsen 2006, p. 165). But aside from broad strategic purposes, the two events were 
operationally separate. The major content focus, with regard to Vicksburg, is the 
deprivations endured by residents of the city after the Union army, under General Grant, 
opted for a siege rather than a frontal assault. America: History of Our Nation captures 
the most visceral elements in its description: ―day after day, Union guns bombarded 
Vicksburg. Residents took shelter in cellars and in caves they dug in hillsides. They ate 
mules and rats to keep from starving‖ (p. 535). America: Pathways to the Present 
(Cayton, et al., 2007) aims for the same sense of scarcity, but focuses its narrative on the 
suffering of the soldiers rather than civilians: “By late June, Confederate soldiers‘ daily 
rations were down to one biscuit and one piece of bacon per day‖ (p. 408). The American 
Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006) does something comparable, focusing its attention on the 
―garrison‖ rather than the citizenry—moreover, in addition to relating how the soldiers of 
the Vicksburg garrison were ―reduced to eating mules and rats,‖ the authors describe the 
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siege as ―[Grant‘s] best-fought campaign of the war‖ (p. 467). The Americans (Danzer, et 
al., 2010) also describes primarily soldiers, including their final appeal to Confederate 
commanders—―If you can‘t feed us, you‘d better surrender‖ (p.360)—but only refers to 
noncombatants peripherally.  
 The manner in which the civilians of Vicksburg were reduced to lives of basic 
survival was a consequence of policy decisions, both on political and military levels, to 
broaden the war‘s scope and impact on noncombatants in the South. This policy, referred 
to as total war, is best exemplified by, and most often featured in textbooks as a corollary 
topic of, General William T. Sherman‘s infamous ―March to the Sea,‖ the second event 
to be examined under jus in bello.  
 
Sherman’s “March to the Sea” 
 The second component of the historical narrative analysis is aimed at one of the 
most famous events of Civil War history, the Union Army‘s march from Atlanta, 
Georgia, to the coastal city of Savannah, under the command of General William T. 
Sherman. When Ulysses S. Grant ascended to the overall commander of the Union army 
in 1864, he had already made the decisions that would transform the war. Unlike other 
Northern generals, Grant understood that the traditional elements of warfare in which 
most members of the officer corps had been trained were poorly suited for both resolving 
the war and for taking advantage of the North‘s material and numerical superiority. 
Grant‘s plan was to wage a relentless campaign of nearly constant fighting, forcing the 
South to defend all fronts at the same time and forcing them to replace soldiers lost to 
death, disease and injury—which they could not do. In addition, Grant planned to deny 
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the Confederate forces any advantages that might help them sustain the war—which 
meant the destruction of material and property on a scale previously unimagined in the 
history of war. Termed ―modern warfare,‖ it is featured prominently in the majority of 
textbooks in this study.  
 There is considerable debate in many historiographical works about the 
development and necessity of ―total war.‖ The primary innovation of Grant‘s military 
policy was not just destruction for its own sake—Grant had realized that eliminating the 
Confederate army (especially the forces under the control of Robert E. Lee) was his main 
objective. His initial orders to subordinate Union generals bore out this point; to George 
Meade, he instructed ―Lee‘s army will be your objective point…wherever Lee goes, there 
will you go also.‖ To William Sherman, Grant gave orders ―to move against [Confederate 
General Joseph E.] Johnston‘s army, to break it up, and to get into the interior of the 
enemy‘s country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war 
resources‖ (McPherson, 1988, p. 722). 
 The ―total war‖ strategy is often conflated with the aggressive state of near 
constant fighting that Grant perpetuated upon his rise to command. The vicious battles 
around Richmond, Virginia—including Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor—produced 
overwhelming casualties that stunned the North. But in truth, these are separate issues; 
the policy at issue here is Grant‘s directive to purposefully destroy Confederate property, 
both public and private. 
 To what degree this policy truly represented a move towards ―total‖ war is where 
intense debate lies among historians. Mark Grimsley, in The Hard Hand of War: Union 
Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians 1861-1865 (1995) has argued that the 
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traditional belief about ―total war‖—that Union armies waged ―an immoral war in an 
immoral fashion‖—is a myth rooted in three major foundations. First, ―Redeemer‖ 
politicians who came to power in the midst of Reconstruction used this account to 
convince fellow white Southerners that they had suffered a ―terrible wrong.‖ Second, it 
served the growing Southern belief, false though it was, that the Confederacy had been 
beaten primarily by brute force and not by military skill on the part of the Union. And 
third, the account of Northern brutality helped explain the economic crises that 
devastated the South in the wake of the war (Grimsley, 1995, p. 219). The legend has 
endured, Grimsley asserts, for a variety of reasons: in the midst of World War I, people 
revolted by the mass slaughter of the Western front began to conflate Grant and 
Sherman‘s policy with it; additionally, the ―total war‖ strategy dovetailed with the 
attitudes of those who felt that in war, any tactic which hastened the end of the conflict 
was morally acceptable (though Grimsley views this as a dangerous oversimplification of 
the actual policy). Finally, in the wake of the 20
th
 century‘s immensely destructive 
conflicts, it became commonplace for historians to consider the Civil War the starting 
point for ―modern‖ strategy that led to such devastation (p. 221-222). 
 Grimsley asserts that even the term ―total war‖ is a poor descriptor of the actual 
policy, and he has proposed the term ―hard war‖ to more completely represent, in 
particular, what William Sherman pursued in Georgia in 1864. Grimsley considers the 
―hard war‖ strategy consistent with military practice stretching back hundreds of years, 
and he differentiates it from ―total war‖ primarily in that the latter had a greater emphasis 
on extensive mobilization of manpower, something that was not present in the actual 
practice of the ―hard war‖ variant. Essentially, the Northern government decided, in the 
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wake of several high-profile losses in the summer of 1862, to move from a policy of 
conciliation (derived from the initial hope that the war might be a limited one, in goals 
and duration) to a policy with ―less regard for its effect on Southern society,‖ one which 
endorsed the destruction of public property and ―the property of private persons who 
supported the Confederacy, especially the wealthy‖ (p. 3-4). The degree to which this is a 
moral policy is a matter of debate, as is the degree to which the policy was followed as 
strictly as Grimsley might assert. The term ―total war‖ will be used in this study, given 
that none of the textbooks in this sample make the distinction that Grimsley and other 
historians who use the term (including Bruce Catton and James McPherson) do.  
 McPherson (1988) points out that Sherman‘s March was, in some ways, spurred 
on by the Confederates themselves. In an attempt to harass the Union army after its 
capture of Atlanta, John Bell Hood‘s troops had conducted a series of attacks outside the 
city, especially on the railroads. This exasperated Sherman, and he finally petitioned 
Grant for the chance to go on the offensive. Sherman claimed that if he could ―move 
through Georgia, smashing things to the sea…instead of being on the defensive I would 
be on the offensive‖ (p. 808). In justifying his plan to the mayor of Atlanta (just prior to 
ordering the mandatory evacuation of the city and then its destruction), Sherman 
elaborated a theory of war that has been much quoted since:  
War is cruelty and you cannot refine it…We are not only fighting hostile armies, 
but a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard 
hand of war…We cannot change the hearts of those people of the South, but we 
can make war so terrible…[and] make them so sick of war that generations would 
pass away before they would again appeal to it. (p. 809) 
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Sherman‘s army left the remains of Atlanta on November 15. Making a dozen 
miles a day, the Union troops burned everything of military value (―a broad definition,‖ 
McPherson terms it) and left a trail of devastation wherever they went. The army was 
trailed by ―bummers,‖ most of whom were Northerners—though a significant number 
were Georgia unionists and newly freed slaves—who, foraged across the countryside and 
―helped themselves to anything they wanted from farms, plantations, even slave cabins‖ 
(McPherson, 1988, p. 810). The greatest damage, though, was at the hands of Sherman‘s 
troops, who wrecked anything and everything that had conceivable value; though, as 
Grimsley points out, these troops never harmed a Southern civilian physically. There 
might have been soldiers who would have been willing; Olsen (2006) quotes an Illinois 
soldier, who, when he heard that Rebel newspapers were exhorting Southern citizens to 
resist Sherman, said, ―Let them do it if they dare. We‘ll burn every house, barn, church, 
and everything else we come to; we‘ll leave their families homeless and without food; 
their towns will all be destroyed‖ (Olsen, p. 214).  
After taking Savannah on December 21, 1864, Sherman and his men turned 
northward into South Carolina, the heart of secession, and raised even more havoc. The 
will of Sherman‘s men to punish South Carolina for what was considered the original sin 
of secession—one soldier commented that ―We will let her know it isn‘t so Sweet to 
secede as she thought it would be‖ (Grimsley, 1995, p. 201). Eventually Sherman took 
the capitol of Columbia, which was burned under mysterious circumstances on February 
17, 1865. Often cited (especially in contemporary accounts) as his worst atrocity, 
Sherman probably doesn‘t deserve all the blame for the city‘s destruction. Olsen (2006) 
states bluntly that Sherman‘s men burned Columbia, though McPherson (1988) claims 
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that the burning was done by a miscellaneous cast of figures, including drunken Northern 
soldiers, disgruntled Union prisoners, evacuating rebel troops, and possibly even some of 
the ubiquitous ―bummers‖ (p. 828).  
 The degree to which the destruction in Georgia and South Carolina was a result of 
orders is debatable. Certainly, Sherman advocated a ―hard‖ policy towards Southerners, 
and his men were happy to comply. And there is little doubt that the destruction was 
effective; as Grimsley (1995) argues, prior to Sherman‘s march the Confederacy still had 
working railroads and food to eat, and in fact still did, even at the end of the war. What 
the March, and the policy that attended it, had proven was that Confederates could not 
stop a Union army from roaming at will and destroying at its leisure; and this resulted in 
a massive loss of national confidence and will to fight, which did more to end the war 
than any other factor associated with Sherman‘s efforts (p. 203). But whether or not 
Union leadership anticipated or approved of the level of destruction, especially in South 
Carolina, is a matter of some dispute. There were multiple incidents where properties 
were burned ―without official sanction.‖ Sherman himself estimated the total damage 
done to be around $100 million, though he thought that only around $20 million worked 
directly to the Union‘s military advantage. The rest was ―simple waste and destruction‖ 
(Grimsley, 1995, p. 200). 
 Textbooks in this sample all cover Sherman‘s march, and all of them present 
―total war‖ as a natural evolution of policy, brought on by the undeniable modernity of 
the Civil War. America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009) describes 
Sherman as ―tough soldier,‖ one who ―believed in total war—all-out attacks aimed at 
destroying an enemy‘s army, its resources, and its people‘s will to fight.‖ After citing 
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Sherman‘s comment about ―the hard hand of war,‖ the text gives a brief description of 
the destruction created during the ―March to the Sea,‖ and then ends the section with a 
brief student prompt: How did Sherman show ―the hard hand of war‖ (p. 536)? There is 
no attempt to critique the policy in question; the text implicitly endorses the position that 
―total war‖ was an inevitable step forward in an already devastating war.  
 Most textbooks echo this premise—that ―total war‖ was a precursor to the modern 
war that would become typical in the 20
th
 century. Give Me Liberty! (Foner, 2008) says 
simply, ―Here was modern war in all its destructiveness‖ (p. 540). Visions of America: a 
History of the United States (Keene, et al., 2010) asserts that the campaign demonstrated 
the effectiveness of a tactic that would become central to modern warfare in the twentieth 
century: bringing the conflict to the civilian population to undermine its willingness to 
continue supporting the war‖ (p. 399-400). The American Journey (Goldfield, et al., 
2007) describes Sherman‘s policy as an attempt to finally end the war—―he proposed to 
break Confederate resistance once and for all by marching his army to the sea and 
destroying everything in its path‖ (p. 447-448).  
American Nation: A History of the United States (Carnes, et al., 2008) makes 
particular mention of the impact of the Union army‘s passage through Georgia on the 
residents of South: ―Another object of Sherman‘s march was psychological. ‗If the North 
can march an army right through the South,‘ he told General Grant, Southerners will take 
it ‗as proof positive that the North can prevail‘‖ (p. 404). Again, there is no opportunity 
for students to critique the morality or virtue of the ―total war‖ approach. The Enduring 
Vision (Boyer, et al., 2008) characterizes Sherman‘s burning of Atlanta as simply 
practical—―This harsh measure relieved him of the need to feed and garrison the city‖ (p. 
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457)—and seems to view the ―havoc‖ as merely part of Sherman‘s grand strategy. The 
authors include Sherman‘s estimate of ―about a hundred million dollars‘ worth of 
property‖ in destruction, but does not include his admission that only a small percentage 
of that destruction directly aided the Union war effort (p. 458) One textbook, United 
States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010), does allow students an opportunity to 
consider the perspectives involved in justification for this policy, but the prompt is one-
sided and effectively reinforces the concept that ―total war‖ was a necessity: ―Why do 
you think General Sherman felt justified in destroying civilian property during his march 
through Georgia‖ (p. 387)? 
Sherman‘s personality and pugnacity is the subject of several textbook narratives. 
The American Nation: A History of the United States (Carnes, et al., 2008) presents 
Sherman as a philosophical match for Grant, both of whom are depicted as military 
thinkers well beyond the ken of their peers: ―Far more completely than most military men 
of his generation, Sherman believed in total war—in appropriating or destroying 
everything that might help the enemy continue the fight‖ (p. 399). The American Pageant 
(Kennedy, et al., 2006) describes Sherman as ―grim-faced and ruthless,‖ a ―pioneer 
practitioner of ‗total war‘‖ who succeeded in ―Shermanizing‖ the South by crushing it (p. 
468). This text is particularly admiring of Sherman and his tactics—though they do admit 
that ―that the discipline of his army at times broke down, as roving riffraff (Sherman‘s 
―bummers‖) engaged in an orgy of pillaging,‖ the authors conclude by asserting that, 
―although his methods were brutal, he probably shortened the struggle and hence saved 
lives‖ (p. 468). 
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Only one textbook seeks to include a civilian voice in its depiction of Sherman‘s 
March. The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010), in the midst of its general narrative, inserts 
a section titled ―A Personal Voice,‖ which quotes a Georgia girl, Eliza Frances Andrews, 
on her view of the Union advance:  
The fields were trampled down and the road was lined with carcasses of horses, 
hogs, and cattle that the invaders, unable either to consume or to carry away with 
them, had wantonly shot down, to starve out the people and prevent them from 
making their crops…The dwellings that were standing all showed signs of 
pillage…while here and there long chimney stacks, ―Sherman‘s sentinels,‖ told of 
homes laid in ashes. (p. 364) 
 Several textbooks frame Sherman‘s March against the presidential election of 
1864. America: Pathways to the Present (Cayton, et al., 2007) sets the stage by 
introducing the concept of ―total war‖ as a sensible move, primarily by starting the 
narrative with a famous Sherman quote: ―War is cruelty…There is no use trying to 
reform it. The crueler it is, the sooner it will be over‖ (p. 414). Describing Sherman as a 
―tough‖ officer, the text characterizes his march to Savannah as a ―daring‖ move that 
would, in the general‘s words, ―make Georgia howl‖ (p. 414). The connection to the 1864 
election is established at the end of the section. Lincoln, facing a difficult reelection bid, 
found the pressure lessened once Sherman captured Atlanta; the fall of Savannah in 
December was a second piece of good news for the nation and the President‘s chances at 
another term. The text relates the now-standard account of Sherman‘s destruction, and 
follows with this question: ―What had the South hoped for in the election of 1864? Why 
did the election turn out differently‖ (p. 415)? The American Nation: A History of the 
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United States (Carnes, et al., 2008) is similar in its treatment of the impact the March had 
on the presidential election: ―Sherman‘s victories staggered the Confederacy and the anti-
Lincoln forces in the North. In November the president was easily reelected, 212 
electoral votes to 21. The country was determined to carry on the struggle‖ (p. 404). 
Sherman‘s treatment of South Carolina is often presented as a form of grim 
justice. The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010), describes the Northern advance into South 
Carolina by presenting the army as a sort of mechanism of abolition: ―Following behind 
them now were about 25,000 former slaves eager for freedom‖ (p. 364). The destruction 
in South Carolina was even worse than in Georgia, but the text characterizes it as rough 
retribution: the authors quote a Union private who said, ―Here is where treason began, 
and by God, here is where it shall end‖ (p. 364). Interestingly, in spite of this 
characterization, the authors felt the need to soften its interpretation of Sherman‘s tactics 
by pointing out that, when the army moved into North Carolina, ―they stopped destroying 
private homes and—anticipating the end of the war—began handing out food and other 
supplies‖ (p. 364). Visions of America: a History of the United States (Keene, et al., 
2010) also represents the devastation of South Carolina as a result of that state‘s role in 
secession; the burning of Columbia is described as a mixture of shared responsibility and 
harsh justice: ―Evacuating Confederates and liberated slaves set some of the fires, but 
some were also started by Union soldiers motivated by vengeance against the state that 
for decades leading up to the war represented Southern nationalism and, ultimately, 
secession‖ (p. 400). 
All in all, these textbooks present a picture of Sherman‘s march that reinforces a 
central premise of the ―official‖ narrative of war—that harsh measures were both a 
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necessity and an inevitability, that they shortened the war and ultimately saved lives on 
both sides. They do not present the nuances and moral ambiguity of Sherman‘s tactics; 
and they certainly do not include significant differing perspectives to allow students to 
comprehensively critique such wartime policy, from a moral standpoint.  
 
Categorical Analysis 
The categorical analysis of textbook narrative descriptions of the wartime 
experience for combatants and noncombatants falls into the following categories: the 
benevolent quarantine and the ethical treatment of prisoners of war (POWs), means that 
may be considered mala in se, and proportionality.  
 
Benevolent Quarantine and Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) 
 The treatment of prisoners of war (POWs) is, in the modern era, an issue of 
settled law. Brian Orend, in The Morality of War (2006) sums up the expectations of the 
international community with regard to the concept of ―benevolent quarantine‖: 
Benevolent quarantine means that captured soldiers can be stripped of their 
weapons, incarcerated with their fellows, and questioned verbally for information. 
But they cannot, for example, be tortured during questioning. Nor can they be 
beaten, starved, or somehow medically experimented on. They cannot be used as 
shields between oneself and the opposing side; in fact, the understanding is that 
captured enemy soldiers are to be incarcerated far away from the front lines. Very 
basic medical and hygienic treatment is supposed to be offered. (p. 110) 
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 Many of these provisions are now part of generally accepted universal codes like 
the Geneva Conventions; and a fair argument against considering Civil War conduct in 
light of these codes would be that they were not written and systematized until, most 
recently, 1949. It would be unfair to judge nineteenth-century figures against the moral 
codes of the twentieth century. But as mentioned earlier, the Civil War is unique, in terms 
of moral theories of war, for being the staging ground for the first real code of moral 
conduct in wartime—the Lieber Code.  
 In 1863, President Lincoln asked Francis Lieber, a jurist and professor at 
Columbia University, to create codes for military conduct. These were collated under the 
heading of the ―Field Army Manual‖ (the full title was ―Instructions for the Government 
of Armies of the United States in the Field‖), and made official by President Lincoln as 
General Orders No. 100. They were also, in many ways, the first national formalizations 
of ―just war‖ theory in world history (Orend, 2006, p. 20-21). Lieber encapsulated much 
of the ―just war‖ tradition, particularly with regard to the treatment of prisoners. Lieber 
creates the concept that upon being taken prisoner, a soldier attains a status that 
commands certain restrictions on his captors‘ behavior. For instance, in Article 56 of the 
Code, Lieber writes that ―a prisoner of war is subject to no punishment for being a public 
enemy, nor is any revenge wreaked [sic] upon him by the intentional infliction of any 
suffering, or disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want of food, by mutilation, death, or any 
other barbarity.‖ Similarly, in Article 79 of the Code, Lieber requires that ―every captured 
wounded enemy shall be medically treated, according to the ability of the medical staff.‖ 
And finally, in Article 80, torture or mistreatment of prisoners is prohibited under what 
Lieber terms ―the modern war‖ (Lieber, 2008). These provisions were an initial concrete 
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formulation of what Walzer (1977) considers the essential nature of a prisoner of war—
―the captured soldier acquires rights and obligations specified [by ―just war‖], and these 
are binding without regard to the possible criminality of his captors or to the justice or 
urgency of the cause for which he has been fighting‖ (p. 46).  
 The issue of prisoners in the Civil War must be preceded by a related and 
certainly more historically celebrated topic. There are some events that are covered to a 
degree perhaps not commensurate to their importance in the larger narrative of the war‘s 
outcome—e.g., the matter of the ―ironclads.‖ At the other end of the spectrum, however, 
is the issue of African-Americans fighting for the Union. Black soldiers in the Union 
army had a decided impact on the outcome of the war, and additionally had great 
symbolic weight—McPherson (1988) pronounced it a marker of the ―transformation of a 
war to preserve the Union into a revolution to overthrow the old order‖ (p. 565). The 
experience of black soldiers was distinct from that of white troops, both in terms of the 
dangers they faced and their treatment by both sides. All the textbooks in this sample 
feature sections on African-American soldiers, especially references to the discriminatory 
practices the Union army adopted in terms of training, equipment, and pay. Additionally, 
several highlight the threats faced by black troops in the form of duty to which they were 
often exposed: The Enduring Vision (Boyer, et al., 2008) points out that ―black soldiers 
suffered a far higher mortality rate than white troops. Typically assigned to labor 
detachments or garrison duty, blacks were less likely than whites to be killed in action but 
more likely to die of illness in the disease-ridden garrisons‖ (p. 443).  
Many books in this sample include references to the 54
th
 Massachusetts 
Regiment, the first all-black unit allowed to fight in the war. America: History of Our 
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Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009) is fairly typical, in its description of the ―pride and 
courage‖ displayed by black troops, their eventual endorsement by initially skeptical 
Union officers (the text quotes a general who said of his troops, ―They make better 
soldiers in every respect than any troops I have ever had under my command‖), and the 
specific bravery displayed by the 54
th
 in their assault on Fort Wagner, South Carolina, a 
section in which the prose becomes charged with imagery:  
The unit volunteered to lead the assault. As the soldiers charged, Confederate 
cannon fire rained down. Yet the 54
th
 reached the top of the fort‘s walls before 
being turned back in fierce hand-to-hand fighting. The regiment suffered terrible 
losses. Nearly half of its soldiers were casualties. (p. 527) 
One textbook, The American Nation: A History of the United States (Carnes, et 
al., 2008), even includes a section analyzing the actual historical event to a popular film, 
Glory, the release of which in 1989 did much to popularize the story of the 54
th
 
Massachusetts. While the bravery of these men is without question, and the 
characterization of African-American soldiers is an apt one, of greater concern in this 
study is the position black troops occupied from a ―just war‖ perspective. In particular, 
the treatment accorded to African-Americans by the Confederacy led to a series of policy 
decisions, both in the North and South, that led to a failure by both sides to adhere to 
―just war‖ conditions. 
 Shortly after news of the formation of black units began to spread across the 
nation, the Confederate Congress issued a proclamation that announced the new Southern 
policy towards black soldiers. If a black soldier was taken in arms against the 
Confederacy, he would immediately be returned to a state of slavery (even if, as was 
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sometimes the case, the soldier in question had never been a slave). If a black soldier was 
captured while wearing a federal uniform, he would be summarily executed, without trial 
or appeal. White officers taken in command of black troops (as was initially the condition 
under which African-Americans were allowed to serve in the Union army) would be 
considered to be ―criminals engaged in inciting servile insurrection,‖ and would also be 
executed (Olsen, 2006, p. 152). This policy had major and horrendous implications in the 
conduct of the war. 
 President Lincoln reacted to the new Confederate policy by threatening 
retaliation, and the South never followed through on the policy to any official degree. 
There were, however, more than a few incidents—McPherson (1988) cites occasions 
where black prisoners of war were shot by Confederate troops, as were several white 
officers captured in battle. McPherson quotes a North Carolina soldier who, in a letter 
home, related how men of his unit had dealt with black soldiers taken captive—―several 
[were] taken prisoner & afterwards either bayoneted or burnt. The men were perfectly 
exasperated at the idea of negroes opposed to them & rushed at them like so many devils‖ 
(p. 566).  
Only a few textbooks from this sample address the events in question. The 
American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006), for example, includes an illustration of the 
brutal treatment to which many black soldiers were exposed, as described by a Union 
sergeant: 
All the negroes found in blue uniform or with any outward marks of a Union 
soldier upon him was killed—I saw some taken into the woods and hung—Others 
I saw stripped of all their clothing and they stood upon the bank of the river with 
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their faces riverwards and then they were shot—Still others were killed by having 
their brains beaten out by the butt end of a the muskets in the hands of the Rebels. 
(p. 463) 
Visions of America: a History of the United States (Keene, et al., 2010) includes 
the most complete description of the peril facing African-American soldiers, referencing 
―the prospect of brutal treatment‖ they faced and the ―acts of murder, torture, and 
mutilation against African Americans‖ that did occur throughout the war (p. 394). The 
most infamous example of this treatment came in 1864 at Fort Pillow, Tennessee, when 
Confederate soldiers under the command of General Nathan Bedford Forrest murdered 
several dozen black soldiers and their commander, who had surrendered. This textbook 
also includes the most complete description of this incident, including a graphic image to 
illustrate the danger faced by African-American soldiers:  
 In the most egregious incident[,] the Fort Pillow Massacre in Tennessee, 
Confederate troops murdered dozens of captured black soldiers at Fort Pillow in 
1864. This image, which ran in a popular Northern magazine, was one of many 
that depicted Confederates as brutal and inhumane. Seeking to influence public 
opinion, Southern publications ran similar images that alleged Northern atrocities. 
(p. 394) 
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Figure 7: ―The Massacre at Fort Pillow,‖ from Visions of America: a History of the 
United States (Keene, et al., 2010) p. 394 
 
 
What is interesting about this selection is the moral equivalency evident in the 
final line—while it is true that the Southern press did attempt to disseminate accounts of 
allegedly similar Union acts, the inclusion of this fact only serves to ameliorate the 
Southern atrocity at Fort Pillow by inferring that such acts might have been perpetrated 
by both sides. The Enduring Vision (Boyer, et al., 2008) includes a far briefer description 
of the Fort Pillow massacre, but it makes a moral judgment that Visions of America does 
not, when it asserts that the ―especially gruesome‖ murder of black troops ―provoked 
outcries but no retaliation from the North.‖ (p. 443) 
The treatment of black soldiers by the Confederacy, it could be argued, 
constituted a clear violation of ―just war‖ tradition, which—though not formalized by any 
act of the Southern government, as in the North with the Lieber Code—was certainly a 
settled format between belligerents by this time, especially given the Confederate army‘s 
roots in the United States military service prior to secession. Textbooks, though, give 
little to no opportunity for students to evaluate this distinction; only two textbooks 
253 
 
discuss the matter at all, and the rest focus primarily on the racism faced by African-
American soldiers emanating from the North, where bigoted officers and politicians 
conspired to keep black troops from serving. In truth, though there was considerable 
discrimination towards African-Americans from their own side, textbooks tend to 
minimize an important consideration—given the lack of protection afforded to them by 
the Confederacy if they were captured, it was seen by many as inhumane to expose black 
soldiers to conditions that white soldiers were never expected nor asked to endure.  
From a ―just war‖ perspective, the Confederate decision to discriminate between 
Union soldiers on the basis of race led to the development of another morally contentious 
issue. From the beginning of the war, both sides had conducted periodic exchanges of 
prisoners taken in battle, a policy that was sensible for both the Union and the 
Confederacy, given the lack of facilities on both sides for long-term detention. The 
Confederate position on African-American soldiers and their refusal to return black 
troops after capture, however, compelled the Union to halt these prisoner exchanges, 
resulting in overcrowded conditions in prison camps for both sides. Five of the ten 
textbooks in this sample address prison camps in a significant fashion, and they do so 
generally after sections describing African-American soldiers; though only one— The 
Enduring Vision (Boyer, et al., 2008)—makes a concrete connection between the 
Confederate decision not to exchange African-American soldiers and the end to prisoner 
transfers as a whole.  
Textbook depictions of prison camps provide ample evidence of ―just war‖ 
violations by both sides. America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009) 
describes the prison camps as ―deathtraps,‖ and points out that ―nearly 10 percent of 
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soldiers who died in the war perished in prison camps‖ (p. 517). The text does not, 
however, establish why prison camps were so overcrowded, and it draws a parallel 
between camps in the North and South by comparing two of the most infamous, Elmira in 
New York state and Andersonville, in Georgia:  
The Elmira camp, built to hold 5,000 Confederate prisoners, held 10,000. The 
camp cut rations to bread and water, forcing prisoners to eat rats to survive. 
Thousands died. At Andersonville, nearly 35,000 Union soldiers lived in a fenced, 
open field intended to hold 10,000 men. As many as 100 prisoners died each day, 
usually from starvation or exposure. (p. 517) 
This is a false comparison—most historians consider the difference between 
Southern and Northern prisons to be considerable. McPherson (1988) points out that the 
Elmira camp provided barrack space ―for the maximum of 9,600 captives living inside a 
forty-acre enclosure—an average of 180 square feet per man‖ (p. 796), in contrast to 
Andersonville, which provided an average of thirty-four square feet per man, with no 
shade or cover to protect them. America: History of Our Nation, in placing the two worst 
prisons side by side in its narrative, presents students with the implicit conclusion that 
both sides were harsh, both sides were in the wrong, and thus no judgment (or moral 
criticism, from a ―just war‖ perspective) is justified.  
 Other textbooks also try to maintain equanimity between Northern and Southern 
prisons, though with varying degrees of success. America: Pathways to the Present 
(Cayton, et al., 2007) compares locations of the opposing sides‘ prisons, and then 
pronounces that ―the North and the South generally treated their prisoners about the 
same.‖ The text does, however, go on to make special mention of the Confederate prison 
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at Andersonville, describing it as ―the exception‖ and highlighting the fact that ―about 
100 prisoners a day died, usually of starvation or exposure.‖ The authors also point out 
that the camp commandant, Major Henry Wirz, was the ―only Confederate to be tried for 
war crimes after the South‘s defeat. He was convicted and hanged‖ (p. 399). This comes, 
however, with no opportunity for students to consider why Andersonville might have 
been different, why Union prisoners were so poorly treated at that prison, and whether or 
not Wirz‘s conduct amounted to war crimes (or, as some historians assert, added up to 
little more than rank incompetence, combined with supply issues beyond his ability to 
solve).  
 The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010) does a better job in this area, connecting the 
problems facing the South as a whole to the troubles that plagued Southern prisons like 
Andersonville. The authors here even include the amount of space per prisoner—34 
square feet per man (p. 356). It also includes a compelling description of the horrors 
faced by the prisoners within the site:  
The prisoners had no shelter from the broiling sun or chilling rain except what 
they made themselves by rigging primitive tents of blankets and sticks. They 
drank from the same stream that served as their sewer. About a third of 
Andersonville‘s prisoners died. (p. 356) 
Additionally, The Americans distinguishes between the blame rightly affixed to 
Henry Wirz (though it provides no details or opportunities for critical thinking on the 
issue) and the manner in which national systemic problems facing the Confederacy 
trickled down to camps like Andersonville: ―The South‘s lack of food and tent canvas 
also contributed to the appalling conditions. In addition, the prisons were overcrowded 
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because the North had halted prisoner exchanges when the South refused to return 
African-American soldiers who had been captured in battle‖ (p. 356). Presumably in the 
interest of equivalency, the authors go on to describe Northern prisons like Elmira, New 
York, and Camp Douglas, Illinois, as ―only slightly better‖—yet, in the next sentence, the 
authors point out that ―Northern prisons provided about five times as much space per 
man, barracks for sleeping, and adequate food.‖ It is true, as the text continues, that 
―thousands of Confederates, housed in quarters with little or no heat, contracted 
pneumonia and died…hundreds of others suffered from dysentery and malnutrition, from 
which some did not recover.‖ Again, though, The Americans distorts this attempt at parity 
by immediately following with this fact: ―Historians estimate that 15 percent of Union 
prisoners in Southern prisons died, while 12 percent of Confederate prisoners died in 
Northern prisons‖ (p. 356). 
The other two textbooks from this sample that speak of prisoners of war, The 
Enduring Vision (Boyer, et al., 2008) and United States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 
2010), do so in different manners. The Enduring Vision covers much of the same territory 
as the previous texts in this area, pointing out the breakdown of prisoner exchanges led to 
prison overcrowding, ―partly because the South refused to exchange black prisoners and 
partly because the North gradually concluded that exchanges benefited the manpower-
short Confederacy more than the Union‖ (p. 455). This text‘s attempt at parity between 
North and South is halfhearted, and tends to blame the South to a greater extent: ―Union 
camps were not much better, but had lower fatality rates‖ (p. 455). United States History, 
on the other hand, gives only a pat description of prison camps, but does include a 
connection between the camps‘ squalor and the larger issues facing the South: ―With 
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their own troops starving, Confederates had little incentive to find food for Union 
prisoners‖ (p. 377). 
The contemporary manifestation of the ―just war‖ doctrine in use at the time, the 
Lieber Code, is quite particular on the issue of prisoners. The Union decision to halt 
prisoner exchanges is probably justified under this code and the ―just war‖ tradition, 
given the Confederate threat to execute black soldiers if captured. The Union calculation 
that keeping Southern troops imprisoned to deny the Confederacy much-needed 
manpower is less justifiable—but the purpose of this study is not to critique the moral 
stance of textbooks, but only to assess its presence and applicability. In this case, the 
textbooks of this sample generally rely on their depictions of prison camps to illustrate 
the horrors of war, rather than to provide students with an opportunity for moral critique.  
 
Mala in se 
 Mala in Se translates as ―evil in themselves.‖ Generally this refers to activities 
that were well beyond the pale in the Civil War: mass rape campaigns; genocide, crimes 
against certain ethnic groups, the use of poison or disguising soldiers in the uniforms of 
the opposing side, forcing captured soldiers to fight against their own side, and using 
weapons ―whose effects cannot be controlled, like biological agents‖ (Orend, 2006). 
Certainly, there were isolated examples of such behavior. There were instances of rape 
throughout the war, including a few reported assaults during Sherman‘s ―March to the 
Sea‖ (Grimsley, 1995, p. 199), but there were no organized campaigns to use rape as a 
weapon of terror or subjugation. The treatment of African-American soldiers may be 
considered a violation of ―just war‖ principles, but it is more appropriate to critique those 
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policies under the provisions regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, rather than as 
an issue of mala in se. Poison was unheard of as a military strategy, and there were no 
weapons that could be construed as possessing the capability of mass destruction. 
Probably the closest the Civil War came to an issue of mala in se would be the use of 
siege, most famously against the city of Vicksburg.  
 Walzer (1977) devotes considerable attention to the siege tactic, calling it the 
―oldest form of total war,‖ the presence of which indicates that neither advances in 
technology or democracy have pushed the impact of war beyond the civilian population 
(Walzer, 1977, p. 160). The tactical approach to a siege—bombardment of the city, plus 
the denial of resources in an attempt to force the city‘s residents and soldiers towards 
submission or risk starvation—is a violation of the status quo, says Walzer, and as an act 
of coercion that necessarily places the same burden on combatants and noncombatants, is 
both a violation of the ―just war‖ admonition to discriminate between the two, as well as 
a prospective violation of the mala in se rule. Avoiding this dilemma, writes Walzer, 
means allowing passage out of the city to those who wish to leave. The ―offer of free 
exit‖ then turns those citizens who choose to stay in the city ―into something like a 
garrison; they have yielded their civilian rights‖ (p. 169). There would be military and 
practical considerations and numerous obstacles to such a policy‘s implementation—but 
the point of ―just war‖ is to make permissible a generally immoral activity, and thus the 
practical degree to which a policy may be enacted is of secondary importance. ―If [a 
military commander] wants (as he probably will want) to lift his hands to heaven and say 
of the civilians he kills, ―It‘s not my doing,‖ he has no choice but to offer them the 
chance to leave‖ (Walzer, 1977, p. 170).  
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 At Vicksburg (nicknamed ―the Gibraltar of the West‖ by Confederates), Grant‘s 
siege was typical of all sieges in its origin—his initial attempts to take the city by force 
failed, and he was compelled to surround it, for lack of a better strategy. After separate 
attempts to take the city in May 1863, Grant remained confident; the ―fall of Vicksburg 
and the capture of most of the garrison can only be a question of time‖ (McPherson, 
1988, p. 633). Prior to his approach to the city, many noncombatants tried to leave the 
city, but were unable to do so, given the shortness of time and the obstruction to roads 
caused by the retreat of the Confederate garrison back into the city. There was no serious 
attempt by General Grant, or any Union commander, to allow civilians to leave the city. 
 Does this comprise a violation of mala in se? There would vigorous debate 
regarding whether or not Grant had violated his obligations, from a ―just war‖ 
perspective, especially given Vicksburg‘s unique status; it was one of the few classic 
sieges in the Civil War, one which involved a large number of non-combatants (which 
contrasts sharply with Grant‘s own experience in siege, an entirely military affair at Fort 
Donelson the previous year). Grant‘s decision to starve out the garrison, and by extension 
the civilian population, was reached only after traditional assaults on the city failed; at 
that point, ―just war‖ admonitions against mala in se could be realistically applied.  
 From a textbook perspective, this argument is moot—there is no consideration, in 
almost all of the textbooks of this sample, of whether or not the strategy of siege against a 
civilian center or the tactics of widely dispersed bombardment were justified. United 
States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al, 2010) does present a question to students in the 
midst of a two-page graphic on the siege titled ―Experience the Siege of Vicksburg‖ (p. 
388-389), that asks ―do you think Grant‘s tactics at Vicksburg were warranted? Why or 
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why not?‖ Oddly, the next question seems to hint that the suffering of civilians during the 
siege was similar to that of Americans in the midst of events beyond all human control—
―Do research to learn about recent natural disasters in the United States. How did those 
events impact Americans living in areas where they occurred‖ (p. 389)? In the bulk of the 
narratives in this study, the siege of Vicksburg—and the suffering of its citizens—is 
presented as a natural evolution of modern war, not an aberration or a morally 
questionable act. 
 
Proportionality 
 The ―just war‖ condition of proportionality holds that a state may use only the 
force that is proportional to the desired outcome. This is a decidedly hazy definition. In 
recent decades, the concepts of ―massive retaliation‖ (a product of the Cold War and its 
emphasis on weapons of mass destruction as a deterrent to conventional war) and 
―preemption‖ have further complicated an age-old question—if the goal is always to win 
the war, what force would be considered disproportionate?  
 The issue of proportionality is explored by many ―just war‖ theorists. Brian Orend 
(2006), for example, asserts that ―the aim should be to win the war without violating jus 
in bello at all,‖ but he does acknowledge that this admonition is complicated by a 
troubling possibility—―What if, ultimately, violating jus in bello seems to be the only 
way to stave off devastating loss‖ (p. 125)?  
 Orend (2005), in his essay ―War,‖ postulates that soldiers ―must restrain their 
force to that amount appropriate to achieving their aim or target,‖ and goes on to 
categorize ―weapons of mass destruction‖ as ―being out of proportion to legitimate 
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military ends.‖ Walzer (1977) accentuates this idea as an avoidance of excess, based on 
two considerations: first, the basic reality of ―military necessity,‖ what must be done to 
win the war; and second, a comparison of the ―mischief done‖ to the end of victory. 
Walzer admits, though, that this argument is a slippery slope—any argument for the 
utility of a wartime choice can rely on individual perspective for justification, and any 
critique of wartime decisions is based heavily on personal moral codes. Walzer‘s 
application of proportionality to the Korean Conflict of 1950-1953 is meaningful—he 
characterizes the war in terms of the ―need to balance the costs of continued fighting, 
against the value of punishing the aggressors‖ (p. 119). This, however, is a facet of 
proportionality that might be more appropriately applied to the change in Union strategy 
that was ushered in by Ulysses S. Grant, ―total war.‖  
 From a ―just war‖ perspective, then, it is difficult to critique textbook accounts, 
given their generally diffuse moral content and the haziness of the proportionality rule. 
But there are two aspects of proportionality that can be measured, from a textbook 
narrative perspective—to what degree was the adoption of ―total war‖ as an overarching 
policy a violation of proportionality, and to what degree do textbooks incorporate the idea 
that the massive effusions of bloodshed were necessary to achieve victory in the war? 
 Ulysses S. Grant is typically identified as the inventor and implementer of 
―modern war,‖ in most textbooks, though the ultimate decisions regarding its use were 
made by Abraham Lincoln. Most textbooks conflate the tactical approach of William 
Sherman (exemplified in his ―March to the Sea‖) and that of Grant; though in reality they 
were similar facets rather than identical iterations of the same policy. Sherman‘s goal was 
to break Southern morale and to destroy civilian support, both materially and 
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psychologically, while Grant‘s intent was to use the North‘s numerical advantage to press 
the Confederacy simultaneously on multiple fronts. The two policies, in light of 
proportionality, should be divorced and considered separately. 
 Sherman‘s policy of destruction is mostly overstated in textbooks. Mark Grimsley 
(1995) views the ―March to the Sea, ‖ as well as other examples of Sherman‘s conduct 
towards civilians (particularly his campaign against Jackson, Mississippi, after the fall of 
Vicksburg), as the result of a hardheaded but pragmatic policy, with the worst destruction 
carried out practically in defiance of Sherman‘s restrictions against ―pillage, plundering, 
and rowdyism‖ (Grimsley, 1995, p. 160). The worst devastation was carried out by the 
―bummers,‖ the non-military hangers-on that followed Sherman throughout Georgia; or, 
it was perpetrated by Sherman‘s own troops, in response to local provocation or pure 
spite, brought on almost understandably by the unrelenting grind of over three years‘ 
worth of war.  
 Textbooks, however, don‘t focus on the discrepancy between Sherman‘s policy 
and its execution; nor do they consider whether or not attacks on civilian property might 
be disproportional to the cause that preceded them. There is no criticism of the moral 
foundation behind commentary such as this, from The American Pageant (Kennedy, et 
al., 2006): ―One of his major purposes was to destroy supplies destined for the 
Confederate army and to weaken the morale of the men at the front by waging war on 
their homes‖ (p. 468). The narratives in this sample present Sherman‘s March as 
attendant to Grant‘s shift to ―total war,‖ and largely conceptualize the tactic of 
destruction of civilian property as a pragmatic approach or as a virtually revelatory 
experience, where Americans began to understand what ―modern war‖ was. The 
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American Nation: a History of the United States (Carnes, et al., 2008) describes the 
economic motive of such destruction as ―obvious,‖ and includes a quotation from 
General Sherman to his wife, reflecting on how his army‘s progress was indicative of the 
true nature of war—―We have devoured the land…All the people retire before us and 
desolation is behind. To realize what war is one should follow our tracks‖ (p. 399). The 
Enduring Vision (Boyer, et al., 2008), too, uses Sherman‘s perspective to justify the 
March and its purposes, using his comment that South Carolina, as the birthplace of 
secession, ―deserves all that seems in store for her‖ (p. 458).  
The authors follow this with the most ubiquitous Sherman quotation—―War is 
cruelty and you cannot refine it―—and concludes the section with a further reinforcement 
of the perspective that such policies were justified: ―Those who brought war into our 
country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out‖ (p. 458).  
Together with this sense of pragmatism is a brand of inevitability, again located in 
the text‘s reliance on William Sherman‘s perspective for moral justification. United 
States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010) includes a lengthy quotation from 
Sherman to James Calhoun, the mayor of Atlanta, who appealed to the Union general in 
September 1864 to spare his city after its occupation. Sherman replied as follows:  
You might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as against these terrible 
hardships of war. They are inevitable, and the only way the people of Atlanta can 
hope once more to live in peace and quiet at home is to stop the war…We don‘t 
want your negroes or your horses or your houses or your lands…but we do want, 
and will have, a just obedience to the laws of the United States. That we will 
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have, and if it involves the destruction of your improvements, we cannot help it. 
(p. 387) 
 This quotation infers a position on war that is chronic in many of these narratives. 
War is something that happens to us, not because of us; war is as inevitable and 
uncontrollable as a ―thunder-storm,‖ an event that proceeds without human agency or 
ownership. The statement infers a responsibility on the part of the war‘s victims, who 
must ―stop‖ the war to cease its horrors. Sherman‘s conclusion—that the destruction is 
practically beyond his control, and that without Southern submission he ―cannot help 
it‖—is part explanation, part absolution, and textbooks largely allow such a view to go 
unchallenged.  
 This is not true for all textbooks, though. Some do include the possibility for 
critique of this aspect of ―total war,‖ though such opportunities are generally incoherent 
in their moral foundations. America: Pathways to the Present (Cayton, et al., 2007), for 
example, features a picture of Sherman‘s men pulling up railroad ties, and asks students, 
―What kinds of destruction are the Union troops causing here? What are the strategic 
purposes of this destruction‖ (p. 413)? There is moral value in these questions, though it 
seems unlikely that most students would move substantially beyond the practical 
purposes of such acts, rather than to ethical considerations. Put another way, an average 
student would probably respond to a prompt such as this by thinking about the economic 
and material damage that would done to the Southern war effort, rather than extending 
the thought into whether or not such a policy was moral to pursue.  
United States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010) does provide a student 
prompt after its depiction of Sherman‘s response to James Calhoun, but it only involves 
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asking students to restate Sherman‘s own reasoning, rather than to challenge it: ―Why do 
you think General Sherman felt justified in destroying civilian property during his march 
through Georgia‖ (p. 387)? Additionally, this text provides certainly the most 
comprehensive assessment for students regarding Sherman‘s March and the policy of 
―total war‖—a ―Document-Based Assessment‖ (p. 399) that incorporates four different 
primary sources and differing perspectives on the issues involved. One of the 
documents—a quote from William L. Barney‘s The Reader’s Companion of American 
History—points to the ―brutal logic‖ of Sherman‘s policy and his unwillingness to 
mawkishly ―sentimentalize‖ the war. The final document, drawn from Milford Overley‘s 
―What ‗Marching Through Georgia‘ Really Means‖ (a reference to a popular Northern 
song about the event) labels Sherman ―cruel,‖ guilty of ―deeds of barbarism.‖ These 
documents provide a genuine opportunity for significant moral critique of the ―total war‖ 
policy; the student prompts regarding these documents, though, are comparatively low-
level, asking students to identify which documents ―focus on southerners reacting to total 
war,‖ and requiring them to describe in writing the ―impact‖ total war had on the South. 
Still, United States History outperforms practically all other textbooks in this regard.  
The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010) does include one of the few expressly 
critical prompts of Sherman‘s policy and their moral value, though it does so with an 
inferred presupposition—in a section titled ―Evaluating Decisions,‖ the authors ask 
students, ―Grant and Sherman presented a logical rationale for using the strategy of total 
war. Do you think the end—defeating the Confederacy—justified the means—causing 
harm to civilians? Explain‖ (p. 365). The text introduces the prompt by conceding the 
―logic‖ of total war, without subjecting the policy itself to scrutiny; the question does, 
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however, allow students the opportunity to morally question the worthiness of ―total war‖ 
as a wartime strategy, though it may require a degree of sophistication on the part of the 
student (the ability to differentiate levels of ―harm,‖ for example) that may be 
unreasonable to expect. 
 America: Pathways to the Present does include one of the few military 
perspectives that questions whether the ―March to the Sea‖ was a moral enterprise. The 
text includes a section titled ―American Heritage: My Brush with History,‖ a first-person 
narrative by David Coyngham. Coyngham, a journalist and also an officer in Sherman‘s 
army, wrote extensively about the army‘s travel through the South, and the text‘s authors 
present his thoughts as effectively contrarian to the main narrative:  
Many of our foragers, scouts, and hangers-on of all classes, thought, like 
Cromwell, that they were doing the work of the Lord, in wantonly destroying as 
much property as was possible…A planter‘s house was overrun in a jiffy…If the 
spoils were ample, the depredators were satisfied, and went off in peace; if not, 
everything was torn and destroyed, and most likely the owner was tickled with 
sharp bayonets into a confession where he had his treasures hid…Hogs are 
bayoneted, and then hung in quarters on the bayonets to bleed; chickens, geese, 
and turkeys are knocked over and hung in garlands from the saddles…cows and 
calves, so wretchedly thin that they drop down and perish on the first day‘s 
march, are driven along, or, if too weak to travel, are shot, lest they should give 
aid to the enemy. Should the house be deserted, the furniture is smashed in pieces, 
music is pounded out of four hundred-dollar pianos with the ends of 
muskets….After all was cleared out, most likely some set of stragglers wanted to 
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enjoy a good fire, and set the house, debris of furniture, and all the surroundings, 
in a blaze. This is the way Sherman‘s army lived on the country. They were not 
ordered to do so, but I am afraid they were not brought to task for it much either. 
(p. 421) 
 The authors of America: Pathways to the Present here incorporate a point of 
view, if not completely opposite to, then at least different from the traditional perspective 
that dominates most textbook accounts of Sherman‘s March—it was brutal but necessary, 
a comprehensive example of the reality of ―total war.‖ The other half of this policy—
Grant‘s approach—is also presented at length as a difficult yet inevitable evolution of 
warfare. 
 During Grant‘s series of battles over the spring of 1864, from Richmond to 
Petersburg, his armies suffered nearly twice the casualties of Lee‘s (McPherson, 1988, p. 
476). Grant lost battles in which he had great numerical superiority, and he lost battles—
particularly Cold Harbor, in which he lost seven thousand men in around forty-five 
minutes (Olsen, 2006, p. 198)—which were ill-conceived and, by Grant‘s own admission, 
should never have been fought. In short, he was responsible for decisions as equally poor 
and disastrous as Union officers like Joe Hooker, John Pope, George McClellan, and 
Ambrose Burnside; yet those men are routinely pilloried, either explicitly or through 
inference, in textbooks. The simple reason for this disparity—eventually, Grant won—is 
often presented as justification for such narrative decisions. Yet, with regard to the issue 
of proportionality, the important question to ask is, did the outcome of the war justify the 
mass carnage created by Grant‘s ―total war‖ strategy? 
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 Textbooks do include significant references to the bloodshed of Grant‘s 
campaigns. America: Pathways to the Present (Cayton, et al., 2007) describes the 65,000 
casualties over less than two months suffered by Grant‘s army in 1864, and the ―chilling 
effect‖ such losses had on the morale of Union troops: At Cold Harbor, many soldiers 
pinned their names and addresses on their uniforms so their bodies could be identified‖ 
(p. 411). Several texts also include explanation for the horrors of these battles. The 
Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010) presents an inadequate rationalization for Grant‘s 
strategy, conceptualizing it as something like a matter of personal honor between the 
Union general and the President: ―Democrats and Northern newspapers called Grant a 
butcher. However…Grant kept going because he had promised Lincoln, ―Whatever 
happens, there will be no turning back‖ (p. 363). At least one text, The American Pageant 
(Kennedy, et al., 2006) justifies the bloodshed of these battles by asserting that the 
carnage wasn‘t, in fact, Grant‘s fault, but Lee‘s, calling the famous Confederate general 
―overrated.‖ The text claims that ―Grant had intended to fight battles out in the open…It 
was Lee, not Grant, who turned the eastern campaign into a war of attrition fought in the 
trenches… Lee‘s new defensive posture in turn forced Grant into some brutal arithmetic. 
Grant could trade two men for one and still beat the enemy to his knees‖ (p. 474). This 
position—that Grant was forced to adopt ―total war,‖ rather than a conscious choice—is 
disingenuous from a historiographical perspective, but from a moral point of view it 
perpetuates the concept that war is something done to participants, rather than by them, 
and that choices in wartime are driven by forces beyond one‘s control, rather than any 
ethical standards, such as the ―just war‖ doctrine.  
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The American Nation: a History of the United States (Carnes, et al., 2008) 
subsumes issues of morality under the dominant narrative of the Civil War—the strategy 
was right because it worked. Grant‘s plan was ―simple, logical, and ruthless,‖ an 
acceptance of the ―fundamental truth that the war could be won only by grinding the 
South down beneath the weight of numbers. And ―critics complained of the cost, he 
replied doggedly that he intended to fight on in the same manner if it took all summer‖ 
(p. 398) The dismay over Cold Harbor in the public and the press could be, according to 
this text, dismissed, thanks to the overarching strategic value of the battle: ―Although the 
price was fearfully high, Grant was gaining his objective. At Cold Harbor, Lee had to 
fight without a single regiment in general reserve while Grant‘s army was larger than at 
the start of the offensive‖ (p. 398). As described earlier, textbooks include substantial 
descriptions of the loss and devastation incurred during these battles; yet only rarely do 
they question, implicitly or explicitly, whether or not such losses were justified under the 
aim of the war. Even more uncommon are opportunities for students to do the same. 
Instead, events such as Cold Harbor and other products of the ―total war‖ strategy are 
presented as typical of the ―harsh realities of modern warfare‖ (United States History 
(Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010, p. 393).  
 The individuals who had to endure the calamities of such events—the soldiers—
are described with considerable detail by all textbooks in this sample. With regard to the 
―just war‖ component of proportionality, the general question is whether or not the force 
exerted is fair in relation to the goal desired, as related to the cost incurred on both sides. 
As mentioned previously, all the textbooks in this sample include a reference to the 
failure of traditional tactical thinking in light of the modern military technology available 
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to both sides. Less ubiquitous is a discussion of the age of the combatants on both sides. 
America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009) points out that ―three-fourths 
of the South‘s 1 million white males between ages 18 and 45 served in the army. Two 
thirds of the 3.5 million northern males of the same age fought for the Union. Some 
soldiers were as young as 14.‖ The text also points out that ―nearly 4,000 Union troops 
were 16 or younger‖ (p. 416). There is one activity for students to consider the impact of 
such policies, labeled ―Critical Thinking: Draw Conclusions‖—in it, students are asked, 
“How do you think the experience of war affected young men‖ (p. 515)? The title for this 
section of the narrative is ―Old Enough for War,‖ a declarative statement that infers the 
authors‘ position on the battle-readiness of soldiers at this age. The American Nation: A 
History of the United States (Carnes, et al., 2008) also includes a reference to the age of 
soldiers, as well as a graphic image (see Figure 8 below); the caption to the photograph 
reads as follows:  
Eighteen-year olds were the largest age group in the first year of the war in both 
armies. Soldiers were universally called ―the boys‖; and officers, even in their 
thirties, were called ―old men.‖ One of the most popular war songs was ―Just 
Before the Battle, Mother.‖ (p. 380) 
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Figure 8: from The American Nation: A History of the United States (Carnes, et al., 2008) 
p. 380 
 
 
The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010) includes the same picture as Figure 4 above, 
even going so far as to identify the site at which the soldier was killed (Petersburg, 
Virginia). Its depiction of the comparative youth of troops in the Civil War is less matter-
of-fact than the previous two texts, contained under the heading ―Boys in War‖:  
Union soldier Arthur MacArthur (father of World War II hero Douglas 
MacArthur) became a colonel when he was only 19. Examination of some 
Confederate recruiting lists for 1861-1862 reveals that approximately 5 percent 
were 17 or younger—with some as young as 13. The percentage of boys in the 
Union army was lower, perhaps 1.5 percent. These figures, however, do not count 
the great number of boys who ran away to follow each army without officially 
enlisting. (p. 344) 
 Although only a few textbooks make mention of the age of the participants, many 
focus on the national scope of the calamity involved. Most of the textbooks in this sample 
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include graphs, charts, and tables that neatly summarize the carnage involved; the one 
below (Figure 9), from United States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010), is fairly 
representative:  
 
 
Figure 9: ―War Deaths,‖ from United States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010), p. 
394 
 
 
The Enduring Vision (Boyer, et al., 2008) contains a similar graphic, but one that 
implicitly infers a hegemonic viewpoint that is reflected in other samples in this study. 
The chart (Figure 10, below), presents a demographic breakdown of the war, including 
statistics on the total number of soldiers who served on each side, in addition to the total 
number who were drafted, served as draft substitutes, those who deserted (including a 
separate reckoning for those who deserted and were captured later), and two separate 
measures for deaths—those resulting from battle wounds, and those from disease. Given 
the disparity between the first metric—total size of each nation‘s armed forces—the chart 
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seems to infer that the number of those who suffered directly, as well as the number of 
those who chose not to participate, was relatively small. 
  
 
Figure 10: ―Opposing Armies of the Civil War,‖ from The Enduring Vision (Boyer, et al., 
2008) p. 427 
 
 
These two graphic representations help to support the argument that most textbook 
narratives construe the Civil War as a war worth fighting—and thus, the means necessary 
to end the war were justifiable, under the proportionality rule. The degree to which 
textbooks in this sample reflect that hegemonic view varies, from strongly supportive to 
more complex, nuanced positions.  
 America: Pathways to the Present (Cayton, et al., 2007) includes much of the 
graphically disturbing descriptions that one may find in all the texts of this study, but 
concludes its chapter on the Civil War with this epilogue:  
Both the North and the South had suffered great losses during the war, but both 
also gained by it. They gained an undivided nation, a democracy that would 
continue to seek the equality Lincoln had promised for it. They also gained new 
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fellow citizens—the African Americans who had broken the bonds of slavery and 
claimed their right to be free and equal, every one. (p. 417) 
The ―gains‖ of the Civil War are, of course, debatable and heavily dependent 
upon whose perspective is being relied on for that conclusion. Visions of America: a 
History of the United States (Keene, et al., 2010) tries to make its final view of the 
conflict as fact-based and value-free as possible: ―When the Civil War began, both sides 
expected that they would emerge victorious in a few months. But the conflict lasted four 
years, claiming more than 618,000 lives, and leaving the South in total subjugation. It 
also emancipated some four million slaves‖ (p. 401). Give Me Liberty! (Foner, 2008) 
does something similar, though with a nod to the complexity of the Civil War‘s 
outcomes—it strives to acknowledge these results with little in the way of editorializing 
or overt conclusions:  
The Civil War laid the foundation for modern America, guaranteeing the Union‘s 
permanence, destroying slavery, and shifting power in the nation from the South 
to the North…It dramatically increased the power of the federal government and 
accelerated the modernization of the northern economy. And it placed on the 
postwar agenda the challenge of defining and protecting African-American 
freedom. (p. 542) 
On the contrary, though, many texts from this sample offer substantially more 
complex conclusions regarding the Civil War, especially its cost. The American Nation: 
A History of the United States (Carnes, et al., 2008) concludes with a poignant anecdote 
about Jones Budbury, a 19-year old Union soldier who volunteered in 1861, served as 
practically every major battle in the Civil War (he had even been imprisoned at the 
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Confederacy‘s notorious Andersonville camp), until his death only a scant few weeks 
prior to the war‘s end. The text‘s authors comment on the ―human and material 
destruction‖ of the war and the manner in which such devastation ―implanted in millions 
of hearts‖ a slow-to-disappear sense of bitterness. The text closes its section on the Civil 
War with one of the few overtly judgmental conclusions to be found in this study:  
The corruption, the gross materialism, and the selfishness generated by wartime 
conditions were other disagreeable by-products of the conflict. Such sores fester 
in any society, but the Civil War bred conditions that inflamed and multiplied 
them. The war produced many examples of charity, self-sacrifice, and devotion to 
duty as well, yet if the general moral atmosphere of the postwar generation can be 
sad to have resulted from the experiences of 1861 to 1865, the overall effect was 
bad. (p. 405) 
Other texts comment on the lasting effects of the Civil War. The Enduring Vision 
(Boyer, et al., 2008) includes references to the ―vivid reminders of the price of Union,‖ 
including ―armless and legless veterans,‖ monuments to the dead, and the pensions paid 
to soldiers‘ widows, ―well into the twentieth century‖ (p. 460). United States History 
(Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010) aims its conclusion primarily at the moral and 
psychological impact of the war on the South. The authors depict the return of 
Confederates soldiers to abandoned or destroyed homes, the millions of dislocated 
refugees who ―drifted aimlessly‖ throughout the nation, and the crippling blow that the 
magnitude of the defeat embodied for every Southerner:  
Defeat had shaken them to the very core of their beliefs. Some felt that they were 
suffering a divine punishment, with one southerner mourning, ―Oh, our God! 
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What sins we must have been guilty of that we should be so humiliated by Thee 
now!‖ Others, however, came to view the Civil War as a lost, but noble, cause. 
These white southerners kept the memory of the struggle alive and believed that, 
eventually, the South would be redeemed. (p. 395) 
The American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006) titles its conclusion ―The 
Aftermath of the Nightmare,‖ and laments the nation‘s ―lasting hurt,‖ the loss of the 
country‘s best ―young manhood and potential leadership, and even points out the reality 
of a lost generation: ―In addition, tens of thousands of babies went unborn because 
potential fathers were at the front‖ (p. 476). The authors include the total monetary costs 
of the conflict—about $15 billion—but they point out that ―this colossal figure does not 
include continuing expenses, such as pensions and interest on the national debt. The 
intangible costs—dislocations, disunities, wasted energies, lowered ethics, blasted lives, 
bitter memories, and burning hates—cannot be calculated‖ (p. 476). The American 
Journey (Goldfield, et al., 2007) approaches the end of the war in a similar fashion; the 
authors cite William T. Sherman‘s prewar admonition to a Southern friend that any 
conflict between North and South would leave the nation ―drenched in blood,‖ and then 
conclude ―he was right.‖ The text cites the grisly numbers of dead and wounded on each 
side, and then concludes with a unique and grim coda to its depiction of the war: 
―Compounding the suffering of the individuals behind these gruesome statistics was the 
incalculable suffering, in terms of grief, fatherless children, women who never married, 
families never made whole, of the people close to them‖ (p. 452). 
Such conclusions in a standard textbook represent a powerful occasion for 
students to critique the necessity of such a war, and whether or not either side violated the 
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proportionality rule in terms of harm incurred versus benefits gained. But, similar to 
textbook depictions under jus ad bellum, the narratives in this sample typically contain a 
wealth of moral content that is presented either without explicit opportunities for student 
critique, or with the expectation that students will passively receive the conclusions 
reached by the textbook‘s authors.  
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CHAPTER SIX: 
JUS POST BELLUM 
 
 The focus in this chapter is on topics/events connected to the ―just war‖ category 
of jus post bellum: the surrender of Robert E. Lee‘s Army of Northern Virginia in April 
1865 to Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox Court House; the contrast between Presidential 
Reconstruction under Andrew Johnson and the period of Republican dominance known 
as Radical Reconstruction; the passage and impact of the 14
th
 Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution; and the presidential election of 1876 and the resulting ―Compromise of 
1877,‖ which is considered the de facto end of Reconstruction in the South. 
 
Lee’s Surrender at Appomattox 
 The surrender of Robert E. Lee to his adversary Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox 
Court House, Virginia, on April 9, 1865, was a moment of high drama that regularly 
serves as the coda to textbook and historiographical accounts of the Civil War.  The 
image of Lee, resplendent in an immaculate gray uniform, together with Grant in his 
shabby private‘s uniform—―unkempt as usual,‖ according to Olsen (2006, p. 223)—is a 
compelling episode with which to end the story of the war itself. Textbooks rely heavily 
on historiographical works for this account, though there are omissions and discrepancies 
that do not square with the historical record.  
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Historical Narrative Analysis 
 Unlike textbooks, historiographical works tend to frame Lee‘s surrender as part of 
a larger series of events, rather than a singular occurrence. The two generalist works used 
in this study, Olsen‘s The American Civil War: A Hands-On History (2006) and 
McPherson‘s Battle Cry of Freedom (1988) use Lee‘s surrender as the pivot point 
between wartime operations and the assassination of Abraham Lincoln. Olsen (2006) 
begins his story of the last stage of the war by describing the three main components of 
Confederate resistance—John Bell Hood‘s army in Nashville, General Joseph E. 
Johnston‘s forces in North Carolina, and Lee‘s Army of Northern Virginia, facing Grant 
outside Richmond. Hood surrendered to Union General George H. Thomas in December, 
and Johnston failed to stop William Sherman‘s advance through North Carolina, allowing 
the Union forces (who had begun in Georgia with the infamous ―March to the Sea‖) to 
enter Virginia and linkage with Grant. Still, the importance of Lee‘s surrender was 
greater than the total cessation of hostilities—Goodwin, in Team of Rivals: the Political 
Genius of Abraham Lincoln (2005), quotes Gideon Welles‘ remark that ―This surrender 
of the great Rebel captain and the most formidable and reliable army of the Secessionists 
virtually terminates the Rebellion‖ (p. 726).  
 The situation facing Lee prior to his surrender was dire indeed—his army 
dissolving rapidly, surrounded on three sides, running short on food and provisions, with 
no realistic hope of escape for the entirety of his force. On the morning of April 9, Lee 
attempted his last breakout on the road to Appomattox, but it was almost immediately 
clear that such an attempt was hopeless, given the almost six to one advantage in troops 
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the North enjoyed at this point. It was at this point, together with his senior officers, that 
Lee was faced with a truly significant decision—whether to surrender formally, or to 
continue the fight in the only manner available to him. Guerrilla warfare was not unheard 
of in this era; most recently, it had been prevalent in Missouri and Kansas during the 
years prior to Fort Sumter, and notorious Confederate raiders like William Quantrill and 
John Singleton Mosby had become practically household names. Lee was presented with 
the option to order his men to break up into small units, to flee into the woods and 
continue the war in an irregular manner. Lee almost immediately refused, saying that the 
―guerrillas would become mere bands of marauders…We would bring on a state of 
affairs it would take the country years to recover from‖ (McPherson, 1988, p. 848). Given 
the situation, Lee finally resolved to go to Grant.  
 The surrender is often heavily described in historical narrative, thanks to Lee‘s 
enduring fame, the almost-requisite dose of Civil War irony (the ceremony occurred in 
the house of Wilmer McLean, whose former residence in Manassas, Virginia, had been 
occupied by the Confederate Army during the First Battle of Bull Run, four years earlier), 
and the atmosphere of what Olsen (2006) calls ―the most dramatic moment in American 
history since 1776‖ (p. 222). McPherson (1988), for example, includes not only the 
interaction between the dignified Lee and the plain Grant, but also an anecdote involving 
Grant‘s military aide, Ely Parker, who was a Seneca Indian. Lee, upon seeing Parker, 
remarked that he was ―glad to see one real American here.‖ Parker replied, in a moment 
full of poignancy, ―We are all Americans here‖ (p. 849).  
 The terms of the surrender are a vital point to the narrative, and to the larger 
theme embodied by Parker‘s words, that of national reconciliation and forgiveness. 
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President Lincoln had ordered Grant to offer the Confederates ―the most liberal and 
honorable terms‖ in order to acquire their submission (Olsen, 2006, p. 223), and 
historians seem to agree that Grant satisfied that condition. Confederate troops would be 
allowed to go home, ―not to be disturbed by U.S. authority so long as they observe their 
paroles and the laws in force where they may reside.‖ This was a crucial concession, 
especially given the fact that the Army of Northern Virginia was not the only force left in 
the field for the South—such a proposal ―guaranteed southern soldiers immunity from 
prosecution for treason‖ (McPherson, 1988, p. 849).  
Grant also allowed Southern troops to keep their horses and mules, in order to 
―work their little farms,‖ a point that Lee appreciated—―this will have the best possible 
effect toward conciliating our people,‖ he remarked, aware of the impending planting 
season and its importance for his men (McPherson, 1988, p. 849; Olsen, 2006, p. 223). 
Winik (2005), in April 1865: The Month that Saved America, points out that such a 
gesture was Grant‘s own devising; the original terms allowed only officers to keep their 
private property, and Grant‘s expansion of this allowance had a immense impact on the 
ease with which the cease-fire took effect (p. 188). His offer of three days‘ ration to the 
25,000 starving Confederate troops left in Lee‘s army was just as conciliatory, in the 
short term.  
 Three days later, the formal surrender took place, and a final assuaging gesture 
occurred—Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, the hero of Little Round Top at the Battle of 
Gettysburg and now a major general, ordered a salute of honor for the defeated 
Southerners as they relinquished their arms. McPherson (1988) credits this gesture with 
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ending the war, ―not with shame at one side and exultation on the other,‖ but with a 
degree of shared dignity in light of the mutual national sacrifice of the war (p. 850).  
 Interestingly, in Battle Cry of Freedom—in all other respects, an exhaustive and 
meticulous retelling of the Civil War—McPherson says little of the remaining 
Confederate forces, allowing only that Lee‘s surrender would ―virtually,‖ rather than 
completely, end the fighting (p. 848). Olsen (2006) calls attention to the fact that 
substantial units of the Confederate military remained at large, and had yet to make the 
choice that Lee eschewed prior to Appomattox—namely, the decision whether to 
continue the fight or disperse into the wilderness and carry on the war as guerrillas. 
Ultimately, it took almost three weeks (April 26) for Joseph Johnston to surrender his 
troops to William Sherman, and over a month and a half (May 26) for Edmund Kirby 
Smith to submit, west of the Mississippi River (Olsen, 2006, p. 223). Hundreds of 
Confederate soldiers headed west rather than formally capitulate, and the final eradication 
of slavery in Texas was forestalled until late June (the famous ―Juneteenth‖ of the 
African-American community).  
 The surrender of Lee at Appomattox is as close to a formal cessation of war as 
occurred between North and South at the end of the Civil War. There was no official 
proclamation by Jefferson Davis or the Confederate Congress, and the piecemeal 
surrender of the last Southern troops over the next few months lacks the degree of finality 
which the capitulation of the Army of Northern Virginia affords, from a narrative 
perspective. Less attention is paid to the prospect that peace might have come several 
months earlier, at what is commonly referred to as the Hampton Roads conference. The 
conference in question had begun in January 1865 with the influential editor Francis 
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Preston Blair, who concocted a somewhat bizarre scheme which called for the North and 
South to declare a postponement to the war in order to join forces and confront France, 
which had recently invaded Mexico in violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Though the 
particulars of this plan were not agreed upon, Davis allowed a group of Peace 
Commissioners to travel to Washington, D.C., with the goal of securing ―peace between 
the two Countries‖ (Goodwin, 2006, p. 691).  
 This was the initial sticking point in the success of the conference, improbable 
though it was at the outset—Lincoln, when told of the prospect, told Blair that he was 
―ready to receive‖ such a commission, on the condition that negotiations would address 
the issues facing ―our one common country,‖ with no admission of the diplomatic or 
political independence of the South. There was a meeting, on February 3, between 
Confederate representatives (most notably, Vice-President Alexander Stephens) and 
Lincoln, on the steamer River Queen, though historians differ on the question of motives 
and the likelihood of success. Goodwin (2006) credits ―the insistent clamor for peace‖ (p. 
691) as the reason behind Davis‘ assent to the meeting. McPherson (1988) asserts that 
Jefferson Davis approved of the conference not out of any serious hope that it would bear 
fruit, but mostly to discredit the nascent peace movement in the South by ―identifying it 
with humiliating surrender terms‖ (p. 822).  
The terms offered by Lincoln are characterized most often as ―generous,‖ 
especially with regard to the treatment of Confederate leaders and confiscation of 
property—Lincoln even posited the idea of compensation for slaveowners, to the tune of 
$400 million (McPherson, 1988, p. 823). But the conditions he laid at the outset were too 
stringent for the Southern commissioners: ―1) the restoration of the National authority 
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throughout the all the states. 2) No receding by the Executive of the United States on the 
Slavery question. 3) No cessation of hostilities short of an end to the war, and the 
disbanding of all forces hostile to the government‖ (McPherson, 1988, p. 822). The 
failure of the conference, says Olsen (2006), was brought on by Jefferson Davis‘ 
―stubbornness, arrogance, and failure to grasp reality‖; though, according to Goodwin 
(2006), it at least gave him the opportunity to ―pragmatically‖ use the event ―to incite 
greater effort on the battlefield‖ (p. 695). 
Textbooks rely heavily on the surrender of Robert E. Lee at Appomattox to signal 
the end of the Civil War. Only on rare occasions do they depict the later submission of 
other Confederate forces or the possibility of peace prior to Appomattox at the Hampton 
Roads Conference. America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009) phrases it 
simply: ―With Lee‘s surrender, the long and bitter war came to an end‖ (p. 537). Most 
other textbooks, though, do include the reality of continued Confederate resistance, 
though in all such depictions, there is the implicit connotation that the war was 
effectively over with Lee‘s surrender. America: Pathways to the Present (Cayton, et al., 
2007) constructs its narrative chronologically: ―A few weeks after Lee‘s surrender, 
General Johnston surrendered to Sherman in North Carolina. Throughout May, other 
Confederate forces large and small also gave up‖ (p. 416). The American Journey 
(Goldfield, et al., 2007) is similar:  
Joseph E. Johnston surrendered to Sherman near Durham, North Carolina, on 
April 26. On May 10, Union cavalry captured President Davis in southern 
Georgia. On May 26, Texas general Kirby Smith surrendered his trans-
Mississippi army, and the Civil War came to an end. (p. 449) 
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The other books in this sample are less detailed but no less clear in their 
conceptualization of Appomattox. Give Me Liberty! (Foner, 2008) states that, ―although 
some Confederate units remained in the field, the Civil War was over‖ (p. 541). The 
Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010) claims that, ―within two months all remaining 
Confederate resistance collapsed…after four long years, at tremendous human and 
economic costs, the Civil War was over‖ (p. 365). The Enduring Vision (Boyer, et al., 
2008) describes ―the remnants of Confederate resistance‖ giving in ―within a month of 
Appomattox‖ (p. 459). And Visions of America: a History of the United States (Keene, et 
al., 2010) asserts that, ―over the next few weeks, the remaining armies of the Confederacy 
would surrender, bringing the Civil War to a close‖ (p. 401). In fact, only one textbook, 
United States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010), allows for the fact that ―Lee‘s 
surrender did not officially end the war.‖ This text points out that ―the South still had 
some 170,000 soldiers under arms, and it took until June for other Confederate generals 
scattered around the South to complete similar surrenders‖ And United States History is 
the only narrative in this study that describes the nature and importance of ―Juneteenth‖ 
to African-Americans in the Southwest (p. 391).  
 With regard to the terms offered by Grant to Lee at Appomattox, the books of this 
sample view the terms of surrender offered by Grant at Appomattox in an approving 
manner. Seven of the ten textbooks incorporate the term ―generous‖ in their descriptions 
of the proposition. Additionally, many offer lyrical contrasts between the nobility of Lee, 
in full dress uniform and magisterial in appearance, and Grant—―stubble-bearded and 
informally dressed‖ (The American Pageant, Kennedy, et al., 2006, p. 474), of a ―rough-
hewn exterior‖ (The American Nation: A History of the United States, Carnes, et al., 
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2008, p. 404). Two of the books explicitly connect Grant‘s terms to the policy of 
reconciliation outlined by Lincoln in his inaugural address of March 4, though two infer a 
more direct role was played by the President. The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010), for 
example, hints that Lincoln‘s instructions to Grant was practically relayed directly to 
Appomattox: ―At Lincoln‘s request, the terms were generous‖ (p. 365). The American 
Nation: A History of the United States (Carnes, et al., 2008) is similar, stating that, 
―acting on Lincoln‘s instructions, Grant outlined his terms‖ (p. 404).  
 A small number of the textbooks in this sample make only the barest mention of 
the scene inside the McLean farmhouse, though a few dedicate significant and evocative 
passages to the description of the two generals‘ meeting. An especially common feature 
is the depiction of Lee riding away from the house to the cheers of Union troops, which 
were quickly silenced by Grant; ―‘The war is over,‘ he said. ‗The rebels are our 
countrymen again‘‖ (America: History of Our Nation. Davidson & Stoff, 2009, p. 537). 
Though the textbooks in this study do tend to oversimplify the surrender at Appomattox 
(a common feature of all textbooks), they do reflect with fair accuracy the prevailing 
historiographical interpretations of the event.  
 
Categorical Analysis 
The categorical analysis of textbook narrative descriptions of Lee‘s surrender at 
Appomattox is subsumed under the ―just war‖ category of proportionality and publicity.  
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Proportionality and publicity. 
 Orend (2005) establishes proportionality and publicity as the first conditions of 
jus post bellum. It is important to distinguish between proportionality of jus in bello, 
which is aimed exclusively at the conduct of the war being waged, and proportionality of 
the postwar period. Any peace settlement must be ―measured and reasonable, as well as 
publicly proclaimed.‖ Orend warns against the use of a peace settlement as an 
―instrument of revenge,‖ pointing out that such attempts are typically shortsighted and 
ultimately self-defeating, since they tend to create long-term bitterness between former 
combatants that tend to obstruct any lasting resolutions. In real-world terms, this means 
that an insistence on unconditional surrender is ruled out.  
It is ironic, then, that Ulysses S. Grant, who achieved notoriety in the Civil War 
for his regular insistence on unconditional surrender—after his first well-publicized 
victory at Fort Donelson, newspapers in the East made a indicative pun out of his initials 
regarding the practice—was the general who offered such ―generous‖ terms to Robert E. 
Lee. His offer—soldiers may keep their mules and horses, officers may keep their 
sidearms, the allowance of a general return for all troops with no future fear of 
prosecution—was entirely in the spirit of Lincoln‘s desire for and policy of 
reconciliation. While Lincoln did not pass along specific instructions to Grant regarding 
such terms, the offer made at Appomattox was certainly approved of by the President.   
From a ―just war‖ perspective, the agreement between Lee and Grant highlights 
an important aspect of the ―proportionality and publicity‖ requirement—what should be 
the goal of a ―just war?‖ Grant‘s proposal to Lee was the starting point for the postwar 
period of Reconstruction, and the ends Grant sought, represented in the terms of 
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surrender, are the goals of Lincoln for the postwar world—what Orend (2006) terms the 
―proverbial status quo ante bellum,‖ the restoration of the state of affairs prior to the war. 
In a very literal sense, this is of course what Lincoln was after; the reestablishment of the 
Union and its pre-1861 political structure. In a more expansive sense, though, the terms at 
Appomattox are representative of Lincoln‘s desires for future relations between North 
and South. Prior to the end of the war, Lincoln would formalize these desires with his 
proposal for reuniting the warring factions; the ―Ten Percent Plan‖ called for re-
admittance of a Southern state after 10 percent of its voters had taken an oath of 
allegiance and pledged to observe emancipation, a new state government was elected and 
a new state constitution (which outlawed slavery) had been adopted. While not 
technically status quo ante bellum, it was a close as could be approximated in light of the 
war‘s outcome. Michael Walzer (1977) points out that the restoration of the status quo 
ante bellum is hardly ever a solid solution to a conflict (especially a civil war) since it 
was the status quo that led to the initial conflict—simply restoring the original state of 
affairs hardly qualifies as an improvement (p. 119). While not introducing the particular 
elements of the ―Ten Percent Plan,‖ Grant‘s offer of generous terms represents a firm 
Union commitment, at the end of the war, to Lincoln‘s goal of an orderly, quick, 
charitable period of Reconstruction. 
There are two issues of greater interest, from a ―just war‖ perspective, regarding 
Lee‘s surrender at Appomattox. The first, Hampton Roads conference, preceded the final 
outcome by over a month, while the second—Lee‘s decision not to allow his soldiers to 
begin a guerrilla campaign rather than formally surrender—came only a few hours prior 
to his meeting with Grant. The Hampton Roads conference may have been a doomed 
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effort from the start, as most historians assert; it was, though, a face-to-face meeting 
between combatants while an active war was still being prosecuted in the field, and thus 
can be scrutinized under the ―just war‖ theoretical framework.  
President Lincoln‘s stated sine qua non at the outset of the meetings was the 
restoration of the Union. The bizarre idea to use the French invasion of Mexico as a sort 
of national military catharsis was dismissed quickly by Lincoln; as was the idea, floated 
by President pro tempore of the Confederate Senate Robert T.M. Hunter to declare an 
armistice and call for a ―convention of the states,‖ to resolve their issues. Lincoln refused 
this idea, stating that surrender was the only viable option. The difficulty between the two 
sides was comprised of more than a series of sticking points, difficult to negotiate; the 
problem was a conceptual one. The Southern commissioners thought of themselves as 
representing a separate nation, one foreign to the United States, with all the rights and 
privileges appertaining to a sovereign state. Lincoln—and the large majority of 
Northerners—considered them rebels, who had endangered the Union through their 
actions, and thus a political restoration was required, not a treaty. When presented with 
the fact that King Charles I of England had entered into negotiated agreements with 
rebels during the English Civil War, Lincoln responded, ―I do not profess to be posted in 
history…All I distinctly recollect about the case of Charles I, is, that he lost his head‖ 
(McPherson, 1988, p. 823).  
On the issue of surrender, the Southern representatives did not have the authority 
to negotiate, and they returned to Richmond empty-handed. Jefferson Davis was able to 
use Northern demands for unconditional surrender (which, as James McPherson points 
out, were disingenuous, since Davis himself certainly knew Lincoln would offer little 
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more than that) to whip up morale and support, if only temporarily. Though the Hampton 
Roads conference failed, it represents an intriguing collision between Northern and 
Southern conceptualizations of what the meaning of the Civil War, their own state of 
sovereignty, and the available means for ending the conflict.  
The Hampton Roads Conference is mentioned in only one textbook, The 
American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006), and its version is poetically phrased, yet 
matter-of-fact about the event itself:  
In February 1865 the Confederates, tasting the bitter dregs of defeat, tried 
desperately to negotiate for peace between the ―two countries.‖ Lincoln himself 
met with Confederate representatives aboard a Union ship moored at Hampton 
Roads, Virginia, to discuss peace terms. But Lincoln could accept nothing short of 
Union and emancipation, and the Southerners could accept nothing short of 
independence. So the tribulation wore on—amid smoke and agony—to its terrible 
climax. (p. 474) 
This passage infers the main conceptual chasm between the Union and 
Confederacy, the issue of ―two countries,‖ though it provides no context or explanation 
for the enigmatic quotation marks around the phrase. There are no opportunities for 
students to critique or consider the different perceptions of nationhood on the part of the 
North and the South, or the manner in which each side acted upon those perceptions. 
From a ―just war‖ perspective, this would be an apt occasion to utilize Brian Orend‘s 
concept of a ―minimally just community,‖ an appropriate theoretical model against which 
to cast this historical event. The American Pageant does not provide activities or prompts 
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that may serve such a purpose; though, inadequate as that may be, this is the only 
textbook to mention the Hampton Roads conference at all. 
Similarly, only one textbook references the possibility that Lee might not have 
pursued a formal surrender at Appomattox at all. America: Pathways to the Present 
(Cayton, et al., 2007) describes the situation facing Lee after his last failed breakout 
attempt in terse but accurate terms: ―Some of Lee‘s officers suggested that the army 
could scatter and continue to fight as guerrillas—soldiers who use surprise raids and hit-
and-run tactics. Lee rejected this idea, fearing that it would bring more devastation to 
Virginia‖ (p. 416). There is considerable scholarship on guerrilla warfare—the concept 
was well-known in the era, to the point that Francis Lieber (who created the ―Lieber‖ 
code of moral conduct in war for the Union Army in 1863) had written a pamphlet the 
year before about the Turkish repression of Greek fighters who had engaged in guerrilla 
tactics (Walzer, 1977, p. 183).  
There is considerable debate about whether or not guerrilla fighters should enjoy 
the same sort of protection under ―just war‖ as do traditional soldiers. Walzer (1977) 
considers guerilla warfare to be a legitimate form of resistance, though punishment for 
that form of combat can also be legitimate; especially since, as Walzer points out, the 
essential nature of guerrilla combat (primarily the avoidance of standard uniform and the 
conduct of military operations among the civilian population) presents a substantial 
―challenge to the most fundamental principle of the rules of war‖ (Walzer, 1977, p. 179). 
That principle (especially in jus in bello), is that there must be clear division between 
combatants and non-combatants, one which guerillas routinely violate—―they attack 
stealthily, without warning; and in disguise. They violate the implicit trust upon which 
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the war convention rests; soldiers must feel safe among civilians if civilians are ever to be 
safe from solders‖ (p. 182). And there are ―just war‖ considerations for civilian 
supporters of guerrillas fighters, given the fact that, ―whereas soldiers are supposed to 
protect the civilians who stand behind them, guerrillas are protected by the civilians 
among whom they stand‖ (p. 185). 
None of the textbooks in this sample address in even a tangential manner these 
issues. As before, it would be unreasonable to expect them to do so—these are fairly 
sophisticated concepts that involve a significantly higher base of knowledge than may be 
practicable for most standard texts. Still, an opportunity exists for students to consider the 
options facing Robert E. Lee prior to Appomattox; and to dismiss them with such ease—
or, as is the case with nine of the ten books in this sample, not to mention them at all—
limits student ability to consider the moral implications of such options.  
The other half of this ―just war‖ component, publicity, is seemingly without 
debate. The news about Lee‘s surrender was immediate and spread nationwide; the 
populace of the North and its leadership, both military and civilian, signaled their mass 
approval of the settlement with little to no controversy. Not only did the North largely 
approve of the surrender in the strictest and most obvious sense, but also there was a 
general endorsement of the generous terms given by Grant to the Confederates. Debate 
over punishment, parole, and pardon would be reserved for Reconstruction. 
Of particular note is the issue of publicity in light of its meaning from a ―just war‖ 
perspective. The most literal interpretation of the publicity requirement is that the 
settlement be made available to the people at large, for approval or disapproval—as 
Orend (2006) states, ―People who have suffered through a war do indeed deserve to know 
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what the substance of the settlement is‖ (p. 179). A less concrete elucidation of this 
requirement, though, is whether or not such a settlement need be part of a formal treaty. 
There was no official document ending the war between North and South—this was 
partially due, no doubt, to the contrasting views of the conflict itself, viewed by the 
Union as the suppression of rebellion and by the Confederacy as a legitimate conflict 
between distinct political entities. Lee‘s surrender at Appomattox is the closest thing to a 
treaty; and as a military event, it was not subjected to popular authorization or 
acceptance, whether through a referendum or through representative assembly.  
It is debatable whether or not the lack of such a formality is a defect of the 
process. Orend (2006) considers the view that a formal document announcing the 
cessation of hostilities ―needlessly strict,‖ and he points out, rather acerbically, that 
World War I ended with a formal, detailed document; and with historical hindsight, not 
many would assert that the Treaty of Versailles was a better settlement for that conflict 
than Appomattox was for the Civil War. Still, if such a treaty was a necessity, or if it was 
legally binding, or if Grant had the right, in absentia, to make a political determination 
for President Lincoln, are issues that are unexplored in the textbooks from this sample. 
All make the implicit assumption that such topics are settled matters, or at least not worth 
investigation.  
 
Presidential Reconstruction vs. Radical Reconstruction 
 Every textbook in this study follows a similar pattern in its structure; there is a 
chapter on events leading to the Civil War, which either ends just prior to the Southern 
attack on Fort Sumter or just after; a chapter covering the main events of the conflict, 
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typically ending after Lee‘s surrender at Appomattox and a brief coda on the war‘s 
impact and general meaning; and, following that, a (usually much larger) chapter on 
Reconstruction. The texts dedicate considerable attention and detail to the issue of 
rebuilding the South (in some cases, more than is given to describing the war itself), and 
do so in a manner that would generally meet the approval of independent historians. The 
moral content of textbooks, viewed in light of just post bellum, is significantly visible in 
the sections detailing the policies of and conflict between Presidential Reconstruction, 
championed by Andrew Johnson, and the subsequent efforts of Radical Reconstruction.  
 
Historical Narrative Analysis 
 After the death of President Abraham Lincoln, Andrew Johnson ascended to the 
Presidency and was immediately thrust into a debate that had been simmering well before 
the assassination in April, 1865. There was no Constitutional apparatus or mechanism for 
what all parties assumed would have to happen after the war‘s conclusion—somehow, 
under some set of circumstances, Southern states would be readmitted to the Union. 
Perhaps more importantly, the issues that led to the national schism in the first place 
would have to be dealt with. Interestingly, it is a textbook—usually derided as too 
simplistic and lacking interpretive value when compared with historiographical works—
that provides a comprehensive introduction to the issues of Reconstruction. This from 
The Enduring Vision (Boyer, et al., 2008):  
While former slaves exulted over freedom, the postwar mood of ex-Confederates 
was often as grim as the wasted southern landscape...The morale of the 
vanquished rarely concerns the victors, but the Civil War was a special case, for 
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the Union had sought not merely military triumph but the return of national unity. 
The federal government in 1865 therefore faced unprecedented questions…First, 
how could the Union be restored and the defeated South reintegrated into the 
nation? Would the Confederate states be treated as conquered territories, or would 
they quickly rejoin the Union with the same rights as other states? Who would set 
the standards for readmission—Congress or the president? Most important, what 
would happen to the more than 3.5 million former slaves? (p. 468) 
 Andrew Johnson has become, at best, a sympathetic figure to historians, but much 
more often an item of mild scorn and disdain. A Unionist from Tennessee, born into 
extreme poverty, he was the only member of the U.S. Senate not to secede with his state; 
his loyalty to the nation earned him contempt from fellow Southerners and a place on the 
presidential ticket with Lincoln in 1864. Republicans viewed Johnson as an opportunity 
to achieve regional balance and pick up support in southern, pro-Democratic areas for the 
election and after the war. Unsurprisingly, there was consternation in the party when 
Johnson was installed in the White House less than a week after Lee‘s surrender in 
Virginia.  
 Johnson‘s contemporaries had few positive things to say about him. Democrats, 
of course, viewed him as treasonous; Republicans viewed him as ―a crude man, a vulgar 
renegade, unable or unwilling to shed his vile temper or the habits of his plebeian 
upbringing‖ (Winik, p. 269). Beyond general impressions, most in Washington were also 
convinced that Johnson was a violent drunk. The stories of his intoxication at Lincoln‘s 
second inaugural—during which the Attorney-General, Edward Bates, pronounced him 
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―deranged‖ and after which Senator Charles Sumner demanded Johnson‘s resignation 
(Winik, p. 270)—persisted during his assumption of the Presidency.  
 Still, most Republicans were pleased at Johnson‘s initial moves, which seemed to 
infer his intention to be substantially harsher towards the Confederates than Lincoln had 
intended. His announcement that ―Treason must be made infamous, and traitors must be 
made impoverished‖ met with general approval, especially among the Radical wing of 
the Republican Party and its leaders, Charles Sumner and Thaddeus Stevens. The 
Radicals viewed the ending of the war as an opportunity to remake American society, and 
their desire to break the Southern way of life so as to facilitate such a rebirth seemed to 
be shared by Johnson. And in the wake of Lincoln‘s death and the bitterness it 
engendered among many Northerners, Johnson‘s proposition of ruthlessness was 
welcomed by most. A Union soldier, upon hearing of the assassination, remarked in a 
personal letter that ―we ought to hang every damn rebel in the Southern Confederacy…I 
go in for killing every one and burn every traitor up north by a stake‖ (Olsen, 2006, p. 
228). Given such attitudes, Johnson had substantial public support upon taking the 
presidential oath.  
 Historians generally agree that the problems suffered by Johnson were mostly 
those of his own making. His first mistake proceeding with Reconstruction efforts during 
the spring of 1865, just after the war‘s end but during a Congressional recess, when he 
could enact policies without seeking consent or advice from legislators. He proceeded to 
implement his own version of Lincoln‘s ―Ten Percent Plan,‖ though in practice, Johnson 
was significantly more generous than even Lincoln had planned—he gave a general 
amnesty to all ex-Confederates (though high-ranking political and military figures would 
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have to apply to Johnson personally, most of which he ratified), quickly recognized new 
Southern governments and effectively declared Reconstruction over in December 1865. 
This was in spite of the fact that many states had officially refused to accept the 
Thirteenth Amendment, which outlawed slavery. Moreover, the states that did accept the 
Thirteenth Amendment often did so with reservations attached. The 1865 Georgia 
constitutional convention ratified the amendment, but only reluctantly, and only after 
asserting that slavery was ―consistent with the dictates of humanity and the strictest 
principles of morality and religion.‖ Alabama also ratified the amendment, but did so on 
the conditional premise that the action did not ―confer upon Congress the power to 
legislate upon the political status of freedmen in this State‖ (Williams, 2005, p. 471-472). 
Even more troubling, most southern states elected former Confederate leaders as their 
representatives to Congress, and passed a wide-ranging series of laws, nicknamed the 
―Black Codes,‖ which reduced freedmen rights to a condition not at all unlike slavery. 
Blacks were no longer allowed to serve on juries, to own guns, or quit jobs voluntarily. 
―Vagrancy laws‖ allowed the detention of freedmen seen engaged in ―idleness,‖ who 
could then be effectively sold off to large landowners for the price of their fines 
(Williams, 2005, p. 472). Through all of this, Andrew Johnson did nothing. His liberality, 
in light of his professed intent to punish the South for treason, left most Radicals 
―disappointed and disgusted,‖ and determined to reverse Johnson‘s policies (Olsen, 2006, 
p. 236).  
 The period known as Radical Reconstruction was generally marked by 
congressional Republicans‘ unwillingness to endure what they saw as Johnson‘s refusal 
to bring about rehabilitative change in the South. Olsen (2006) claims that Johnson‘s 
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leniency allowed Southerners—who were, at war‘s end, largely resigned to defeat and 
accepting of whatever fate the federal government doled out—to ―regain their fighting 
spirit‖ and resist Northern intervention, thus forcing the Radicals‘ hand (Olsen, 2006, p. 
236). Goodwin (2005) quotes the Richmond Whig, a Southern newspaper, on the 
assassination of Lincoln—―the heaviest blow which has ever fallen upon the people of 
the South has descended‖ (p. 744). The loss of Lincoln, the ascension of Johnson, and the 
revolt of the Radicals was the succession of heavy blows that changed the tenor of 
Reconstruction.  
 When President Johnson resisted Radical policies, he was shoved aside through 
veto override and made irrelevant to the new Republican effort to remake Southern 
society. Beginning with the Military Reconstruction Act of 1867 (which divided ten ex-
Confederate states into five separate military districts), Radicals effectively forced the 
acceptance of the 14
th
 Amendment and black male suffrage upon the South. Another 
Radical policy, the Tenure of Office Act, was ―violated‖ by Johnson when he fired the 
Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton; though the impeachment trial that followed failed to 
unseat Johnson, it signaled clearly that the executive branch was, for the time being, no 
longer part of the functional government of the United States. Republican state 
governments were successful in enacting some reforms, but practically all of them were 
forced to raise taxes in order to enact most of the repairs left over from the war—perhaps 
worse, they were accused of ineptitude and corruption, feeding Southern charges of black 
inferiority. The alienation of white Southerners and the preoccupation of Radicals in 
removing President Johnson allowed for a resurgence of both the Democratic Party and 
white insurgent groups, like the Ku Klux Klan (Olsen, 2006, p. 247). Over the late 1860s, 
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through a combination of solidarity among white voters and racial violence, Republicans 
lost strength in Southern states in the face of ―Redeemers‖ who vowed to return 
individual states to their prewar status. By 1876, the Democratic Party had effectively 
―redeemed‖ all the former Confederate states, and in so doing, had hit upon the ―unifying 
themes [which] provided the foundation of Southern Democrats‘ identity well into the 
twentieth century‖ (Olsen, 2006, p. 249). 
 Radical Reconstruction, most historians agree, failed to one degree or another. 
Early scholars of the era—primarily William Dunning and John W. Burgess—considered 
the period a disaster of corruption and seediness, finally undone by Southern Democrats 
and their restoration of ―home rule.‖ More recent historiography—particularly Eric 
Foner, who wrote the definitive modern work on the era, Reconstruction: America’s 
Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877—takes a more complex and comprehensive view of 
the era. Certainly, Reconstruction was a failure according to any metric, ―whether 
measured by the dreams inspired by emancipation or the more limited goals of securing 
blacks‘ rights as citizens and free laborers, and establishing an enduring Republican 
presence in the South‖ (Foner, 1988, p. 603). Possibly the most catastrophic feature of 
Reconstruction‘s failure is the degree to which it allowed (or even encouraged) the 
growth of the politically uniform ―Solid South,‖ which defined the scope and reach of 
racial policies throughout the United States for the next century. Given these failures, 
though, it is equally important to note Reconstruction‘s successes, among them the 
creation of African-American churches and political organizations, the establishment of 
black male suffrage, and a partial measure, at least, of economic independence. In 
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particular, the creation of constitutional and legislative tools (most notably, the 14
th
 
Amendment) would eventually allow for more widespread institutional equality.  
 Textbooks, generally, are commendable for the historical value of their narratives, 
with regard to Reconstruction. The chapters on this era are, for all ten books, well-
developed and detailed, and all provide multiple perspectives on the time period—white 
and black, Northern and Southern. Many focus their initial discussions on Reconstruction 
on the failure of Andrew Johnson—though the degree to which textbook authors blame 
Johnson (as opposed to Radicals) for the controversy that ensued varies. America: 
History of Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009) refers to Johnson‘s plan as ―relatively 
lenient,‖ and points out that Johnson did try to follow through with his policies without 
consulting legislators; but the authors also point out that in this, Johnson ―followed 
Lincoln‘s example‖ (p. 552). The Enduring Vision (Boyer, et al., 2008) avers that 
Johnson‘s worst error was ―[underestimating] the possibility of Republican unity‖ (p. 
471). America: Pathways to the Present (Cayton, et al., 2007), on the other hand, is less 
charitable, setting the stage for the postwar era by pointing to the inadequacy of Johnson: 
―With Lincoln‘s death, Reconstruction was now in the hands of a one-time slave owner 
from the South: the former Vice President, Andrew Johnson‖ (p. 427). Foner, in Give Me 
Liberty! (2008) describes Johnson as a ―lonely, stubborn man…intolerant of criticism and 
unable to compromise‖ (p. 560). As do other textbooks in this sample, The American 
Journey (Goldfield, et al., 2007) makes a special point of ―Johnson‘s disdain for wealthy 
whites,‖ a form of class envy or bitterness that is commonly cited as a motivating factor 
for the new President‘s policies (p. 465). The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010) goes so far 
as to affirm that Johnson ―hated wealthy Southern planters, whom he held responsible for 
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dragging poor whites into the war‖ (p. 377). The American Nation: A History of the 
United States (Carnes, et al., 2008) offers a discriminating view of Johnson, balancing 
views of his contemporaries with analysis of strengths and flaws: 
Thaddeus Stevens called Johnson a ―rank demagogue‖ and ―damned scoundrel,‖ 
and it is true that Johnson was a masterful rabble-rouser. But few men of his 
generation labored so consistently on behalf of small farmers. Free homesteads, 
public education, absolute social equality—these were his objectives…The 
president [however] proved temperamentally unable to work with [Radicals]…he 
soon alienated every powerful Republican in Washington...[Johnson] had great 
respect for states‘ rights and he shared most his poor white Tennessee 
constituents‘ contempt for blacks. ―Damn the negroes, I am fighting these 
traitorous aristocrats, their masters,‖ he told a friend during the war. (p. 411) 
 Johnson‘s bigotry is described explicitly in many textbooks of this sample. 
Visions of America: a History of the United States (Keene, et al., 2010), for instance, 
points to Johnson‘s ―racist views about African Americans,‖ and asserts that he 
―abhorred the notion of black equality‖ (p. 412). United States History (Lapansky-
Werner, et al., 2010), additionally, contrasts Johnson‘s attitudes towards newly-freed 
slaves with those of Radical Republicans:  
Johnson‘s dislike of the planter class did not translate into a desire to elevate 
African Americans. Like many southerners, Johnson expected the United States to 
have a ―government for white men.‖ He did not want African Americans to have 
the vote. In fact, he had little sympathy for their plight…Radical and moderate 
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Republicans were concerned about the lack of African American suffrage, but 
they remained hopeful that black political rights would soon follow (p. 405).  
Such rights did not follow, of course—instead, ―Black Codes‖ were adopted 
throughout the states of the former Confederacy. The linkage of Johnson‘s bigotry, 
Radicals‘ egalitarianism, and the Southern white backlash that followed implicitly casts 
Andrew Johnson as the antagonist of this narrative, the singular figure that betrayed 
Lincoln‘s legacy and abandoned ex-slaves. To student readers (especially in light of their 
chronic passivity towards received content), phrases such as the following heighten the 
impression that Andrew Johnson stood firmly opposed to racial progressivism, a core 
value of modern American political culture: ―While the Radicals claimed that federal 
intervention was needed to advance African American political and civil rights, President 
Johnson accused them of trying ‗to Africanize the southern half of our country‘‖ (p. 406).  
The degree to which Johnson‘s policies are construed as a betrayal of Lincoln‘s 
intentions is evident in several texts. The American Nation: A History of the United States 
(Carnes, et al., 2008), for example, describes Lincoln‘s ―Ten Percent Plan as a product of 
his ―lack of vindictiveness and his political wisdom‖ (p. 410-411). Johnson‘s version, 
which contained no ten-percent provision (since he assumed, probably correctly, that 
most southerners would be willing to take an oath of loyalty with the war over), had ―no 
chance‖ of passing Congress, the authors argue, due to its political shortsightedness; 
given the impact black citizenship would have on congressional apportionment and the 
regional balance of power, Republicans had little reason to support it. Thus Lincoln‘s 
vision was hamstrung by Johnson‘s practical myopia (p. 411). A similar view can be seen 
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in the narrative of The American Pageant ((Kennedy, et al., 2006), which establishes an 
analysis of Johnson‘s failings through the metaphor of a crucifixion:  
 
A few historians have argued that Andrew Johnson, now president-by-bullet, was 
crucified in Lincoln‘s stead. The implication is that if the ―rail-splitter‖ had lived, 
he would have suffered Johnson‘s fate of being impeached by the embittered 
members of his own party, who demanded harshness, not forbearance, toward the 
South. The crucifixion thesis does not stand up under scrutiny…the surefooted 
and experienced Lincoln could hardly have blundered into the same quicksands 
that engulfed Johnson…In addition to his powers of leadership refined in the war 
crucible, Lincoln possessed in full measure tact, sweet reasonableness, and an 
uncommon amount of common sense. Andrew Johnson, hot-tempered and 
impetuous, lacked all of these priceless qualities. (p. 479) 
 The American Pageant, to its credit, does acknowledge that Lincoln‘s plan did not 
meet with mass approval among Radicals in Congress—―Lincoln no doubt would have 
clashed with Congress; in fact, he had already found himself in some hot water‖ (p. 
479)—and other textbooks, notably The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010), describe the 
ambivalence many legislators felt towards the leniency of Lincoln‘s proposals, pointing 
out that Radical leaders saw little distinction between the former President and the new 
executive: ―To the dismay of Thaddeus Stevens and the Radicals, Johnson‘s plan differed 
little from Lincoln‘s‖ (p. 378). In such narratives, there is often a strange disconnect in 
the representation of Lincoln—treated as almost a mythic figure during the war itself, 
especially in describing his ability to hold the Union together, textbook authors struggle 
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to reorient their characterization of the ―martyred‖ President in light of ongoing 
contemporary criticism of his plans. There is no such difficulty with Andrew Johnson; he 
is routinely memorialized as at least obstinate, at most foolish, and in all cases misplaced. 
 The events of Radical Reconstruction are related in textbooks in much the same 
detail and order as in historiographical works. All the books in this study feature 
thorough descriptions of the Freedmen‘s Bureau, the, the Tenure of Office Act, the 
impeachment of Andrew Johnson, the 14
th
 and 15
th
 Amendments, the Civil Rights Act, 
the Military Reconstruction Act, and the Enforcement Acts designed to restrict white 
violence towards blacks. Several texts incorporate creative, though somewhat simplistic 
representations of the competing plans for Reconstruction, such as America: History of 
Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009)—see Figure 11: 
 
 
Figure 11: Opposing Plans for Reconstruction (America: History of Our Nation, 
Davidson & Stoff, 2009, p. 552) 
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In terms of the individual acts of Reconstruction, this study‘s sample does tend to 
include multiple viewpoints regarding the intent, effectiveness, and legacy  of the various 
acts of legislation. The most comprehensively examined policy initiative of the Radical 
Republicans, among these ten textbooks, is the Military Reconstruction Act of 1867. 
Some narratives are quite brusque in their description; The Americans (Danzer, et al., 
2010), for example, describes the Act in the barest terms possible—―Johnson vetoed the 
Reconstruction Act of 1867 because he believed it was in conflict with the Constitution. 
Congress promptly overrode the veto‖ (p. 381).  
America: Pathways to the Present (Cayton, et al., 2007), does somewhat better, 
relating the substance of the Act and pointing out that ―historians noted that this was 
indeed a ‗radical‘ act in American history‖ (p. 432). The authors provide no more 
explanation or justification for this statement; that is hardly the case, however, with The 
American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006), which includes a thoughtful, detailed 
argument about the radicalism (and pragmatism) of the Military Reconstruction Act:  
The bitterest pill of all to white Southerners was the stipulation that they 
guarantee in their state constitutions full suffrage for their former adult male 
slaves. Yet the act, reflecting moderate sentiment, stopped short of giving the 
freedmen land or education at federal expense. The overriding purpose of the 
moderates was to create an electorate that would vote those states back into the 
Union on acceptable terms and thus free the federal government from direct 
responsibility for the protection of black rights. As later events would 
demonstrate, this approach proved woefully inadequate to the cause of justice for 
blacks. (p. 492)  
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 The authors go on to critique the Reconstruction Act as an usurpation of executive 
authority by Congress, as well as a creation of ―a martial regime of dubious 
legality….Peacetime military rule seemed starkly contrary to the spirit of the 
Constitution. But the circumstances were extraordinary in the Republic‘s history, and for 
the time being the Supreme Court avoided offending the Republican Congress‖ (p. 492). 
Such interpretations carry their own moral weight, but from a historiographical 
perspective, this narrative provides a significant degree of depth, articulation, and 
complexity.  
The textbooks in this sample do a credible job of highlighting Radical 
Reconstruction‘s successes and failures. Many of them also present multiple historical 
interpretations of the event itself. United States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010), 
for example, incorporates a chart that summarizes the advances and setbacks of 
Reconstruction. In terms of successes, the text recognized that ―the Union is restored,‖ as 
well as ―Southern economic rebuilding begins‖; on the other side of the ledger, the text 
concedes that ―distribution of wealth and power in the South remains unchanged,‖ as well 
as the fact that racism precipitated the limitation of African-American voting rights (p. 
428). America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009) includes the following 
summation of historical analyses of Reconstruction:  
Historians once took a critical view of Radical Reconstruction, focusing on the 
widespread corruption and extensive spending during this period. More recently, 
however, historians have written about important accomplishments of 
Reconstruction. They noted that during Reconstruction, southern states opened 
public schools for the first time. Legislators spread taxes more evenly and made 
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fairer voting rules. They gave property rights to women. In additions, states 
rebuilt bridges, roads, and buildings destroyed by the war. (p. 555) 
The Enduring Vision (Boyer, et al., 2008) highlights the Radicals‘ unwillingness 
to guarantee a ―large military presence in the South,‖ which would have protected 
freedmen‘s rights, and the subsequent diminishment of federal power in the former 
Confederate states as the major factor in the failure of Reconstruction (p. 481). United 
States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010), rather than blaming Republicans for not 
doing enough, accuses white Southerners of being the primary factors behind 
Reconstruction‘s shortcomings. In a section titled ―Violence Undermines Reform 
Efforts,‖ the authors describe the ―fierce economic competition‖ that existed in the war-
ravaged South and how such competition ―fueled the fire of white southerners‘ outrage‖ 
(p. 416-417). 
Eric Foner, in Give Me Liberty (2008) gives one of the more sweeping 
characterizations of Reconstruction, as may be expected, given his preeminence as a 
historian of the era. Foner acknowledges Radical Reconstruction‘s ―limitations‖ and the 
―daunting challenges‖ faced by Radical reformers, as well as exploring one of the 
fundamental constraints on the American concept of freedom in the nineteenth century: 
―The policy of granting black men the vote while denying them the benefits of land 
ownership strengthened the idea that the free citizen could be a poor, dependent laborer‖ 
(p. 581). Foner does, however, draw attention to the ―remarkable‖ achievements of 
Reconstruction, given such restrictions, and argues that one of the most important 
achievements of the era was the emphasis placed on an enduring social and political 
issue: ―how, in a modern society, to define the economic essence of freedom‖ (p. 581).  
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The American Journey (Goldfield, et al., 2007) attributes the failures of Radical 
Reconstruction to a similar issue—a national conceptual resistance to the evolution of 
political and natural rights. Particular to this resistance was the issue of voting, which 
most nineteenth-century Americans saw as something less than a given: ―Voting was a 
privilege to be earned, they maintained, not a basic right of citizenship. And black people, 
according to some Republicans, had not earned that right‖ (p. 471). The narrative labels 
this a ―racist assumption,‖ one that was gaining ―an aura of scientific respectability‖ 
among the intellectual and social elite in America: ―White racial theorists held that it was 
folly to grant suffrage to African Americans because an inferior race (black) could not 
hold power over a superior race (white)‖ (p. 471-472).  
On the whole, then, the textbooks in this sample do a commendable job in their 
accounts of Presidential Reconstruction and Radical Reconstruction. A common feature 
of these narratives is a significant degree of historical complexity; however, such 
complexity tends to carry moral qualifications, both implicit and explicit. Such 
qualifications will be apparent during the categorical analysis of jus post bellum.  
 
Categorical Analysis 
The categorical analysis of textbook narrative descriptions of Presidential and Radical 
Reconstruction falls into the following categories: compensation and punishment, and 
rehabilitation. 
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Compensation and punishment. 
 The issue of compensation is central to any jus post bellum analysis. Material 
devastation and financial loss are natural to any conflict; and for one as destructive as the 
Civil War, such destruction was more widespread than had been previously imaginable. 
Even worse, the sectional nature of the war created a major complication—given the fact 
that the former Confederate states were to rejoin the Union as a consequence of their 
defeat, the cost of rebuilding those areas would become, by default, the responsibility of 
the entire nation.  
 Brian Orend, in The Morality of War (2006), argues that any financial settlement 
between former combatants must be permissible under other jus post bellum conditions, 
primarily proportionality and discrimination. The issue is not strictly financial, though it 
is often reducible to that—put simply, the ―Aggressor has cost [the] Victim a 
considerable amount, and so at least some restitution is due.‖ From a ―just war‖ 
perspective, there are two major questions—―how much and from whom [in the aggressor 
state] is the compensation to be paid out‖ (Orend, 2006, p. 166)? 
 The first question, how much, is subject to the proportionality rule; the civilian 
population of the aggressor state has a claim to human rights, just as does the civilian 
populace of the victimized state, and those rights can‘t be violated through a mass 
bankruptcy of the defeated nation‘s financial resources. The second question, from whom, 
is more complicated. The difficulty (and irony) for the federal government at the 
conclusion of the Civil War lay in the fact that any financial settlement would come from 
the newly-unified nation—which meant, in effect, that Northerners would be paying for 
the rebuilding of the South, after they had paid to destroy it. 
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 This is, of course, an unavoidable aspect of civil war, but never before in 
American history (and, arguably, in human history), had it been faced on such a 
monumental scale. The total cost of the Civil War is difficult to calculate or even to 
fathom. Some estimates puts the combined cost at over $1 trillion, while other scholars 
limit their estimation to the total amount raised by each side, in the form of taxes or 
loans—$3 billion for the North, $2 billion for the South (Powell, 2008). Whether or not 
the nation would have the ability to absorb the massive financial investment necessary to 
achieve the physical aspects of Reconstruction was unclear.  
 Most of the textbooks in this sample tend to focus on the legal, emotional, and 
political ramifications of reunification after the Civil War. There is only cursory mention 
of economic issues, which mainly occurs as a form of framing or introductory device to 
the subject of Reconstruction in general. Several textbooks—for example, Give Me 
Liberty! (Foner, 2008)—describe one of the conditions of Presidential Reconstruction 
that was required of Southern states, a repudiation of Confederate debt. This is less an 
issue of compensation, however, and more an issue of submission to federal authority by 
dismissing the financial obligations of an eliminated government. Only a few textbooks 
explicitly mention any form of financial compensation, which—given the particular 
impact of reunification as the mechanism for peace—took the form of taxes. The 
Enduring Vision (Boyer, et al., 2008) describes how Republican governments of southern 
states, established during the period of Radical hegemony, were forced to raise taxes in 
order to rebuild the shattered infrastructure of Southern society—―Because rebuilding the 
devastated South and expanding state government cost millions, taxes skyrocketed.‖ The 
increased revenues allowed for massive rebuilding, but also fueled Reconstruction‘s 
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critics, who termed Republican administrations, both federal and state, the ―most 
stupendous system of organized robbery in history‖ (p. 479). Beyond this, there is no 
overt mention of any financial form of compensation. 
 It may be, though, that it is unfair to expect textbooks to properly address a strict 
definition of compensation in their content. Certainly, the classic failing of textbooks—
lack of complexity and depth—may play a part in such a deficiency, but also the peculiar 
nature of the Civil War precludes a clear-cut establishment of compensation by an 
aggressor state to a victim state. One must turn, then, to other components of ―just war‖ 
theory that may substitute in this situation for the moral elements of compensation, if not 
the legal ones. The most appropriate condition would be the issue of punishment. 
 As the war drew to a close, and it became apparent that the Confederacy would 
not win, many Northerners began to call for harsh retribution against Southern leaders 
and military commanders for treason. Orend (2006) and Walzer (1977) argue that a 
distinction must be made between soldiers—who are following orders, and are thus 
generally protected from postwar prosecution except in the case of blatant violations of 
other ―just war‖ conditions (e.g., proportionality)—and leaders, who have committed 
egregious violations of ―just war‖ tenets.  
 It would be unfair to draw comparisons between modern trials for heads of state 
for war crimes and any hypothetical trials for Confederate leaders, like Jefferson Davis. 
First, such trials, of course, never occurred—Davis, the most famous ―traitor,‖ was never 
put on trial (though he was imprisoned for a time). Second, the crimes for which trials 
and tribunals have been created in the last century have been for crimes so outside the 
realm of traditional conduct in war—most notably, the Nuremberg Tribunals for genocide 
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and crimes against humanity—that nothing of which Confederacy might have been 
accused can be considered comparable. In point of fact, only one Confederate officer—
Henry Wirz, the commandant of Andersonville Prison—was court-martialed and 
ultimately executed for his crimes, and that only because public outrage over the 
revolting standards at the prison convinced Union authorities of the necessity for such a 
trial (Williams, 2005, p. 239).  
 Orend (2006) and Walzer (1977) reach similar conclusions about the blame that 
may be reasonably affixed on political and military leaders—generally, ―the greater a 
person‘s influence on his country‘s actions in wartime, the greater his responsibility for 
them‖ (Orend, 2006, p. 176). Using this principle, both Presidential and Radical 
Reconstruction can be examined from a ―just war‖ perspective. Did either plan demand 
compensation in the form of punishment for political or military figures, and to what 
degree do textbooks represent this? 
 Lee‘s surrender at Appomattox and Grant‘s acceptance thereof set the conditions 
for common soldiers of the Confederacy—they would be granted a general amnesty and 
immunity from further prosecution, and be allowed to keep their personal effects and, 
where applicable, their horses and mules. For political leaders, the situation was more 
complex and addressed both under Presidential and Radical Reconstruction plans. To 
their credit, the textbooks of this sample all differentiate between the possibility of 
punishment for Confederate soldiers and their political leaders, which is an essential 
condition of ―just war‖ theory. The U.S. government‘s policy towards the latter class of 
Southerners is often depicted in textbooks but rarely offered for critique. 
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Under Andrew Johnson, the federal approach was distinguished for its leniency 
towards ex-Confederates, a fact which many textbooks highlight. America: History of 
Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009) includes a quotation from Radical leader, Senator 
Charles Sumner, at the beginning of its paragraph on Reconstruction, next to a picture of 
Johnson and the heading, “Who Shall Rule the South?” The quotation reads: ―Rebels 
found themselves in places of trust, while the truehearted Unionists, who had watched for 
the coming of our flag and ought to have enjoyed its protecting power, were driven into 
hiding places‖ (p. 552). The text goes on to describe Johnson‘s plan to offer a general 
amnesty to most ex-Confederates and characterizes the approach as ―relatively lenient‖ 
(p. 552). America: Pathways to the Present (Cayton, et al., 2007) asserts that Johnson‘s 
plan was ―generous,‖ and goes on to state that his policy, ―although officially it denied 
pardons to all Confederate leaders,‖ was hardly that stringent in reality: ―Johnson often 
issued pardons to those who asked him personally. In 1865, he pardoned 13,000 
southerners‖ (p. 427). The implication that all 13,000 must have asked him personally 
and were thus granted pardons seems unrealistic, but the authors present the point without 
further comment.  
 Other textbooks describe how Johnson‘s leniency contributed to both flagging 
support for his policies and Radical disenchantment with Presidential Reconstruction. 
Eric Foner‘s Give Me Liberty! (2008) points out that, ―at first, most northerners believed 
Johnson‘s policy deserved a chance to succeed,‖ but eventually the behavior of Southern 
states—the election of ex-Confederates to Congress, and reports of violence towards 
freed blacks—together with Johnson‘s reluctance to curb such conduct, led to resistance 
among Northern Republicans (p. 561). Foner argues that it was the passage of the Black 
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Codes that signaled to Radicals that Johnson was ultimately unwilling to demand 
Southern submission to federal policy, which they saw as the only real form of 
compensation available. Foner places the blame for the harsher policies of the Radicals 
squarely on the South:  
Wars—especially civil wars—often generate hostility and bitterness. But few 
groups of rebels in history have been treated more leniently than the defeated 
Confederates. A handful of southern leaders were arrested but most were quickly 
released. Only one was executed…Most of the Union army was swiftly 
demobilized. What motivated the North‘s turn against Johnson‘s policies was not 
a desire to ―punish‖ the white South, but the inability of the South‘s political 
leaders to accept the reality of emancipation. (p. 562) 
 The American Nation: a History of the United States (Carnes, et al., 2008) also 
holds that the Southerners were comparatively well-treated after the war‘s end. The 
authors implicate ―the refusal of the South to accept the spirit of even the mild 
reconstruction designed by Johnson‖ as a primary factor behind ―ever more overbearing 
efforts to bring the ex-Confederates to heel‖ (p. 415), and they point out that prior to 
Reconstruction, the Civil War was marked by considerably more humane treatment than 
might have been expected:  
Despite its bloodiness, the Civil War had caused less intersectional hatred than 
might have been expected. Although civilian property was often seized or 
destroyed, the invading armies treated the southern population with forbearance, 
both during the war and after Appomattox. While confederate President Davis 
was ensconced in Richmond behind Lee‘s army, Northerners boasted that they 
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would ―hang Jeff Davis from a sour apple tree,‖ and he was at once clapped into 
irons preparatory to being tried for treason and murder.  But feeling against Davis 
subsided quickly. In 1867 the military turned him over to the civil courts, which 
released him on bail. He was never brought to trial. A few other Confederate 
officials spent short periods behind bars, but the only Southerner executed for war 
crimes was Major Henry Wirz, the commandant of Andersonville military prison. 
(p. 410)  
The American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006) addresses the same issue of 
imprisoning former Confederate leaders, but does so with a more skeptical tone:  
[Davis] and his fellow ‗conspirators‘ were finally released, partly because the 
odds were that no Virginia jury would convict them. All the rebel leaders were 
finally pardoned by President Johnson as sort of a Christmas present in 1868. But 
Congress did not remove all remaining civil disabilities until thirty years later and 
only posthumously restored Davis‘s citizenship more than a century later. (p. 479) 
Still, the issue here is not whether either version—that Davis and other 
Confederates were treated fairly, unfairly, or too generously—is right, but whether or not 
textbooks contain narrative that infers a moral position, as measured against ―just war‖ 
doctrine. Together, there is significant content, in the textbooks of this study, that 
addresses the ―just war‖ components of compensation and punishment; yet, there are few 
opportunities for students to question the moral decisions of either President Johnson or 
Radical Republicans, from either a historical or moral standpoint.  
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Rehabilitation. 
 Possibly the most complex component of jus post bellum is that of rehabilitation, 
the attempt by a victorious state to rebuild the fundamental structure of a defeated 
nation‘s society so as to prevent further acts of aggression. Such efforts are complicated, 
aimed at social and political institutions that are often grounded historically, culturally, 
sometimes even ethnically or religiously. Attempts at national rehabilitation are often 
long-term investments of national capital, and recent examples (the U.S. occupation of 
Iraq) highlight the manner in which well-meaning policies can often have substantial 
negative repercussions.  
 Orend asserts, in The Morality of War (2006), that the ―opportunity to reform 
decrepit institutions in an aggressor regime‖ are permissible, so long as such efforts are 
―proportional to the degree of depravity in the regime‖ (p. 181). These reforms are not 
only meant to be durable solutions to future hostile acts from that nation, but also a form 
of permanent ―exit strategy‖ from future wars—all of which, claims Orend, are allowable 
under ―just war‖ theory, so long as they are ethical. One of the chief concerns in this area 
is the reform of what Orend terms ―illegitimate state structures,‖ and the degree to which 
they can be altered, transformed, or replaced (p. 190).  
 Peter Temes, in The Just War: An American Reflection on the Morality of War in 
Our Time (2003), posits three main principles for a ―just‖ war: first, that the conflict 
―sanctifies human life‖ by treating all people, on both sides, as equally valued (in 
opposition to the general dehumanization of opponents); second, that the war is ―about 
the future, not the past‖; and third, that the war ―preserves and strengthens the principles 
of individual rights, based on the notion that the legitimacy of government derives from 
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the consent of the governed‖ (p. 193). The last two precepts are fully in the tradition of 
jus post bellum—a war should be fought with a moral aim in mind and the intent to 
change those preexisting conditions that led to the initial conflict. Temes quotes Karl 
Marx, who wrote in the midst of the Civil War that ―Up to now [1862] we have witnessed 
only the first act of the Civil War—the constitutional waging of war. The second act, the 
revolutionary waging of war, is at hand‖ (cited in Temes, 2003, p. 195). Marx‘s point—
and Temes‘, too—is that the Civil War became revolutionary (and moral) when Lincoln 
transformed the conflict from a war of reunion to a war of liberation; and in so doing, the 
rehabilitation of the South, in order to prevent further oppression and denial of human 
liberty, became a moral necessity.  
 Orend (2006) spends considerable time describing the conditions for a successful 
rehabilitation of a defeated regime and what steps in that process may be considered just. 
He examines the reconstruction of Germany and Japan after World War II and points to 
several policies which ultimately not only helped both nations recover and made each 
strong partners to the U.S., but also made future conflicts substantially less likely while 
retaining each nation‘s unique cultural identity. In Germany, the Nazi party was banned 
and the purging process of ―de-Nazi-fication‖ removed former political leaders from 
participation. The militaries of both Germany and Japan were disbanded, and the United 
States and her allies became the singular security force in the postwar environment. 
Additionally, the Allies created ―Basic Law‖ in the form of written constitutions and 
revamped both nation‘s educational systems to remove the ―racism, ultra-nationalism and 
distorted ignorance of the outside world‖ that presaged World War II (p. 194). Finally, 
and most importantly, American leaders realized that these reforms would certainly fail 
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in an unstable economic climate; and thus, rather than trying to punitively remove capital 
from Japan and Germany in the form of reparation payments, as with World War I, the 
United States pumped billions of dollars into both national economies. The results of this 
effort are quite clear—Germany and Japan, both former combatants, are now ―very good 
‗citizens‘ on the global stage,‖ who have retained their cultural distinctiveness, providing 
―clear evidence that even massive forcible post-war changes need not threaten ‗a nation‘s 
character,‘ or what makes it unique and special to its people‖ (p. 194). 
 The example of Reconstruction after the Civil War was, in many ways, the first 
modern attempt at national rehabilitation, and both Andrew Johnson and Radical 
Republicans attempted to create a ―new‖ South from which further acts of aggression, 
towards the North or its own people, were eliminated. The question here is not to what 
degree each succeeded, or to what degree such efforts were moral—the question is to 
what degree do the textbooks of this sample contain content that is reflective of the ―just 
war‖ condition of rehabilitation? 
 Many of the actual elements of both phases of Reconstruction—e.g., the creation 
of the Freedmen‘s Bureau, the Civil Rights Act, the Military Reconstruction Act—were 
imbued with the rehabilitative spirit and were clearly aimed at remaking Southern life. 
All of these events and policies are covered in significant detail, typically in stand-alone 
sections, with a considerable level of complexity (especially when compared to other 
Civil War topics). Particularly, the initial phase of Radical Reconstruction, after the 
passage of the Military Reconstruction Act, is reflective of Orend‘s conditions for 
―coercive regime change.‖ America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009) 
highlights how Union soldiers helped blacks in the South register to vote for the first 
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time, after which ―states wrote new constitutions and, in June 1868, Congress seated 
representatives from seven ‗reconstructed‘ states‖ (p. 555). The language here is 
inferential rather than explicit—the authors modestly claim that ―Under military rule, the 
South took on a new look,‖ which is a mild characterization, to say the least. Still, 
though, the content in question does address the issue of rehabilitation, and contains a 
clear element of approval for such efforts. 
 Visions of America: a History of the United States (Keene, et al., 2010) 
encapsulates the view that coercive rehabilitation was necessary, given the failure of the 
South to adopt to the new reality at war‘s end:  
Many Northerners wondered if the Civil War had been fought in vain. Had 
hundreds of thousands died to defeat the Confederacy only to see their leaders 
quickly resume power? Had slavery been abolished only to be replaced with a 
similar system of unfree labor? (p. 413) 
The passage above points to the two events most often identified as the pivot 
between Presidential and Radical Reconstruction—the election of former Confederates to 
the U.S. Congress and the widespread adoption of ―Black Codes.‖ Textbooks often indict 
the Southern implementation of the Black Codes as the justification for a harsher 
reconstruction policy, since it seemed evident at that point that ―softer,‖ Presidential 
Reconstruction had failed to achieve necessary regime change. United States History 
(Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010), for example, describes how both ―Radical and moderate 
Republicans were infuriated by the South‘s disregard for the spirit of Reconstruction‖ (p. 
406). The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010) portrays the dissatisfaction Republicans felt 
over Johnson‘s desire for a quick reconciliation: ―Many [Radicals] believed that the 
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Southern states were not much different from the way they had been before the war. As a 
result, Congress refused to admit the newly elected Southern legislators‖ (p. 378). And 
the Black Codes were indicative of the South‘s desire to re-institutionalize the practice, if 
not the formality, of slavery: ―To many members of Congress, the passage of black codes 
indicated that the South had not given up the idea of keeping African Americans in 
bondage‖ (p. 379). The American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006) echoes the frustrations 
of many Republicans in light of such Southern repressions: ―Again, angry voices in the 
North raised the cry, who won the war‖ (p. 488)? 
The Radical belief that coercive regime change was necessary is on full display in 
many textbooks from this sample. Give Me Liberty! (Foner, 2008) describes how ―the 
Radicals fully embraced the expanded powers of the federal government born during the 
Civil War. Traditions of federalism and states‘ rights, they insisted, must not obstruct a 
sweeping national effort to protect the rights of all Americans‖ (p. 562) The American 
Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006), on the other hand, sees the Radical attempts to 
undertake a massive renovation of American society as less a noble experiment and more 
a hardheaded political assessment:  
While the South had been ―out‖ from 1861 to 1865, the Republicans in Congress 
had enjoyed a relatively free hand. They had passed much legislation that favored 
the North, such as the Morrill Tariff, the Pacific Railroad Act, and the Homestead 
Act. Now many Republicans balked at giving up this political advantage. (p. 488) 
The American Nation: a History of the United States (Carnes, et al., 2008) issues 
its own judgment regarding the Radical embrace of rehabilitation in the South. ―The 
Radicals,‖ the authors claim, ―were in effect demanding not merely equal rights for 
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freedmen but extra rights; not merely the vote but special protection of that right against 
the pressure that southern whites would surely apply to undermine it.‖ The need for such 
protection would necessarily lead, the text maintains, to ―interference by the federal 
government in local affairs, a concept at variance with American practice [and] 
conventional American beliefs in equality before the law and individual self reliance‖ (p. 
414). This, by itself, would represent a thorough and thoughtful analysis of the Radical 
approach, and would comprise a substantial degree of content representative of ―just war‖ 
perspectives. The American Nation goes even further, though, and issues a fairly explicit 
endorsement of the Radical approach and their ultimate goal: ―Events were to show that 
the Radicals were correct—that what amounted to a political revolution in state-federal 
relations was essential if blacks were to achieve real equality. But in the climate of that 
day their proposals encountered bitter resistance, and not only from white Southerners‖ 
(p. 414). For the purposes of this study, whether or not The American Nation is right is 
beside the point; the incorporation of such a moral viewpoint is representative of ―just 
war‖ doctrine.  
Interestingly, several textbooks include descriptions of attempts at Reconstruction 
prior to the war‘s formal end. Eric Foner, in Give Me Liberty! (2008) depicts the Sea 
Islands Experiment, in which Northern Radical reformers helped newly freed slaves in 
coastal South Carolina to create a new social structure. On the Sea Islands, freedmen 
owned and worked their own land, produced their own crops (sweet potatoes, rather than 
rice, rejecting the slavery-era stigma of that crop), and largely ran their affairs. Foner 
points to the benefits and long-term hazards of such an experiment:  
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By 1865, the Sea Island experiment was widely held to be a success. Black 
families were working for wages, acquiring education, and enjoying better shelter 
and clothing and more varied diet than under slavery. But the experiment also 
bequeathed to postwar Reconstruction the contentious issue of whether land 
ownership should accompany black freedom. (p. 537-538) 
Foner also depicts a military attempt at rehabilitation during the war itself, which 
he terms ―Wartime Reconstruction.‖ After the capture of Vicksburg in 1863, Union 
military authorities forced white plantation owners (the ones who had taken a loyalty 
oath) to sign labor contracts with newly emancipated slaves. The traditional relationship 
of landowner-to-laborer would remain, with one major exception: ―unlike before the war, 
[blacks] would be paid wages and provided with education, physical punishment was 
prohibited, and their families were safe from disruption by sale‖ (p. 538). Foner uses 
these examples to demonstrate not only the promise of Reconstruction, but also the future 
conflicts such attempts at rehabilitation would create, particularly over the issue of land 
ownership. 
Only one other textbook, Visions of America: a History of the United States 
(Keene, et al., 2010), includes references to the Sea Islands, as well as similar black 
resettlement projects in Louisiana and Davis Bend, Mississippi. This textbook, however, 
is less optimistic in its depiction of such experiments, calling into question the motivation 
of the reformers that helped the freedmen. Initially, the ex-slaves engaged in subsistence 
farming; when reformers arrived, they came with ―a very different vision of the future for 
the Sea Islands‖ (p. 406). Federal authorities did not give land to freedmen, but instead 
sold it, primarily to Northern investors. Such investors were intent on restarting cotton 
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production and hired blacks as wage earners. The text questions the moral intent of white 
reformers in these projects, allowing initially for the prospect that such efforts were 
―sincere,‖ motivated by a belief that small-plot subsistence farming was ―backward [and] 
harmful to the long-term interests of the freedmen.‖ Directly thereafter, however, the 
authors parallel this motive with the statement that reformers also held ―the racist notion 
that African Americans were not capable of handling their freedom responsibly and 
therefore needed white employers to guide them‖ (p. 406-407). According to Visions of 
America: a History of the United States, efforts at pre-1865 Reconstruction were, at best, 
only middling in success, and (seemingly worse), they ―created a host of conflicting 
visions regarding the rights of freedmen, land redistribution, and the authority of ex-slave 
owners‖ (p. 408).  
Textbook narratives from this sample are fairly clear in their endorsement of 
Radical policies. This is not to say that such endorsements are explicitly stated or 
affirmed; that would run contrary to the generally passive voice employed by most 
standard textbooks. Instead, the attempts by Radical Republicans are generally presented 
as virtuous, motivated by notions of equality and justice, whereas resistance in the South 
is shown as motivated by racism, fear, ignorance, and bitterness. The Americans (Danzer, 
et al., 2010) portrays ―resentful whites [who] used violence to keep blacks from 
improving their position in society,‖ (p. 378), while America: Pathways to the Present 
(Cayton, et al., 2007) decries the ―brutality‖ of white Southerners towards freedmen 
while describing the ―public outrage‖ over such incidents (p. 432). The American 
Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006) probably is most equitable in its treatment of the postwar 
South, describing ex-Confederates as ―beaten but unbent,‖ who ―cursed the 
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‗damnyankees‘ [sic] and spoke of ‗your government‘ in Washington, instead of ‗our 
government‘‖ (p. 480). Southerners were ―conscious of no crime,‖ and ―continued to 
believe that they view of secession of correct and that the ‗lost cause‘ was a just war.‖ 
Still, though, despite this attempt to incorporate the perspective of white Southerners, the 
text‘s authors still manage to characterize the former combatants as ―dangerously 
defiant‖ (p. 480).  
 Textbooks often portray the remaking of Southern society as inevitable, the only 
possible solution to the issues that led to the Civil War. The American Pageant (Kennedy, 
et al., 2006), as described earlier, characterizes the Reconstruction Act of 1867 as an act 
of moderation, one intended to ―create an electorate that would vote [Southern] states 
back into the Union on acceptable terms.‖ The text makes it clear, though, that this policy 
did not go far enough: ―As later events would demonstrate, this approach proved 
woefully inadequate to the cause of justice for blacks‖ (p. 492). This conclusion may well 
be right; many historians consider Reconstruction (at least, the proposed reforms, if not 
the actual ones) to have been an appropriate response to the original causes of secession, 
or even, as with The American Pageant, not far-reaching enough. ―Just war‖ theorists, in 
view of the general rule that violence should be limited in all ethical ways, would tend to 
accept a limited resolution without coercive regime change, but only if the factors which 
led to the conflict were rectified. If not, one is left with an unjust resolution.  
One of the important points about the concept of rehabilitation is the ethical 
application of force. Orend (2006) believes that issues of all three phases of ―just war‖—
jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and just post bellum—must be ethically maintained 
throughout the entire progression of the war itself. If a state‘s cause for going to war is 
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just, Orend asserts, it does not necessarily follow that its conduct in war, or its postwar 
resolutions, will be similarly just—but, by the same token, if a defeated state does not 
obey the provisions of a postwar resolution, the victorious state would be justified in 
using additional force, in defense of its continued just cause. In effect, then, all phases of 
―just war‖ must be satisfied in order for a war to be considered morally permissible.  
Textbooks do sometimes reflect this understanding of rehabilitation, though such 
reflection tends to be inchoate. The American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006), for 
example, acknowledges different attitudes between moderate and Radical Republicans 
regarding the correct course of action in the South, but also states that ―one thing both 
groups had come to agree on…was the necessity to enfranchise black voters, even if it 
took federal troops to do it‖ (p. 492). In fact, several textbooks also note that military 
force was not the only form of coercion that was at use during this period. When Radicals 
and President Johnson were at loggerheads over their competing visions for 
Reconstruction, Republicans in Congress were willing to override the President‘s veto of 
the Civil Rights Act and the Military Reconstruction Act, the first time that particular 
method of legislative force had been used in American history.  
On the whole, all the textbooks contain significant passages related the Radical 
attempt to remake Southern society after the war; yet very few provide opportunities for 
students to critically examine or challenge the ethical value of such policies. Whether or 
not Reconstruction (Presidential or Radical) was a moral approach, of course, depends 
heavily on one‘s perspective. The perspective of this study is drawn from ―just war‖ 
tradition—and textbook depictions of the two main phases of Reconstruction, and the 
moral conclusions drawn or inferred from those depictions, are at issue. Textbooks in this 
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sample are unmistakably more willing to include moral content in their depictions of 
Reconstruction, but there are few clear opportunities in the narratives for students to 
question the policies of that era.  
 
The 14
th
 Amendment 
The willingness of Radical Republicans to use legislative and constitutional tools 
to effect rehabilitative efforts in the South is well-explored in historiography and well-
represented in textbooks. Radical Republicans used the constitutional amendment process 
to enshrine and protect the advances made in race relations during their control of 
Congress, in the late 1860s. The Thirteenth Amendment banned slavery, which was 
enormously important in its own time; the 14
th
 Amendment, however, which guaranteed 
―equal protection‖ under the law, has had significantly more repercussions in the modern 
era. In this section, textbook depictions of the 14
th
 Amendment, one of the most 
important and far-reaching milestones of Reconstruction, are examined. 
 
Historical Narrative Analysis 
 The 14
th
 Amendment is a legislative achievement that most historians rank 
alongside the most important of American history, not least of which for its long-term 
impact. It was the first constitutional amendment since 1804, and while its contemporary 
purpose was protective of newly-granted status for blacks, it has become one of the most 
expansive and powerful constitutional tools in American political culture. 
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 In effect, the 14
th
 Amendment is little more than the citizenship provisions of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 (Olsen, 2006, p. 239). In reality, though, the 14
th
 Amendment 
was, as Eric Foner writes (1988), the result of the Radicals‘ ―lonely battle… [aiming for] 
equality before the law, overseen by the national government‖ (p. 256). This was the 
central tenet of the Amendment, though some historians differ on the nature of Radical 
motivation for its passage. Olsen (2006) relies on the most traditional explanation for the 
Amendment: to prevent future legislative rollback of Radical policies, particularly the 
Civil Rights Act, which, Republicans presumed, would come under assault from any 
Democratic-controlled Congress (p. 239). Williams (2005) claims that the amendment‘s 
support among Republicans was driven by the knowledge among the Congressional 
majority that ―blacks would vote for Republican candidates if given the opportunity‖ (p. 
475). Foner (1988), considered the authoritative voice on the era, claims the Amendment 
was brought about by a series of contemporaneous factors: ―the break with the President, 
the need to find a measure upon which all Republicans could unite, and the growing 
consensus within the party around the need for strong federal action to protect the 
freedmen‘s rights, short of suffrage‖ (p. 257).  
 One of the few provisions of the Amendment that can be taken concretely is its 
passage on citizenship: ―All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they 
reside.‖ This phrase ―[established] the primacy of a national citizenship whose common 
rights the states could not abridge‖ (Foner, 1988, p. 258), a fact which carried tremendous 
portent in its own time. The Radical Republicans in Congress had embarked on a massive 
―state-building‖ process, and the  14th Amendment represented a permanent and far-
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reaching intrusion into local Southern politics. It was true that many Republicans 
considered the proposal more moderate than it might have been; only if state 
governments failed to protect the newly-granted citizenship of freedmen would the 
federal government be empowered to intervene, thus placing the main authority in the 
states. However, what was at issue was less the immediate meaning of the 14
th
 
Amendment, but instead its future role in the creation of a ―new political leadership that 
would respect the principle of equality before the law‖ (Foner, 1988, p. 259).  
 The 14
th
 Amendment had a divisive effect on the nation, partially because it 
encompassed fears in the former Confederacy that the Radical intent was to 
disenfranchise white Southerners and to empower blacks, and partially because, under the 
Military Reconstruction Act of 1867, readmission to the Union was tied to a state‘s 
acceptance of the Amendment. What made the Amendment powerful as well as impactful 
was its adaptability of the Amendment. Republicans at the time understood the need for a 
flexible constitutional tool, given the dynamic and changing nature of the process. The 
phrases ―equal protection‖ and ―privileges and immunities‖ from Section 1 of the 
Amendment would undergo chronic reinterpretation, given the number and changing 
nature of injustices to which blacks might be subjected in the postwar South. The federal 
court system would, in years to come, attempt to dilute the Amendment‘s import—
through the courts‘ refusal to dismantle ―Jim Crow‖ laws in the 1870s (Williams, 2005, 
p. 477), and particularly with the Slaughterhouse Cases of 1873—in which the Supreme 
Court chief justice, Samuel Miller, asserted that since the rights described in the 
Amendment still resided in the states, thus the Amendment itself had, effectively, 
―nothing to do‖ (Foner, 1988, p. 529). As the United States grew into the twentieth 
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century, though, the 14
th
 Amendment‘s promise of ―equal protection‖ became one of the 
main constitutional instruments for achieving racial equality, primarily during the civil 
rights era of the 1950s-1960s. Moreover, the language of the Amendment, guaranteeing 
―equal protection‖ to all those born within the United States, provided a crucial 
constitutional platform from which, eventually, to secure the right of suffrage for 
American women (Williams, 2005, p. 478).  
All the textbooks in this sample include the 14
th
 Amendment, though some 
dedicate considerably more attention to it than others. In some cases this is probably a 
result of authorial choice—Eric Foner, the chief writer of Give Me Liberty! (2008), is also 
one of the leading contemporary authorities on the Reconstruction era, so it is 
understandable that he might dedicate more time and pages to such a constitutional 
milestone.  
Generally, textbooks accurately reflect the Amendment‘s origins, its intent, and 
its impact. Visions of America: a History of the United States (Keene, et al., 2010), for 
example, establishes the Radical belief that the reforms they had achieved might prove 
tenuous: ―The recently passed Civil Rights Bill was an unprecedented piece of 
legislation, but its supporters knew that it could easily be overturned by a later Congress. 
An amendment, on the other hand, became a permanent part of the Constitution‖ (p. 416). 
America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009) provides context to the 
Radicals‘ concerns: ―Republicans remembered the Court‘s Dred Scott decision. In that 
ruling, the Court declared that no one descended from an enslaved person could be a 
United States citizen‖ (p. 554). America: Pathways to the Present (Cayton, et al., 2007) 
also references this fear among Republicans, as well as neatly summarizing the singular 
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impact of the 14
th
 Amendment: ―Concerned that courts might strike down the Civil 
Rights Act, Congress decided to build equal rights into the Constitution‖ (p. 431). The 
American Journey (Goldfield, et al., 2007) describes the 14
th
 Amendment as an attempt 
to ―To keep freedmen‘s rights safe from presidential vetoes, state legislatures, and federal 
courts‖ (p. 466), while The American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006) uses an evocative 
phrase to indicate how the 14
th
 Amendment was intended to ―rivet the principles‖ of the 
Civil Rights Act into the Constitution (p. 489).  
Two textbook narratives explicitly recognize the political maneuvering behind the 
14
th
 Amendment‘s proposal and adoption. Give Me Liberty! (Foner, 2008), for instance, 
points out the stark political options made available by Radicals to the former 
Confederate states: ―The Fourteenth Amendment offered the leaders of the white South a 
choice—allow black men to vote and keep their state‘s full representation in the House of 
Representatives, or limit the vote to whites and sacrifice part of their political power‖ (p. 
564) The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010) points out the political reality that black 
suffrage was probably beyond even the most ardent Radicals at that point: ―The 
amendment did not specifically give African Americans the vote‖ (p. 377). The text goes 
on to highlight the manner in which Radicals extracted Southern approval of the 
amendment with the amendment‘s provisions: ―…it did specify that if any state prevented 
a portion of its male citizens from voting, that state would lose a percentage of its 
congressional seats equal to the percentage of citizens kept from the polls‖ (p. 377).  
The textbooks of this sample perform strongly in their description of the 
Amendment‘s long-term impact. Some descriptions are simplistic but accurate; United 
States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010) says simply of the Amendment, ―It 
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guaranteed equality under the law for all citizens‖ (p. 403). The Enduring Vision (Boyer, 
et al., 2008) refers to Southern reaction to the amendment‘s proposal as a ―firestorm‖ (p. 
472). Other texts are more substantial in their evaluations—Visions of America: a History 
of the United States (Keene, et al., 2010), for example, characterizes the Amendment as a 
―radical redefining of the role of the federal government as the guarantor of individual 
civil rights‖ (p. 416). The American Nation: A History of the United States (Carnes, et al., 
2008) highlights the revolutionary nature of the Amendment, calling it a ―truly radical 
measure… Never before had newly freed slaves been granted significant political rights‖ 
(p. 414). The authors also refer to the Amendment as a ―milestone along the road to the 
centralization of political power in the United States‖ which ―confirmed the great change 
wrought by the Civil War: the growth of a more complex, more closely integrated social 
and economic structure requiring closer national supervision‖ (p. 414). 
Probably the most substantive and historically relevant description of the 14
th
 
Amendment can be found, appropriately enough, in Eric Foner‘s Give Me Liberty! 
(2008). Foner describes the ―broad language‖ of the Amendment and the resulting 
flexibility of its principles, which allowed ―future Congresses and the federal courts to 
breathe meaning into the guarantee of legal equality‖ (p. 563). Give Me Liberty! depicts 
the rights instituted by the Amendment‘s passage as ―fundamental‖ to all Americans, the 
principle of ―equality before the law regardless of race‖ (p. 564). Foner gives the most 
emphatic endorsement of the Amendment‘s historical stature, calling the 14th 
Amendment ―the most important change in [the Constitution] since the adoption of the 
Bill of Rights‖ (p. 564).  
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Overall, the textbooks in this study do arguably their best work, as compared to 
historiographical works, in their depictions of the 14
th
 Amendment. In terms of moral 
content, this sample‘s textbooks similarly contain significant passages as compared to 
components of jus post bellum. 
 
Categorical Analysis 
The categorical analysis of textbook narrative descriptions of the 14
th
 Amendment 
focuses on the ―just war‖ category of rights vindication.  
 
Rights vindication. 
 The primary purpose of going to war (other than stopping another state‘s 
aggression) is the restoration of a right or rights that have been violated through 
aggression. Walzer (2004) refers to jus post bellum as the ―least developed part of just 
war theory,‖ and the issue of rights vindication is one of the most nebulous concepts of 
this category. ―Just war‖ theory aims to institute limits on a conflict to ensure that 
pursuing it to its end is moral. Initially, ―just war‖ theory was aimed at the restoration of 
the status quo ante bellum, the condition prior to the aggression which led to the war. The 
idea of ―restoring‖ or rehabilitating an aggressor state had never really been a component 
of ―just war,‖ except for the fairly obvious caveat ―that the threat posed by the aggressor 
state…before the attack should not be included in this ‗restoration‘‖ (Walzer, 2004, p. 
92). But Walzer posits that the internal transformation of a defeated state and its political 
structure is only justified in ―extreme cases,‖ like Nazi Germany; mainly because any 
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such attempt to create a new system of internal politics ―would require a usurpation of 
sovereignty, which is exactly what we condemn when we condemn aggression‖ (Walzer, 
2004, p. 92).  
Certainly, though, the issue of rights vindication, as indistinct as it might be in 
practice, is generally approved of by ―just war‖ theorists. And some form of external 
compulsion of a defeated government to recognize a violation of rights and correct it is 
accepted by scholars in the field as a reasonable evolution of jus post bellum. This may 
be for no other reason than basic responsibility; as Walzer (2004) puts it, ―once we have 
acted in ways that have significant negative consequences for other people (even if there 
are also positive consequences), we cannot just walk away…The work of the virtuous is 
never finished‖ (p. 20-21).  
Orend (2006) considers the goal of a just war in light of the ―just goal‖ of that 
conflict; namely, a ―more secure and more just state of affairs than existed prior to the 
war.‖ Generally speaking, Orend gives an overall definition of that principle as ―a more 
secure possession of our rights‖ (p. 163). He establishes three major conditions to the 
concept of rights vindication that should be observed in order for a war‘s moral 
foundation to remain stable. First, the pursuit of rights vindication ―forbids the 
continuation of the war after the relevant rights have, in fact, been vindicated‖ (p. 163). 
This is meant to prevent a war from degenerating either into an unending conflict, one in 
which a just resolution is hopelessly muddled or, worse still, one which may devolve into 
a war where the goal is to eliminate a ―demonized enemy.‖  
The second condition Orend proposes for rights vindication is the restriction of 
unconditional surrender. This is because the very nature of the rights that had been 
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violated serve as a form of limitation, or ―outside constraints‖ on what may be done to an 
aggressor after its defeat. A reliance on unconditional surrender is typically 
counterproductive, since it rarely convinces an enemy to give in and tends to lengthen a 
conflict; it is often at this point that wars become, in Walzer‘s (1977) phrase, 
―crusades…[which] aims not at defense or law enforcement, but at the creation of new 
political orders and at mass conversions‖ (p. 114).  
Orend‘s third condition is that a victorious state must ―communicate clearly to the 
losing aggressor its sincere intentions for post-war settlement.‖ ―Winners,‖ Orend argues, 
―should never find themselves in a position where they have won the war but they do not 
know what do to next and so start making up post-war policy on the fly‖ (Orend, 2006, p. 
164). In many ways, this is precisely what happened after the Civil War, as President 
Johnson and Radical Republicans battled over competing visions of how to properly 
readmit the South to the Union. 
Orend also considers what might be a ―just aim‖ of a post-war settlement, and he 
proposes three major components: 
 The ―unjust gains from aggression must be eliminated‖ (Orend, 2006, p. 164). 
Whatever wrong was done by an aggressor state must be restored (often, this is as 
simple as the removal of enemy troops from a conquered territory and the 
restoration of the victimized state to a minimally just community). 
 Compensation for the victimized state and punishment for the aggressors—its 
political leaders and, where necessary, military leaders or troops who have 
behaved egregiously. 
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 Some form of political rehabilitation of the aggressor state may be required, 
Orend claims, dependent upon the ―nature and severity of the aggression it 
committed and the threat it would continue to pose in the absence of such 
measures‖ (Orend, 2006, p. 165).  
These conditions are by no means settled among ―just war‖ scholars, and there is 
considerable debate over their meaning and application; this is especially so given the 
relatively thin level of work in jus post bellum, as compared to the first two categories of 
―just war‖ (a condition that has less to do with scholarly efforts and much more with the 
changing nature of war, as post-war resolutions have become a larger issue in the last 
century). Given Reconstruction‘s status as a brand of intra-national rehabilitation, 
textbook descriptions of the 14
th
 Amendment, and the manner in which it served as a tool 
of rights vindication, are common enough, though often disorganized and implicit. 
The 14
th
 Amendment was intended, by its supporters, to constitutionally enshrine 
the advances of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 particularly, and the progressive changes of 
Radical Reconstruction generally. The degree to which textbooks describe such 
intentions and their judgments regarding the Amendment‘s success or failure is the 
subject of this analysis. America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009) terms 
the 14
th
 Amendment ―a powerful tool for enforcing civil rights,‖ but the text does note 
that ―almost a century passed before it was used for that purpose‖ (p. 554). The 
dismissive phrasing infers the author‘s position that the Amendment did little help 
African-Americans at the time or in the immediate future. America: Pathways to the 
Present (Cayton, et al., 2007) is somewhat more supportive of the Amendment in its 
depiction, terming it ―a turning point‖ and claiming, somewhat ambiguously, that ―its 
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effects have echoed throughout American history‖ (p. 431). Visions of America: a 
History of the United States (Keene, et al., 2010) points out the Amendment‘s importance 
without offering moral commentary on its value or impact on African-Americans: ―The 
Fourteenth Amendment represented a radical redefining of the role of the federal 
government as the guarantor of individual civil rights‖ (p. 416). Beyond relating the 
Amendment‘s general importance and its prominent role in future civil rights debates, 
however, none of these books can be said to contain significant moral content, relating to 
the concept of rights vindication. 
Two textbooks— The American Nation: a History of the United States (Carnes, et 
al., 2008) and Give Me Liberty! (Foner, 2008)—include the most detailed and 
comprehensive accounts of the 14
th
 Amendment, and come the closest, of this sample, to 
offering content somewhat relatable to the ―just war‖ component of rights vindication. 
The American Nation characterizes the Amendment as ―a truly radical measure‖ for its 
day and age, and compares the expansion of black rights to an analogous case study: 
―Never before had newly freed slaves been granted significant political rights. For 
example, in the British Caribbean sugar islands, where slavery had been abolished in the 
1830s, stiff property qualifications and poll taxes kept freedmen from voting‖ (p. 414).  
The authors go on to describe the Amendment and identify its importance, politically and 
socially:  
The Fourteenth Amendment was a milestone along the road to the centralization 
of political power in the United States because it reduced the power of all the 
states. In this sense it confirmed the great change wrought by the Civil War: the 
growth of a more complex, more closely integrated social and economic structure 
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requiring closer national supervision. Few people understood this aspect of the 
amendment at the time. (p. 414) 
While this does signify the impact of the Amendment and does so in a fairly 
comprehensive and analytical manner, the passage does not contain significant content 
that can be related to the conditions of rights vindication established by Orend: the 
correction of wrongdoing by an aggressor, compensation for victims of aggression, and 
political rehabilitation of the aggressor state. In Foner‘s Give Me Liberty! (2008), there is 
a more passionate and lyrical endorsement of the 14
th
 Amendment, but again, there is 
little overt connection to be found between the textbook narrative and the obligations of 
rights vindication:  
The laws and amendments of Reconstruction repudiated the idea that citizenship 
was an entitlement of whites alone…The Reconstruction amendments 
transformed the Constitution from a document primarily concerned with federal-
state relations and the rights of property into a vehicle through which members of 
vulnerable minorities could stake a claim to freedom and seek protection against 
misconduct by all levels of government. In the twentieth century, many of the 
Supreme Court‘s most important decisions were based on the Fourteenth 
Amendment, perhaps most notably the 1954 Brown ruling that outlawed school 
segregation [.] (566-567) 
 This selection can be inferentially held up against the components of rights 
vindication, and some moral content can be discerned. The expansion of rights and 
equality to African-Americans can be reasonably interpreted as a form of restoration of 
natural rights, the type of which was denied to them under the duress of slavery. The 
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transformation of the Constitution and its utility for the protection of minorities is 
representative of the ―just war‖ condition of political rehabilitation (especially if one does 
not interpret the renovation of the South as the product of a foreign nation‘s occupation, 
but instead the restoration of the political order throughout the Union after a sectional 
rebellion). And certainly, the 14
th
 Amendment can be realistically construed as a means 
of correcting an immoral act by the aggressor nation—namely, the denial of equal rights, 
which had been the fundamental rule of Southern society prior to the war. 
 While all of these inferences may be reasonable, they are necessary because Give 
Me Liberty! and The American Nation include little content that presents a plain, clear 
moral tone. Like other textbooks in this sample, it is difficult to find content that is 
clearly derived from the ethical principles found in the ―just war‖ tradition.  
 
The Compromise of 1877 
 By the mid-1870s, Northerners were tiring of the long national discussion on 
Reconstruction. But the era itself did not end neatly, by legislative act or presidential fiat. 
Most historians—and thus, most history textbooks—mark the unofficial end of 
Reconstruction at the presidential election of 1876, the disputed result of which set in 
motion a series of events that ultimately led to the removal of federal troops from the 
South. While it would be simplistic to call this the complete and final end to 
Reconstruction, it clearly is the event that, at least, ended the active engagement of the 
federal government in rebuilding the South, socially, economically, and politically. In 
this section, textbook depictions of the presidential election of 1876 and the resulting 
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―Compromise of 1877‖ are examined, as compared to historiographical works on the 
same subject. 
 
Historical Narrative Analysis 
While the presidential election of 1876 offers a definitive and clear-cut finale to 
Reconstruction from a dramatic standpoint, the reality of the collapse of governmental 
reform efforts in the South is significantly more complex. Christopher Olsen (2006) 
describes the factors that led to Reconstruction‘s end, as a governmental process, pointing 
particularly to two factors. First, Southern Democrats focused their efforts on 
―redeeming‖ individual states from black Republican government control by utilizing two 
main strategies—―white unity and violence‖ (p. 248). Because whites outnumbered 
blacks in most congressional districts, Democrats relied on racial arguments about black 
inferiority and the tradition of white rule in the South to boost their electoral chances. 
Additionally, vigilante groups like the Ku Klux Klan intimidated, harassed, beat, and 
even killed scores of Republican supporters, black and white. Though the passage of 
several federal laws designed to stop the Klan had a significant effect, by the early 1870s 
most Northerners had grown weary of the dissension and bloodshed, and were ready to 
move on.  
 The second factor that led to Reconstruction‘s collapse, according to Olsen, was 
the disintegration of the southern Republican Party. Originally a coalition between white 
Southern Unionists (nicknamed ―scalawags‖) and new black voters, party unity suffered 
from increasing demands for political equality and leadership by African-Americans, 
which in turn led to the disaffection of many white supporters. In congressional elections, 
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―many whites balked and then withdrew from politics…Some returned as Democrats, but 
many simply stayed home‖ (Olsen, 2006, p. 249). As a result of this collapse, together 
with growing northern fatigue with the issue, the Democrats managed to ―redeem‖ 
(reclaim control) all but three southern states by the time of the presidential election of 
1876.  
 The election that year, between the Republicans‘ Rutherford B. Hayes of Ohio 
and the Democrats‘ Samuel Tilden of New York, became a morass of error, 
manipulation, confusion and, very likely, fraud. Tilden won the popular vote handily, and 
seemed to have won the electoral vote; though three Southern states (Florida, South 
Carolina, and Louisiana) reported two different sets of electoral results. Foner (1988) 
considers this quite predictable; the three states‘ election boards, dominated by 
Republicans, invalidated returns from counties ―rife with violence‖ to hand the election 
to Hayes (p. 575-576). Amid charge and counter-charge of voter intimidation, violence, 
and corruption, the two parties turned to the Constitution. With neither candidate holding 
a clear electoral victory, the Constitution decreed that the Congress should settle the 
matter—but as Olsen points out, ―while Congress counts the electoral votes, the 
Constitution does not specify who does the counting‖ (p. 250). With Democrats in control 
of the House and Republicans in charge of the Senate, the election‘s results would be 
determined by an appointed commission, one balanced between the two parties—seven 
Democrats, seven Republicans, and one independent. The latter member, Supreme Court 
Justice David Davis, abruptly dropped from the commission after being nominated for an 
open Senate seat in Illinois; his replacement, Justice Joseph Bradley, had been appointed 
to the bench in 1870 by Ulysses S. Grant, a Republican. Democrats complained bitterly, 
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but the commission‘s final vote—along party lines, ―eight‖ to seven—gave Hayes the 
election (Olsen, 2006, p. 250). 
 The impact on Reconstruction is a subject of debate. Most commonly, historians 
characterize the removal of federal troops by Hayes, in his first two months as president, 
as one of two things: either an effort to mollify Democrats over the disputed result of the 
election, or as the result of a ―backroom‖ deal with Democrats in exchange for the White 
House. As to the latter theory, Foner (1988) focuses on a meeting between Democrats 
and Republicans at Washington, D.C.‘s Wormley House hotel (owned, ironically, by a 
black man). The meeting was ostensibly about the fate of Francis T. Nicholls, the 
Democrats‘ choice for Governor of Louisiana. At the meeting, Republican 
representatives vowed that Hayes would cleave to a policy of noninterference in Southern 
affairs. For their part, Democrats vowed to ―avoid reprisals against [Louisiana‘s] 
Republicans and recognize the civil and political equality of blacks‖ (Foner, 1988, p. 
580). Republicans and Democrats apparently felt that some sort of accord had been 
reached at the Wormley House meeting, and thus the legacy of the ―Bargain of 1877‖ 
began. Foner points out that the ―deal,‖ whatever it might actually have been remains 
difficult to pin down; all parties have differing versions of what was actually agreed to at 
Wormley House. What matters, to historians, is the reality of what followed next: Hayes 
removed federal troops from the South, and political Reconstruction was abandoned, 
what Foner terms ―a decisive retreat from the idea, born during the Civil War, of a 
powerful national state protecting the fundamental rights of American citizens‖ (Foner 
1988, p. 582).  
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 Every textbook in this sample ends its depiction of Reconstruction with an initial 
account of the 1876 election, its results, and its aftermath. Most include the salient details 
to a considerable detail, though some (particularly those designated for Advanced 
Placement use) are significantly more thorough in their descriptions. All the texts, 
however, connect the Compromise of 1877 to the end of Reconstruction, and all proceed 
from their explanations of the election to a post mortem of the Reconstruction era—its 
successes, failures, and legacy.  
 America: History of Our Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009), for instance, begins its 
account of the Compromise of 1877 with a frank statement: ―The end of Reconstruction 
was a direct result of the presidential election of 1876‖ (p. 558-559). The bargain reached 
by Republicans and Democrats to end the dispute is described as the final act of the 
postwar era, one which ―sealed the fate of Reconstruction‖ (p. 559). America: Pathways 
to the Present (Cayton, et al., 2007) states that ―the two parties made a deal,‖ one which 
―opened the way for Democrats to regain control of southern politics and marked the end 
of Reconstruction‖ (p. 434). The American Journey (Goldfield, et al., 2007) is even more 
blunt, stating that ―Reconstruction officially ended with the presidential election of 
1876,‖ and that it ―installed Hayes in the White House and gave Democrats control of 
every state government in the South‖ (p. 473). The American Nation: A History of the 
United States (Carnes, et al., 2008) considers the significance of the compromise—―one 
of the great intersectional political accommodations of American history‖—was its role 
ending Reconstruction and the fact that it ―inaugurated a new political order in the 
South,‖ one which ―would shape the destinies of the four million freedmen‖ (p. 430).  
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 Several textbooks are less overt in establishing the connection between the 
election of 1876 and the end of Reconstruction, though the implication is generally clear. 
For instance, The American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006), states that, ―with the Hayes-
Tilden deal, the Republican party quietly abandoned its commitment to racial equality‖ 
(p. 511). The authors go on to assert that ―Hayes clinched the bargain by withdrawing the 
last federal troops that were propping up carpetbag governments‖ (p. 511). Though this 
seems damning, it is notable that the text‘s narrative does not conclude that Hayes or the 
Republicans agreed to anything with Democrats. However, the statement that ―the 
bayonet-backed Republican regimes collapsed as the blue-clad soldiers departed‖ (p. 
511) is a fairly clear conclusion on the authors‘ part that the electoral result was directly 
linked to the end of Reconstruction.  
Whether or not Hayes and Tilden (or their representatives or proxies in either 
party) actually reached an accord in which Republicans would retain the White House in 
exchange for the removal of federal troops from the South is a matter of debate among 
historians, and that lack of unanimity is reflected in textbooks. America: History of Our 
Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 2009), for example, states explicitly that Hayes ended the 
military aspect of Reconstruction in accordance with a private assurance he made with 
the Democrats, though the authors do not indict Hayes for the outright end of 
Reconstruction as a political movement:  
Rather than fight the decision in Congress, Democrats agreed to accept it. Hayes 
had privately told them that he would end Reconstruction. Once in office, Hayes 
removed all federal troops from the South. (p. 559) 
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The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010), in a more cautious turn, distinguishes 
between Hayes and Republican leaders and their respective roles in negotiating an end to 
the election crisis. The text introduces the campaign of 1876 by portraying the ―stodgy 
governor of Ohio, Rutherford B. Hayes‖ and his opponent, of the Democrats‘ ―ablest 
leaders, Governor Samuel J. Tilden of New York‖ (p. 339). The authors describe the 
resolution of the election as a deal made by party leaders, ―in the oldest tradition of 
politics,‖ one which in which Democrats extracted a series of concessions (The 
Americans is one of the few textbooks in this sample to include all Democratic demands, 
including federal appropriations for construction of railroads, bridges, and harbors in the 
South). The Democratic demand for a removal of federal troops from the South is 
described in circumspect terms; rather than implicating Hayes, the text states that 
―Republican leaders‖ were behind the deal (p. 399). In any case, the authors reach the 
same conclusion as the other textbooks in this sample: ―The acceptance of this 
compromise meant the end of Reconstruction in the South‖ (p. 399).  
United States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010) does not establish a firm 
connection between the election‘s results and the end of Reconstruction, avoiding a 
condemnation of Republicans or Democrats: ―Hayes was elected President. In return, the 
remaining federal troops were withdrawn from the South…Federal Reconstruction was 
over‖ (p. 424). Visions of America: a History of the United States (Keene, et al., 2010) 
depicts the damage done to the Hayes presidency by the taint of the election‘s outcome—
the text states that ―Hayes‘s presidency was weakened by the aura of 
illegitimacy…detractors referred to him as ‗his fraudulency‘‖ (p. 427). But the authors do 
not attach the electoral debate to the end of Reconstruction, other than stating that Hayes 
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―oversaw the dismantling of the last remnants of Reconstruction policy‖ (p. 427). Though 
there is variance in the degree to which textbooks connect the Compromise of 1876 to the 
end of Reconstruction, this variance does reflect similar disputes among historians. To 
the textbooks‘ detriment, however, there is no open discussion of this historiographical 
debate; instead, the issue is largely unexplored. Still, though some are more concrete in 
their conclusions, the textbooks from this sample generally reflect historians‘ conclusions 
that the Compromise of 1877 was the definitive political end of the era of Reconstruction.  
 The impact of the Compromise of 1877 on the end of Reconstruction is a feature 
common to textbooks, as it is to historical works. Most of the books in this sample move 
immediately from a discussion of the election and its result to an analysis of what led to 
Reconstruction‘s collapse, establishing clearly a connection between the two—sometimes 
to the detriment of the narrative‘s complexity. America: History of Our Nation (Davidson 
& Stoff, 2009), for instance, describes the presidential election and moves directly to its 
depiction of the ―end of Reconstruction‖ (p. 560). Most of the other textbooks, however, 
do not simplify the matter by stating that the Compromise of 1877 caused the end of 
Reconstruction. Instead, to their credit, they tend to offer complex, nuanced, historically 
valid evaluations of the era. 
 America: Pathways to the Present (Cayton, et al., 2007), after its description of 
the presidential election of 1876, refers to Reconstruction as ―a dying issue,‖ one with 
which white voters ―had grown weary.‖ It summarizes Northern frustration with the 
decade-long political process of reconciliation under four categories: ―Corruption,‖ ―the 
Economy,‖ ―Violence,‖ and ―The Democrats Return to Power‖ (p. 433). Most of the 
textbooks conceptualize the end of Reconstruction in a similar manner.  
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 The American Journey (Goldfield, et al., 2007) considers political violence to be 
the major contributor to the end of Reconstruction. Such violence ―reflected less the 
inadequacy of congressional legislation than a failure of will on the part of northern 
Republicans to follow through on commitments to southern Republican administrations‖ 
(p. 471). Moreover, the text presents violence as it was utilized by southern Democrats, 
as a form of political mechanism:  
For southern Democrats, the Republican victory in 1872 underscored the 
importance of turning out larger numbers of white voters and restricting the black 
vote. They accomplished these goals over the next four years with a surge in 
political violence, secure in the knowledge that federal authorities would not 
intervene against them. The elections of 1876 affirmed the triumph of white 
southerners. Reconstruction did not end; it was overthrown. (p. 472) 
 The term ―overthrown,‖ in this context, contains less moral implications and is 
more fundamentally analytical—it hints at the active role Southerners played in ending 
political Reconstruction, rather than casting aspersions or judgment on those who 
practiced such violence.  
 The Enduring Vision (Boyer, et al., 2008) presents the end of Reconstruction as 
the culmination of a long trend—a combination of national fatigue with the issue and a 
desire to ―celebrate reunion,‖ rather than to continue dealing with division. To that end, 
The Enduring Vision does not consider the presidential election of 1876 as the definitive 
end of Reconstruction, but instead epilogic—the real finale of the era came with the 
toppling of Republican governments in the South. When that happened, the text states, 
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―the era of Reconstruction finally ended, though more with a whimper than with a 
resounding crash‖ (p. 496).  
United States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010) addresses the failure of 
Northern support, focusing more on the desire of Northerners to reform perceived 
political abuses and corruption, primarily of the Grant administration. It also includes 
national anxiety over the financial strain of continued military occupation of the South. 
Interestingly, United States History is the one of the few texts to dedicate substantial 
coverage to the role of the U.S. Supreme Court in dismantling Reconstruction, describing 
the Court‘s decisions in The Slaughterhouse Cases and United States v. Cruikshank (p. 
421).  
Visions of America: a History of the United States (Keene, et al., 2010) offers one 
of the more detailed and complex analyses of the end of Reconstruction. Though it does 
include the obligatory reference to political violence in the South and the role played by 
vigilante groups like the Ku Klux Klan, the authors also highlight the ―abandonment‖ of 
political Reconstruction, rather than its failure, and focus on reasons why Northerners 
became less committed to ―vigorous Republican policy‖ (p. 423). The text describes the 
corruption scandals that occupied national attention during the presidency of Ulysses S. 
Grant, a common trait of the textbooks in this sample; yet it also pointed to the dissension 
within the Republican party over two major issues—the concern of moderates over the 
proper role of the federal government in intervening in state affairs, and the disaffection 
of liberal Republicans in the wake of continual debates over such intervention, combined 
with disgust with the attempt to impeach President Johnson (p. 423). Finally, Visions of 
America is unique for its emphasis on economic factors beyond the considerable cost of 
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Reconstruction. This text also highlights the impact of the ―Panic of 1873,‖ a national 
economic calamity that changed many Northerners‘‘ view of the value of 
Reconstruction—―As hard times set in, and hundreds of thousands of workers lost their 
jobs, the fate of the freedmen became less of a concern to Northerners‖ (p. 424).  
Some textbooks rely on visual graphics to summarize for students the factors 
behind the end of Reconstruction. The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010), for example, 
includes this ―Visual Summary‖ that captures the foundations, policies, and end points of 
Reconstruction (see Figure 12, ―Reconstruction and its Effects‖):  
 
 
Figure 12: Reconstruction and its Effects (The Americans, Danzer, et al., 2010, p. 402) 
349 
 
As is evident in the final cell of the graphic, the authors here highlight many of 
the causes of Reconstruction‘s ending that are the subject of historiographical works, 
including the internal dissension of the Republican Party, the impact of scandal and 
political corruption, Supreme Court decisions, and economic stagnation. In this manner 
as well as those discussed above, textbooks from this sample perform strongly in their 
depiction of the Compromise of 1877, the facets of historical debate regarding that event, 
and its connection to the military and political end of Reconstruction.  
 
Categorical Analysis 
 The categorical analysis of textbook narrative descriptions of the Compromise of 
1877 concerns the ―just war‖ category of rights vindication.  
 
Rights vindication. 
 The concept of rights vindication, it may be recalled, concerns the ability and 
responsibility of a victorious state to ―secure the basic rights whose violation triggered 
the justified war‖ (Orend, 2007, p. 580). The goal of a state that has successfully resisted 
aggression is to remove the conditions that led to the hostile acts of a defeated state, as 
well as to restore the rights of a vanquished people which had been, presumably, limited 
or violated by the aggressive act of the ruling regime. The obligation of the winning side 
is to avoid punitive measures of retribution—―vindicating rights, not vindictive revenge, 
is the order of the day‖ (p. 580).  
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 The Compromise of 1877 is recognized by all the textbooks of this sample to be 
the practical end of Reconstruction. Moral content is evident in textbook narratives in the 
manner in which such narratives express a position, primarily on two issues—whether or 
not the compromise itself was moral, and whether or not Reconstruction, at its end point, 
was successful or a failure.  
 Textbook depictions of the Compromise of 1877 do include moral conclusions 
regarding whether or not the agreement between Republicans and Democrats like 
moral—however, as has been common in such depictions, such conclusions are often 
latent and implicit. Some books, like The American Journey (Goldfield, et al., 2007) 
include only veiled references to the ethical failings of the agreement, referring to the 
―so-called ‗Compromise of 1877‘‖ (p. 473). Some equivocate on the value of the 
compromise, relying on moderation to characterize the bargain‘s flaws: ―Like all 
compromises, the Compromise of 1877 was not entirely satisfactory; like most, it was not 
honored in every detail‖ (The American Nation: A History of the United States, Carnes, et 
al., 2008, p. 429). In other cases, though, the viewpoint of a given textbook is apparent 
from the conjoined descriptions of the presidential election of 1876 and the failings of 
Reconstruction. This can be seen in the narrative of America: History of Our Nation 
(Davidson & Stoff, 2009), which explains that, ―once in office, Hayes removed all 
federal troops from the South,‖ and follows this in the next section with the following: 
―With the end of Reconstruction, African Americans began to lose their remaining 
political and civil rights in the South‖ (p. 559-560). A similar practice is evident in The 
Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010):  
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In the Compromise of 1877 [sic], Republican leaders agreed to these demands, 
and Hayes was peacefully inaugurated. The acceptance of this compromise meant 
the end of Reconstruction in the South. The Democrats had achieved their long-
desired goal of home rule [sic]—the ability to run state governments without 
federal intervention…They passed laws that restricted the rights of African 
Americans, wiped out social programs, slashed taxes, and dismantled public 
schools. (p. 399) 
Other textbooks are more explicit in their condemnation of the Compromise as an 
abrogation of the promises made by Radical Republicans at the outset of Reconstruction. 
In fact, it is the depiction of Reconstruction‘s failures and shortcomings, as related to its 
premature end after the 1876 presidential election, that textbooks contain their most 
pronounced and explicit moral perspectives. 
 The ―just war‖ component of rights vindication requires that a ―reversal of the 
aggression that prompted parties to resort to arms‖ (Bosanquet, 2007, p. 39). Several 
textbooks in this sample conceptualize the end of Reconstruction as a moral 
disaffirmation by the North, an abandonment of freedmen and the principles that 
motivated Radicals at the war‘s end. Eric Foner, in Give Me Liberty! (2008), goes so far 
as to avoid the standard term for the agreement between Republicans and Democrats, 
habitually calling it the ―Bargain‖ of 1877, rather than ―compromise.‖ Southern 
Democrats (―Redeemers‖) who took control in southern states, displacing Republican 
administrations in the late 1860s, are often portrayed as villainous restorers of a corrupt 
and racist regime. For instance, The American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006) 
characterizes the Democrats as follows: ―Shamelessly relying on fraud and intimidation, 
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white Democrats…resumed political power in the South and exercised it ruthlessly. 
Blacks who tried to assert their rights faced unemployment, eviction, and physical harm‖ 
(p. 512). Visions of America: a History of the United States (Keene, et al., 2010) 
describes the ―hundreds of thousands of freedmen‖ who worked with ―thousands of 
Southern whites attracted by the progressive ideology of the Republican Party to build a 
reconstructed society based on democracy and equal opportunity, and social and civil 
equality for all‖; but the section ends with an implicit indictment of the ―rising tide of 
Redeemer oppression‖ (p. 426), as well as condemnation of ―white Southerners who 
rejected this vision regained control of their state governments and began to slowly 
dismantle Reconstruction and impose a new form of white supremacy‖ (p. 435). The 
perspectives of Democrats are rarely included, and instead are often minimized to 
caricatures of bigotry and small-mindedness. The American Pageant does admit the 
reality that ―many white Southerners regarded Reconstruction as a more grievous wound 
than the war itself,‖ but dilutes the weight of this counterpoint by claiming that 
Republicans could have (and presumably, should have) been much harder on the South: 
―Given the explosiveness of the issues that had caused the war, and the bitterness of the 
fighting, the wonder is that Reconstruction was not far harsher than it was‖ (p. 498).  
In The American Journey (Goldfield, et al., 2007), the tactics employed by 
Democrats to win the 1872 congressional elections are presented as craven and 
practically antidemocratic: ―For southern Democrats, the Republican victory in 1872 
underscored the importance of turning out larger numbers of white voters and restricting 
the black vote‖ (p. 472). The text deprecates the ―political violence‖ endorsed by 
Democrats, ―secure in the knowledge that federal authorities would not intervene against 
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them,‖ and goes on to describe how, in years to come, Democrats would rely on ―the 
menace of black rule‖ to rally their white constituents in opposition to African-American 
equality (p. 474). The American Journey characterizes the Compromise of 1877 not as a 
natural endpoint for Reconstruction, but instead as an artificial conclusion chosen by 
white southerners. ―Reconstruction did not end,‖ the authors claim, ―it was overthrown‖ 
(p. 472). In general, then, textbooks view Democrats as antagonistic opponents of the 
moral aims of Reconstruction, and the chief obstacle to the successful vindication of 
freedmen‘s rights. 
 Even more than Democrats, though, textbooks blame Republicans for the failures 
of Reconstruction. The Enduring Vision (Boyer, et al., 2008) echoes the opprobrium 
heaped upon the Democratic Party at first—―Democratic promises to treat blacks fairly, 
were forgotten‖ (p. 496)—but it goes on to admonish Rutherford B. Hayes and the 
Republicans for failing to ―ensure freedmen‘s rights.‖ The authors include a harsh 
quotation from Frederick Douglass, at the Republican presidential convention of 1876, as 
a moral reproach of the administration‘s failure to protect freedmen in the ―redeemed‖ 
South: ―When you turned us loose, you turned us loose to the sky, to the storm, to the 
whirlwind, and worst of all…to the wrath of our infuriated masters [.] The question now 
is, do you mean to make good to us the promises in your Constitution?‖ The textbook 
follows this with a grim pronouncement, a response to Douglass‘ question—―The answer 
provided by the 1876 election and the 1877 compromises was ‗No‘‖ (p. 496).  
Visions of America: a History of the United States (Keene, et al., 2010) also 
criticizes Republicans for their failures in Reconstruction, though it does begin by 
conceding some of the real philosophical differences held by some in the party regarding 
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postwar policy—―many Republicans, including former radicals, began to question the 
wisdom of maintaining a strong federal role in the affairs of Southern states‖ (p. 423). 
Similarly, the text refers to the belief among some Republicans that the primary tasks of 
Reconstruction had been accomplished, and that it was up to ―the freedmen to elevate 
themselves economically, socially, and politically using their new rights‖ (p. 423). Still, 
though, within short order the authors charge liberal Republicans with caving in to 
Southern arguments about black inferiority—―they accepted the argument of Southerners 
that freedmen and their white allies were incapable of honest and effective government‖ 
(p. 424). Visions of America begins by excusing Republicans for the end of 
Reconstruction—an end clearly perceived to be premature—but ends by charging the 
party with a ―transformation from a progressive to a reactionary view‖ (p. 424). 
The American Journey (Goldfield, et al., 2007) charges northern Republicans with 
a ―failure of will‖ to support southern Republican state governments, in addition to the 
malaise and frustration with governmental corruption felt by liberals (p. 471). Moreover, 
The American Journey charges many Republicans with falling prey to what is described 
as a ―racist assumption‖—the concept that the right to vote was not a right at all, but a 
privilege that had not been earned by African-Americans, an ―inferior race,‖ one that 
―could not hold power over a superior race‖ (p. 472). The accusation of racism is one that 
is particularly harsh to a modern reader; the text‘s point that ―racism gained an aura of 
scientific respectability in the nineteenth century‖ does not moderate the unforgiving 
tone, but instead infers that such science was faulty and thus, conclusions based on it 
were based more on plain bigotry than reason.  
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 Some books do not single out Republicans and Democrats for excessive blame, 
but instead critique both sides and most white Americans for their neglect of former 
slaves. The American Journey (Goldfield, et al., 2007) states that ―ideally, Americans 
could have had both healing and justice, but instead they settled for the former‖ (p. 475). 
United States History (Lapansky-Werner, et al., 2010) laments the Compromise of 1877 
as a desertion of freedmen who were relying on federal assistance, though it conjoins the 
unsolved problems of both black citizens and the former Confederacy—― The South and 
the millions of recently freed African Americans were left to negotiate their own fate‖ (p. 
424) The American Nation: A History of the United States (Carnes, et al., 2008) adopts a 
tone of disapproval for North and South, as well as Democrats and Republicans, for the 
manner in which freedmen were left to fend for themselves after 1877:  
The major significance of the compromise, one of the great intersectional political 
accommodations of American history, was that is ended Reconstruction and 
inaugurated a new political order in the South. More than the Constitutional 
amendments and federal statutes, this new regime would shape the destinies of the 
four million freedmen. (p. 430) 
 By itself, this passage would not be substantially different from the tone adopted 
by most textbooks. Whether for good or ill, there is little debate about the prospect that 
the ―new political order‖ in question would ―shape the destinies‖ of African-Americans 
in the South. But the authors go on to include a blistering denunciation of the failings on 
both sides to adequately address the unresolved issues of Reconstruction: 
For most, this future was to be bleak. Forgotten in the North, manipulated and 
then callously rejected by the South, rebuffed by the Supreme Court, voiceless in 
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national affairs, they and their descendants were condemned in the interests of 
sectional harmony to lives of poverty, indignity, and little hope. Meanwhile, the 
rest of the United States continued its golden march toward wealth and power. (p. 
430)  
 After fixing blame, most textbooks of this sample move to their conclusions about 
Reconstruction—which, generally, are laments over its limitations and inadequacies. 
Contrary to other events and topics described in jus post bellum (or, in fact, in the first 
two phases of this study, jus ad bellum and jus in bello), most textbooks are much more 
open about taking moral positions, articulating them, and reaching substantial 
conclusions about the ethical conduct of both North and South. It is not necessary to 
parse or infer from textbook passages; instead, with regard to the end of Reconstruction, 
textbook authors make their points clear from the outset. 
 The American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006), for example, characterizes the 
Compromise of 1877 as a morally reprehensible bargain—―violence was averted by 
sacrificing the black freedmen in the South‖ (p. 511). The verdict on Reconstruction‘s 
success is similarly sharp—―Reconstruction conferred only fleeting benefits on blacks 
and virtually extinguished the Republican Party in the South for nearly one hundred 
years‖ (p. 499). The authors clearly regret the failure of Republicans to follow the radical 
policies espoused by Thaddeus Stevens, including ―drastic economic reforms and heftier 
protection of political rights‖ for freedmen,‖ pointing at that under such policies, ―things 
might well have been different‖ (p. 499). But in a single passage, The American Pageant 
summarizes the obstacles faced by well-meaning Radicals and the causes of 
Reconstruction‘s failure:  
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Deep-seated racism, ingrained American resistance to tampering with property 
rights, and rigid loyalty to the principle of local self-government, combined with 
spreading indifference in the North to the plight of blacks, formed too formidable 
an obstacle. Despite good intentions by Republicans, the Old South was in many 
ways more resurrected than reconstructed. (p. 499) 
The American Journey (Goldfield, et al., 2007) is equally unsympathetic in its 
portrayal of Reconstruction‘s end, titling this section ―The Failed Promise.‖ The authors 
clearly deplore the inability of Americans to take advantage of the prospect for a lasting, 
just peace after the war—―But by 1877, the ―golden moment,‖ an unprecedented 
opportunity for the nation to live up to its ideals by extending equal rights to all its 
citizens, black and white alike, had passed‖ (p. 475). The Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments are held up as ―among the few bright spots in Reconstruction‘s otherwise 
dismal legacy,‖ and the final verdict on the era is unforgiving—―the chance to redeem the 
sacrifice of a bloody civil war with a society that fulfilled the promise of the Declaration 
of Independence and the Constitution for all citizens slipped away‖ (p. 476). 
One textbook, Visions of America: a History of the United States (Keene, et al., 
2010) considers Reconstruction a lost opportunity, not only to help freedmen in the 
South, but also in terms of achieving long-lasting social reform among white Southerners. 
In particular, the text addresses the rise in the postwar South of ―Lost Cause‖ mythology, 
the belief among many white citizens that presented a nostalgic picture of how life had 
been prior to the war—―a harmonious paradise where benevolent masters treated loyal, 
contented slaves with kindness, where chivalrous Southern gentlemen protected delicate, 
charming Southern women, and where everyone revered tradition, family, and the Bible‖ 
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(p. 429). For the authors, the hardening of this myth among Southerners was one of the 
lasting legacies of the war and the abortive attempt at Reconstruction. Worse still, the 
―Lost Cause‖ became the foundation for further acts of suppression by the white 
majority:  
The Lost Cause thus presented Southerners as victims of misguided and 
unjustified Yankee aggression who, in the wake of devastating war and 
humiliating Reconstruction, ought to be left alone to run their own affairs. The 
overt racism and self-serving depictions of slavery in Lost Cause rhetoric and 
imagery served to justify a resumption of white rule and the return of African 
Americans to the status of powerless, exploitable laborers. (p. 429) 
While most textbooks are neither equitable nor mild in their allegations of missed 
opportunities and a revival of racism in the South, several textbooks try to be more 
evenhanded in describing Reconstruction‘s end. One, America: History of Our Nation 
(Davidson & Stoff, 2009), attests that the final record was mixed; in the final estimation, 
the authors hold, ―[Reconstruction‘s] record showed many successes and some failures. 
Most importantly, all African Americans were finally citizens. Laws passed during 
Reconstruction, such as the Fourteenth Amendment, became the basis of the civil rights 
movement that took place almost 100 years later‖ (p. 563). The Americans (Danzer, et al., 
2010) presents a chart titled ―Point/Counterpoint,‖ that summarizes evidence supporting 
both the conclusion that Reconstruction was a success and that it was a failure. For the 
former, the text suggests that ―African Americans only a few years removed from slavery 
participated at all levels of government,‖ and that ―the breakup of the plantation system 
led to some redistribution of land.‖ In support of condemning Reconstruction as a failure, 
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the text points out that ―state Republican parties could not preserve black-white voter 
coalitions that would have enabled them to stay in power and continue political reform,‖ 
as well as stating that ―racial bias was a national, not a regional problem‖ (p. 400).  
 Compared with other textbooks in this sample, The Americans tends to be more 
forgiving to Reconstruction‘s legacy. Still, despite the seeming balance in the chart‘s 
content, there is still an implicit tone of defeatism regarding Reconstruction‘s 
accomplishments. While lauding the passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments, the text concedes that the ―Supreme Court undermined the power‖ of those 
amendments; and while claiming that ―African Americans succeeded in carving out a 
measure of independence within Southern society,‖ the authors precede that point by 
referencing the ―loss of ground that followed Reconstruction‖ (p. 400). The narrative 
concludes with a quote by Eric Foner—―Whether measured by the dreams inspired by 
emancipation or the more limited goals of securing blacks‘ rights as 
citizens…Reconstruction can only be judged a failure‖ (p. 400).  
The quotation above is drawn from Foner‘s (1988) largest work on the subject of 
the era, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (p. 603). Ironically, 
the textbook from this sample primarily written by Foner himself, Give Me Liberty! 
(2008), also tends to be more charitable in its account of the end of Reconstruction, 
claiming that ―In view of the daunting challenges they faced, the remarkable thing is not 
that Reconstruction governments in many respects failed, but how much they did 
accomplish‖ (p. 573). This text acknowledges the ―limitations‖ of Reconstruction, but 
calls it ―a remarkable chapter in the story of American freedom‖ (p. 581). Even while 
―the policy of granting black men the vote while denying them the benefits of land 
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ownership strengthened the idea that the free citizen could be a poor, dependent laborer,‖ 
this text considers this failing the genesis of a new opportunity—―Reconstruction placed 
on the national agenda a problem that would dominate political discussion for the next 
half-century—how, in a modern society, to define the economic essence of freedom‖ (p. 
581).  
In summary, then, many of these textbooks contain content that can be interpreted 
from a ―just war‖ perspective; yet, like examples from jus ad bellum and jus in bello, 
most textbook narratives are not morally articulate. The value of the ―just war‖ theory, in 
textbooks, would be to provide a coherent framework of moral criticism. While the 
authors often address historical events that contain moral conclusions, they often do so in 
such a latent and implicit manner as to make the opportunity for students to similarly 
engage with such critical thinking difficult to detect.  
The textbooks of this study do not explicitly mention rights vindication as a 
condition of a just postwar settlement, though it would be naïve to expect them to do so. 
However, there is significant evidence that these narratives contain numerous passages 
which represent moral content drawn from the ―just war‖ tradition; namely, the 
expectation that a victorious state should pursue a redress of the wrongs that led to the 
initial outbreak of violence. The state of economic, political, and social inequality 
between blacks and whites was left largely unsolved in the South after the end of 
Reconstruction, and the failure of the North to successfully attain secured rights for 
African-Americans is presented in textbooks as a moral failing. It is certainly the most 
overt moral stance taken by textbook authors in this sample, especially as compared to 
the other topics examined under the three components of the ―just war‖ doctrine.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
A FRAMEWORK FOR THE MORAL CRITIQUE OF WAR 
 
 This study indicates, through two separate analytical methods, that American 
History textbooks contain a considerable amount of historically accurate content that 
does represent moral value and perspective; but that this moral content is often inchoate, 
opaque, or passively offered. The emphasis of this study has been on the presence and 
type of content made available to students, but has commented little on the value of such 
subject matter. In this chapter, I will consider the implications of the study‘s findings, and 
offer recommendations based on the utility and value of the ―just war‖ doctrine in the 
classrooms. Moreover, I will explore the values we present to our students—what we 
want them to know about war, and what we should hope to teach them.  
 
What Should Students Know About War?  
 On October 25, 2007, Salvatore Giunta, a 22-year old soldier in the U.S. Army, 
was involved in a fierce battle with Taliban fighters in the Korengal Valley in 
Afghanistan. He was hit in the chest by a high-velocity bullet, which was deflected by his 
body armor; and while other soldiers in his unit tried to find cover, Giunta ran directly 
towards the ambush, in order to help three wounded comrades. He went three times, in 
order to rescue each one, in spite of the danger to his own life. For his actions, Giunta 
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was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor, the nation‘s highest decoration for valor 
in combat (Whitlock & Jaffe, 2010).  
A year and a half earlier, a U.S. Army soldier named Steven Green was stationed 
in Iraq. On March 12, 2006, Green and three other soldiers got drunk while on duty 
manning a checkpoint. The region of Iraq they were in was one of the country‘s most 
dangerous, at the height of insurgent violence towards U.S. troops. Green and his fellow 
soldiers put on black clothing (which they called their ―ninja suits‖), left their checkpoint 
and went to a nearby house, occupied by an Iraqi family. Inside, the soldiers cornered the 
residents, raped the 14-year old daughter, and then killed all four members of the 
family—including a six-year old girl. The initial assumption was that the attack was the 
result of sectarian violence; but ultimately, another soldier who had heard about the 
attack indirectly came forward and implicated Green. All of the soldiers were arrested, 
put on trial, and ultimately convicted. Green, who did the shooting, was found guilty of 
16 counts of murder, rape, and other charges. At his sentencing hearing, Green‘s attorney 
said that the U.S. Army was partially to blame for Green‘s actions—they had known 
about the awful conditions under which Green‘s unit had been living, as well as the 
failure of the unit‘s leadership to recognize Green‘s obsession with killing Iraqis. 
Eventually, the jury could not reach a unanimous decision to give Green the death 
penalty, so he was sentenced to life in prison without parole (Frederick, 2009). 
 The two stories represent two extremes of the American experience in warfare—
tremendous courage and bravery, as opposed to vicious cruelty and barbarity. Perhaps 
strangely, there may be no more moral enterprise in human affairs than war, given its 
function and intent. The nature of war is based on the belief that a wrong has been done 
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which is so immoral, the only solution is to resort to the most extreme mechanism 
available to us. Americans have participated in a variety of armed conflicts over the 
nation‘s history, but all have been predicated on one fundamental basis—there are causes 
for which no solution is possible except for violence. Textbooks, upon which so much of 
our instruction is based, present a moral picture of war, but one which is generally 
implicit, inferential, and without criticism. We should consider what we want our 
students to know about war, and the best manner in which to teach it.  
 
The Psychology of War 
 One of the deficiencies of textbooks is their inability to routinely present complex 
ideas in a manner that is engaging, enlightening, and accurate. This is both a structural 
failing and an ideological one. For the former, textbook narrative is a poor device for 
transmitting such ideas, given the restrictions on space and the demand for more 
universal coverage of subject matter. On ideological terms, textbooks serve as the vehicle 
for the transmission of a dominant cultural paradigm, as well as being subjected to a near-
constant process of political haggling, whitewashing, and marginalization. It is little 
wonder that the narratives in question often seem incoherent. The picture of war that our 
textbooks present to students is one where the experience of battle is often brutal and 
vicious, but the behavior of soldiers is generally the same—stoic acceptance of the 
necessity to fight, kill, and possibly die. 
 This is a gross oversimplification. We should not hide the fact that men in battle 
react differently, across a wide spectrum of behavior. The extremes of such behavior—
represented by the two examples described above—are valuable for students to 
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understand, given the fact that such extremes are not only possible in wartime, but are 
often regular occurrences. Students should first be made aware of the varying reactions of 
soldiers to battle, and be given the opportunity to explore how and why those reactions 
occur.  
This is a difficult task—teenagers are, of course, still children, and the degree to 
which we expose them to gruesome, horrifying content should be measured and prudent, 
after much thought. Such an argument, however, allows us to escape a decidedly 
unpleasant truth—most of the soldiers who go to fight on our nation‘s behalf are barely 
older than the children in our schools. If children do not learn about war in schools, there 
are few other avenues or opportunities for such lessons. If we choose to teach about war, 
though, what is our aim? If our goal, as a society, is to encourage our students to admire 
the sacrifice and valor of our soldiers, then certainly showing the costs incurred and 
borne by those who fight is necessary. If our goal is to make war less likely, then 
exposing our students to the terrible reality of war is vitally, equally important.   
 The 19
th
-century notion of combat—the idea that war was heroic, adventurous, 
with the possibility of injury or even death but a greater likelihood of glory—was quickly 
dashed against the reality of the Civil War. Yet the picture described by most 
textbooks—war was brutal, but most soldiers were able to bear its privations and 
dangers—is too one-dimensional a portrait, and doesn‘t encompass the full range of 
behaviors soldiers might exhibit when faced with the near-daily possibility of dying. For 
instance, while most textbooks depict the death and devastation of the Civil War, many 
rely on comparatively antiseptic descriptive terms (especially ―casualties‖). Textbooks try 
to occupy a middle space between presenting an authentic view of the war and revealing 
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too much of the hideous nature of such conflicts. But our students might be better served 
if they were exposed to the depths of human behavior and experience, so as to better 
judge American policies which may have led to our involvement in such conflagrations.  
For instance, most textbooks relate the hardships and deprivations soldiers were 
expected to endure, focusing mainly on poor food, lack of hygiene, and the boredom of 
camp life. The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010) includes the following roughly humorous 
doggerel about camp food—―The soldiers‘ fare is very rough/The bread is hard, the beef 
is tough/If they can stand it, it will be/Through love of God, a mystery‖ (p. 354). Yet the 
scarcity of supply—and, routinely, the inadequacy of the supplies they did have—had 
much more horrific consequences for soldiers. Sam Watkins, a Tennessee volunteer 
whose memoirs were featured prominently in the widely viewed PBS miniseries The 
Civil War, relates a horrifying example of the type of extremes to which soldiers were 
often exposed, after his unit was ordered to relieve a regiment on guard duty: 
I cannot tell the facts as I desire to. In fact, my hand trembles so, and my feelings 
are so overcome, that it is hard for me to write at all. But we went to the place that 
we were ordered to go to, and when we arrived we found the guard sure 
enough…there were just eleven of them. Some were sitting down and some were 
lying down; but each and every one was as cold and as hard frozen as the icicles 
that hung from their hands and clothing—dead! They had died at their post of 
duty. (Williams, 2005, p. 206-207) 
The horror of war is often featured in textbooks, but largely as the consequence of 
the traditional expectations of combat—that is to say, violent death and injury as the 
result of armed interaction with the enemy. Such activity has the veneer of respectability, 
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an end that meets Faust‘s (2007) conditions of the ars moriendi, the ―Good Death.‖ Yet 
death in the Civil War was often more anonymous, more degrading, and much more 
terrifying than textbooks can (or will) hint at. David Williams (2005) describes how 
wounded men at the battle of Antietam would crawl towards and hide in haystacks which 
were scattered about the battlefield. As the battle ground on, some of the haystacks were 
set afire by exploding artillery; too badly injured to get out, many of the wounded men 
were burned alive (p. 225).  
Perhaps more importantly, the psychological impact of killing is rarely explored 
or hinted at in textbooks. One of the most disturbing aspects of war is the fact that 
soldiers often began to see their business as less the avoidance of death and more the 
infliction of it. Ernie Pyle, in World War II, wrote from Tunisia that ―the most vivid 
change‖ in soldiers exposed to combat is ―the psychological transition from the normal 
belief that taking human life is sinful, over to a new professional outlook where killing is 
a craft. To them now there is nothing morally wrong about killing. In fact it is an 
admirable thing‖ (Pyle & Nichols, 1986, p. 103). This attitude is not a modern 
development for soldiers. Linderman (1987) quotes an Illinois volunteer who thought of 
killing as his ―duty,‖ and who described his ―business‖ in frightening terms—when his 
unit overran a Confederate position, he said, ―We won it fairly. We are the best 
killers…that establishes the righteousness of any cause‖ (p. 150).  
 The hard truth of all wars, including the Civil War, is that while many people see 
the necessity of war, and often consider armed conflict the only option, there are many, 
too, who see war as something else entirely. Noddings (2006) points out that we are 
doing ourselves and our students a disservice when we present war as strictly an option of 
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last resort, without consideration of the fact that there are many individuals who want 
war, whether for ―financial gain, national dominance, or personal glory‖ (p. 36). 
Noddings quotes Chris Hedges, who wrote in ―War is a Force That Gives Us Meaning‖ 
(2002) that individuals who lack ―purpose, meaning, a reason for living‖ find war to be 
an ―enticing elixir,‖ with its ―simplicity and high‖ (p. 10). Hedges writes that war creates 
its own culture, which can be addictive for its participants:  
The rush of battle is a potent and often lethal addiction, for war is a drug, one I 
ingested for many years. It is peddled by myth-makers, historians, war 
correspondents, filmmakers, novelists and the state—all of whom endow it with 
qualities it often does possess: excitement, exoticism, power, chances to rise 
above our small stations in life, and a bizarre and fantastic universe that has a 
grotesque and dark beauty. It dominates culture, distorts memory, corrupts 
language and infects everything around it, even humor, which becomes 
preoccupied with the grim perversities of smut and death. Fundamental questions 
about the meaning, or meaninglessness, of our place on the planet are laid bare 
when we watch those around us sink to the lowest depths. War exposes the 
capacity for evil that lurks just below the surface within all of us. (p. 13)  
This concept—that many soldiers enjoy war—is a ghoulish thought, especially in 
contrast to the traditional view of war, that it is a terrible event in which we participate 
reluctantly, but unavoidably. The modernist view of war holds that fighting has deep and 
lasting psychological costs for soldiers; but the idea that soldiers may come to enjoy what 
they are doing is a difficult one for most Americans to consider. J. Glenn Grey, in The 
Warriors; Reflections on Men in Battle (1967) says that ―anyone who has watched men 
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on the battlefield…finds hard to escape the conclusion that there is a delight in 
destruction‖ (p. 51). This phenomenon has been apparent, among some soldiers, since at 
least the Civil War. Stonewall Jackson talked of the ―delightful excitement‖ he found in 
combat. Phillip Kearny, a Union general, reportedly told George Armstrong Custer, ―I 
love war. It brings me indescribable pleasure, like that of having a woman.‖ Kearny even 
wrote a poetic homage to war that captured the same view: ―Let us fight for fun of 
fighting/without thought of ever righting/Human Wrong‖ (Linderman, 1987, p. 74).  
Perhaps more importantly, such behavior among soldiers is still present in modern 
conflicts. In a 2009 Newsweek article titled ―Love is a Battlefield‖ (Stone, Conant, & 
Barry, 2009), the experiences of Staff Sgt. Shaun McBride are shown as what may 
happen to a soldier who returns from an active war (in McBride‘s case, after 43 months 
in Iraq and Afghanistan). McBride ―would rather be in a war zone than at home,‖ and 
revels in what he considers to be war‘s freedom—in Iraq, ―[you can] do whatever you 
want…You can go into people's houses without being invited in. It's like you own their 
house." Retired Gen. Barry McCaffrey points out what was true of Phillip Kearny and 
soldiers like McBride—―Soldiers want to fight…that‘s why they signed up‖ (Stone, 
Conant, & Barry, 2009).  
The impact of such behavior is not limited to the psychological condition of 
soldiers—it directly affects civilians, both in the war and out. Textbooks often hint at 
how war may have adverse implications for noncombatants, but they restrict these 
implications to those directly derived from the conflict itself—the destruction of cities, 
the loss of crops and foodstuffs, the debilitation of a cultural way of life (as with the 
South in the Civil War). Yet none of the textbooks in this sample explicitly address the 
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costs of war that go far beyond the final gunshots. Veteran care, continued disability, loss 
of wages and employability—all these are real concerns and our students should be 
exposed to them in any discussion of war. In the modern era, significant new research has 
been and is being done regarding the continuing damage done by war to soldiers. In 
2008, the Rand Corporation produced a detailed report, Invisible Wounds of War: 
Psychological and Cognitive Injuries, Their Consequences, and Services to Assist 
Recovery (Tanelian & Jaycox, Ed., 2009), that researched the occurrence of post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and traumatic brain injury (TBI) among veterans of the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The report finds that a significant percentage of returning 
soldiers suffers from such ailments—with regard to TBI, the findings indicated that, 19 
percent of U.S. troops (around 380,000) may have sustained brain injuries in war. The 
report takes their treatment as a national priority: ―The nation must ensure that quality 
care is available and provided to its military veterans now and in the future‖ (p. 452) 
The ―just war‖ component of proportionality applies to each side‘s own populace, 
and the care of those who fought for a state‘s defense is paramount among its conditions. 
Textbooks have little to say about national veterans‘ policy after Civil War, a deficiency 
that would be easy enough to dismiss, if one assumed that PTSD and TBI are modern 
diagnoses which were not medically recognized at the time. This would not be entirely 
true, however. ―Shell shock,‖ the term used first in World War I, is the precursor to more 
appropriate contemporary terminology like PTSD and TBI. There is, however, 
considerable anecdotal evidence that such trauma had existed prior to 1914, especially in 
the Civil War, given its role in the introduction of modern artillery barrages (Alexander, 
2010). In 2010, Home Box Office (HBO) premiered a documentary special titled 
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Wartorn 1861-2010, an examination of PTSD and TBI as it occurred throughout all 
American wars. An essay written as a companion piece to the special, titled ―Psychic 
Injury from Bull Run to Fallujah‖ (Talbott, 2010), outlines the evolving understanding of 
the effects of war on soldiers. It relates the struggle Civil War medical experts had in 
diagnosing what today we understand to be PTSD. They called it alternatively 
―melancholia‖ or ―Dementia,‖ or sometimes even ―soldier‘s heart,‖ a reference to the 
only physically recognizable symptoms they could recognize—heart palpitations and 
rapid breathing, what would probably be termed panic disorder today. 
Particularly poignant in this documentary was the story of Angelo Crapsey, a 
Union soldier from Pennsylvania who entered the Civil War in 1861, just after Fort 
Sumter. He survived Fredericksburg and was on Little Round Top at Gettysburg, serving 
over two-and-a-half years altogether. Upon his return home, his friends and family found 
him a changed man—his stepmother noted that ―his mind was weak,‖ and those who 
knew him as ―lively and cheerful‖ now characterized Angelo as ―melancholy and sober.‖ 
By mid-1864, Angelo suffered from hallucinations of lice infestations, even trying to 
hack the imaginary vermin off his arm with a rusty scythe; he tried several times to 
commit suicide, drinking poison and even trying to drown himself in the Allegheny River 
(he was saved by his own father). Finally, after several old friends refused to take him on 
a group hunt, Angelo went into the woods near his house and shot himself. Dennis Brandt 
(2010) writes, ―The American Civil War cost the nation 620,000 lives. Angelo‘s death is 
not included in that statistic, but he is a casualty of war as surely as if he had died in 
battle.‖ The experiences of soldiers like Angelo Crapsey are depressingly common, and 
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his difficulties after the war are chronic for veterans of all wars. Textbooks take little note 
of such struggles, especially with regard to the Civil War, and they should. 
The loss of a loved one is a fact of warfare that textbooks refer to tangentially, if 
at all. There has been a great deal of research on the impact of war on noncombatants, 
particularly on soldiers‘ families. A 2010 Rand Corporation report, titled Views from the 
Homefront: the Experiences of Youth and Spouses from Military Families (Chandra, et 
al., 2010) examines the impact of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan on military families 
over the course of a year. The report includes alarming results with regard to the damage 
done to service personnel‘s children during deployments: ―We found that youth in our 
study sample reported experiencing anxiety symptoms at levels that were higher than the 
average observed in other studies of youth. Thirty percent of the youth in our study 
reported elevated anxiety symptom levels, compared with 15 percent of youth in civilian 
studies‖ (p. xv). Military spouses often fare as bad or worse. A May, 2010 Associated 
Press article titled ―‘Where Do We Fit In?‘ Asks GI‘s Widows,‖ addresses the continuing 
agony of the families who face difficulty in moving on with their lives after the death of a 
relative in war. Often, widows who try to move on after the death of their spouses facing 
tremendous social pressure that civilians do not face, as they fear they may be ―betraying 
not just the memory of their deceased husbands but also that of fallen national heroes‖ 
(Watson & Maurer, 2010). The damage done to soldiers‘ families is a crisis for any 
democratic nation to solve; yet it missing from textbooks almost entirely. 
Instead of presenting students with an authentic view of war, textbooks hint at the 
terrors of war without fully rendering them. Injuries are commonly described in 
textbooks, as is the medical treatment most commonly applied to such wounds; namely, 
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amputation. And photos of such treatments can be occasionally found in textbooks. For 
example, this is a picture of Alfred Stratton, a Union soldier who lost both his arms in 
battle, featured in The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010):  
 
Figure 13: ―Alfred Stratton,‖ from The Americans (Danzer, et al., 2010, p. 367) 
 
The text includes the following description: ―Though both Union and Confederate 
soldiers were lucky to escape the war with their lives, thousand—like this young 
amputee—faced an uncertain future‖ (p. 367). The picture hints at the horrors endured 
and the lifetime of difficulty faced by soldiers like Stratton, but does not tell the full 
story. Stratton received a set of artificial arms and a pension of twenty-five dollars a 
month from the government, but little else. With no ability to earn a living, Stratton—like 
many disabled veterans—turned to selling small photos of himself, called carte-de-visites 
(Connor & Rhode, 2003). Below is a picture of Stratton, without his prostheses, from 
1869: 
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Figure 14: Alfred Stratton, from Shooting soldiers: Civil War medical images, memory, 
and identity in America. (Connor & Rhode, 2003) 
 
The photograph of Stratton, naked to the waist and his scars plainly visible, is 
made all the more plaintive by the fact that he had been reduced to selling such pictures 
to survive. This is not to say that such images should be included strictly for the sake of 
shock value. But the reality of veterans‘ experience are hardly hinted at in most 
textbooks; and stories like Alfred Stratton‘s, where the cost of war continue long after the 
cessation of hostilities, are necessary for students to properly judge, from a fully critical 
standpoint, the politics and policies that may have led soldiers to such a condition.  
In modern depictions of war (outside of textbooks), it has become common to 
present human beings as a short step away from savagery. Hedges (2002) writes that ―it 
takes little in wartime to turn ordinary men into killers. Most give themselves willingly to 
the seduction of unlimited power to destroy, and all feel the peer pressure‖ (p. 12). Yet as 
disturbing as this portrait of war is, it was much more common for soldiers to find ways 
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in which to maintain a degree of normality in the midst of brutality. Students should also 
be presented with another facet of soldiers‘ behavior in wartime—their ability to modify 
their conduct in such a way as to avoid taking human life. Many soldiers were able to 
endure the nightmarish reality of war, all the while circumventing the need for killing. 
This is not to endorse such a maneuver as the moral or recommended course of action—
there are those (perhaps many) who would consider such behavior to be akin to 
cowardice. However, if our goal is to give our students both an accurate view of war and 
the opportunity for genuine critical thought, the description of such behavior is crucial.  
Many Civil War historians have documented how Confederate and Union soldiers 
often established friendly, informal truces between lines, to accommodate the exchange 
of foodstuffs, small items, and gossip. Bruce Catton described the Civil War as a conflict 
in which the men ―got along beautifully‖ (Catton, 1952, p. 66). Linderman (1987) depicts 
how soldiers on both sides would give warnings prior to attacks—―Are you dressed yet?‖ 
―Look out, Yanks, we‘re going to shoot‖ (p. 67). Displayed courage was often a basis for 
extending a degree of charity that seems contrary to the intent of war; often, if an 
opponent seemed brave or commendable in behavior, a soldier might hold off firing, 
highlighting what Linderman (1987) called ―the ability of courage even to suspend the 
soldier‘s sense of killing as the first necessity‖ (p. 69). An unwritten yet binding code 
was in place about when and how violence might be utilized in war. For instance, Elisha 
Hunt Rhodes, a Rhode Island volunteer, detailed a chance encounter in 1863 in Virginia 
with the iconic Confederate General Stonewall Jackson across a riverbank:  
General Thomas J. Jackson came down to the riverbank today with a party of 
ladies and soldiers. General Jackson took his field glasses and coolly surveyed our 
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party. We could have shot him with a revolver, but we have an agreement that 
neither side will fire, as it does no good, and in fact, is simply murder. (Rhodes, 
1991, p. 103) 
Even more intriguing, there is considerable evidence that men will go to 
extraordinary lengths to avoid killing, even in the heat of battle. S.L.A. Marshall, in Men 
Against Fire: the Problem of Battle Command in Future War (2000), explored the 
experiences of infantrymen in the European Theatre of Operations (ETO) during World 
War II. He proposed answering a question that seemingly had been ignored by military 
experts—―During engagement, what ratio of fire can be expected from a normal body of 
well-trained infantry under average conditions of combat‖ (p. 51)? He found, amazingly, 
that a strong majority of soldiers would simply refuse to take part in what had been 
considered an elementary, automatic process—firing at the enemy. ―A commander of 
infantry,‖ Marshall wrote, ―will be well advised to believe that when he engages the 
enemy not more than one quarter of his men will ever strike a real blow unless they are 
compelled by almost overpowering circumstance or unless all junior leaders constantly 
‗ride herd‘ on troops with the specific mission of increasing their fire‖ (p. 50). Marshall‘s 
emphasis at this point is to propose corrective training measures that will increase the rate 
of fire; but it should be noted that, absent such training, the natural inclination of men in 
combat seems to be not to fire at the enemy. 
This seems to be true for other American wars, as well. Paddy Griffith, in Battle 
Tactics of the Civil War (1989), shows how the Union Army salvaged over 27,000 
muskets and rifles abandoned by retreating Confederate soldiers at the Battle of 
Gettysburg. Of these, ―24,000 were loaded, including 12,000 loaded twice, 6,000 loaded 
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between three and ten times, one with twenty-three charges and one with twenty-two 
balls and sixty-six buckshot. Some had six balls and only one charge of powder; others 
had six unopened cartridges. Others again had the ball behind the powder instead of the 
other way round‖ (p. 86).  
Dave Grossman, in On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War 
and Society (1995), comments on the gravity of this finding. The training of Civil War 
soldiers was a series of constantly repeated drills, over and over, without pause. From the 
very start, soldiers on both sides were trained to load, aim, and fire, in a steady and 
unrelenting fashion. The idea that so many soldiers would load their weapons, fail to fire, 
and then load again, is an anomaly that signals, to Grossman, the presence of a deeper 
motivation—the willingness of soldiers to subvert their own training in an effort to avoid 
hurting or killing other people. Grossman holds that physical proximity is a major issue 
here; the farther away an enemy might be, the more likely a soldier is to fire upon him, 
and conversely, as an enemy draws closer, the chances for directed fire decrease 
significantly. Grossman calls this ―the impact of powerful instinctive forces and supreme 
acts of moral will‖ (p. 25).   
Such moral will is evident in the type of fighting and killing that went on in the 
Civil War. The physical distance between combatants led to a difficult choice for 
soldiers—with which weapons to engage the enemy. While artillery fire was quite 
common in the Civil War, the use of musketry was haphazard (and scattered in usage); 
and the use of bayonets was practically nonexistent. As much as soldiers would drill with 
projectile weapons, they received just as much training in the use of bayonets, and yet 
those weapons were rarely, if ever, used. In fact, both Griffith and Grossman hold that the 
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majority of bayonet wounds, as limited as they were, occurred almost always in a 
singular set of circumstances—after an enemy unit had broken and ran in pell-mell 
fashion, when the ―chase instinct‖ had set in among victorious troops. All in all, though, 
the evidence of reluctance to use any weapon on human beings, especially during the 
Civil War, is considerable.  
Such reluctance is barely hinted at in textbooks. Indeed, only one textbook, The 
Enduring Vision (Boyer, et al., 2008) refers to bayonets at all, and then only in terms of 
the impact of improved artillery in keeping charging troops at bay—―Attackers would 
now have far greater difficulty getting close enough to thrust bayonets; fewer than 1 
percent of the casualties in the Civil War resulted from bayonet wounds‖ (p. 432). In 
most textbooks, the behavior of soldiers is dutiful; in spite of all hazard and threat to their 
lives, men on both sides trudged stoically to the fight. To be fair, many did—yet many, in 
battle, chose not to kill. The complexity of human behavior, in this regard, is absent from 
our textbook narratives. Soldiers, according to these accounts, fight and kill without 
particular reservation, in spite of the considerable evidence leading to a contrary 
conclusion—men are made into killers, not born.  
 What is especially troubling about textbook depictions of war is the overriding 
sense that such conflicts were inevitable products of multiple causes, events which were 
unavoidable for historical participants. Worse still is the implication that such conflicts 
were necessary for national progress towards a more unified, more cohesive American 
identity. While such presumptions may or may not be historically valid, the foundational 
belief behind them encourages student passivity and an absence of critical thought. If 
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students are taught that Americans wars had to happen and could not have occurred 
otherwise, there is little hope for substantive, reflective thought.  
 This is in light of another startling historical truth—in human society, war is 
actually becoming a rarity. The Human Security Report Project of Simon Fraser 
University in Canada recently released the Human Security Report 2009-2010: The 
Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War (2010). The Report‘s findings indicate a 
number of encouraging trends around the globe, especially a sharp decline in global 
conflicts since the end of the Cold War, primarily international wars. Civil wars—defined 
as ―intrastate conflicts‖—did rise, but surprisingly, the mortality rate of these wars 
dropped substantially. There are many reasons for this decline—the ―rapid rise in the 
number of democracies, a growing international economic interdependence, a growing 
norm of ‗war-averseness,‘ and the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons‖ (p. 2). The Report 
includes the following chart which details the waning number of wars: 
 
 
Figure 15: Average Number of International Conflicts, per Year, 1950-2008, from the 
Human Security Report 2009-2010 (2010) 
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 As it develops, this movement toward peace is not a recent trend. John Horgan, in 
―Winning the Ultimate Battle: How Humans Could End War‖ (2009), details how most 
people believe that war is a natural phenomenon, practically a default state for human 
beings, in line with our savage, pre-civilization roots. This is not so, Horgan argues; war 
seems to have arisen in human society as a result of the slow movement from a nomadic 
lifestyle to one grounded by agriculture, and was thus a cultural change, not one rooted in 
genetics. Further, Horgan asserts that the decline of state-to-state warfare over the last 
fifty years, promoted by the rise of democracies (from 20 to almost 100) is similar to the 
overall decline in violence around the world. Human beings, it seems, are more averse to 
war and less violent than ever before. Yet textbooks infer a degree of inevitability and 
acceptance to war that should be reexamined and revised.  
 The difficulty with textbooks, of course, is their subtlety, a strange criticism given 
their usual reputation as a sort of academic blunt instrument, stacked to the bursting point 
with names, dates, and places and wielding considerable authority over pedagogical 
choices. This is no doubt partially due to the intent of any textbook—Paxton (1999) 
posits that ―it may be that school texts need not be exciting to students to be educative,‖ 
since their most basic intent is to introduce students to a massive historical span. There 
have been textbooks that have attempted a more open, clearly subjective authorial voice, 
particularly Harold Rugg and David Muzzey in the early twentieth century, a decision 
which opened them both up to critics who accused them of promulgating a particular 
moral viewpoint (Paxton 1999; Nash, Crabtree, & Dunn, 1997). Still, as this study has 
shown, it is rare for a textbook to take an explicit moral position, though there is 
substantial moral content that is suggestive in nature. A textbook‘s ability to create a 
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sense of inevitability regarding war can be detected in its reliance on a passive voice in its 
narrative. Such a voice denotes a lack of agency in human behavior—we do not cause 
events, such events happen to us. Benware and Deci (1980) point the danger of passivity 
in learning: ―People may absorb the facts, but they will be less active in interpreting and 
integrating them‖ (p. 755). Below are some examples from the textbooks in this study:  
 
Table 3 
 
 Examples of Passive Voice/Lack of Agency in Textbook Narratives 
Book Title  Example 
Give Me Liberty! (Foner, 
2008) 
―And the war came.‖ (p. 499) 
 
―Civil war had begun.‖ (p. 499) 
 
 
America: History of Our 
Nation (Davidson & Stoff, 
2009) 
 
 ―Compromises Fail‖ (p. 359) 
 
―The Crisis Deepens‖ (p. 401) 
 
―The Coming of the Civil War‖ (p. 401) 
 
 
America: Pathways to the 
Present (Cayton, et al., 2007)   
 
―The War Starts‖ (p. 371) 
 
―Instead, the fort became the flash point that ripped apart the Union.‖ (p. 
372) 
 
―Cannons boomed, rifles fired, men shouted, and the battlefield was 
wreathed in a haze of gunfire and dust.‖ (p. 402) 
 
 
The American Nation: A 
History of the United States 
(Carnes, et al., 2008) 
 
―Fear approaching panic swept the region.‖ (p. 322) 
 
The American Pageant 
(Kennedy, et al., 2006) 
America: Pathways to the 
Present (Cayton, et al., 2007)   
 
―The Collapse of Compromise‖ (p. 428) 
 
―Impending bloodshed spurred final and frantic attempts at 
compromise—in the American tradition.‖ (p. 429) 
 
 
The Enduring Vision (Boyer, 
et al., 2008) 
 
― The Coming of War‖ (p. 421) 
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United States History 
(Lapansky-Werner, et al., 
2010) 
 
On the U.S. acquisition of territory after the Mexican War: ―Thus, the 
lands won from Mexico increased tensions between North and South.‖ (p. 
312) 
 
―The Civil War Begins‖ (p. 352) 
  
Textbooks which infer that wars are products of historical causation, outside the 
control of human choice, minimize both the importance and consequences of all 
American wars, but especially the Civil War. The imputation that the war occurred 
beyond our will is disingenuous—Drew Gilpin Faust, in This Republic of Suffering 
(2007), in referring to the mass bloodshed of the war, wrote that ―the carnage was not a 
natural disaster but a man-made one, the product of human choice and human agency‖ (p. 
55).  
 In sum, there is a need to revisit the tone and structure of textbook narratives 
which do not fully represent the psychological impact of war, or infer a lack of agency or 
the inevitability of war. But given the restrictions and parameters generally facing 
textbook authors and publishing firms, such a shift in tone is unlikely. Teachers should 
consider ways in which such materials, given their limitations, may be used to help 
students engage in thoughtful, critical analysis of the moral implications of human 
conflict. Such methods are considered in the following section. 
 
The Value of the “Just War” Doctrine 
 The hegemonic influence of textbooks can lead to student passivity and lack of 
inquiry, two outcomes which are antithetical to the democratic process. Hofstadter and 
Wallace (1970) point to the impact of textbooks in writing that ―American history 
textbooks are written in order for students to be instructed, informed, and to accept the 
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author‘s interpretation and evaluation of history‖ (p. 3). The use of the textbook to foster 
a particular viewpoint of American wars—that they were generally moral in scope and 
intent, that they were prosecuted as such, and that American involvement in such 
conflicts was always necessary and reluctantly entered—is an evaluative stance that 
should be challenged, not necessarily because it is wrong in all circumstances, but 
because challenging such assumptions and testing their validity is the purpose of the 
educational process. 
 The value of reflective inquiry in the social studies is well-established (Dewey, 
1938). Noddings (2006) defines critical thinking as ―the diligent and skillful use of reason 
on matters of moral/social importance—on personal decision-making, conduct, and 
belief‖ (p. 32). Teachers have relied on critical thinking as a foundation of their 
instruction for decades—yet textbooks, often the informational resource upon which such 
inquiry is based, is often deficient to those needs (Wong, 2003). Stahl, et al. (2002) points 
out that students who have relied primarily on textbooks for information—and thus have 
―been taught to think of history merely as a series of chronicled events‖ (p. 20)—may 
have difficulty pursuing critical inquiry without assistance. Assuredly, that is a teacher‘s 
function; but a clearly delineated standard against which to cast any reflective exercise 
would be a boon to historical instruction, a role the ―just war‖ doctrine can fill 
appropriately.  
The value of the ―just war‖ doctrine is that is provides a critical framework for 
judging war. Those who might take issue with student analysis of American wars could 
be concerned about such analysis being rooted in a teacher‘s conception of right and 
wrong, the overweening influence of a single instructor‘s moral values on student 
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conceptions—and that would be a fair concern. The significance of the ―just war‖ 
doctrine, then, is that it is the culmination of two millennia of thought, both secular and 
religious; and it has become the foundation of international law and diplomacy around 
the world. In the U.S., it has formed the standard of military conduct since the Lieber 
Code was written, in 1863 (Doty, 1998). While morality is inherently subjective, no 
careful examination of the ―just war‖ tradition could conclude that it was without broad 
support across the spectrum of human societies. The ―just war‖ doctrine is as universally 
agreed upon as a moral scaffold about war is likely to be, and thus provides a valuable 
teaching tool for the social studies. 
Textbooks contain a wealth of moral content and perspectives, yet these are 
largely incoherent and implicit. As is always the case, it falls to the teacher to determine 
what happens in the classroom and how students may use such resources for their benefit 
(Thornton, 1991). As often as textbooks are criticized for their shortcomings, they can 
still be useful learning resources for students. Teachers often rely on textbooks as the 
source and scope of their curricular choices; therefore, the use of a framework like ―just 
war‖ would serve to focus and accentuate the value of such materials. Teachers generally 
will move away from textbooks only when given a better, more useful alternative (Schug, 
Western, & Enochs, 1997). Given this, the inclusion of the ―just war‖ tradition increases 
the educational value and impact of traditional materials. 
Possibly the most mundane issue for teachers, yet one of the most important, is 
that of time. Moving chronologically through an American history course and covering 
the required number of topics, in accordance with most state curricula, is a challenging 
enough task for teachers; doing so in a meaningful way is often impossible, given the 
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daunting number of challenges facing even the most experienced educator. Most teachers 
resort to a belated focus on the historical names, dates, places, and events that comprise 
traditional ―information knowledge‖ (Wineburg, 2002). When teaching wars, it is little 
wonder that teachers may resist spending time on the events of the war itself (the scope of 
jus in bello) and instead focus more peripherally on causes and consequences of the 
conflict. The ―just war‖ doctrine has a particular utility in this instance. Rather than being 
forced to teach all the events of a given war, or none (and instead relying on causes and 
effects), ―just war‖ allows for a clarity of effort and instruction. Teachers may choose 
specific events, themes, trends, or results of a given war and apply the ―just war‖ 
convention in the classroom.  
The ―just war‖ doctrine also has variable uses in its implementation. It may be 
used critically with historical events, as large as the Civil War (as this study has done) or 
as particular as specific battles, policies, or decisions. World War II, for example, is often 
characterized as a conflict that was simply necessary to fight. Nazi Germany, the standard 
argument goes, together with fascist Italy and militarist Japan, represented too great a 
threat to the rest of humanity to allow to go unchecked. Studs Terkel (1985), in The Good 
War, his oral history of World War II, drew his title from several interviewees who 
referred to that global conflict as a ―good war,‖ a bromide which has become hardened 
truth among many Americans. But one of Terkel‘s subjects, US Navy Rear Admiral Gene 
R. LaRoque, was more thoughtful on the issue: ―World War Two has warped our view of 
how we look at things today. We see things in terms of that war, which in a sense was a 
good war. But the twisted memory of it encourages the men of my generation to be 
willing, almost eager, to use military force anywhere in the world‖ (p. 36). If we 
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conceptualize World War II as a ―good‖ war to our students, we should consider the 
impact such a description may have. Have we signaled our belief in the concept of a ―just 
war?‖ Are there occasions when mass extermination of human beings is justified, even 
commendable? When the U.S. firebombed the city of Dresden in early 1945, killing tens 
of thousands of German civilians, should that be characterized as a grim necessity, one 
forced on us by external forces? Should it be characterized as a ―victory?‖ These are 
questions which, without a moral anchor point to facilitate critical analysis, lead to almost 
rudderless debate, without merit or conclusion. The ―just war‖ doctrine is a coherent and 
measured standard to use in finding answers to these questions.  
The value of the ―just war‖ tradition goes beyond the evaluation of historical 
events or era. It may be used as a framework against which to judge the historical sources 
themselves, applying a methodology very similar to this study—a teacher might ask 
students to examine their own textbooks for moral content and conclusions in their 
depictions of a given American war. Richard Paxton wrote, in ―A Deafening Silence: 
History Textbooks and the Students Who Read Them‖ (1999), that though textbook aim 
for a voice of disembodied objectivity, this is not the case at all—in truth, ―the 
characteristics of the finished solution are determined not only by its components, but 
also by the hand that stirs it‖ (p. 319).  
The value of the ―just war‖ doctrine is in its use as a moral structure against which 
to evaluate historical events. Like all moral constructs, though, it is subjective, which 
means the terms and conditions we use for morality may be open to debate and question. 
Just as valuable as the question, ―Is a war moral?‖ is the question ―What do we mean by 
moral?‖ Teachers can find significant instructional value in posing such questions to their 
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students. Is there ever an occasion in which it may be permissible to attack a nation that 
has not committed an overtly aggressive act? Is it possible that the jus ad bellum 
admonition of just cause is no longer applicable in a world where traditional state-to-state 
warfare is becoming a rarity? In an era where asymmetrical methods and tactics are now 
becoming the norm, and where state-sponsored transnational terrorism represents a threat 
that is more existential than territorial, is it worth relying on international law built at a 
time where such threats were practically nonexistent? The ―just war‖ tradition generally 
disapproves of the moral nature of nuclear weapons, terming them indiscriminate and 
disproportional to the threat faced (Walzer, 1977, p. 277). This is a prohibition that would 
provide a valuable instructional experience for students—did the United States commit a 
violation of jus in bello with its use of two atomic bombs at the end of World War II? 
Should a threat have been made to use such weapons, without the intent to actually do 
so? Or would even that threat constitute a moral violation, as many theorists consider it 
―wrong to threaten to do something which is actually wrong to do‖ (Orend, 2006, p. 
122)? The components of the ―just war‖ doctrine should be themselves critiqued, both 
their moral foundations and their applicability in a modern world.  
There are those, doubtlessly, who would be troubled by the prospect of students 
challenging the policy decisions and moral assumptions that have led our country to war 
in the past. It seems likely that some of these potential critics might consider such inquiry 
to be contrary to ―traditional‖ American values or the United States‘ status as a ―lodestar 
to people around the world‖ (Cheney, 1995). But judgment is inherent in historical 
inquiry, not merely about a given event‘s ―importance‖ or ―relevance,‖ but, innately, its 
value. The historian Paul Gagnon (1988) refers to judgment as ―nothing less than 
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wisdom,‖ which requires ―a bone deep understanding of how hard it is to preserve 
civilization or to better human life‖ (p. 43). This goal, ―to better human life,‖ has to mean 
more than dry intellectualism; it needs to be closely connected to a student‘s life and 
experiences, with the overt goal of helping all to prosper. The principled aim of any 
democratic society should be to make war as unlikely and as limited as possible, given 
the sanctity and value of each human life. 
This may sound troubling, to some. Those who might view the ―just war‖ doctrine 
simplistically or from a particularly myopic standpoint may criticize it as pacifistic. This 
would be inaccurate. ―Just war‖ is neither pacifistic nor militaristic. It is instead firmly 
based on the concept that war can be justified, and thus can be moral, but must always be 
limited. To insist upon these limitations is the method through which we can make our 
participation in violent action both justifiable and utilitarian.  
 
Morality and War in Education 
 Nel Noddings, in Critical Lessons (2006), elaborates upon her ethic of care as a 
foundation of public education, and distinguishes between ―caring-for,‖ a personalized 
act between individuals, and ―caring-about,‖ a generalized emotive trend that 
encompasses abstractions (like the moral nature of war) and thus is the purview of public 
education. The issue of caring for ourselves and each other is, of course, a deeply moral 
one; Noddings points out that ultimately, whether an educational relationship is between 
a teacher and a student or simply one human to another, ―we are responsible for each 
other's moral development‖ (Noddings, 1990, p. 124).  
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 There may be no more important time in American history to understand the 
moral nature of war. Over the last ten years, the United States has been committed to two 
separate military incursions, in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the fighting has been borne 
entirely by the all-volunteer armed services. It is deceptively simple for an American 
citizen to ignore the fundamental reality of war in today‘s society; and with that, to ignore 
the threats, perils, and costs endured by servicemen and servicewomen at war. Our 
textbooks and our classrooms should be alive with principled discussions of the moral 
nature of our conflicts, to be certain that the risk we ask our soldiers to take on is worth 
such an investment of human life.  
 James Palmer was killed at the Second Battle of Bull Run in 1862. Prior to the 
battle, knowing her brother was in combat, Sarah Palmer regularly scanned newspapers 
for casualty lists, even though the prospect of what she might find nearly unnerved her—
―I do feel too anxious to see the papers and get the list of casualties…and yet I dread to 
see it‖ (Faust, 2008, p. 104). When news came that James had been killed, the Palmer 
family underwent a moral and psychological trauma all too familiar to families of those 
killed in action. Esther, James‘ mother, embraced denial—―I sometimes think he is not 
dead, it might have been a mistake,‖ as did another sister, Elizabeth, who said ―I find 
myself continually thinking of him as alive‖ (p. 145). The realization that James was 
gone and would not return required an almost physical act of will, a determination to 
accept the horrifying reality—Harriet, a third sister, five months after the battle, said, ―It 
is very hard for me to believe that dear Jim is dead. Were it not for the cessation of those 
letters we used to hail with so much gladness…I could not realize it‖ (p. 144-145). 
Sarah‘s pronouncement that, prior to James‘ death, ―we had never known what death was 
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before‖ is a sentiment understood by all those who have waited for news of their loved 
ones. It is also a principle that should be remembered by a nation that has asked its 
citizens to risk their lives in the service of their country‘s aims.  
 The physical, psychological, and moral damage done by our participation in wars 
is a cost that all Americans should keep in mind, and our decisions to enter such conflicts 
must be informed by the reality of what war can do to us and our enemies. William 
Sherman, in a letter to his wife in July 1864 during his campaign in Georgia, wrote that 
―"I begin to regard the death and mangling of a couple of thousand men as a small affair, 
a kind of morning dash" (Wortman, 2009, p. 250). The dehumanization of war, ―an 
abandonment of emotion and sensibility‖ (Faust, 2008, p. 145), is a consequence that 
teachers (as well as the resources they use) should be prepared to withstand.  
There is a need for continued research and contemplation in this area, as 
circumspect and qualified as it may be in design and conclusion. Under a critical 
pragmatist perspective, there is no one great ―truth,‖ but instead competing arguments. 
Certainly, an argument about our national conception of war is one that would cause 
much consternation. There would be accusations of bias and underlying agendas, 
critiques of patriotism and ideology. But such an argument is vital to our sense of our 
national identity and our humanity. Williams (2005) relates the story of a soldier‘s wife 
who railed against her government after learning her husband had been killed in battle: 
―What do I care for patriotism…my husband is my country. What is country to me is he 
be killed‖ (p. 162)? A discussion about our national conception of war is not unpatriotic; 
it is, instead, humanistic.  
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In 1845, prior to the outbreak of the Mexican-American War, Senator Charles 
Sumner gave a Fourth of July Address in Boston to the American Peace Society, during 
which he claimed that ―in our age, there can be no peace that is not honorable; there can 
be no war that is not dishonorable‖ (Ziegler, 1992, p. 111). There was great disagreement 
as to Sumner‘s conclusion, as there would be now. But we live now in an era where war 
is often disassociated from regular human experience, where, as the journalist Joe Klein 
writes, ―every human tragedy can easily be mistaken for a television show‖ (Klein, 
2010). The language we use to describe our wars in our textbooks represents a hegemonic 
view of the moral stature of such conflicts; and conversely, the language we avoid or 
minimize signifies a moral choice in our national memory. Michael A. Bellesiles, in his 
article ―Teaching Military History in a Time of War‖ (2010), describes how painful 
otherwise innocuous discussions about war can be for veterans when words like ―just‖ or 
―only‖ are used to characterize the number of casualties in a given engagement. And, 
more ominously, he describes the failure of many Americans to consider the import of 
U.S. military policies—regarding the decision by President Barack Obama to increase the 
number of American soldiers in Afghanistan in 2010, Bellesiles admonishes us that ―we 
should see more than just a number; we should see families beginning their long, anxious 
vigil until these men and women return home‖ (Bellesiles, 2010). We cannot afford, in an 
era where we are capable of such destruction, to avoid moral criticism of war in our 
classrooms. To do so would be to indulge in collective dissonance, where we decry war 
as a moral evil but revel, in a variety of ways, in its occurrence.  
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Discussion and Recommendations 
 A standard criticism of many textbook analyses is that they spend a great deal of 
time focusing on a given text‘s deficiencies, and comparatively too little on possible 
solutions to such deficiencies. Often, these analyses point to a textbook‘s failure to 
include or to marginalize a particular point of view, and the solution then is quite 
simple—the textbook should have more of a given topic. This solution, then, helps to 
foster another standing criticism of textbooks—that they are often too large, filled to the 
bursting point with seemingly trivial bits of data that have little meaning to students.  
The findings of this study suggest that a similar phenomenon occurs with 
textbook depictions of war. Textbook authors are faced with two competing forces—the 
tendency to avoid concrete or controversial value positions, together with the demands of 
various constituencies that their perspectives be represented. Narrative depictions of the 
Civil War are long, often very detailed and—though there is latent moral content—rarely 
explicit in value judgment. Given this study‘s orientation and goals, it is unlikely that the 
failing of textbooks to adequately represent war could be solved by simply adding more 
to the standard textbook narrative. Instead, a reorientation of focus and intent is 
necessary, and this section aims at offering possible recommendations for such a 
transition. 
Will and Ariel Durant, in Lessons of History (1968) point out that advances in 
human history are often ―merely new means of achieving old ends‖ (p. 95). It would be 
retrograde to propose solutions to textbook depictions of war that would be limited by the 
factors that limit all the effectiveness of any text-based resource in the classroom. 
Teachers are restricted by time, availability of resources, student ability and interest; and 
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suggesting that another section, or another graph, or another eyewitness account be 
folded into the main narrative, and that this would provide an adequate remedy, would be 
foolish. The problem, then, is reconsidering the goal of textbooks. The Durants claim 
that, throughout history, ―means and instrumentalities change; motives and ends remain 
the same‖ (p. 34). We must consider what textbooks will look like with a new goal in 
mind. Primarily, this section is concerned with two important questions: what should 
textbooks be doing? And, even if such remedies are not likely in the near future, what 
might teachers do in order to more effectively instruct students about the realities of war?  
It would unfair to indict textbook authors specifically for the failings of textbooks. 
A textbook is the product of a substantial and lengthy process, one that involves a large 
number of entities, from the writers themselves to publishers and editors, with the added 
obstacles of state adoption committees, legal considerations, and revision after revision—
all in light of the constant scrutiny that such books receive as both mechanisms and 
victims of political ideology. Given this, any proposed revision to textbooks could hardly 
be a radical one. Noddings, in Critical Lessons, (2006) concedes that the traditional 
curriculum utilized across the country for decades ―probably will not change in the 
foreseeable future.‖ Yet her belief that ―every discipline can be stretched from the inside 
to provide richer, more meaningful studies‖ (290) can also be true of textbooks.  
In order to more appropriately address American wars in classrooms, there are 
two facets to consider (as this study has tried to do): historical and moral. From a 
historical perspective, it is vital that the events of our past be represented accurately and 
to an appropriate degree of depth and breadth. From a pedagogical perspective, textbooks 
should provide teachers with the tools and content necessary for a moral evaluation of 
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war. It is vital to note that this is not a call for indoctrination. This study has focused on 
the presence and nature of value positions in textbooks, not in judgment of them. Instead 
of instructing our students in what to believe, our textbooks should be one of the devices 
through which we teach students why our principles are held dear.  
Telling the Story: How We Must Change Textbooks 
Criticizing textbooks is an easy thing to do—they are as maligned as they are 
ubiquitous. Textbooks are critiqued as discriminatory, racist, sexist, too detailed, not 
detailed enough, poorly written, as mechanisms of social control and as ineffective 
transmitters of national values. While many of these criticisms are valid and should be 
addressed, it bears repeating that very few of these faults can be considered intentional. 
Textbook authors—most of them professional historians or educators—try, under 
difficult circumstances, to create the best instructional resources they can, with the 
singular goal of promoting the best education for our students and our nation. The 
construction of a textbook is a collaborative process that often includes dozens of direct 
contributors, created in light of a varying number of motivations (academic interests and 
the prospect of publication chief among them). It is little wonder that moral content—in 
fact, any content—is disparate throughout any textbook.   
The omnipresent status of the textbook in school curricula has made it the center a 
perennial debate over censorship. As far back as 1783, attempts to control the content of 
textbooks have occurred in American civic life (Borowiak, 1983, p. 11). The argument 
over textbook content is a well-profiled and routine ritual of school life, as various groups 
assail textbooks for containing too little of this, too much of that, and presenting our 
394 
 
students with a dangerous amount of ideology, whether liberal or conservative. It has 
been occurring in America since the early days of public education, and many of the most 
important names in social studies have been subjected to such scrutiny. Harold Rugg‘s 
massive set Man and His Changing Society, the most popular textbooks ever produced 
(which over five million students used over time), were assailed in the late 1930s by 
conservative groups for their perceived ―lack of patriotism and subversive efforts to 
introduce socialism into public schools‖ (Makler, 2004, p. 37). 
In truth, though, the history of textbook censorship is less about the battles waged 
over content, fierce though they may be, but instead the battles that are avoided. Given 
the multiple reality and responsibility for a textbook‘s authorship, it is easier to see how 
many are subject to a form of self-censorship. In an effort to avoid the public (and often 
commercial) backlash brought on by the possibility of controversial topics or language, 
textbooks are often diluted in content to avoid the likelihood of offense and any 
consequences that attend it (Swearingen, 1986, p. 33). This avoidance of confrontation 
over content is understandable, and pervasive. Certainly, it would be obtuse to blame 
textbook authors and publishers for wanting to be published; and it would be naïve to 
insist on controversial content for its own sake. But the willingness of textbook 
companies to avoid, delimit, or moderate the reality of war may prove to be a disservice 
to teachers and students, in serving to obscure the potential for moral criticism. This is an 
area of research that requires further exploration and investigation.  
A more common criticism of textbooks is inaccuracy. While the degree and 
frequency of content mistakes vary from text to text, many of the resources we hand to 
our students as unquestioned repositories of historical fact are often anything but. The 
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failing of textbooks is rarely that of outright factual error, but more commonly the sin of 
omission. Vital events, themes, and ideas are missing from the primary mechanism of 
social studies instruction.  
For instance, with regard to the Civil War, a proper consideration of the war‘s 
beginning is incomplete, from a historiographical standpoint, without addressing the end 
of James Buchanan‘s presidency. As this study has asserted, it is incomplete to consider 
the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter without considering the policies which led to it. 
While textbooks often praise Abraham Lincoln for his sober and measured approach to 
the issue of secession, little is made of Buchanan‘s attempt, with the Star of the West 
mission, to resupply the fort, maintain the federal garrison there, and avoid war. With the 
value of hindsight, it is easy enough to criticize this plan; but while Lincoln‘s reluctance 
to provoke the South is portrayed as thoughtful moderation, Buchanan‘s policies are 
derided (if they are mentioned at all) as dilatory and dithering. Textbooks should give 
students the opportunity to face the same choices James Buchanan did—should he 
resupply the fort? Would he have weakened the authority of the executive if he did not? 
Was it moral to risk American lives and peace for the federal installation in Charleston 
harbor—and if not there, where? 
Textbooks can also be adjusted to reflect the reality of war. It is a difficult 
challenge to provide compelling and realistic depictions of military conflict while 
remaining appropriate for the classroom—but we should consider what we mean by 
―appropriate.‖ Surely, we do not want to shock or disgust our students to a degree that 
may prove psychologically damaging; but at the same time, if students are not exposed to 
the brutality and carnage of war in classrooms, where will they be? Some of the children 
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in our classrooms will grow into the young men and women we, as a nation, will send to 
battlefields on our behalf. If we rely on popular entertainment to serve as the primary 
avenue through which American students learn about war—where it is generally offered 
as amusement, rather than for educative value—we do a tremendous disservice to them 
and to those who fight for us now, trivializing their risk and their sacrifice.  
We, as educators, should insist on frank, unvarnished depictions of war, not with 
the intent of horrifying our students or convincing them that war is a pointless, bloody 
tragedy. But how can students be expected to respect the hardships of our soldiers 
without knowing of the dangers they have faced? How can students judge, in the same 
manner we ask our adult citizens to judge, the morality of our decisions to risk our fellow 
citizens‘ lives? Textbooks should include accounts from the soldiers themselves, relating 
the experiences of war—and not simply the horrific presence of death and injury, but also 
the exhilaration felt by many participants, the troubling fact that many soldiers enjoy war.  
Students should know that the psychological implications of combat are complex 
and our understanding of them is still evolving. While the concrete details of such 
depictions would be devilish and painful to contemplate, a reasonable standard should be 
our conception of soldiers like Alfred Stratton, the Union soldier who lost both his arms 
in combat and eventually, sold pictures of his mutilated limbs as keepsakes. We should 
see the enormous sacrifice made by soldiers who are injured in combat, and we should 
esteem them for enduring such adversity; but we should also keep foremost in our mind 
the frightful nature of such wounds, the failure of our nation to heed Lincoln‘s 
admonition ―to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his 
orphan.‖  
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In a similar fashion to failings of historical accuracy, textbooks often also fail to 
provide sufficient breadth or depth for meaningful engagement. As instructional 
resources, textbooks are plagued by either a lack of complexity or a deluge of 
meaningless data (and, occasionally, both). Providing students with the murky reality of 
wartime policy allows them to engage in the sort of critical thinking that marks the best 
of social studies instruction. Moreover, it also allows them to consider the traumatic 
nature of war for all participants and the costs of imprudently entering such a conflict. In 
war, there are few decisions with clearly defined choices. When Abraham Lincoln was 
confronted with the Confederacy‘s discriminatory policy towards African-American 
soldiers, he faced a thicket of dangerous options—should he refuse to allow black 
soldiers to serve under such conditions? Should he extend similar treatment towards 
Confederate prisoners, and contemplate the use of summary execution? Or should he 
suspend prisoner exchanges, condemning captured soldiers on both sides to a hellish 
existence for the remainder of the war? The fact that Lincoln opted for the last choice is 
rarely presented in textbooks; and when it does appear, it is presented with the standard 
veneer of inevitability, with the implication that because it was the choice taken, it was 
thus the right one. In the study of history, there are routinely less answers than questions; 
we should expect the same from our textbooks. A textbook that included activities for 
students to evaluate the choices facing leaders and soldiers alike would better serve the 
aims of our schools. Noddings, in The Challenge to Care in Schools (2005) calls for a 
―clear and unapologetic‖ commitment to what should be our goal—―the main aim of 
education should be to produce competent, caring, loving, and lovable people‖ (p. 174). 
If we claim to care for our students and wish for them to have fulfilling, happy lives, 
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surely we should want them to have the ability to avoid carelessly endorsing human 
conflict. 
Passivity in tone is a common feature of textbooks, and while it is certainly less 
overt of a problem than other deficiencies, it has a deceptive impact on readers. The air of 
inevitability adopted by many textbook authors leads students to the implicit assumption 
that wars are something that happen to us, rather than a course of action chosen by 
individuals for any number of reasons. Perhaps more alarmingly, such a tone robs the 
narrative of its dramatic element, removing any sense that what did happen need not 
have, and that the historical figures involved had choices they had to make. When the 
narrative of The American Pageant (Kennedy, et al., 2006) asserts that ―impending 
bloodshed spurred final and frantic attempts at compromise—in the American tradition‖ 
(p. 429), the ownership of such bloodshed is shifted to nameless forces beyond our 
control. This divorces us from the costs, tragedies, and responsibilities for war. Textbook 
authors and publishers should adopt a more personal, honest tone in writing narrative, 
one which encourages students to understand that while war may sometimes be justified, 
it is always avoidable, always the product of a choice. 
This study has revolved around the ―just war‖ doctrine, and its use in the 
classroom would be an effective mechanism for moral education and a thoughtful 
evaluation of American wartime policy. This is not to say, however, that its explicit 
inclusion in a textbook is a necessity. Instead, textbook authors should construct their 
narrative on American conflicts with a focus similar to the doctrine itself, considering the 
conditions that may lead the United States to enter into a war, our conduct during it, and 
the manner in which we conclude it. The ―just war‖ doctrine represents an opportunity 
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for moral scrutiny, and while the use of its conditions and categories is negotiable, the 
aim of the doctrine—to compel an examination of our moral conduct—should not be.  
Any criticism of such scrutiny as unpatriotic would be misguided. No one would 
argue that textbooks should provide contrary narrative to the traditional hegemonic view 
of U.S. history, simply for its own sake. Students should, though, be exposed to not only 
multiple perspectives of historical events, but opposing ones, primarily to avoid the 
intellectual slovenliness that accompanies indoctrination. And if we fear that our students 
may reach different conclusions about American wartime behavior—if we fear that the 
monuments of our past may crack and fade in the present and the future—we would do 
well to recall that our ongoing critique of our national story is what makes it relevant to 
all generations. J. William Fulbright claimed that ―in a democracy, dissent is an act of 
faith‖ (Fulbright, 1964, p. 221). We should not avoid such moral criticism, nor dismiss it 
as anti-American, when it is, in fact, the source of our national strength.  
 
Teaching the Story: How Teachers Should Change  
How the textbook is written is the first step towards reforming how it is used by 
teachers. The ―just war‖ doctrine, as has been asserted, has great potential for teachers as 
a mechanism for teaching American military conflicts. Orend (2005) contends that ―just 
war‖ theory can serve as a ―hugely useful and insightful—indeed, unparalleled—[aid] to 
reflection and decision-making in connection with war,‖ and teachers should embrace 
that utility (Orend, 2005, p. 268). I have argued, throughout this study, that the ―just war‖ 
doctrine can serve as a highly effective tool for teachers in the thoughtful examination of 
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American wars. Textbooks are still, perhaps in spite of everything, the main resource for 
classrooms around the country, and thus what they say has an outsized impact on 
instruction. But, as with any instructional resource, its value is chiefly determined by the 
individual instructor, who will elaborate the process through which content and skills are 
passed on to students. The manner in which teachers utilize such content is just as 
important as the content itself. The difficulty lies in the fact that many teachers view the 
textbook as less a guide to instruction and more the foundation of the entire curriculum. 
The status of the textbook as the source of all answers can create an unwillingness among 
teachers to challenge it. The individual teacher is the focal point of instruction in the 
classroom, and the textbook should be viewed as a means to an end, and not the end 
itself.  
Using a textbook to impart moral lessons about warfare is a difficult task. The 
classroom use of the ―just war‖ doctrine requires more than simply a nuts-and-bolts 
understanding of the theory and its components. The foundation of ―just war‖ theory is 
the belief that war should only be considered under the strictest conditions, a concept that 
protects us from unnecessary risk and loss. It requires a deep empathy for the goal of 
―just war‖—namely, a limitation of war to its most humane manifestation. Perhaps most 
importantly, then, the theory requires that teachers care for their students in a way that 
moves beyond hoping they have successful careers or simply obey the law. In The 
Challenge to Care, Noddings (2005) argues that most reform is aimed at curricular issues 
rather than the concept of caring for our students—―Too many of us think that we can 
improve education merely by designing a better curriculum, finding and implementing a 
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better form of instruction, or instituting a better form of classroom management‖ (p. 173). 
For the goals of ―just war‖ to be realized, textbooks have to be better; but so do teachers. 
It is well enough to state that teachers should be the arbiters of instruction in the 
classroom; but, in reality, they are often hampered by forces outside the classroom as 
well as their own deficiencies within it. Diane Ravitch, in The Death and life of the Great 
American School System (2010) argues that schools ―are a public good,‖ where ―the goal 
of education is not to produce higher scores, but to educate children to become 
responsible people with well-developed minds and good character‖ (p. 227-228). 
Presumably, the concept of ―good character‖ means something more than simple 
rectitude and good behavior. Character should mean, for our society, fostering the ability 
among our students to live a reasoned, well-considered life. Our students should be able 
to consider the possible costs and sacrifices inherent in war in a manner that best serves 
our nation, our culture, and each other. Given the climate of the age of accountability, 
though, teachers are often forced to focus less on the character of our students and more 
on their quantitative accomplishments. For a moral understanding of war, teachers must 
have the confidence to depart from the demands of traditional curriculum, formally 
represented by the textbook. Teachers must be willing to use the textbook, rather than be 
used by it. 
Part of this will revolve around content knowledge. The ability to successfully 
articulate the reality of war in the classroom is determined in large part by the teacher‘s 
ability to move beyond the limited narrative capabilities of the standard textbook, and to 
infuse the subject with the complexity and detail necessary to achieve our ends. In 
Critical Lessons, Noddings (2006) argues that ―the gap between content and pedagogy is 
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often enormous‖ (p. 283). Teachers need to have the content expertise to challenge the 
narrative of textbooks and to fill the gaps for their students. This is a depressingly 
common refrain, and reaching a sufficient degree of content knowledge among new 
teachers will be no easy task; but given the number of studies that have supported such 
measures as the basis for any number of possible reforms, it is an imperative issue to 
address. Noddings, in The Challenge to Care (2005), identifies knowledge of subject 
matter as essential, not only to help students towards greater understanding of the 
subjects they study, but also to help teachers avoid a common pitfall: ―teachers would 
have to know their subjects so well that they can spot and encourage promising 
approaches in their students and not be overcome, out of ignorance, by the need to 
control‖ (p. 178). 
Teachers would be better able to utilize textbooks in a meaningful manner if they 
had greater understanding of historical content, the historiographical debates over major 
topics, and the methodology of historians. This being the case, the question of where and 
how preservice teachers will learn this content is an important one. Simply saying that 
―teachers should know more history‖ does not suffice—Thornton (2005) points out that 
the standard education a preservice teacher receives (typically a bachelor‘s degree in 
some disciplinary field) does little to address the whole range of historical topics 
addressed in a standard curriculum (p. 89). The prospect of adding more requirements 
prior to a student‘s graduation from an education program is little removed from the 
refrain of many textbook critiques when they argue that fixing textbook narratives is 
largely a case of adding more detail, or more anecdotes, or more data. From a practical 
standpoint, too, the question of content revolves around responsibility—who will offer 
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this content to preservice teachers? Will we expect a university department of education 
to train teachers in historical content? Or will we send them to the department of history? 
More importantly, we must balance the need for greater content knowledge—certainly a 
given, if teachers are to be properly equipped to deal with the deficiencies of textbooks—
with the reality that teachers are not professional historians, and neither are our students. 
The expectation that either should be would be a disservice. 
One possible solution to the deficiency of content knowledge among teachers is a 
change in the current division between subject matter and method. Thornton (2005) 
asserts that, since subject matter preparation typically falls outside colleges of education, 
social science professors are most responsible for the content training of preservice 
teacher. Given this, there has been little collusion between faculties in education and the 
liberal arts to determine what sort of content would be most appropriate, given curricular 
demands in the classroom. Thornton argues for ―academic courses to integrate the social 
sciences around themes that could drive a dynamic social studies curriculum‖ (p. 92), 
courses which would provide teachers with the ability to more critically evaluate and 
arrange textbook resources for classroom use. There is a tendency to assume that 
knowledge of subject matter is a sort of ―silver bullet‖ for method, that the former will 
create a proficiency in the latter. The subject matter itself should be crafted for use in a 
school curriculum, and it should be so created by both the professionals in the content 
itself and the practitioners in the classroom (Thornton, 2005, p. 96).  
Similar to the argument for a reconfiguring of content is a consideration of what 
we mean by content. One of the chief findings of this study is that the problems with 
textbooks are not necessarily connected to the breadth, depth, or amount of historical 
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content, but rather the conceptualizations behind that content. If our desire is to train our 
teachers to be historians, there are too many obstacles, practical and ideological, to 
accomplish it. But content knowledge does not simply mean the ability to marshal great 
quantities of historical fact, nor the ability to interpret historians‘ arguments over the 
meaning of such fact (though such skills would undoubtedly be valuable). Noddings, in 
Critical Lessons (2006) points out that a typical teacher‘s preservice content education 
(usually a bachelor‘s degree in a social science) has helped to create an air of professional 
equality with graduates of other fields, but did little to prepare young educators for the 
rigor of the classroom—―we may have traded,‖ Noddings asserts, ―competence for 
status‖ (p. 283). Worse, we have created an academic culture founded on the ―worship of 
expertise‖ (Noddings, 1992, p. 178) which, given the restrictions of both higher education 
and most social studies curricula, does little to help our teachers critically interpret and 
utilize educational resources. 
Knowledge of a single content will not suffice, it seems, to allow teachers to 
overcome either a crippling reliance on the textbook or the inability to move beyond it. 
Noddings calls for a ―breadth of knowledge that will enable [teachers] to connect the 
various subjects their students are required to study and also to connect that material to 
the issues of everyday life‖ (p. 284). This certainly would require the restructuring of a 
considerable amount of curricula, but it also requires us to divorce the concept of 
education as a profession from the disciplines we teach. A social studies teacher is not a 
historian, a specialist in a given (and often limited) range of topics. Instead, teacher 
education should focus on the connections between topics, to encourage the sort of broad, 
effective content knowledge that educators need to use textbooks effectively. A teacher 
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who is capable of connecting the ethical issues between seemingly disparate historical 
topics—the Alien and Sedition Acts, for example, with the embargo of Japan prior to 
World War II—is a teacher who can open students to the possibility of moral critique of 
U.S. wartime policy. In teacher preparation, we need to foster ―a superbly well-trained 
capacity for inquiry and a Socratic willingness to pursue wisdom‖ (Noddings, 1992, p. 
178). This is no easy task, and certainly not one as measurable as simple subject matter 
knowledge; but it seems the most promising route to giving teachers the ability to 
establish command over textbooks, and not the other way around.  
In 1895, Oliver Wendell Holmes gave a Memorial Day address in Boston, at the 
graduation ceremony of Harvard University. In it, Holmes—a veteran of the Civil War—
lauded what he referred to as ―the faith... which leads a soldier to throw away his life in 
obedience to a blindly accepted duty, in a cause which he little understands, in a plan of 
campaign of which he has little notion, under tactics of which he does not see the use‖ 
(Holmes & Posner, 1992, p. 89). This faith is admirable and necessary for soldiers to 
operate; but it demands, then, a concurrent degree of thoughtfulness from this nation‘s 
citizenry, a committed and engaged scrutiny of national policy which may risk the lives 
of American men and women without question. As of 2008, there were over 1.4 million 
active service personnel in the U.S. military worldwide, out of a total population of 
almost 309 million (―Military Personnel Strength Figures,‖ 2011). When such a small 
percentage of U.S. citizens bear the costs and risks of war, while the overwhelming 
majority only peripherally feels war‘s impact, it is especially incumbent on teachers to 
prepare students to thoughtfully engage in the agonizing debates that will eventually face 
our country.  
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Textbooks are meant to be resources which aid teachers in instruction; yet they 
have achieved a distinction as repositories of our moral selves and arbiters of our national 
story, the mechanism through which we present our conception of our nation. Herman 
Frye, in Anatomy of Criticism (1957), pointed to the reason for the textbook‘s status in 
social studies education: 
The culture of the past is not only the memory of mankind, but our own buried 
life…study of it leads to a recognition scene, a discovery in which we see, not our 
past lives, but the total cultural form of our present life. (p. 346) 
 When we use a textbook to question our nation‘s behavior in war—or point out a 
textbook‘s deficiency in the presentation of such questions—we challenge both our 
―buried life‖ and our ―present life.‖ And such challenges are vitally important; without 
them, we risk both mindless indoctrination and useless sacrifice. Drew Gilpin Faust, in 
This Republic of Suffering (2008), wrote that ―without agendas, without politics, the Dead 
became what their survivors chose to make them‖ (p. 269). We should write our 
textbooks in acknowledgement of the fact that they can never be neutral. Our goal, then, 
should be to encourage the regular engagement, by our students, in moral critique of our 
wars and our choices, to make the losses we bear as a nation worthwhile. 
 John Palmer was the father of James Palmer, the young soldier killed at the Battle 
of Second Bull Run. Like many family members of the era, he couldn‘t bear the thought 
of his child buried on some distant battlefield; and, having the means that so many others 
did not, John Palmer paid for his son‘s body to be exhumed and relocated to a military 
graveyard closer to their home. In the process of removing the body, the bullet that killed 
James was found in the coffin and given to his father. John Palmer carried the bullet with 
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him for the rest of his life (Faust, 2008, p. 245). As a nation, we carry the same memories 
of loss and grief as John Palmer. This grief is meaningful to our national story, and it has 
moral value—though it is often obscured by trivial approaches, shallowness, and 
hegemony. Teachers and textbooks are focal points through which we can reach clarity. 
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Appendix A 
Historical Narrative Analysis Template 
 
This template was used as an evaluative tool for measuring textbook depictions of the Civil War against relevant historiographical accounts of that 
conflict. This template is based on a method for clustered summary tables derived from Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1984). Qualitative data 
analysis: A sourcebook of new methods. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, p. 157. 
 
 
 
Jus Ad Bellum (“Justice Before War”) 
 
 
Historical Event/Topic Summary of Relevant Historiography 
 
Textbook Narrative Sample 
 
Secession and States‘-Rights 
 Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions 
 Nullification Crisis 
 Wilmot Proviso 
 Fugitive Slave Act 
 
  
 
Presidential Election of 1860 
 
 
  
 
Fort Sumter, April 1861 
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Jus In Bello (“Justice During War”) 
 
 
Historical Event/Topic Summary of Relevant Historiography 
 
Textbook Narrative Sample 
 
Soldiers in Combat/Battle 
 
  
 
Sherman‘s ―March to the Sea‖ 
 
 
  
 
 
Jus Post Bellum (“Justice After War”) 
 
 
Historical Event/Topic Summary of Relevant Historiography 
 
Textbook Narrative Sample 
 
Lee‘s Surrender at Appomattox 
 
  
 
Passage of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution 
 
 
  
 
Radical Reconstruction v. Andrew 
Johnson‘s plan 
 
  
 
Compromise of 1877 
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Appendix B 
“Just War” Categorical Analysis Template 
 
This template was used as an evaluative tool for measuring textbook depictions of the Civil War against relevant historiographical accounts of that 
conflict, as well as the three categories of the ―just war‖ doctrine: jus ad bellum (―justice before war‖), jus in bello (―justice in war‖), and jus post bellum 
(―justice after war‖). This template is based on a method for clustered summary tables derived from Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1984). 
Qualitative data analysis: A sourcebook of new methods. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, p. 157. 
 
Jus Ad Bellum (“Justice Before War”) 
 
 
―Just War‖ component Summary of Relevant Historiography 
 
Textbook Narrative Sample 
Just cause (self-defense from external attack; defense 
of others from external attack; protection of innocents 
from brutal, repressive regimes; punishment for a 
grievous wrongdoing with remains uncorrected) 
 
  
Right intention (a nation must intend to fight only in 
defense of its just cause, or in light of its justification. 
 
 
  
Proper authority/public declaration (generally 
addressed within a state‘s constitution or the 
legitimacy of its governmental system) 
 
  
Last resort (a state may resort to war only if it has 
exhausted all plausible, peaceful attempts at 
resolution, e.g., diplomacy, have been exhausted) 
 
  
Probability of success (states must measure the 
likelihood of victory prior to hostilities, in order to 
prevent unnecessary and futile bloodshed) 
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Proportionality (a state must weigh the universal 
goods expected to result from war, such as securing 
the just cause, against the universal evils to result, 
especially bloodshed) 
 
  
 
 Jus In Bello (“Justice During War”) 
 
 
―Just War‖ component Summary of Relevant Historiography 
 
Textbook Narrative Sample 
The observance of international laws on the 
prohibition of certain weapons ( e.g., chemical or 
biological weapons) 
 
  
Discrimination and non-combatant immunity 
[soldiers may only target those who are ―engaged in 
harm‖ (Walzer, 2004), which infers the 
―discrimination‖ between combatants and civilians, 
who are morally immune from attack]. 
 
  
Proportionality (only the force proportional to the 
desired outcome is appropriate) 
 
  
Benevolent quarantine for prisoners of war (it is 
morally wrong to threaten, harm, or use POWs 
inappropriately, a standard spelled out by various 
international laws) 
 
  
No Means Mala in Se (―evil in themselves,‖ the use 
of weapons, tactics, and methods that unequivocally 
immoral are prohibited)  
 
  
No reprisals (when a state fails to observe jus in bello, 
an attacked state may not retaliate with a similar 
violation)  
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 Jus Post Bellum (“Justice After War”)  
 
 
―Just War‖ component Summary of Relevant Historiography 
 
Textbook Narrative Sample 
Proportionality and publicity (a peace agreement 
should be reasonable and publicly proclaimed, usually 
without a provision for unconditional surrender on the 
part of the defeated state) 
 
  
Rights vindication (the violation of a state‘s rights, 
upon cessation of hostilities, should be restored as the 
basis for a lasting peace) 
 
  
Discrimination (peace treaties and settlements must 
differentiate reasonably between leaders, combatants, 
and non-combatants on the defeated side)  
 
  
Punishment #1 (―Proportionate punishment‖ must be 
assigned to a defeated state and its leaders, when clear 
violation of another state‘s rights have occurred) 
 
  
Punishment #2 (―Proportionate punishment‖ must be 
assigned to a state‘s combatants—both victorious and 
defeated—for the commission of war crimes)  
  
Compensation (A defeated state can be compelled to 
make proportionate financial restitution which 
discriminates between those who are liable and non-
liable (e.g., civilians) 
 
  
Rehabilitation (a victorious state may enact reforms 
within the institutions of a defeated country in order to 
facilitate the development of ―minimally just society,‖ 
which limits future violation of ―just war‖ principles) 
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